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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

EASTERN AFFAIRS

PART XVIII

CLOSED
UNTIL

1977

JANUARY TO JUNE 1926

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PART XVIII

JANUARY TO JUNE 1926

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| 162 Mr. Jordan No. 63. Tel. | June 8 | Wahabism. Reports dissatisfaction on part of many pilgrims with Wahabi practices ... | 154 |
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| 164 Mr. Jordan No. 64. Tel. | " 9 | Pan-Islamic Conference at Mecca. Conference opened. Wahabi fanaticism causing Indian criticism ... | 155 |
| 165 Mr. Jordan No. 72 | May 28 | Capitulations in the Hejaz. Gives case where question of capitulations arose, Ibn Saud's attitude and requests instructions ... | 155 |
| 166 Colonial Office | June 14 | Implementing of Hadda Agreement. Transmits despatch from Lord Plumer suggesting nomination of British officer as president of tribunal mentioned in agreement ... | 156 |
| 167 Mr. Phipps No. 218. Tel. | " 16 | International Sanitary Conference. Gives details of certain difficulties which have arisen with Persia concerning the sanitary administration in the Persian Gulf ... | 157 |

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| 168 Mr. Jordan No. 68. Tel. | 1926 June 19 | Pan-Islamic Conference at Mecca. Refers to Nos. 162 and 164. Gives main objectives of conference which have been attained and describes situation at Mecca ... | 158 |
| 169 Mr. Jordan No. 73. Secret | " 1 | Jeddah report. Transmits copy of report for period 1st-31st May ... | 158 |
| 170 British Delegation. Sanitary Conference No. 11 | " 21 | Karawan Quarantine Station. Transmits signed and sealed copy of Anglo-Dutch Agreement regarding Karawan ... | 164 |
| 171 To Mr. Phipps No. 1852 | " 23 | Instructs him to inform French Government of raising of embargo on arms traffic to Arabia ... | 173 |
| 172 Mr. Jordan No. 73. Tel. | " 24 | Egyptian Mahmal. Reports clash between escort of Mahmal and Akhwan. Several losses ... | 173 |
| 173 The Marquess of Crewe No. 1201 | " 29 | Arms traffic to Arabia. Refers to No. 171. Transmits copy of note sent to M. Briand as instructed ... | 174 |

Chapter III.—SYRIA.

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| 174 Mr. Smart No. 1. Tel. | 1926 Jan. 4 | Abdul Majid. Refers to Part XVI. No. 52. Has arrived at Damascus and is thought to be French candidate for throne of Syria ... | 175 |
| 175 Mr. Smart No. 284 | 1925 Dec. 27 | President of the Syrian State. Reports resignation of Saubhi Bey, long overdue ... | 175 |
| 176 Mr. Smart No. 285 | " 28 | Damascene deputation to M. de Jovernel. Refers to Part XVII. No. 358. Reports on proceedings of deputation, which has returned, leaving three members to continue discussions ... | 176 |
| 177 Mr. Mayors No. 177 | " 30 | Damascene deputation to M. de Jovernel. Deputation has not had much success. Overtures to Druses a failure. Constitution hung up ... | 178 |
| 178 Mr. Smart No. 288 | " 30 | Fighting near Damascus. Refers to Part XVII. No. 358. Reports results of military operations during last few days ... | 179 |
| 179 Mr. Smart No. 290. Conf | " 30 | Syrian hostility to Armenians. Refers to Part XVII. No. 359. Reports on growing Moslem feeling against Christians generally, but especially Armenians ... | 180 |
| 180 Mr. Hough No. 1. Tel. | 1926 Jan. 11 | Riot in Aleppo. Reports riot caused by arrest of six Nationalists and quelled by machine-guns ... | 181 |
| 181 Mr. Mayors No. 2 | " 3 | Peace proposals to Druses. Transmits copy of manifesto to Druses and gives gist of official communiqué on the subject ... | 181 |
| 182 Mr. Smart No. 2 | " 4 | Peace proposals to Druses. Refers to No. 179. Discusses manifesto (which forms enclosure to No. 181) ... | 182 |
| 183 Mr. Mayors No. 7 | " 9 | Damascene deputation to M. de Jovernel. Refers to No. 182. Gives impression of the demands made by the deputation ... | 183 |
| 184 Mr. Smart No. 18 | " 11 | Damascene deputation to M. de Jovernel. Refers to No. 183. Gives an appreciation of the demands made by the deputation from a Syrian angle and a review of the situation ... | 185 |

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| 185 Mr. Hough No. 4 | 1926 Jan. 11 | Riot in Aleppo. Refers to No. 180. The arrested Nationalists were imprisoned because of a pamphlet which they issued. Gives fuller account of riot | 187 |
| 186 Mr. Mayers No. 5. Conf | " 7 | Peace proposals to Druses. Gives the Emir Amin Arslan's own account of his mission to the Druses to propose negotiations | 188 |
| 187 Mr. Mayers No. 12 | " 13 | French decrees in Syria. Transmits a copy of a French decree calculated to cause dissension among the rebels | 189 |
| 188 Mr. Hough No. 5 | " 13 | Riot in Aleppo. Refers to No. 183. Transmits further details concerning | 190 |
| 189 Mr. Mayers No. 19 | " 17 | Situation in Syria. Refers to Nos. 183 and 184. Gives impression of situation in Syria and of French difficulties | 191 |
| 190 Mr. Hough No. 8 | " 15 | Elections in Aleppo. Reports on progress of elections | 193 |
| 191 Mr. Smart No. 28 | " 19 | Cutting of railway near Damascus. Reports cutting of railway by rebels and French measures to remedy it | 194 |
| 192 Mr. Mayers No. 20 | " 25 | Situation in Syria. Sees no improvement in situation | 195 |
| 193 Mr. Smart No. 44 | " 28 | French decrees in Syria. Refers to No. 187. Discusses terms of decree in light of own observations | 196 |
| 194 Mr. Smart No. 52 | " 31 | Fighting in Damascus. Reports on recent military activity and the position of the French | 197 |
| 195 Mr. Smart No. 56. Conf | Feb. 5 | Prospects of submission of Syrian rebels. Rebels are exhausted. If French officials inspired confidence rebellion would end | 199 |
| 196 Mr. Smart No. 4. Tel. | " 16 | Proposed visit to Palestine by Mr. Smart. Suggests leaving at once in view of temporary lull in fighting | 199 |
| 197 Mr. Mayers No. 30 | " 7 | Constitution of the Greater Lebanon. Gives impression of various currents of thought in discussions on proposed new Constitution | 200 |
| 198 Sir R. Lindsay No. 72 | " 17 | Visit of M. de Jouvenel to Angora. Discusses possible scope and provisions of Turco-Syrian Agreement under negotiation | 201 |
| 199 Mr. Smart No. 6. Tel. | " 18 | Syrian hostility to Armenians. Refers to No. 196. Situation becoming more serious owing to employment of Armenians and Chirassins by French | 202 |
| 200 Mr. Smart No. 59 | " 10 | Visit of M. de Jouvenel to Damascus. Describes visit of M. de Jouvenel to Damascus | 202 |
| 201 Mr. Smart No. 60 | " 10 | Situation in Damascus. Refers to No. 194. Describes rebel activity, apparently unhampered by 10,000 French troops. Rebels do not molest non-French Europeans | 203 |
| 202 Mr. Smart No. 8. Tel. | " 20 | Syrian hostility to Armenians. Refers to No. 199. Excesses of irregulars have caused indignation. French are returning some of the loot taken by them | 205 |
| 203 Mr. Smart No. 63 | " 12 | French decree in Syria. Refers to No. 200. Reports issue of new decree vesting government in French hands owing to non-co-operation of natives | 205 |
| 204 Mr. Smart No. 66 | " 15 | Situation in Damascus. Refers to No. 203. Situation continues to be bad. Describes conditions | 206 |

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| 205 Mr. Smart No. 69 | 1926 Feb. 16 | Situation in Damascus. Refers to Nos. 196 and 204. Endeavoured to impress upon the French the seriousness of the situation, but they were incorrigibly optimistic | 208 |
| 206 Mr. Mayers No. 10. Tel. | " 24 | Visit of M. de Jouvenel to Jerusalem. High Commissioner has returned from Angora and proposes to go to Jerusalem | 209 |
| 207 The Marquess of Crewe No. 399 | " 24 | Turco-Syrian frontier. Gives information gleaned from M. Berthelot about agreement made by M. de Jouvenel at Angora | 209 |
| 208 To the Marquess of Crewe No. 619 | " 25 | Turco-Syrian frontier. Gives substance of interview with M. de Fleurbaey in which he stated that the Angora Agreement had only been initiated as <i>referendum</i> | 210 |
| 209 The Marquess of Crewe No. 370 | " 24 | Turco-Syrian frontier. Gives text of <i>aide-memoire</i> addressed to the French Government concerning | 211 |
| 210 The Marquess of Crewe No. 385 | " 26 | Turco-Syrian frontier. Transmits text of <i>aide-memoire</i> received from French in answer to that in No. 209 | 211 |
| 211 Sir R. Graham No. 179 | " 26 | Permanent Mandates Commission of League of Nations. Commission met and considered French report on Syria for 1925 and cognate questions | 212 |
| 212 Mr. Smart No. 72 | " 18 | Situation in Damascus. Refers to No. 199. Transmits copy of note sent to representative of the French High Commissioner regarding behaviour of Armenians in Damascus | 213 |
| 213 Mr. Mayers No. 40 | " 21 | United States of Syria and the Lebanon. Refers to No. 200. Proposal to unite Syria and the Lebanon has caused dismay in Beirut | 213 |
| 214 Mr. Mayers No. 82 | " 23 | Visit of M. de Jouvenel to Angora. Gives M. de Jouvenel's report on his mission to Angora | 214 |
| 215 Mr. Smart No. 74 | " 22 | Situation in Damascus. Refers to No. 201. Transmits copy of French reply to consular note of 9th February | 215 |
| 216 Mr. Smart No. 77 | " 23 | French employment of irregulars in Syria. Reports recruitment of 200 Levantines. So long as French remain all will be well, but after they leave Arabs will take vengeance | 216 |
| 217 Mr. Smart No. 81 | " 24 | French offensive against Jebel Druse. Reports bombing operations in Jebel Druse. French expect submission soon | 217 |
| 218 Mr. Smart No. 84 | " 25 | Fighting in Damascus. Refers to Nos. 199 and 202. Reports French attack on the Meidan quarter. Not much loss of life, but much pillaging by irregulars | 217 |
| 219 Mr. Smart No. 89 | Mar. 1 | Peace proposals to Druses. Reports visit of deputation to M. Atype with object of arranging a truce | 221 |
| 220 Mr. Mayers No. 51 | " 4 | United States of Syria and the Lebanon. Refers to No. 213. Reports M. de Jouvenel's explanation of phrase and public opinion on the subject | 221 |
| 221 Mr. Vaughan-Russell No. 98 | " 4 | Situation in Damascus. Refers to No. 212. Transmits note from M. Atype in answer to Mr. Smart's note in No. 212 | 222 |
| 222 Mr. Vaughan-Russell No. 96 | " 6 | Peace proposals to Druses. Refers to No. 219. Project of sending deputation to Jebel Druse has so far not materialised | 223 |

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| 223 Mr. Jordan No. 30 | 1926 Feb. 27 | Proposed Nejd-Syrian Commercial Agreement. M. Duput, representing M. de Jouvenel, found Ibn Saud unwilling to make agreement. He wished to make agreement with Syrian Government ... | 224 |
| 224 Mr. Mayers No. 52 | Mar. 8 | Peace proposals to Druses. Refers to No. 219. Communiqué published by Druses in press has put an end—temporarily, at least—to hopes of mediation ... | 225 |
| 225 Mr. Smart No. 99 | " 11 | Peace proposals to Druses. Refers to No. 224. Corrects error in No. 224 ... | 226 |
| 226 Mr. Mayers No. 57 | " 18 | Anglo-French co-operation. Transmits correspondence with Bagdad regarding a proposed Iraqi-Syrian Convention ... | 226 |
| 227 Mr. Mayers No. 59. Conf. | " 21 | Situation in Syria. Gives impression of course of events as viewed from Beirut ... | 229 |
| 228 Mr. Smart No. 108 | " 24 | Situation in Syria. Reports conversation with M. Alys in which they discussed the situation and mentioned Sir G. Clayton's mission to the Imam ... | 231 |
| 229 The Marquess of Crewe No. 607 | Apr. 1 | French opinion on Syrian question. Reports debate on Syrian question in Chamber of Deputies ... | 232 |
| 230 Mr. Vaughan-Russell No. 119 | " 1 | Fighting near Damascus. Reports result of operations under General Marty ... | 233 |
| 231 Mr. Vaughan-Russell No. 23. Tel. | " 26 | French offensive against Jebel Druse. Reports recapture of Suweida by French ... | 234 |
| 232 The Marquess of Crewe No. 792 | " 29 | Proposed parliamentary commission for Syria. Commission proposed in Senate but postponed until military operations should be finished ... | 234 |
| 233 Mr. Vaughan-Russell No. 148 | " 27 | President of the Syrian State. Refers to No. 203. Damiel Ahmed Nami Bey has been appointed President. So far, only provisional ... | 235 |
| 234 Mr. Vaughan-Russell No. 149 | " 27 | French offensive against Jebel Druse. Refers to No. 231. Gives observations on French strategy and on capture of Suweida ... | 236 |
| 235 Mr. Satow No. 87 | " 28 | President of the Syrian State. Gives information about Ahmed Nami Bey ... | 237 |
| 236 Mr. Vaughan-Russell No. 181 | " 29 | Fighting near Damascus. Transmits French communiqué warning inhabitants of Ghouta of bombardment and discusses reason for its issue ... | 238 |
| 237 Mr. Vaughan-Russell No. 181 | May 6 | President of Syrian State. Refers to No. 236. Gives names of newly-formed Cabinet and short histories of their activities ... | 240 |
| 238 Mr. Vaughan-Russell No. 185 | " 13 | Bombardment of Damascus. Refers to No. 236. Reports new bombardment of Meidan quarter of Damascus. Considers measures unnecessarily severe and that they will have a bad effect ... | 241 |
| 239 Mr. Satow No. 106 | " 18 | Programme of new Syrian Ministry. Gives programme of new Ministry as put forward to two newspapers ... | 244 |
| 240 Mr. Vaughan-Russell No. 188 | " 18 | Foreign communities in Damascus. Refers to Nos. 239 and 238. Transmits French reply to Mr. Keeley's note in No. 239 ... | 244 |
| 241 Mr. Vaughan-Russell No. 189 | " 19 | Programme of new Syrian Ministry. Refers to No. 237. Transmits copy of official programme put forward by Nami Bey and comments on impossibility of its execution in present conditions ... | 245 |

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| 242 Mr. Vaughan-Russell No. 152. Conf. | 1926 Apr. 30 | Muslim feeling against Christians. Transmits copy of a letter from Minister of the Irish Presbyterian Mission showing how Muslim feeling against Christians is inflamed by French policy ... | 248 |
| 243 Mr. Vaughan-Russell No. 179 | May 28 | Conciliatory speech by M. de Jouvenel. M. de Jouvenel made conciliatory speech, but it did not have much effect. Discusses difficulties of new Government ... | 249 |
| 244 Mr. Satow No. 24. Tel. | June 8 | Turco-Syrian frontier. French intend to occupy post near Suweida ... | 251 |
| 245 Mr. Vaughan-Russell No. 29. Tel. | " 11 | Ghouts. French action in. French have proclaimed Ghouts a dangerous zone. Propose to evacuate British Indians ... | 251 |
| 246 The Marquess of Crewe No. 1096 | " 11 | Report by M. de Jouvenel. He reported on what he had done in Syria to Foreign Affairs Commission ... | 251 |
| 247 Mr. Vaughan-Russell No. 185 | " 3 | French offensive against Jebel Druse. Refers to No. 234. Reports on French consolidation and plight of Druses ... | 252 |
| 248 Mr. Satow No. 122 | " 4 | Arrest of M. Hadad. Reports arrest of honorary Roumanian consul on suspicion of murder. Protect of consular body and French ineffectiveness ... | 253 |
| 249 To Mr. Vaughan-Russell No. 90. Tel. | " 14 | Ghouts. French action in. Refers to No. 245. Gives permission to expend £50 each on destitute Indians who evacuate ... | 254 |
| 250 Mr. Vaughan-Russell No. 189 | " 5 | Peace proposals to Druses. Refers to No. 222. Unofficial delegates have been making proposals to the Druses to find a basis for peace ... | 254 |
| 251 Mr. Vaughan-Russell No. 190 | " 7 | Bombardment of Damascus. Refers to No. 238. Has examined the Meidan quarter and formed an estimate of the damage done ... | 255 |
| 252 Mr. Vaughan-Russell No. 193 | " 11 | Bombardment of Jobar. Refers to No. 240. Saw in Arabic press that village would be bombarded, confirmed it and warned British subjects. Transmits notice ... | 256 |
| 253 Mr. Vaughan-Russell No. 193 | " 12 | French action in the Ghouts. Refers to No. 232. French have refused to give warning of attacks on villages and so situation of British subjects is precarious ... | 258 |
| 254 Mr. Vaughan-Russell No. 195 | " 14 | Situation in Syria. Reports arrest of three Nationalist Ministers and continued French bombardments of towns ... | 260 |
| 255 Mr. Vaughan-Russell No. 200 | " 16 | French action in the Ghouts. Refers to No. 253. Reports action taken to safeguard British Indian subjects in Beit Sana ... | 262 |

Chapter IV.—GENERAL.

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| 257 Marquis della Torretta | " 3 | Ottoman Public Debt (detached territories). Enquires what action His Majesty's Government propose to take on No. 256 ... | 264 |

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| 258 Marquis della Torretta | Feb. 8 | Ottoman Public Debt (detached territories). Enquires what action His Majesty's Government propose to take with reference to Yugoslavia's refusal to accept liability | 205 |
| 259 M. de Flouriau | " 15 | Ottoman Public Debt (detached territories). Enquires point of view of His Majesty's Government on refusal of Yugoslavia to accept liability | 205 |
| 260 Mr Mayers No. 11. Tel. | " 25 | Movement of Turkish war material. War material reported as being moved east | 206 |
| 261 Mr Satow No. 12. Tel. | " 27 | Movement of Turkish war material. Reports more war material going east | 206 |
| 262 The Marquis of Mar. | 1 | Three-Syrian Agreement. Refers to N. 257. M. Berthoulet gave assurances with regard to agreement at Angora | 206 |
| 263 Sir R. Landsay No. 63. Tel. | Apr. 9 | Iraq representative in Mosul frontier negotiations. Turkey will not agree to Iraq representative unless questions other than frontier should arise | 206 |
| 264 Sir R. Landsay No. 64. Tel. | " | Iraq representative in Mosul frontier negotiations. Refers to No. 263. Thinks Turks will reject proposed | 207 |
| 265 Sir R. Landsay No. 65. Tel. | " | Iraq representative in Mosul frontier negotiations. Makes enquiries of Bagdad. Approaches sending it full powers by King Faisal | 207 |
| 266 Sir R. Landsay No. 61. Tel. Conf. | " 13 | Iraq representative in Mosul frontier negotiations. Would prefer not to have Iraq representative until discussions about frontier finished | 207 |
| 267 Sir R. Landsay No. 1A. Tel. | " 18 | Iraq frontier negotiations. Gives report of interview with Prime Minister which was non-committal | 208 |
| 268 Sir R. Landsay No. 2A. Tel. | " 21 | Iraq frontier negotiations. Reports interview with Tewfik Rushdi who declined cession of territory and made three new suggestions | 208 |
| 269 Sir R. Landsay No. 3A. Tel. | " 21 | Iraq frontier negotiations. Refers to No. 268. Comments on Tewfik Rushdi's suggestions | 209 |
| 270 Sir R. Landsay No. 4A. Tel. | " 22 | Iraq frontier negotiations. Refers to No. 268. Promises for agreement on lines suggested by Turks | 209 |
| 271 To Sir R. Landsay No. 5A. Tel. | " 24 | Iraq frontier negotiations. Refers to Nos. 268, 269 and 270. Assures him that agreement is being drafted with all convenient speed on lines of Turkish proposals and mentions Turkish fears of Greece and Italy | 211 |
| 272 Sir R. Landsay No. 6A. Tel. | " 27 | Iraq frontier negotiations. Reports interview with Tewfik Rushdi. He was very cooperative | 211 |
| 273 To Sir R. Landsay No. 8A | " 28 | Iraq representative in Mosul frontier negotiations. Thinks immediate presence of Iraq plenipotentiary is | 212 |
| 274 Sir R. Landsay No. 9A | " 29 | Iraq representative in Mosul frontier negotiations. Does not favour presence of Iraq representative yet | 212 |
| 275 To M. de Flouriau | " 29 | Ottoman Public Debt (detached territories). Refers to Nos. 259 and 277. Gives views requested in No. 259 | 213 |
| 276 To Marquis della Torretta | " 29 | Assurances to Italy relative to Palestine. Sends memorandum giving explanations and assurances asked for | 213 |
| 277 To M. de Flouriau | " 29 | Ottoman Public Debt. Refers to No. 258. Furnishes views of His Majesty's Government as requested | 214 |

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| Sir R. Landsay No. 10A. Tel. | Apr. 29 | Iraq frontier negotiations. Refers to No. 272. Gives reasons for preferring that Iraq representative should | 215 |
| To Sir R. Landsay No. 13A. Tel. | May 1 | Iraq frontier negotiations. Refers to No. 273. Tent to be guided by his advice | 215 |
| Sir R. Landsay No. 14. Tel. | " 4 | Iraq frontier negotiations. Refers to No. 271. Gives details of proposals to be made to Turks with regard to oil | 216 |
| Sir R. Landsay No. 17A. Tel. | " 7 | Movements of Sir R. Landsay. Reports proposed journey to Constantinople | 216 |
| Sir R. Landsay No. 18A | " 8 | Iraq frontier negotiations. Refers to No. 274. Gives gist of new Turkish proposals to Iraq authorities for | 217 |
| Sir R. Landsay No. 19A | " | Iraq frontier negotiations. Refers to No. 275. Gives details on Turkish proposals and gives | 217 |
| Sir R. Landsay No. 21A | " 8 | Bagdad Railway. Reports proposal to Tewfik Rushdi link up Turkish and Mosul sections of railway was non-committal | 218 |
| To Sir R. Landsay No. 26. Tel. | " 10 | Iraq frontier negotiations. Refers to No. 282 and 1. Asks on what basis he forms his estimate of figure | 218 |
| Sir R. Landsay No. 27. Tel. | " 11 | Iraq frontier negotiations. Refers to No. 283. Gives reasons for figure suggested | 218 |
| To Sir R. Landsay No. 28. Tel. | " 17 | Iraq frontier negotiations. Refers to No. 280. Gives figure up to which His Majesty's Government will go and suggestions for drafting | 219 |
| Sir R. Landsay No. 22A. Tel. | " 18 | Iraq frontier negotiations. Turkish Assembly of adjourning and treaty will not be ratified | 220 |
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| Sir R. Landsay No. 26A. Tel. | " 20 | Iraq frontier negotiations. Refers to No. 288. Rushdi has referred offer of capital | 220 |
| Sir R. Landsay No. 27A. Tel. | " 21 | Iraq frontier negotiations. Tewfik Rushdi promised to keep Assembly sitting to ratify treaty if he could | 221 |
| Sir R. Landsay No. 28A. Tel. | " 21 | Iraq frontier negotiations. Refers to No. 287. Tewfik Rushdi has no objection to having sum of mentioned in treaty. Asks for draft | 221 |
| Sir R. Landsay No. 21A. Tel. | " 21 | Iraq frontier negotiations. Reports conversation with Tewfik Rushdi during which he tried to raise amount of lump sum offered by His Majesty's Government | 221 |
| Sir R. Landsay No. 22A. Tel. | " 23 | Iraq frontier negotiations. Asks for full reply to our promise at £755,000 | 222 |
| Sir P. Lumsden No. 126. Tel. | " 23 | Reported Turco-Iraq Anglo Pact. Report of impending Turco-Iraq Anglo Non-Aggression Pact and possible accession of Persia. Reports a lot on taken | 222 |
| Lord Lloyd No. 314 | " 15 | Caliphate question. Discusses Egyptian attitude towards and possible developments also reports on attitude of Al Ashraf Caliphate Committee | 222 |
| Lord Lloyd No. 315 | " 15 | Caliphate question. Transmits report on attitude of a rival Caliphate Committee | 223 |

CONFIDENTIAL

Further Correspondence respecting Eastern Affairs.

PART XVIII.

CHAPTER I.—MOBUL.

[E 62/62/65]

No. 1

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 4, 1926.)

(No. 940.)

Sir,

Constantinople, December 26, 1925.

I HAVE read with great interest Sir H. Dobbs's memorandum of the 6th December on a suggestion I had made for a transfer of Kurdish areas of Irak to Persia and I must confess to be surprised that a proposal put forward with considerable diffidence should meet with so numerous and so cogent objections. I can quite see that it may be distasteful, prejudicial, even disastrous, to Irak, Persia, Turkey and the Kurds, alike, unfortunately, I cannot see how the present apportionment of territory is destined to produce any better results, for it must induce an unrest in Kurdistan which, sooner or later, may involve all four races alike in common disaster, and profit only Russia.

2. Though the Kurdish question is never mentioned in the press in connection with Mosul, and seldom officially in conversation by Turks (the only two cases I know of are the words of Ismet Pasha to me on the 9th November and those of Zeynel Bey to myself on the 21st December), it causes a feeling of deep-seated danger to the Turkish Government. Angora may, indeed, have aggressive ideas towards Persian Azerbaidjan—even a wish to establish closer relations across it with the Turcophone inhabitants of Russian Central Asia, but there are also factors more vital and nearer home impelling the Turkish Government to stamp out Kurdish nationalism (see my despatch No. 786 of the 16th October), and it feels that its existence will be menaced by the allotment of any considerable body of Kurds to the care of a third Power who will treat their national susceptibilities with kindness. Just as before the war the existence of a well-administered Egypt (the most insular country in the world) predisposed the Arabs in general to disaffection towards the Ottoman Empire, so the existence of a more or less autonomous Kurdistan exercising a perpetual drag on the Kurds of Eastern Turkey. It is, I fear, quite impossible to hope that explanations to the Turkish Government, however careful and patient, of Irak policy towards its Kurds, will afford the smallest satisfaction. A cession of territory, say, the mountainous country down to Rowanduz, as suggested in my telegram No. 133 of the 29th November might possibly now appear Turkish in name, but it would afford no immediate satisfaction, but I could not feel sure that it would be a real solution of the difficulty. I cannot help wondering whether Persia may not, too, in the course of time find herself affected in the same way as Turkey.

3. At the present juncture, then, the future of Turks, Kurds, Arabs, and possibly Persians, is at stake, and we may have arrived at a sort of parting of the ways, where much will depend on the course which His Majesty's Government will

choose to follow. In considering the problem it is not enough to think of British interests alone, or of the interests of any one of the States concerned, but it becomes necessary to think of the group of States as a whole. Taking into consideration the probable tendencies of Russian policy for the next two generations, the interests of peace and of His Majesty's Government alike will best be served by the development of friendly relations between Great Britain and Turkey, and to achieve this result it may be necessary to pay a price, but it is no good thinking that Turkey can be made to pay the whole price, especially where the benefits are to accrue equally to all. Each party concerned will have to put up with something distasteful for the common advantage.

I had a long conversation with Tewfik Rushdi Bey, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, returned here yesterday morning from Geneva and Paris, having stopped forty-eight hours en route at Belgrade, and I had a conversation with him of over an hour's duration in the afternoon. His Excellency's mind works on very subjective lines, and he was, therefore, full of his recent experiences at Geneva, and whatever efforts I might make to turn the conversation into other channels, he always brought it back to the past. He spoke bitterly of the proceedings before the League and characterised the decision as an injustice. He maintained, as Turkish newspapers always do, that the report of the League's Sub-Commission of Enquiry was in favour of the inclusion of Mosul in Turkey, and yet its conclusion was set aside by the Council. He said that Turkey had never agreed to arbitration or to anything more than mediation by the League. If she had wanted arbitration, she would not have accepted as arbitrator any body of men who merely voted as their Governments instructed them to vote, but would have asked for some individual who would act independently. Nor would she have accepted any body of men among whom not a single one could be counted as a friend, for if Turkey had had a single friend on the Council, unanimity would not have been attained and the present finding could not have been rendered. He himself had gone to the utmost limits of conciliation, he had been ready to accept partition at the line of the Lesser Zab, with demilitarisation of the contested area, a security treaty, an economic agreement to preserve the economic unity of the vilayet, and he thought an exchange of population, too, might be desirable. The exchange should be a voluntary exchange only, on the lines of the Greco-Bulgarian Convention, and he was sure there were just as many Turks and Turcomans in Iraq anxious to emigrate northwards as there were native Christians in Turkey who would wish to move to the south. Beyond this point of concession Turkey could not possibly go, nor could she possibly accept and recognise a decision which gave every single point against her and afforded her no satisfaction whatever.

2. To these observations I rejoined that Turkey had only herself to blame for her present position. I had said that a decision would be given by the League, which would certainly be distasteful to Turkey, and if national feeling were aroused a difficult situation would ensue for the Turkish Government. This is precisely what has happened. I have said that the Turkish Government have been over-excited about Mosul. I had said that a decision would be given by the League, which would certainly be distasteful to Turkey, and if national feeling were aroused a difficult situation would ensue for the Turkish Government. This is precisely what has happened. I have said that the Turkish Government have been over-excited about Mosul.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY

E 63 62 65

No. 2

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 4, 1926.)

(No. 941.)

Sir,

Constantinople, December 29, 1925

I HAVE the honour to report that Tewfik Rushdi Bey, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, returned here yesterday morning from Geneva and Paris, having stopped forty-eight hours en route at Belgrade, and I had a conversation with him of over an hour's duration in the afternoon. His Excellency's mind works on very subjective lines, and he was, therefore, full of his recent experiences at Geneva, and whatever efforts I might make to turn the conversation into other channels, he always brought it back to the past. He spoke bitterly of the proceedings before the League and characterised the decision as an injustice. He maintained, as Turkish newspapers always do, that the report of the League's Sub-Commission of Enquiry was in favour of the inclusion of Mosul in Turkey, and yet its conclusion was set aside by the Council. He said that Turkey had never agreed to arbitration or to anything more than mediation by the League. If she had wanted arbitration, she would not have accepted as arbitrator any body of men who merely voted as their Governments instructed them to vote, but would have asked for some individual who would act independently. Nor would she have accepted any body of men among whom not a single one could be counted as a friend, for if Turkey had had a single friend on the Council, unanimity would not have been attained and the present finding could not have been rendered. He himself had gone to the utmost limits of conciliation, he had been ready to accept partition at the line of the Lesser Zab, with demilitarisation of the contested area, a security treaty, an economic agreement to preserve the economic unity of the vilayet, and he thought an exchange of population, too, might be desirable. The exchange should be a voluntary exchange only, on the lines of the Greco-Bulgarian Convention, and he was sure there were just as many Turks and Turcomans in Iraq anxious to emigrate northwards as there were native Christians in Turkey who would wish to move to the south. Beyond this point of concession Turkey could not possibly go, nor could she possibly accept and recognise a decision which gave every single point against her and afforded her no satisfaction whatever.

2. To these observations I rejoined that Turkey had only herself to blame for her present position. I had said that a decision would be given by the League, which would certainly be distasteful to Turkey, and if national feeling were aroused a difficult situation would ensue for the Turkish Government. This is precisely what has happened. I have said that the Turkish Government have been over-excited about Mosul. I had said that a decision would be given by the League, which would certainly be distasteful to Turkey, and if national feeling were aroused a difficult situation would ensue for the Turkish Government. This is precisely what has happened. I have said that the Turkish Government have been over-excited about Mosul.

appearance had to be made! If, as he said, Turkey was friendless, whose fault was it? What friendship could survive the spectacle of a deportation of Christians at the very moment when the League was in session? As to the question of arbitration or mediation, it was submitted to The Hague Court, and why should his Excellency now state the opinion of Mr. Baldwin against the Court's decision? These arguments should have been stated to the court itself, as the Turkish Government was invited to do, and if they chose not to plead they also forfeited their right to complain. To this Tewfik Rushdi Bey's answer was that he could not appear before The Hague Court because by doing so he would be casting doubt on the correctness of his Government's view.

3. There was thus a good deal of recrimination in our conversation, but it was, nevertheless, conducted in a tone of friendliness, and we did succeed in exchanging some views as to the future. His Excellency told me that he had not yet seen Ferid Bey's report of what Mr. Baldwin had said in London, and I repeated to him briefly the substance of what had passed, asking him what the Turkish Government would do about it. Tewfik Rushdi Bey expressed natural reluctance to pronounce himself till he had seen his Ambassador's report and consulted with his Government, but he did say that no negotiations would be possible "on the basis of the League's verdict" and that no solution would be possible that did not provide for the cession to Turkey of a large area of the Vilayet of Mosul.

4. One other point I made to the Minister. If, I said, things so turned out that I should be negotiating with the Turkish Government, and if the League's decision was to be set aside, I should be glad to see the Turkish Government's proposal. Tewfik Rushdi Bey said he shared my view on this point and would support it. I should inform you that in making this proposal I was bearing in mind the experience of the French in their efforts to settle the Syrian frontier question. Here M. Surraut has been confronted by a commission on which local deputies sit. These men put up a first-class fight over every market-garden and there is no possibility of any progress.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch direct to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Iraq and to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY

(E 107/107,44)

No. 3.

Mr. Kennard to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 5, 1926.)

(No. 465.)

Sir,

Belgrade, December 30, 1925

WITH reference to my telegram No. 171, I have the honour to report that the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs arrived here on the 24th instant and left for Constantinople on the 27th instant. His arrival was heralded in the local press with a great flourish of trumpets and he was much feted during his stay here. He was received by the King, the President of the Council and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, with whom he had long conversations. I have the honour to transmit herewith a summary of Tewfik Rushdi Bey's statements to the press and also a translation of the official communiqué, which was issued on the conclusion of his visit. He made the most of the fact that he was made a prisoner by the Serbs during the Balkan wars, while a doctor in a Turkish military hospital in Macedonia, and that during his internment at Kumanovo he was in excellent relations with the local Serbian authorities.

2. The Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed me that Rushdi Bey spoke to him in a reassuring manner about the Mosul question, in regard to which he hopes to reach an amicable settlement with His Majesty's Government. M. Ninic has further assured me that there has been no question of concluding any far-reaching agreement with the Turkish Government, though it was agreed that the Treaty of Peace which was recently signed should be ratified forthwith, and that a Commercial and Consular Convention should be negotiated. It was further probable that some arrangement will be come to as regards the emigration of Moslems from Jugoslavia to Turkish territory. It will be remembered that the S.C.S. Government have been encouraging Moslems, more especially in Southern Serbia, to emigrate to Anatolia, but that the Turkish authorities have of late refused to

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B 2

3 While in official circles it has been denied that any closer relations with Turkey are imminent, there have been rumours that Ruzhdi Bey had come here with the intention of concluding a similar treaty to that recently signed with the Soviet and also of approaching the S.C.S. Government, with a view to their resumption of relations with Moscow. It has been further suggested that, while the Government have come to no immediate decision in this sense, they have not definitely declined to entertain these proposals, and that their attitude may indicate an orientation of foreign policy towards Moscow and Angora. While one can never place implicit confidence in official assurances here, I can hardly believe that this country would at the present moment enter upon so drastic a reversal of policy. M. Pasic generally lives in an atmosphere twenty years behind the times, but while he still cherishes friendly recollections of the Russia of the Tsarist régime, he is believed to be opposed to intimate relations with the Soviet Government. It is true that fear of Italy and desire for Salonica are perhaps the main factors in Jugoslav foreign relations at the present time, and that there are signs of some instability in M. Nincic's attitude regarding the future orientation of this Government. As reported in my despatch No. 467 he seems to have a few days ago seriously contemplated a rapprochement with Turkey as a counterbalance against any action of Italy, Greece or France against Yugoslavia, and as he seemed to be in an uncertain frame of mind on the subject, I ventured to go perhaps further than might have appeared advisable in insisting on the desirability of genuinely considering a Balkan pact (see my despatch No. 474). It is possible that our conversations have brought M. Nincic to a saner realisation of the best interests of his country, as I have reason to believe that he has been carefully studying the possibility of a pact within the last few days. I fear, however, that we shall have to wait a long time before the true Locarno spirit spreads throughout the Balkans.

6. I certainly see no likelihood of the S.C.S. and Greek Governments finding any satisfactory compromise which would save the faces of both parties, unless it be suggested to them from some disinterested quarter. In the meantime they are drifting further apart. A large meeting has just taken place at Monastir to protest against the ill treatment of Yugoslav subjects in Greek Macedonia. One must suspect that this demonstration was perhaps engineered by the local authorities. I see no signs of modification in the anti Greek atmosphere at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, although one is always assured that this country has no territorial designs on Salonica, and the Greek Government have only to agree to a minimum percentage of Yugoslav representation on the administration of the railway. M. Radic has not improved matters by contributing one of his usual indiscretions in a recent speech and urging the necessity of a Yugoslav outlet on the Aegean.

the Government will pay no heed to Russian overtures. It is possible that Russhd may have endeavoured to ascertain what attitude this Government would assume in the event of her being called upon under article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations to contribute forces to enforce the authority of the League against Turkey, but I have no authoritative information to confirm this suggestion. The press have, of course, exploited the visit to the full, and no doubt the vanity of certain elements here has been flattered by the idea that Belgrade has been anxiously watched by the whole of Europe during the past few days as a factor of the highest importance in the struggle between Western and Eastern Europe.

S I am sending copy of this despatch to His Majesty's representatives at Constantinople, Sofia and Athens

I have, &c
H. W. KENNARD

R. n. to R. q. - 1st *in R. f. - 1st* *of the Helgrade Process*

ON the day of Rushdi Bey's arrival Hukmed Bey, Turkish representative at Belgrade, gave an interview to the "Vreme," in which he stated that Rushdi Bey would spend two days in Belgrade, in order to discuss with M. Pasic, M. Naisic and His Majesty the King various outstanding questions between Yugoslavia and Turkey. He took the opportunity to state that Turkey had no intention whatsoever of accepting the League's decision.

On his arrival at Belgrade Rushdi Bey granted interviews to the correspondents of the three principal Belgrade papers, "Vreme," "Politika" and "Pravda." Having outlined the main points of the above-mentioned treaty, he described it as one of non-aggression.

"We cannot surrender Mosul, even if we wish to do so. I should like a peaceful solution to the question to be found. There are ways of avoiding a conflict without prejudicing our sovereignty in Mosul. We proposed a plebiscite, but that was not accepted. Let them find another solution. But we will not surrender our sovereign rights in Mosul. Apart from this question, we have no differences with England, and it is to be hoped that this fact will be made use of to ensure peace. We are desirous of peace."

Rushdi Bey then pointed out that according to the Turkish Constitution and the "National Oath" of 1919 Turkey has no right to alter her frontiers, either by conquest or by surrender.

Having been asked whether the treaty with Russia provided for a Russo-Turkish sphere of influence in Mahomedan districts, Rashid Bey replied that there had been no question of such a sphere of influence in the Mussulman provinces under Russia.

Present-day Turkey is not a pan-Islamic country, but the land of the Turkish people." The real pan-Islamic States are England and France, and the Sultan of Egypt wants the Caliphate. Turkey's attitude towards the Moslems of Jugoslavia is one of disinterested "bienveillance."

Asked what further action he proposed to take in the Mosul question Rushdi Bey replied —

"First of all we must examine the details of the new English offer. But time is working in our favour and we are not in a hurry. British public opinion is also working for us, and we shall wait for it to prevail."

As regards the relations between Turkey and Jugoslavia, Rushdi Bey stated that these were excellent, and that Turkey regarded this country as a dominant power in the Balkans. In Balkan relations everything must start from the basic fact of the dominant situation of Jugoslavia, and all work must aim at consolidating Jugoslavia's position.

Sunday, December 27, 1925

Before his departure Rushdi Bey gave interviews to the principal papers on his conversations with M. Nincic.

He stated that he had discussed with M. Nincic all questions which could interest the two Powers. He himself was greatly in favour of the emancipation of the Balkans. All those who were sincerely in favour of peace could only be encouraged by what he had discussed with M. Nincic. But of those who had not a fair conscience he could say nothing.

To the question whether he had discussed with M. Nincic the question of a possible conflict between Turkey and Great Britain, he replied that he was a man of peace and not of conflicts. Turkey had banished the word "war" from her dictionary and substituted the expression "national defence." He had only discussed peaceful matters with M. Nincic, and concluded with the words: "I do not really know whether any danger threatens us, even from the side of England."

Enclosure 2 in No.

Official Communiqué, issued on December 27, 1925

ON the occasion of the meeting between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Turkish Republic and the S. C. S. Kingdom, questions of general politics were reviewed, especially those which directly interest the two countries, i.e., commercial and consular treaty and conventions, a convention regarding establishment and the emigration question.

In the course of their conversation the two Ministers noted the friendship that exists between the two countries and the complete harmony of their views. They expressed their desire for the consolidation of peace and for sincere and friendly relations with all States.

No. 4

Sir W. Tyrrell (for the Secretary of State) to Sir R. Lindsay (Constantinople)

(No. 8.)

(Telegraphic) R

Foreign Office, January 5, 1926

FOLLOWING from Prime Minister

"The Turkish Ambassador this morning communicated to me, in reply to my statement of 22nd December (see my telegram No. 152), a memorandum to the following effect —

"The Turkish Government is animated by the hope that its point of view concerning the programme to be followed in the question of the delimitation of the Turco-Irak frontier has been clearly set forth by the negotiations which have taken place up to the present and by the official declarations which have been made on various occasions. The Turkish Government is convinced that in the dispute regarding the Mosul Vilayet, which is in reality a question of territorial

sovereignty as well as a question of peace and security, the fixing of a stable frontier is of primary importance. The Turkish Government is ready to resume new negotiations to settle the dispute which exists between the two States. The choice of Angora as the place of negotiation is also convenient to the Turkish Government. That Government has not failed from the outset to indicate by the line of conduct which it has followed hitherto its preference for a direct solution of the question between the two Governments. Turkey, taking into consideration the value and the importance of the happy expansion which would ensue in the relations between the two Powers, has always desired the solution of this dispute on condition that it should be reached from claims which were of vital interest to her. The proposals which the British Government will be so good as to make for the discussions relative to the fixing of the frontier in the disputed territory and the procedure which it will follow in these discussions will render it possible to foresee the result of the negotiations. Turkey desires very sincerely to live on terms of perfect and cordial friendship with Great Britain. It is specially desirable that the single dispute which exists between the two countries should be brought to a happy conclusion."

I have informed his Excellency in reply that, in taking note of the agreement of his Government to Angora being the most convenient place for negotiation I would gladly authorize you to proceed to the capital in order to explore the ground and ascertain what accommodations or alleviations might be possible in connection with the decision given by the Council of the League of Nations on 16th December. I also assured him that I cordially reciprocated the desire of his Government for the promotion of the friendliest relations between our two countries, and that I shall spare no effort to achieve that end."

(Reprinted to Bagdad, No. 1)

E 137 62 65]

No. 5

Sir W. Tyrrell to Ahmed Ferid Bey.

My dear Ambassador,

Foreign Office,

WITH reference to your Excellency's conversation this morning with the Prime Minister, the latter desires me to express to you the views of the Turkish Government. In view of the fact that, in connection with the recent decision of the League of Nations on the 16th December relating to the Turkish-Irak frontier

Mr. Baldwin also wishes me to renew to you his assurance that he cordially reciprocates the desire of your Government for the promotion of the friendliest relations between our two countries, and that he proposes to spare no effort to achieve that end.

Believe me, Sir,

W. TYRRELL.

E 137 62 65]

No. 6

Note communicated to the Prime Minister by the Turkish Ambassador, January 5, 1926. (Received in Foreign Office January 6.)

Le Gouvernement turc est animé de l'espoir que son point de vue concernant le programme à suivre dans la question de la délimitation de la frontière turco-irakienne s'est dégagé clairement des négociations qui ont eu lieu jusqu'à présent et des déclarations officielles qui ont été faites à diverses occasions.

Le Gouvernement turc est convaincu que dans le différend du vilayet de Mossoul, qui est en réalité une question de souveraineté territoriale

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question de paix et de sécurité, la fixation d'une frontière stable est d'une importance primordiale.

Le Gouvernement turc est prêt à reprendre de nouvelles négociations pour régler le différend existant entre les deux États.

Le choix d'Angora comme lieu de négociations convient également au Gouvernement turc.

Le demandeur, dans la ligne de conduite qu'il a suivie, a pas mal que dès le début, de manifester ses préférences pour une solution directe de la question entre les deux Gouvernements.

La Turquie, prenant en considération la nature et l'importance de l'heureux épanouissement qui résulterait dans les relations des deux Puissances par suite de la solution de ce différend, s'est toujours, à condition d'arriver à un résultat final, désistée des réclamations qui ne lui étaient pas d'un intérêt vital.*

Les propositions que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique voudra bien faire pour les pourparlers relatifs à la fixation de la frontière dans le territoire contesté et pour la procédure qu'il suivra dans ces pourparlers permettront de prévoir le résultat des négociations.

La Turquie désire très sincèrement vivre en termes de parfaite et cordiale amitié avec la Grande-Bretagne.

Il est particulièrement désirable que le différend unique qui existe entre les deux pays aboutisse à un heureux résultat.

Ambassade de Turquie, Londres,
le 5 janvier 1926.

E 226 226/44]

No. 7

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 11.)

No. 6. Confidential.)
Sir,

Constantinople, January 6, 1926.

IN my despatches Nos. 942 and 945 of last week I reproduced some of the sayings of Tewfik Rushdi Bey to various diplomats on his passage through Constantinople on the 28th ultimo.

2. While the German Ambassador was with him the talk turned on the approaching admission of Germany to the League of Nations, and Herr Nadolny said something about Turkey's being now far from taking any such step. Tewfik Rushdi replied that it was so and that the matter was at present academic. The Ambassador said it was more than that—it was impossible. Turkey had bound herself not to enter into any combination directed against Russia; Russia would certainly maintain that the League was so directed and would not allow Turkey to join it. Tewfik Rushdi was startled at this idea; he maintained rather indignantly that the League was not in any way aimed against Russia and said he would have to combat vigorously any suggestion that it was.

3. It is interesting to see Tewfik Rushdi reacting strongly against a suggestion that Turkey is now bound irrevocably to Russia in any particular.

4. The French Ambassador has given me no precise details of what passed between himself and the Minister, but expresses the conviction that Tewfik Rushdi had been much sobered by the conversation he had had with M. Briand. M. Sarraut thinks that he now only seeks some face-saving arrangement, but that at present Turkey will not consider that anything less than the cession of Mosul will meet the case.

5. Last of all the foreign representatives came the Persian Ambassador. By this time Tewfik Rushdi was not talking so wisely for seven hours. He was in a high state of febrility and was moving at a terrific speed; Tabatabai, who is no mean talker, was left miles behind from the moment he entered the room, when the Minister informed him that war was inevitable and that the alliance of Jugoslavia and Russia was assured. From the latter unlimited ammunition would be obtained. The plan was to abandon Constantinople to the English if they chose to take it and to retreat to the interior of Anatolia, and for every pound Turkey spent Great Britain would have to put down fifty. The Ambassador was quite dazed at this and had no opportunity to say anything

* This paragraph has been amended at the request of the Turkish Ambassador.

at all, and at ten minutes past ten the Minister may go out and a busy day's work joined the dinner party and had been waiting for me since at past eight.
I have sent copies of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Baghdad and to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY

[E 216,62/65]

No. 8

Ahmed Ferid Bey to Sir W. Tyrrell.—(Received January 11)

Ambassade de Turquie, Londres,
le 8 janvier 1926.

Cher Excellence,

J'ai l'honneur de vous accuser réception de la lettre que vous avez bien voulu m'adresser le 4 du courant.

Lors de notre entrevue du 5 janvier, j'avais communiqué textuellement à son Excellence le Premier Ministre la réponse de mon Gouvernement au fait que le Cabinet britannique avait manifesté pour la reprise des négociations.

Comme votre Excellence a dû le remarquer, la réponse de mon Gouvernement aux propositions britanniques ne contenait aucune allusion se rapportant de près ou de loin aux négociations de la Société des Nations, et j'informai M. le Président du Conseil que j'en conviendrais que mon Gouvernement désirait, uniquement pour arriver à déterminer une frontière acceptable de part et d'autre dans les territoires contestés, que la question fût remise en discussion, sans aucune réserve.

J'avais, en outre, eu le plaisir d'ajouter que mon Gouvernement était animé des meilleures intentions pour arriver à une solution pacifique et, en négociant avec une bonne volonté réciproque, on était certain d'arriver à un résultat satisfaisant.

Je vous prie, d'autre part, afin de faciliter les négociations d'éviter de mentir dans les communications, la recommandation et la décision formulées par la Société des Nations.

Du désir exprimé par son Excellence le Premier Ministre, à l'issue de notre entrevue, de laisser à l'Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté britannique l'initiative de la reprise des négociations en vue de régler la question d'une frontière acceptable de part et d'autre, j'ai transmis télégraphiquement à mon Gouvernement la teneur de la lettre ci-dessus.

J'ai transmis également à mon Gouvernement la teneur de la lettre ci-dessus.

En réponse aux informations que je lui ai télégraphiées, je viens d'être informé par mon Gouvernement que son Excellence le Premier Ministre a décidé de reprendre les négociations qui seront entreprises à Angora et de examiner les propositions qui lui seront faites ainsi que dans les contre-propositions qu'il fera connaître sur ce principe qu'il se trouve en face d'une question pendante et non encore résolue et, sous cette réserve, il se propose d'accepter la proposition d'ouvrir une conférence finale.

Mon Gouvernement enregistre avec une grande satisfaction les nouvelles assurances de l'ambassadeur de la République de Turquie sur l'importance de l'établissement des relations les plus amicales entre nos deux pays et son attachement à la paix et à la coopération.

Je suis également chargé de renouveler à votre Excellence les sentiments de cordiale amitié et de coopération de mon Gouvernement à la République de Turquie.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

A. FERID.

No. 9

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 12.)

(No. 4.)

(Telegraphic)

Constantinople, January 11, 1926.

I HAVE sent Helm to Angora to try to secure SALT'S help in the period which will follow the withdrawal of the British troops. I am going to Angora myself in about a week. Meanwhile I think no harm is done by proceeding with the negotiation.

Turkish delegate here has communicated to me verbally substance of note to you from Turkish Ambassador, according to which apparent intention of direct or indirect shall be made of Geneva proceedings. I said to delegate that your declarations to Turkish Ambassador should have been regarded by Angora as wide enough to afford them satisfaction. I had myself intended in forthcoming conversations to avoid the past, simply because that line of discussion would not help matters but that I thought it very foolish of Turkish Government to put stipulations of this sort in an official note.

(Repeated to Bagdad No. 1.)

No. 10

Sir W. Tyrrell (for the Secretary of State) to Sir R. Lindsay (Constantinople)

(No. 7.)

(Telegraphic)

Foreign Office, January 14, 1926

YOL R telegram No. 4 of 11th January. Mosul negotiations.

We have received letter from Turkish Ambassador in sense communicated to you. No. 10. It is desirable, in order to avoid any appearance of not wishing to give effect to Ministers' statements in House of Commons, etc., expressing willingness to negotiate, that you should proceed to Angora to hear what Turkish Government desire to say. If, however, Turkey stipulate *à titre quod non* discussion of subject *de novo*, you must express regret at the inability of His Majesty's Government to ignore decision of Council and their promise loyally to observe it, and return to Constantinople.

No. 11

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain — (Received January 20)

(No. 18.)

(Telegraphic)

Constantinople, January 20, 1926

I HAVE to-day returned from Angora, where I had two interviews with Minister for Foreign Affairs and one with Prime Minister.

With former, conversations were friendly and, on the whole, quite businesslike. There was in his language an absence, though unusual and incomplete, of quibbles, insincerities and false arguments. We soon disposed of preliminary question of conditions or reservations formulated in note of 9th January from Turkish Ambassador in London. I made it unmistakably clear that views of His Majesty's Government as to Geneva proceedings were radically different from those in the note, and on this Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed his readiness to continue conversations, each side, as he said, maintaining its own opinion.

I said that I had come to ascertain what adjustments were possible to facilitate matters for Turkish Government, and to do so I was anxious to find what were reasons of State underlying their wide territorial demands. He said first point was question of security as affected by Kurdish situation. With Persian Kurds he said that no trouble need be anticipated but with passing of any considerable number of Kurds under a third Power interminable difficulty was to be anticipated. He gave an odd turn to this question by maintaining I think sincerely, that southern Kurds would always be desirous of joining themselves to their kinsmen in Turkey, and would therefore be impelled to organise constant raids across northern frontier and keep up a state of perpetual insecurity. He said that Turkey did not wish to incorporate Arabs in the State and that Turkish Government had no hostility to Iraq and no desire to reconquer lost territories. He referred more than once sympathetically to "Arab ethnic identity." Turkey had no fear of any Arab aggressiveness against herself. It is particularly to be noticed that he stated no arguments in favour of inclusion of Mosul town in Turkey.

Another point made was what he called "floating frontier." At a number of dealings between the two countries, he said, frontier claimed or held by Great Britain during last six years had been steadily pushed further north till now we have *de facto* line more unfavourable than that of rejected Treaty of Sèvres. To convince

Turkey of permanence of any arrangement now made, frontier must go a good way back to the south.

I asked him to develop idea he had in mind at Geneva, when he had suggested a guarantee of Mosul. He had in mind, he said, a three-Power pact, including Persia, and guarantee of joint frontiers between them, then later on he had hoped for a similar pact for Syrian frontier bringing in French. This, he said, would have necessitated conclusion of similar arrangements with Russians, and so attainment of her final aim, which was neutralisation of Turkey.

He made no mention of any idea of demilitarisation, though I gave him every opportunity. I also ascertained that commercial ("adjustments") had no attraction for him. He was not in the least interested in a scheme for transit of Turkish goods through Iraq to Basra, which has been mentioned in a newspaper.

With Prime Minister I had long and friendly talks. I told him, quite frankly, that he wanted to leave Mosul negotiations solely to Minister for Foreign Affairs and did not wish to discuss it with me, and I found it hard to make him talk till quite at the end, when he relaxed somewhat. He said at one moment that possession of Mosul City was the crux of the whole question, but perhaps the remark may be discounted somewhat, as it was in reply to a challenge which I put. He referred to Kurdish question, as he did last (1 November), but rather subordinated it in importance to territorial and frontier question. Latter, he said, was only aggravated by existence of former. He referred to Minister for Foreign Affairs' suggestion about "floating frontier," saying that, as a result of it, everyone in Eastern Turkey and Western Persia now believed that English intended to push to Van and that resulting disquietude was intolerable. The frontier to be fixed could not be acceptable unless it was such that it would be accepted by everyone that it was final and that no further expansion northwards would take place.

My general impression is that Turkish Government have now made up their mind to give up claim to Mosul town, but that they are determined to obtain a cession of territory further east and to have as much as they can possibly get. I obtained no indication as to what line would satisfy them. I do not think that they have any idea of other alleviations in their mind at present.

General atmosphere at Angora is calm and there is no longer any talk of war. The tone with regard to my visit, both at the capital and in Constantinople press, is one of indifference and scepticism over outcome of negotiations. Thus, I think, is an inspired *mot d'ordre*.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 2.)

No. 12

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain — (Received January 20)

(No. 19.)

(Telegraphic)

Constantinople, January 20, 1926

REFERENCE omitted.

Neither of Ministers mentioned internal prestige of Government as a factor impelling them to demand concessions from His Majesty's Government, but it was stated very explicitly to me by Yunus Nadi, a scurrilous Deputy-journalist, who is well in the presidential circle. He said British pressure over Mosul question was constituting a peril to the republican régime. I think this is true. The hat orders have caused wide dissatisfaction to lower classes. New taxation proposals are likely to make it extend to upper classes, while new civil code which is to be voted *en bloc* in a few days by Assembly and put into force at once, affecting as it does whole status of the family, and of women in particular, is giving serious misgivings even to President's friends. Thus, though Government is strong, it is also menaced at its base. If, as I believe is the case, it is to the interest of His Majesty's Government that present secular and republican regime should continue in Turkey, then this matter of prestige is an argument in favour of finding some solution for Mosul question which will give Turkish Government something to be proud of.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 29)

(No 10.)

(Telegraphic)

Constantinople, January 29, 1926

MY immediately preceding telegram

I had intended to return to Angora in about a week and continue discussions with Turkish Government until you were ready for any further step, but I fear this idea will not work. Both Turkish Ministers were restive under cross-examination and showed impatience to get to business. If, therefore, I revisit the Turkish views, and I might do more harm than good. If there is any specific point on which you require further enlightenment or have any message of any sort for Angora, I could either go there or communicate through Turkish delegate here, but at present I am in a quandary as to how to proceed and should be most grateful for any guidance you can give me within the next three or four days.

E 752 62 65

No 14

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 2.)

(No. 45. Confidential)

Sir,

Angora, January 22, 1926

I ARRIVED in Angora yesterday to negotiate with the Turkish Government regarding the Iraq frontier question, and I had an interview with Tewfik Rushdi Bey. As the interview was held in a rooming house, it lasted only three-quarters of an hour, and we only dealt with three preliminary questions.

1. I informed his Excellency that I desired, before entering on the main negotiation, to establish beyond possibility of doubt the meaning of the reservations to which the Turkish Government according to Ferid Bey's note of the 9th January were proposing to subject their participation in the conversation. I had no desire now or in the forthcoming discussions, to harp on the past; to do so would probably not help towards an agreement; but as to what had passed at Geneva and before the League of Nations His Majesty's Government had very decided and definite views, and did not intend to abandon them; on the other hand, the views of the Turkish Government on the same matters, though not stated very categorically, seemed to be very different, and His Majesty's Government could not admit their justification. It seemed to me that the language you had used to Ferid Bey in your conversation with him of the 3th December opened the door sufficiently wide for future negotiation to be possible, and that without talking about any common basis we could easily find a starting point, but if the Turkish Government desired to involve us in any admission that we regarded the proceedings or decisions of the League of Nations as "nul et non avenue," then we must understand that our negotiation was menaced by an extreme peril from the very outset. Tewfik Rushdi answered that the object of the Turkish Government was to eliminate from the discussion topics alien to it and which, if the discussion happily were to result in an agreement, would be of no importance. His language was all in the sense that the Turkish Government did not stipulate that we should abandon any rights we may have acquired at Geneva, but as his language was not without ambiguity, I took Ferid's note of the 9th January and read out the following passage—

"Le Gouvernement de la République, lors des négociations qui seront entreprises à Angora . . . se basera sur ce principe, qu'il se trouve en face d'une question pendante et non résolue, et, sous cette réserve, est prêt à entrer en pourparlers. . . ."

It was unnecessary, I said, to state precisely what the views of His Majesty's Government were, but I must say that they were radically different from those of the Turkish Government, as defined by Ferid Bey in the passage quoted above. Was his Excellency, nevertheless, ready to proceed with the conversations? Tewfik Rushdi replied that he was ready, each side might hold its own views as to Geneva and yet negotiate; if the negotiation failed, then the two rival views might have to come into conflict. On this reply I felt that I could proceed.

I asked Tewfik Rushdi Bey why he had sent his note and formulated his reserve, which seemed to me rather pointless. His answer was that he had had to do so because Geneva was referred to in Sir W. Tyrrell's note of the 5th January, an answer at which I could not help smiling when I had looked again to see what Sir W. Tyrrell had said. Another possible solution has occurred to me. Tewfik Rushdi is essentially shallow and imitative. It is a favourite trick of his to take something you have said, give it a dishonest twist, and shoot it back at you as his own. Now when I saw him in Constantinople on the 28th December I kept on saying to him "let's drop the past and talk about the future," and I think it quite possible that this "reserve," which he has made Ferid put in, is merely his own distorted reflection of my own attitude.

2. I then asked his Excellency with whom I was to negotiate, and expressed my pleasure at learning that it was to be with himself and not with a commissaire, but he also added "unless the circumstances of the negotiation require that it should be surrounded with special solemnity," a suggestion the meaning of which escaped me altogether. I then said that the widest issues were involved in our conversations, and that I was anxious to keep contact also with other Ministers, especially with Ismet Pasha with whom I should like to talk politics. To this Tewfik Rushdi assented, though he said that Ismet would not be able to give me answers about the negotiations; and he undertook to talk to him and arrange for me an appointment in the near future. I cannot, however, help remembering that the last time his Excellency rendered me the same service the answer I got was that Ismet was unable to see me at all.

I am glad not to have a commissaire to deal with, and on the whole I am content to have to do with Tewfik Rushdi. He is a terrible person to deal with, but he has done a lot of negotiating with foreigners and has learned something of the necessity of give and take. He is said to be shaky in his office now, after his cheek at Geneva, and for the sake of his position is therefore personally anxious to come to terms, and I fear that if he went we might get worse. Shukri Kaya is mentioned as the most likely alternative. He was Feizi Bey's Foreign Minister in the early part of last year and I should much prefer Tewfik Rushdi to him. However while ready to talk with Tewfik, I am anxious to keep a back door open to Ismet, and with Tewfik's assent.

3. I then turned to another question. I said I was perfectly aware of the close relations which for long had existed between Turkey and Russia. With those relations I had no concern, I might have my own view as to the benefit that might accrue to Turkey from her friendship with Russia, but I would quite admit that Turkey could judge best for herself in such a matter. His Excellency would therefore remember that since he and I had been in relations together I had never even alluded to Russia in conversation with him. My attitude in the past therefore gave me to-day this right, namely to request that in the negotiations now about to be entered into by the Turkish Government with the Russian Government, I should be kept in the picture. I was not at all sure that Russia would regard it as in her interest that Turkey and Great Britain should come to terms over Mosul. Our negotiation was going to be difficult enough anyhow, and I must express the hope that the Turkish Government would not allow them to be hampered by extraneous influences. Tewfik Rushdi Bey thereupon started off on a tangent—then on another and yet another, and in half a minute was talking glibly about anything but Mosul and Russia. I waited awhile and then remarked that I had put a very simple matter before him but that I was entirely unable to understand his answer. He then went off on the subject of Russian newspaper articles and his own independence of judgment, and after being twice brought back to the subject he steadied down and at last informed me quite distinctly that of course the Turkish Government would admit of no such interference by Russia in the Mosul discussions. To conclude, he said to me "Je vous dis tout franchement que le Mosoul est une affaire qui ne concerne que la Russie et la Turquie, et que la Turquie est libre chez soi." The observation, I think, is very likely true, but I dare say it was intended to frighten rather than to reassure me.

When I introduced this topic to Tewfik Rushdi I had expected to receive nothing but instantaneous and voluble assurances that no interference would take place, and I was quite surprised to see how completely his Excellency was taken aback at my question. He was quite a time talking sheer nonsense while trying to collect his thoughts. I am at a loss to explain his emotion. The natural thing to suppose is that he has promised the Russians to keep them *au courant* of what passes yet if he had done so, he would surely have been all the readier with the assurance.

he finally gave. He may have thought that, familiar with his well known Russophile proclivities, I was starting an attack on his own position as negotiator or as Minister, yet this is rather far-fetched. No certainty can be had, and conjecture is useless.

I should perhaps mention that the Tewfik Rushdi of yesterday was very different from the man I saw last month in Constantinople, just back from Geneva, Paris and Belgrade, excited and talking thirteen to the dozen. Yesterday, except in the last few minutes, he was cautious and almost reticent, and he refrained from taking any initiative in bringing up subjects for discussion or in suggesting any ideas. I am to see him again to-morrow.

I am sending copies of this despatch direct to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Iraq and to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &c
R C LINDSAY

E 753 62 65]

No 15

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 2.)

(No 46. Confidential)

Sir

Angora, January 24, 1920

In continuation of my despatch No. 45 of the 22nd January respecting the negotiations about the Iraq frontier, I have the honour to report that I had a second view with Tewfik Rushdi Bey last evening. As on the previous occasion, his unwillingness to take the initiative and to start talk in the channel that best suited

me, I found myself in a very awkward position. His Majesty's Government knew, caused dissatisfaction to Turkey, and I myself was now in Angora to discover what accommodations could be found to render the situation more acceptable to the republic. The difficulty of my task was that I found myself in great ignorance of what it was that the republic really desired. I was aware of a persistent demand for territory—the more the better—but the more I thought of it, the more I was conscious of the weakness to the acquirer. Behind the demand for territory there must be solid reasons of State, and it was these reasons of State which I was anxious to ascertain and report to you, so that His Majesty's Government might know the exact dimensions of the problem. I was, however, disappointed. His Majesty's Government with suggestions based on misstatement of fact, the British authorities had now administered Iraq for six years and they knew all about the country—its population, ethnology, commerce and aspirations. His Excellency and I were there to talk frankly together and it was useless for us to try to gain advantage by deceiving each other or to score off each other by verbal victories.

Hereupon, Tewfik Rushdi took up the thread of the discourse and held it mainly for the rest of the interview, though I frequently had to interrupt in order to elucidate his meaning. His Excellency is always voluble, and, at best, almost incomprehensible, and in reporting what he said I despair of reproducing the order of his arguments or the language in which he clothed them. The utmost I can do is to endeavour to give you their general sense as accurately as I can.

The first point was security as affected by the Kurdish question. With the Kurds of Persia Turkey had no concern, they were entirely rooted in the Persian Empire, they were Shi'as, and their existence caused no trouble in Turkey. But with the allotment of a considerable number of Kurds to another State a situation of permanent danger and insecurity arose. The republic aimed at having a compact territory comprising all that existed of those ethnic elements of which it already consisted, and it must have all the Kurds outside Persia. Arabs, said the Minister, were not wanted, and their inclusion in the Turkish State could only be a source of weakness. More than once he referred to Arab ethnic unity. He was not afraid of Arab aggressiveness, Arab irredentism, such as it was, lay in a different direction, nor could there be any danger of Turkish aggressiveness now. Under an Imperial administration, he said, the Kurds would be a source of trouble. As to the Turkish Government feared the creation of discontent among their own Kurds whose eyes would be turned to their compatriots across the Iraq frontier—at least so he said. On the contrary, he anticipated that the Southern Kurds, being a

minority, and with a certain hostile complex against the Arabs, would be inclined to sympathise with the Turkish Government. They would be impelled thus to create a lasting state of unrest on the frontier by organising raids across it, and they would influence the Iraq Government to sympathise with and encourage their efforts.

This astonishing diagnosis of the Kurdish situation seems to me, and in doubt is, sheer nonsense, and the boot really is on the other leg. I did not hide my surprise, and I pointed out that the Southern Kurds, so far as I knew, were fairly content, and enjoyed a favourable position in Iraq politics. I therefore feel that, nonsensical as the theory seems to me, I have correctly reproduced what the Minister said. But, as to what he thinks, it strikes me, on reflection, that he may have remembered that some time ago he denied to me that the Southern Kurds would cause any unrest among the Turkish tribes. A feeling of false pride now would prevent him both from going back on something he once told me, and from admitting the existence of any weakness in the Turkish body politic, and he would argue to himself that he could emphasise to me the Kurdish danger, and it would not matter whether that danger proceeded from north to south or from south to north—it would create the same impression on my mind. I rather incline to think, therefore, that Tewfik Rushdi's talk in mere emphasis on a point which I have drawn your attention to long since, though he has disguised it in a foolish manner, and though he knew that I had had a direct admission of the truth from Ismet Pasha.

I told him I did not see how Iraq could divest herself of her Kurdish mountains without giving herself a completely indefensible frontier against invasion from the north. At the mere danger of hostilities the military frontier of Iraq would have to be drawn back to the Dula. To grant such a concession would make Iraq's existence impossible, and we could not do it. Tewfik Rushdi endeavoured at length to prove the contrary, but his arguments were of an elusive nature and I am unable to reproduce them.

He made two, what he called, psychological points. The first was what he called the "floating frontier." When hostilities ended, the line was south of Mosul, then Mosul town was included in it, then it advanced in its eastern part, then came the Sèvres line, and soon after that Amadia was taken in, and at the Constantinople Conference an effort was made for a line in Hakkari Vilayet. To-day we have a Brussels line more unfavourable than that of the Treaty of Sèvres which Turkey rejected. Every international contact had resulted in something worse for Turkey, and to-day the mind of the country was such that it would not accept a proposal of a line which would take a good turn back to the Book of last September. I am always surprised that it is not exploited more vigorously.

The other "psychological" point he made was that, at the Lausanne Conference, a line had been privately hinted at by Sir W. Tyrrell, that the Turkish Government had decided not to accept it, and that no Government could to-day face the Assembly and recommend it to accept less. I expressed my ignorance of this transaction and asked him how the line ran, but he was very vague in his reply, and I am not sure that he himself knew, but he implied that it included Suleimanieh. I said, however, though I am not sure that really Sir W. Tyrrell at Lausanne with Lord Curzon's approval, indicated to Ismet Pasha, by a gesture of his hand across the map, a line running through the neighbourhood of R. I have never heard the incident alluded to by a Turk.

The second point he made was that, if a State was created, it would be a State, and it would pass either by the complete incorporation of a vanquished State, or by a treaty. If a treaty was forced on a State, nothing but bad relations could ensue. If there was no treaty, but merely the perpetuation of a *de facto* situation, then legality was set aside. I disputed this. International law, I said, was not fixed, and the rise and development of the League was creating whole new legal principles. He said that the League was not yet a League, and that it had no title to territory.

Finally his Excellency suggested to me that we had had enough beating about the bush, and that we should come now to concrete proposals. I said I was not prepared to make any proposal. I still had a lot to find out, I did not see that there was any good in he and I fencing together as to who should make the first move perhaps in talking together some idea would come up of which neither of us could

claim sole authorship, there was only one diplomatic victory to be won in this business, and that lay in the conclusion of an agreement, and it would be shared equally between the two parties. It was a suggestion agreeable to His Majesty's Government and likely to help Turkey. I would put it forward at once, and I hoped he would act likewise. With these sentiments his Excellency agreed, and, as he had attended an aviation ball the previous evening, had gone to bed only at 9.30 in the morning and was showing visible signs of physical fatigue, I took my leave.

11. I came away with two strong impressions. The first is that Tewfik Rushdi Bey was genuinely anxious for serious business. He was quiet and moderate in manner and there were no fireworks, exaggeration or claptrap. There was an abundance of common ground on which we could both stand for purposes of argument. I think he was genuinely endeavouring to be sincere, though, as I have reported, he had one terrible lapse. Still, I may say he was quite at his best.

12. The second point is more significant. We talked a lot about the Southern Kurds—never once did he mention Mosul town or attempt to adduce any arguments for its incorporation in Turkey. On the contrary, he admitted freely and more than once the existence of Arab ethnic entity and the perfect legitimacy of it. These are encouraging signs, but as they are not at all new, I do not propose to report them to you by telegraph till I return to Constantinople, probably on the 28th January.

13. I am sending copies of this despatch direct to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Iraq and to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY

E 754 62 65]

No. 16

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain—(Received February 2.)

(No. 47. Confidential.)

Sir,

Angora, January 25, 1926.

IN continuation of my despatches Nos. 45 and 46 of the 22nd and 24th January respecting negotiations with the Turkish Government on the Iraq frontier question, I have the honour to report that I had a third interview this evening with the Minister for Foreign Affairs. I may say at once that the conversation took place with the same tone and general character which had marked my two previous talks with his Excellency.

2. I reminded Tewfik Rushdi Bey that when at Geneva in September last he had put forward a proposal for the solution of the Mosul question which, presupposing the conclusion of a general agreement, included the greater part of Syria. I later suggested subsidiary arrangements too. I was aware that his proposal had come to nothing because there was then no agreement possible on the frontier line, but by turning over old and discarded ideas it might be possible to find in them some element of value at the present time, and I should be grateful if he would develop to me the thoughts that were in his mind at the time when he made his suggestion.

3. Tewfik Rushdi told me that his suggestion had been made by himself on his own authority and without specific instructions from his Government, though the general trend of the orders he had received assured him that his action would not be disavowed. His idea, in its simplest expression, had been that Turkey, Great Britain and Iraq should, having agreed on a line, guarantee that line in a solemn manner, and so induce in the whole complex of States a feeling of security and permanence. He agreed with my remark that this was no more than was done by any and every treaty fixing a frontier, but he had been anxious to include Persia in order that, when Great Britain's mandate in Iraq terminated, there should still be a third Power interested closely in the region and committed to ensuring the permanence of the territorial arrangements. But this was not all. The Turko-Persian-Iraq frontier knot was not the only one; there was also the Turko-Syrian-Iraq point of meeting, and he would have wished—perhaps later on—to have a similar guarantee for this part of the frontier also, bringing in France for the purpose. This, he said, would eventually necessitate bringing in Russia also, and the result would be what he most desired, namely, a Turkey not in equilibrium among various forces, but neutralised between them.

I must say he put them forward in a very academic manner and not in the least as if he regarded them as matters now of any practical importance. I was not called on to

make any observations in regard to them, and the conversation passed on to other features of his Geneva proposal which are of less importance. He made no mention whatever of the Mosul town or of the Mosul question. I gave him every chance to do so. As to the Mosul question, he was not interested in the least in any idea of facilities for Turkish trade to transit through Iraq to the port of Basra.

5. We then had a good deal of conversation on matters of no particular importance and as I was about to leave Tewfik Rushdi Bey began to suggest that I should submit to him some proposals. He said that interest was aroused in the negotiations and that he would be pleased to state how they were progressing; at present he would be unable to make a reply. I answered, as before, that I was in Angora, and knew too well that with all his efforts he was not ready to make any proposals at all to him. He said he expected to have a reply to interpellations in the Assembly and I remarked that I would, as he could, as Ministers do in other countries, reply that it would not be in the interest of the negotiation to make any public declaration. He said he could indeed adopt an attitude of reserve but was it to be a pessimistic or an optimistic reserve? He even began to sketch out the answer he might return to an interpellation. I expressed my regret at being unable to advise him what he would best say to his Assembly.

6. I am to see Ismet Pasha to-morrow. The day after I return to Constantinople where I propose to remain for seven or eight days before going to Angora.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch direct to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Iraq and to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY

No. 17

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir R. Lindsay (Constantinople)

(No. 12)

(Telegraphic)

Foreign Office, February 2, 1926.

YOUR telegram No. 10 of 25th January. As to negotiations. Whole matter is being sympathetically considered, but it is quite impossible to send any definite reply for some time. This, then, is merely to explain that it would in my opinion be undesirable for you to return to Angora for the present.

E 884 62 66

No. 18

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain—(Received February 8.)

(No. 52)

Sir,

Constantinople, February 2, 1926.

IN continuation of my despatches Nos. 45-47 of last week about the Iraq frontier negotiations, I have the honour to report that on 25th January I had a long conversation with Ismet Pasha who took place in the afternoon. I have already reported to you by telegraph that I have already given you by telegram No. 4 of 25th January. His Excellency, though courteous and friendly, was very guarded and from the very outset that he was not making any definite statement. He said that the first step was to fix the system, but was not prepared to say what the Grand Vizier was perpetually interfering in the business of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. It was therefore Tewfik Rushdi who must conduct the frontier negotiations. He evinced no interest in Mosul at all. He was not himself of any opportunity to turn the conversation to the Mosul question and I have no doubt that I was in Angora to serve, if possible, how cheaply Turkey could be pacified, he considered it was that I should have the advantage of cross-examining two persons separately on the subject. He does not often receive foreign representatives, and I attribute the fact that he reserved his best words only to me to the fact that I am His Majesty's High Commissioner for Iraq. At the present time, by a telegram received last May. The result is that the conversation was not, on the whole, on the comparatively businesslike lines which Tewfik Rushdi and I had followed, and his Excellency seemed to welcome

[15026]

2. Like Tewfik Rushdi Bey, Ismet Pasha expressed disappointment that so much time should be spent in preliminaries and the desire that we should enter into the heart of the business at once - in other words, that His Majesty's Government should make concrete proposals. I explained to him, too, as I had to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, what the position was. He asked me very insistently whether I was pessimistic or optimistic as to the situation. Having heard that Tewfik Rushdi had been expressing himself in the gloomiest terms about my attitude and behaviour, I confined myself to telling Ismet that I was not as pessimistic as the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I have, &c.

[E 961 62 65]

Sir A. Grant Duff to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 10.)

Stockholm, January 29, 1925.

7. M. Undén then passed to the Mosul question. He emphasised the fact that the task imposed on the League was a delicate one. It was never seriously suggested that the League should refuse to settle the dispute, inasmuch as both parties had appealed to it. The parties had undertaken to abide by the decision of the League. The speaker next said that he was not sure that he had not mistaken the duty of being reporter. According to the rules of the Council, the chairman decided

8. On the reception of the report of the Commission of Investigation, of which a Swedish diplomatist was chairman, the Council had naturally to consider it. The sub-committee of the Council appointed for this purpose was asked to work out a set of ~~that new~~ ^{new} emergencies as to the functions of the Council arose. The sub-committee was compelled to lay the situation before the Council in order that a solution of the difficulty might be arrived at.

9. The British delegate had already suggested that, if there were any doubts as to the competence of the Council as an arbitrator, the matter should be referred to the International Tribunal at The Hague. M. Undén had himself no doubt on the point, but his colleagues considered it advisable that the question should be so referred, as also the question respecting the system of voting which should be applied. The decision of the court of justice on both points was accepted by the Council.

10. The discussions in the Council were based on the report of the Commission. Convincing proof was given that a plebiscite could not be carried out. The population, however, wished to be united with the German Reich. The Commission retained the mandate to continue its work. The Commission's report was adopted by the Council.

As regards the matter of the Council thought it was better to stick with its decision, viz., that Great Britain should retain the mandate for twenty-five years, the Minister for Foreign Affairs emphasized the fact that, in the event of Great Britain refusing to accept, the Council would have to take up the question for further consideration.

12. M. Udden pointed out that the dispute concerned the relations between two States, Turkey and Iraq, which were members in the League of Nations, and added that the Covenant of the League and the stipulations as to the responsibility of the League for the fulfilment of the conditions of the mandate did contain rules which apparently assumed that the Mandatory Power had a certain responsibility towards the League as regards the administration of the territory in dispute. As the parties had referred the question to the League it would have been deplorable if no decision had been taken. If the Council had not been unanimous, the result would have been a continuation of the *status quo*—that is to say, the territory south of the Brussels line would have been incorporated with Iraq, but no means of determining the question of the boundary would have been available. Such a state of things would hardly have been desirable to peace. The Swedish representative would have assumed a serious responsibility if he had broken up the unanimity of the Council and had thus done away with the possibility of settling the question on the lines indicated in the Treaty of London.

There was no reason to think that there was any risk of a conflict.

4. M. Undén declared that he could not understand what M. Ljunglund meant when the latter said that the foreign policy of Sweden was to attain an equilibrium with her means of defence. Did M. Ljunglund really think that the Swedish Government could have acted at such a moment as to make such a statement? He was of the opinion that the Government was so preoccupied with the internal situation that it was unable to grasp as a whole the situation in Europe. He was of the opinion that M. Ljunglund's remarks were very superficial. He thought that the Government was the greatest enemy of the peace. He confessed that he and his colleagues were not very well acquainted with the situation of the peace movement in Sweden. He said that his staff were very busy with the work of the Government and that they were not able to follow the work of the peace movement in Sweden. He said that he was of the opinion that the Swedish Government was not doing enough for the peace movement.

Speeches delivered by Mr Amery and Sir Austen Chamberlain in the House of Commons on February 18, 1926

ANGLO-IRAK TREATY

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES (Mr Amery) I beg to move—

"That this House approves the treaty signed between representatives of His Majesty the King of Iraq and the British Government by the Council of the League of Nations in connection with the settlement of the Iraq frontier."

It is just two months since the Prime Minister asked this House to approve the action taken by the representatives of the Government at Geneva in accepting the award of the League of Nations in connection with the Iraq frontier. In commending that resolution to the House, the Prime Minister showed, and showed conclusively, I think, that the line pursued by the Government in this matter involved no new departure in policy, no violation of assurances and pledges given to the House in the past, no fresh commitments of a costly, dangerous or unnecessary character, but that, on the contrary, it embodied and gave effect to the consistent policy pursued by each successive Government as they came face to face with the problem of our interests in the East. It gave effect to the principle, approved by all parties, of extending as far as possible the frontiers of the British Empire in the East, and of strengthening by our support its authority for that purpose.

The Prime Minister made it clear to the House that the approval which he had asked for was not a mere endorsement of the policy of the Government, and did not cover the actual detailed provisions of the new treaty which, in conformity with the decision of the League and the decision of this House, we proposed to conclude with Iraq. He said the treaty would not be ratified before it had been submitted to this House for its approval. The House approved the Prime Minister's motion and affirmed the general policy of the Government by an overwhelming majority.

My duty to-day, in asking the House to approve the actual treaty now signed and awaiting ratification, is not to argue all over again the general case for our position in Iraq, but to show that the terms of the treaty fulfil the stipulations laid down by the League of Nations, and that in so doing they have not exceeded or run counter to the general policy announced by the Prime Minister and accepted by the House.

Before doing so, however, I might, perhaps, to say something about the alternative policy—if policy it be—which is advanced in the amendment put down officially by the Opposition. On the last occasion that this matter was before the House, hon. and right hon. gentlemen opposite decided that they could not decide on such a question within the short space afforded by a week-end, and they absented themselves from the debate. It may be due to the internal organisation of the party opposite, to the employment, shall I say, of propulsive rather than of tractive motive power, that their heavy artillery, though powerful, is not always very mobile. They have now had two months of preparation, and have been able successfully to push their big guns into position and train them at a definite target. [Hon. Members successful.] Certainly, success tells that far. I would not hold for the hon. member's benefit, that it is the target of last December at which this amendment is aimed; it is aimed not at the motion which I have the honour to bring before the House, but at the motion which the Prime Minister introduced in December last. It is aimed not at this particular treaty, but at the whole principle of giving effect to the resolution of the League of Nations, which the House of Commons affirmed by an overwhelming majority while hon. members opposite were still engaged in making up their minds. Incidentally, I might add that the guns are now so trained as to fire, not only at the enemy on these benches, but into the backs of some of their own troops.

This amendment is not only a condemnation of His Majesty's Government, but it is a declaration of their policy. The Prime Minister showed clearly in the last debate that the protocol of the treaty of 1923 contemplated

and provided explicitly for the renewal of our treaty relations with Iraq after 1925. But if we concluded that treaty, it was the right hon. gentleman opposite who brought it before the League of Nations and who before the League assumed responsibility for it. More than that, Lord Parmoor, acting on behalf of the late Government, and more specifically on behalf of the right hon. gentleman who was then Foreign Secretary, gave a definite undertaking to the Council that, if by 1925 Iraq had not been admitted to the League, the Council would be invited to decide what further measures were required to give effect to article 22 of the Covenant—in other words, to prolong the mandatory relationship. I really should like to ask hon. members opposite to look at M. Uden's report to the Council of the 16th December last, on which the decision of the Council was given. They will see on p. 8 of that report, that this undertaking is not only quoted in its actual terms in order to show that the League was determined to insist that the mandatory relationship should not disappear before Iraq entered the League but also that the stipulation as to the submission of a new treaty which was attached to the fixing of the frontier was regarded by M. Uden and his colleagues as nothing more than securing the immediate fulfilment of Lord Parmoor's pledge. The treaty is Lord Parmoor's treaty as well as mine. It is not, however, only Lord Parmoor's dog out which is threatened by the guns opposite. If there was anyone who stoutly defended the just claim of Iraq to retain her territory it was the right hon. gentleman the Member for Derby (Mr Thomas). He defended it not only in word, but he defended it also in action. When he heard that there was some anxiety in Iraq as to the exact line the Government here at home were taking, he telegraphed out—this was on the 29th July, 1924—a statement to be published throughout the length and breadth of Iraq to the following effect: "I had better perhaps, quote the precise words."

"His Majesty's Government has no intention whatever of abandoning their support of the frontier claim which they have brought forward on behalf of Iraq at Constantinople."

I may say that that was a rather larger claim than that which we have now accepted. Two months later the air forces, under the right hon. gentleman's orders, successfully repulsed a determined attempt by the Turks to invade Iraq territory and to rush the position while the discussions were going on at Geneva. Now that the right hon. gentleman's efforts have been crowned with success, now that the frontier which he so stoutly defended in arms and which he vowed never to abandon is secure, having been recognised by the League of Nations and only awaiting the approval of this House in the treaty now before it in order to become definitely established in international law, he endorses an amendment which, if it were carried, would not only destroy the present treaty, but would mean the rejection of the whole award of the League and would mean that the whole question of Iraq's frontier into the melting pot. I hope, in justice to the right hon. gentleman, that the House by its vote to-night will prevent him from committing the crime of infamy against his own policy.

The House need be under no illusion whatever as to what would be involved in the acceptance of this amendment. It would, of course, involve not only the rejection of the present treaty, but also the reversal of the policy affirmed by this House in December. It would mean that the Government would be abandoning which the whole policy of this Government has been influenced during the last three years. It would mean that we should undo all the work of the last three Governments. It would mean more. It would mean that we should make ourselves ridiculous in the eyes of the League of Nations, contemptible in the eyes of the Turks, and odious in the eyes of the people of Iraq, whom we should have betrayed. It would mean the desertion of Christian populations who, during the last seven or eight years, have experienced a freedom and happiness they never dreamt possible before and who have had only too recent and too terrible an example in their immediate neighbourhood of what would be their fate if this amendment were carried.

Mr THURTELL: The old, old story.

Mr AMERY: It may be an old story but I am glad to think it is not an altogether modern phase, for this country has always considered its responsibilities for the happiness and welfare of people in whose interests it has been directly concerned. At any rate, until 1925 if not for a much longer period, we should still be obliged to continue to support an Iraq which would have no defensible frontier, whose revenue and resources would have shrunk away, whose country would be swarming with hordes of starving refugees, and to do so not with the prospect of

men who have kept their word, but dishonoured, discredited, and despised. It is under these conditions that the amendment of the right hon. gentleman opposite asks us to expedite the admission of Iraq into the League of Nations. I can assure the House that the Government need no exhortation from the benches opposite on this subject. We are as eager as they to bring about that result, and in clause 3 of the treaty before us you will see that we have specially provided that this object should not be left out of sight, but should be brought before Iraq at frequent and regular intervals.

MR. RAMSAY MACDONALD: It is worse than it was before.

MR. AMERY: Not at all. If the right hon. gentleman will read that clause carefully, he will see that it is without prejudice in any way to article 6, which states that at the earliest possible date we shall bring the matter before them. This provides that at the earliest possible date we shall bring the matter before them. In four years we may not actively consider the question of bringing Iraq into the League before. I would say there is only one effective way of securing that. It is by securing her frontier, by enabling her to provide her own defence, by co-operation with her in the building up of a stable administration, and in the development of her resources. The right hon. gentleman opposite, have consistently pursued. The biggest step forward in that direction that could possibly be taken will be the approval which I hope the House will give to this treaty to-night. The most disastrous set back to that policy, the policy urged in the second half of the right hon. gentleman's amendment, would be the acceptance of the first half of that amendment. I really wonder, when he put down that amendment what he conceived would be the actual measures that he would take, if he were responsible, if he rejected this frontier settlement, and if he had to begin all over again with a weaker hand to play and faced with all the actual, practical problems which would be involved in the weakening of our position. This is not only a matter of treaty obligations, but it is also a question of the actual situation. When the right hon. gentleman was in office, he could not simply clear out and abandon the situation in the Middle East to chaos.

Let me come to the actual terms of the treaty before the House. That treaty has been approved by both Houses of the Iraqi Legislature, and only awaits the approval of the Council of the League. As soon as that is done, the present frontier of Iraq will, in pursuance of the decision of the League on the 16th September, become the definite frontier fixed in accordance with the provisions of article 3 of the Treaty of Lausanne, and the Turkish renunciation in article 16 of all rights and claims to any portion of the territory of Iraq will become completely and finally effective. Of the three clauses in the treaty, the only one of any serious importance is the first. The second clause refers to a number of minor points, mostly of a departmental character, arising out of the existing military and financial agreements. The most important of these refer to the settlement of the claims of His Majesty's Government in respect of the oil concessions, the railway, the telegraph, the postal, the customs, and so on, and members who are interested in these points will find them very fully dealt with in the appendix to the admirable report of the Financial Commission presided over by my right hon. friend the Member for Norwich (Mr. Hilton Young). These matters are also referred to in article 3 which, as I have already mentioned, also provides that the question of Iraq's admission to the League shall be definitely brought up and actively considered at regular intervals of four years, as well as actively considered during the interval.

Now as to clause 1. In order to understand the full purport and effect of this clause it is essential that the House should have clearly in mind the existing treaty position. The main treaty of October 1922 established a general relationship between the British Government and Iraq, and embodied those mandatory obligations with which the League of Nations is concerned, and for the sake of which it has insisted upon the admission of Iraq to the League. I need not go into the details of that treaty because they are in the main concerned with the maintenance of a civilised and progressive type of Government in Iraq. They provide for an organic law ensuring for the rights of communities to maintain schools in their own languages, for the protection of foreigners resident in Iraq, for the safeguarding of antiquities, and for the due fulfilment of international obligations.

In return for these undertakings by Iraq the Government undertake in article 1 to give its general advice and assistance, and in articles 7 and 15 to give the military and financial assistance defined in the separate military and financial agreements. Other separate agreements safeguard the position of British officials in the service of the Iraqi Government and regulate the conditions for judicial proceedings in which foreigners are concerned. The main treaty was originally to be in force for a minimum of twenty years, irrespective of Iraq's entry into the League of Nations, and was only terminable after twenty years if the high contracting parties were of opinion that it was no longer required. The protocol of April 1923 reduced that period to the date of Iraq's entry into the League of Nations, or to four years after the ratification of peace with Turkey, whichever was the earliest, but it also provided that negotiations for a further treaty to regulate the subsequent relations between the parties should be entered into before the termination of that period.

In accepting that treaty as the fulfilment of our mandatory obligations, the Council of the League in September 1924 exacted, as I have already mentioned, an undertaking from Lord Parmoor that if Iraq had not entered the League of Nations by 1929, then the League should decide how those obligations should be carried out. Apart from the general limit of time laid down in the protocol, the military and financial agreement provide, specifically in clause 1 of the military agreement and in clause 1 of the financial agreement, that the Government of Iraq accept the military and financial responsibility for the maintenance of internal order and for the defence of Iraq against external aggression within that same period of four years.

MR. THURTELL: Has the right hon. gentleman not left out two important words? Are the words "In principle" included in that phrase?

MR. AMERY: I think the words, "In principle," refer to the "earliest possible date," and that the obligations terminate as specifically provided. What I want to make clear is that the effect of clause 1 of the new treaty upon the situation established by the treaty with the protocol and its subsidiary agreements is that the four years mentioned in the protocol become twenty-five years as from the 16th November last, unless, as I confidently believe, Iraq is admitted before that date to the League of Nations, and I have every confidence that she will be admitted many years before that. On the other hand, the specific undertaking of Iraq to accept fully responsible for its own external and internal security remains unaffected and unaltered by the new treaty. The treaty thus fulfils the conditions laid down by the Council of the League, which is only concerned with the maintenance of a certain type of government and administration in Iraq. I may add, in presenting that treaty to the League, we shall, of course, follow the example set by our predecessors in office and carry out the other assurance which they gave to the League that this treaty shall not be altered or amended without the consent of the League. Those are briefly the objects of the treaty which this House has been invited to approve of, and, apart from any conditions laid down by the League, we should be equally concerned in securing them in any new agreements entered into before 1929 in accordance with the terms of the protocol.

On the other hand, the policy which successive Governments have laid before the House, the policy of helping Iraq to stand on its own feet, and of bringing to an end within a definite period of time the burden of our military and financial responsibility for Iraq, remains unchanged. There is nothing in this new treaty which imposes any new military or financial obligation of any kind whatsoever upon this country or in any way prolongs any existing military or financial obligations.

The hon. and gallant member opposite (Lieut.-Commander Kenworthy) asked whether this was a Bill like some other treaties. The Prime Minister pointed out, as the right hon. gentleman the Member for Derby (Mr. Thomas) had pointed out to him eighteen months before when the original treaty was before the House, that treaties are only submitted in the form of Bills when legislation is required to give effect to them. The hon. and gallant member was not satisfied and suggested that as this treaty means an expenditure of money there should be a money resolution to support it. I am not aware that money resolutions are required for every act of policy which might conceivably involve, directly or indirectly, the expenditure of money. In any case I can assure the hon. and gallant member that there is nothing whatever in the present treaty which involves any new financial obligation or commitment at all.

Considering the position in which that country was when we took it over after the war and comparing it with what was done in Egypt in the early days, I regard that as a most satisfactory achievement in the administration of Irak. In other respects, also, I have every confidence that Irak will steadily improve her position. Her export and import trade is already very far from negligible. In the last two years her export trade stood at about £3 250 000 and her import trade at about £4 750 000. Of that total 33 per cent, or about £2 250 000, came from the United Kingdom. That is a trade not far off the volume of our trade with such countries as

"the welfare of religious and racial minorities"

This country has gone through some very difficult years since the war. It has had to face a financial and economic situation of immense difficulty. We have stood the almost incredible strain of those years without once giving way to the temptation to dishonour our obligations, either domestic or external, or to attempt to evade our problems by short-sighted devices which would only have postponed and aggravated our difficulties. To-day the country is just beginning to feel that it is nearing the turning point, and the time is coming—it may not be very far off after all—when we shall begin to reap the reward of our sacrifices and of our steadiness. I believe the same is true of the Middle East. Government after Government has steadily, if sometimes very reluctantly, pursued the same policy of honouring its obligations and working patiently towards the building up of a self-dependant structure in Iraq. We are far nearer that goal than we have ever been before, and nothing will advance that goal so certainly or so rapidly as the ratification of this treaty, and the new start that it will give both to the internal life and to the external relations of Iraq. Is this the time when we should begin to play fast and loose with our whole Imperial policy in the Middle East? Is this the time when we should begin running away from our obligations and abandoning all that our efforts and sacrifices have won for us in the last few years? We have been a great commercial and industrial nation in the past. We have been an Imperial Power with great creative and constructive tasks before it and I am not one of those who believe that our destiny, in either of those respects, is played out. Our real destiny is in the century that is before us, and it is only beginning. This is not the time for pessimism and faintheartedness, but for steadfastness, courage and vision.

I came down to the House under the impression that at the close of this debate I should have to reply on behalf of His Majesty's Government to an attack on them. If that were all that there had been in the debate, I should be quite content to rest the defence of the Government policy—I will not say on the speech of my right hon. friend the Colonial Secretary, but on two speeches delivered from opposite sides of the House, that of my hon. and gallant friend the Member for Ripon (Major H. D. D'Almeida) and that of the Member for Norwich (Mr. Hulton).

"What has happened? The right hon. gentleman said he was responsible for the interests of Iraq before the League. I undertook to present the case of Iraq to the League. I warned the Turkish Government that until the League decided, we would tolerate no attack on Iraq, for which we were then responsible. I undertook to stand by the decision of the League." Very well. If he had remained in office, what would he have done other than that which we have done? He would have gone before the Council, as my right hon. friend the Colonial Secretary did to defend the interests and the rights of Iraq.

SIR A CHAMBERLAIN: He would have gone, as my right hon. friend did, to defend the interests and the rights of Irak. He would have gone as my right hon. friend did, to secure a verdict from the Council. I have no doubt that with the same material to work upon and with his powers of advocacy no less than the powers of advocacy of my right hon. friend, he would have secured the same verdict. What would he have done when he got it? He who had undertaken to defend the rights of Irak, he who had undertaken to maintain her interests, he

when I said that the right hon. gentleman had not done his duty. I have done with the interests of Iraq and with her rights. I have done with you. I clear out of the whole concern, and reprobate your justice and your partiality. When you bring the right hon. gentleman's loose language against me, I will show you that he did not mean that. He meant nothing. He would have done exactly what we did. If he were still in office he would stand here to defend the agreement and the Council of the League. I am not going to stand here to defend the shadow of a case against the Government which he is criticising without impugning the honour of the Council of the League.

MR. RAMSAY MACDONALD: Needless to say, I did nothing of the kind.

SIR A. CHAMBERLAIN: I am very glad to have drawn that excellent weight of evidence. He has been followed by ought I to say his followers on the back benches, at any rate by those who sit on the back benches, by the hon. member for Shoreditch and the other speeches which followed the hon. Member for Shoreditch nodded his approval to my reply.

MR. MACDONALD: I have been listening with a great deal of interest to the right hon. gentleman. If the right hon. gentleman thinks that anything which I have said has justified all this, then either he is or I am. I am not going to stand here to defend the shadow of a case against the Government which he is criticising without impugning the honour of the Council of the League. I am not going to stand here to defend the shadow of a case against the Government which he is criticising without impugning the honour of the Council of the League.

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MR. THURTELL: Will the right hon. gentleman permit me to explain? What I said was this. The League of Nations Council had developed a habit of having always in favour of the strong as against the weak.

SIR A. CHAMBERLAIN: Was it to lead up to that of course? I am not going to stand here to defend the shadow of a case against the Government which he is criticising without impugning the honour of the Council of the League. I am not going to stand here to defend the shadow of a case against the Government which he is criticising without impugning the honour of the Council of the League.

MR. MACDONALD: I am very glad the right hon. gentleman was a follower of his.

SIR A. CHAMBERLAIN: Then the right hon. gentleman and I make a statement of the hon. Member for Shoreditch, and we pledge our honour as to the impartiality of the Council.

MR. W. BAKER: Italian melodrama.

SIR A. CHAMBERLAIN: The hon. gentleman opposite and I are going to make a statement of the hon. Member for Shoreditch, and we pledge our honour as to the impartiality of the Council.

I am not going to spend time in defending the Government case. There is only one matter with which I think I must deal before I sit down. The hon. Member for Shoreditch—and he was not alone—drew a very pessimistic picture of the future. He said it was easy to conceive that, in the course of a few years, Russia and Turkey would combine to make war on Iraq.

and on Great Britain. The hon. gentleman's particular friends seem to be of very bellicose tendencies. I wonder whether that is what endears them to him. I do not accept it. I do not believe that Turkey will dispute the decision given by the Council. The hon. gentleman said that they were not under any obligation to accept it. He is mistaken. It is quite true, as my right hon. friend reminded the House earlier in the day, that their representative specifically undertook, in answer to a question put by the late Mr. Branting, at that moment President of the Council, to abide by the decision of the Council when it should be given. The obligation of Turkey does not depend upon that undertaking, given solemnly by her representative to the Council and embodied in the Council's resolution. The obligation of Turkey depends upon the Treaty of Lausanne, and was found so to depend by the Permanent Court of International Justice when the Council sought their advice. It is a treaty obligation which she has undertaken, to accept the decision of the League in this matter, and I do not believe that she will be so ill advised as to dispute the decision which she has given her undertaking to accept, and which carries so much authority and weight.

But there is more than that. This is, I hope, not the end. No sooner had the Council given its decision than, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, I made a declaration upon which we have acted, that now there was a boundary fixed which might be the basis of discussion, we would be glad to open conversations with the Republic of Turkey and to see whether any means could be found of rendering that decision more palatable to them. My right hon. friend the Prime Minister, in his absence, at once invited the Turkish Ambassador to meet him and begin these conversations. Since then, our Ambassador has been at Ankara and we are now considering the report which he has rendered to us of the conversations which he had, and considering what are the next steps and what are the possible proposals that we can make to the Turks. I will not speak with confidence of the results of these negotiations. I can only say that, on our side, they will be conducted with an earnest desire to arrive at a friendly settlement of our trouble and put our relations with Turkey on the footing which we all desire, and which for many years they occupied.

I am a little consoled for the denunciations of the Conservative Government to-day by the almost universal praise which the policy of their predecessors has met with from the members of the parties opposite. It is true that, in the days when the Conservative Government were doing that which the hon. and gallant Member for Central Hull now points to as singular wisdom contrasting with our present policy, I remember that there was a man, a man of great power and influence, a man of equal to his own and an eloquence that none of us possess, a man of the highest commonsense. I cannot help hoping that while we may never meet with his approval, his lineal successors, when we are dead and gone, will point to the wisdom of our actions, will argue how right we were, and will dispose lightly of himself and his fellow critics. In regard to restoring friendly relations with Turkey, I carefully avoided taking up any one of those criticisms or observations on one side or the other which, if answered or commented upon by a Foreign Secretary, might make the conduct of such negotiations more difficult.

LIEUTENANT COMMANDER KENWORTHY: Does the right hon. gentleman repudiate some of the insults hurled at the Turks by the hon. Member for Oldham (Mr. Cooper) and others of his followers?

SIR A. CHAMBERLAIN: But there is one observation which has been current which I must answer. There is a suggestion that His Majesty's Government have been actuated in this question by the desire to secure the oil of Iraq. Were the party opposite actuated by that desire when they undertook to defend the interests and the rights of Iraq and contended for the same frontier for which we have contended? Why does the oil well up when we are in office, and only when we are in office? But never was there a more palpable untruth. I was approached by the Turkish representative with a proposition in March of last year to settle this question apart from the League of Nations. What was the basis of the proposition? It was that Turkey should have so much as she desired of the Vilayet of Mosul. That was one side of the bargain. The other side was that a British company, approved by His Majesty's Government, should have the exploitation of all the oil. Pipe lines were to be necessary, and a British company should have the construction of the pipe lines. A port or two ports would be required, and a British company should have the concession for the ports. Five other ports and the

concession for, I think—I speak from memory—3,000 kilom. of railway were offered. If we were after oil, we could have had a concession for all the oil in Mosul and concessions for anything else we liked. The reply of His Majesty's Government was that they were trustees for Irak; that they were not possessors, but mandatories, and as mandatories and trustees they could not bargain away the rights and interests of Irak and her people in exchange for concessions to British capitalists. There never was a shameful allegation made with less shadow of foundation.

E 1388 42 65]

No. 21

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 1.)

(No. 88.)

Sir,

Constantinople, February 23, 1926.

FOUR weeks have now elapsed since I went to Angora to begin discussions on the Irak frontier question, and, though no developments of that question have since taken place, I can report that the general atmosphere here is one of calm. Now and then some speech by Mr. Amery or some English newspaper has been one or two unprovoked outbursts, but on the whole journalists keep quiet and some days Mosul is not even mentioned at all. Perhaps the Turkish Government, feeling fairly certain that His Majesty's Government will make a first offer of some sort for the settlement of the Mosul question, are content for the time being with this. Doubtless the various alarms of last autumn have served no useful purpose, and have merely put them

I hear from many quarters that there has been a cooling off of relations between Turkey and Russia, which developments of the Mosul question are awaited. The only reason ever given for the withdrawal of Russian support which was forthcoming in December when, after the League's verdict had been given, Russia's previous protestations of sympathy were put to a practical test. The commercial considerations only, confirm the loss of cordiality in relations between the two countries.

3. I do not think the Turco-Syrian Convention recently signed by M. de Jouvenel at Angora, on November 2, is a very important document. It is a declaration of intent on Mosul prospects, though I shall be glad to have closer knowledge of some of its stipulations. On the contrary, I should say that, if anything, the manner in which the Turks have come to terms with the French and the great exertions they have made to secure the Convention, especially noteworthy in the clause submitting arbitration and more especially that contemplating arbitration before the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague. I would remind you here of the impression left in the mind of the French Ambassador, that in pursuing this negotiation to a successful conclusion the Turks were thinking all the time of the yet more important negotiation over Mosul which is shortly to begin.

4. On the whole, therefore, the Turks are at present displaying a very proper reserve. Their patience will not last for ever, and as soon as I detect any signs of restiveness I shall report to you by telegraph. And when we begin actual negotiations we must be prepared for endless difficulties and delays. Still, there is nothing to complain of here to-day.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Irak.

I have, &c.

R. O. LINDSAY

No. 22

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 1.)

(No. 23.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, February 28, 1926.

FOLLOWING for Mr. Oliphant.—

Your letter of 22nd February.

I assume that major policy is no longer to be thought about, and that we had better now concentrate on a less ambitious scheme. The problem is how to get a frontier which Turkish Government will recognise in a formal treaty.

My own views on this have changed considerably in the last two months and my estimate of Turkish requirements in such a negotiation has steadily become lower. Though I do not yet know terms of French treaty, I rather think that its conclusion helps our chances. Italian Ambassador, who has just returned here after ten days in the capital, tells me that Minister for Foreign Affairs spoke to him optimistically about Mosul prospects. Why, he said,

should British choose to fling us into arms of Russia when they could satisfy us by cession of a few square kilometres? Ambassador thinks it would be a considerable satisfaction to Turkey now to achieve neutrality parts covering all her land frontiers. Fact is that since Geneva Turkey has become very much aware of weakness of her position in international politics, and I am told on every side that she is having more difficulty now than ever before in laying hands on any cash.

I now incline to think that we might perhaps bring Turkish Government to terms with a treaty embodying whatever is sound in the French treaty, plus additional territorial concessions. As to latter, I fear we cannot hope to get off as cheaply as French have done.

My present view is—

1 That it would be useless to expect and impolitic to ask seriously for any cession of territory now Turkish.

2 That we should have to give up something more than minor rectifications of frontier.

3 That perhaps we might get off with something rather less than line south of Rowanduz.

Above view is put forward with diffidence, and its correctness can only be tested in the course of bargaining. Of course I do not know what frontier lines can be drawn across the north-east corner of Irak, nor how much territory Irak would cede in order to get a northern frontier recognised by Turkey.

As to my opinion of such a settlement as above, see my memorandum of 8th February, but it might enable us to carry on for a year or two and see how things develop especially the internal politics of Turkey.

E 1387 44 65]

No. 23

Foreign Office to League of Nations.

Sir,

Foreign Office, March 2, 1926.

IN compliance with the invitation conveyed in article 2 of the decision recorded by the Council of the League of Nations on the 16th December, 1925, I am directed by Secretary Sir Austen Chamberlain to transmit to you herewith, for submission to the Council, the text of a new treaty between Great Britain and Irak which was signed at Bagdad on the 13th January, 1926.

2. By a decision dated the 27th September, 1924, the Council accepted the undertakings given by His Majesty's Government, as giving effect, in respect of Irak, to the provisions of article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. By article 2 of their decision of December last the Council made the further condition that the régime established by the aforesaid Treaty of Alliance and undertakings should be continued for a specified period. The requisite extension of the duration of the Treaty of Alliance is provided for by article 1 of the new treaty. In continuing this treaty, the Council of His Majesty's Government declare that so long as it remains in force they will regard as binding the undertakings given by

them to the Council in September 1924, and will continue to act in conformity therewith.

1. His Majesty's Government are thus in a position to inform the Council that the stipulations of article 2 of the decision of December 1925 have been fulfilled, and that the high contracting parties have agreed to continue the present régime as approved by the Council in September 1924, unless Iraq is admitted as a member of the League before the expiration of that period.

4. Provision for periodical review of the question of the admission of Iraq to the League of Nations is made in article 3 of the new treaty.

5. The high contracting parties, approved by the Council in September 1924, have agreed that they would agree to no modification of the Treaty of Alliance without the consent of the Council of the League.

6. The high contracting parties give a similar undertaking in regard to the treaty of the 13th January, 1926. This undertaking will apply to any proposals that may be made, as a result of the discussions contemplated in articles 2 and 3 of the new treaty, for the revision or amendment of the agreements subsidiary to the treaty of the 10th October, 1922.

8. In the light of these explanations His Majesty's Government request that the Council should be asked to take the decision in regard to the Turco-Irak frontier has become definitive.

7. The Treaty of the 13th January, 1926, has now been approved by the Council of the League of Nations.

9. With reference to the memorandum of December 1924, I am to enclose, for the information of the Council, a memorandum dealing with the administration of the Kurdish districts in Irak.

I am, &c

LANCELOT OLIPIANT

Enclosure 1 in No. 23.

Treaty between His Britannic Majesty and His Majesty the King of Irak

HIS Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and His Majesty the King of Irak, of the one part, and His Majesty the King of Irak, of the other part.

Anxious to give full effect to the stipulations in the decision of the Council of the League of Nations dated the 18th day of December, 1925, fixing the frontier between Turkey and Irak in pursuance of article 3 of the Peace Treaty signed at Lausanne on the 24th July, 1923, to the effect that the relations between the high contracting parties now defined by the Treaty of Alliance and by the undertakings of His Britannic Majesty and His Majesty the King of Irak to the League of Nations on the 27th September, 1924, should be continued for a period of twenty-five years, unless Irak is, in conformity with article 1 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, admitted as a member of the League before the expiration of that period.

Have decided by means of a new treaty to ensure due fulfilment of the said stipulations, and have for this purpose named as their plenipotentiaries

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Henry Boardillon, Esquire, C.M.G., Acting High Commissioner of His Britannic Majesty in Irak

His Majesty the King of Irak, Abdul Muhaim Beg al Sa'dun, Prime Minister of the Irak Government and Minister for Foreign Affairs

Who, having communicated their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:—

ARTICLE 1

The present treaty, which is the result of the negotiations between the high contracting parties signed at Bagdad on the 10th day of October, 1922, of the Christian era corresponding with the 10th day of Safar, 1340, Hijrah, and in the protocol signed on the 30th day of April, 1923, of the Christian era, corresponding with the 14th day

of Ramazan, 1341, Hijrah, in so far as they relate to the duration of the said treaty are hereby abrogated, and the said treaty shall remain in force for a period of twenty-five years from the 18th day of December, 1925, unless before the expiration of that period Irak shall have become a member of the League of Nations.

The various agreements between the high contracting parties subsidiary to the said treaty of the 10th day of October, 1922, shall, in so far as their duration is made dependent on that of the said treaty, likewise remain in force for the period laid down in the present treaty, but in other respects their provisions shall not be affected.

ARTICLE 2

The high contracting parties agree, immediately after the ratification of the present treaty and its approval by the Council of the League of Nations, to continue active consideration of the questions which have already been under discussion between them in regard to the revision of the agreements arising out of articles 7 and 15 of the Treaty of the 10th October, 1922.

ARTICLE 3

Without prejudice to the provisions of article 6 of the Treaty of the 10th October, 1922, in regard to the admission of Irak into the League of Nations or the provisions of article 18 of the said treaty which permit the revision at any time, subject to the consent of the Council of the League of Nations, of the provisions of the said treaty or of certain of the agreements subsidiary to the said Treaty of the 10th October, 1922, that, at the time when the Treaty of the 10th October, 1922, would have expired under the protocol of the 30th April, 1923, and at subsequent successive intervals of ten years, until the admission of Irak into the League of Nations, he will take into active consideration the following two questions, namely:—

- (1) The question whether it is possible for him to press for the admission of Irak into the League of Nations.
- (2) If it is not so possible, the question of the amendment, on account of the progress made by the Kingdom of Irak or for any other reason, of the agreements referred to in article 18 of the Treaty of the 10th October, 1922.

The present treaty, in English and Arabic, of which in case of divergence the English text will prevail, shall be ratified and ratifications shall be exchanged as soon as possible.

In witness whereof the above named plenipotentiaries have signed the present treaty and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at Bagdad the thirteenth day of January, one thousand nine hundred and twenty-six of the Christian Era corresponding to the twenty-eighth day of Jamad al Awwal one thousand three hundred and forty-four Hijrah, in three copies, of which one shall be deposited in the archives of the League of Nations at Geneva and one shall be retained by each of the high contracting parties.

H. H. BOARDILLON

His Britannic Majesty's Acting High Commissioner in Irak

ABDUL MUHAMMAD AL-SA'DUN

Prime Minister of the Irak Government and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Enclosure 2 in No. 23

Memorandum on Administration of Kurdish Districts in Irak

THE third paragraph of the decision of the Council of the League of Nations in the matter of the Turco-Irak frontier read as follows:—

3. The British Government, as mandatory Power, is invited to lay before the Council the administrative measures which will be taken with a view to securing for the Kurdish populations mentioned in the report of the Commission of Enquiry the guarantees regarding local administration recommended by the commission in its final conclusions.

2. The recommendations of the Frontier Commission regarding the Kurdish populations referred to in the Council's decision were as follows:—

Regard must be paid to the desires expressed by the Kurds that officials of Kurdish race should be employed in the administration of the country, the dispensation of justice and teaching in the schools, and that Kurdish should be the official language of all these services.

3. In his speech before the Council on the 3rd September, 1925, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, when referring to this subject, stated that the existing measures adopted by the Iraq Government for the administration of predominantly Kurdish areas

4. Out of a total number of fifty-seven administrative officials employed under the Ministries of Finance and the Interior in the Kurdish districts, forty-three are Kurds, while nine Kurds are employed in similar posts in non-Kurdish districts. There has been a steady progressive reduction in the number of non-Kurds employed in Kurdish districts, and the policy of employing only Kurds, where suitable men are available and willing to serve, is being steadily followed.

5. The Ministry of Justice employs thirteen officials (judges and chief clerks) in the Kurdish districts. Ten of these are Kurds. Cases are heard in Kurdish and in Sulaimaniya and the Keri Sanjak qadha of the Arbil Liwa the record of the proceedings is in Kurdish, though an Arabic translation is attached when a case goes to the Court of Appeal or Cassation. Six Kurdish officials are employed in similar posts in non-Kurdish districts.

6. The various departments other than those dealt with above (e.g., Waki, Posts and Telegraphs, Public Works, Jails, Customs, Irrigation, Tapu, Agriculture), employ fifty-five officials in the Kurdish districts, of whom thirty-eight are Kurds, while seventy-eight Kurds are employed in non-Kurdish districts.

7. Kurds also take their full share in the Central Government. Two Senators out of twenty are Kurds (another being half Kurd), and ten out of eighty-eight. The Minister of Finance is a Kurd and so is the Minister of Communications and Works.

8. Kurds form about 17 per cent. of the total population of the country. Twenty-four per cent. of the whole police force of the country are Kurds, and 14 per cent. of the army, while 23 per cent. of railway employees are Kurdish. The police, army and railways combined give employment to over 20,000 persons, of whom just over 4,000, or 20 per cent., are Kurds.

9. There are twenty-five schools in the Kurdish districts. Five of these are Christian, the language in use being Chaldean and Arabic. In sixteen of the remainder the language of instruction is Kurdish. In the four remaining where the pupils are partly Christian and partly Kurd, Arabic is the main language of instruction. The number of teachers employed in these schools is fifty-two, of whom all but eight are Kurds. These eight are Arabs, all fully conversant with Kurdish. They are mostly engaged in teaching Arabic, the use of which is of course necessary for advanced education. Their number was thirteen a short time ago, and is shortly being further reduced.

10. In addition to these there are twenty-two Kurds and a large number of Kurdish knowing Arabs and Turcomans employed as teachers in non-Kurdish schools outside the Kurdish area. It will therefore be seen that the educational policy now being followed is in full accord with the commission's recommendations. Development of the school system will be continued in accordance with the needs of the country as and when the country is able to afford this increase.

11. The above figures have been compiled from headquarters records. They exclude menial and minor clerical appointments (which are filled by local recruitment), and probably underestimate the number of Kurds actually employed, as only those definitely known to be Kurds have been so classified. Most officials have recorded their race as 'Iraqi,' and it is probable that a number of these are really Kurds who are not known to be so at headquarters.

12. As regards the use of the Kurdish language, it must be remembered that before the war Kurdish was not used as a means of written communication, either private or official. A fair number of poetical works in Kurdish were in existence but the development of the written language as a means of communication is entirely due to the efforts of British officials. Persian, Turkish and Arabic were previously

used. The use of written Kurdish has not yet spread to the Mosul liwa where Turkish and Arabic are used. It has gradually spread to Arbil, where it has recently been recognised as the official language for purposes of written communication with Government offices. Sulaimaniya has for some years possessed a Kurdish newspaper, and the use of written Kurdish for both private and official communications has been general for some time. The work begun by the Government of occupation is being steadily carried on by the Iraq Government. Two Kurdish news sheets are published in Bagdad, and everything possible is being done, not only to permit, but actively to encourage, the free use of the Kurdish language.

13. It is confidently submitted that the foregoing information demonstrates a complete accord between the Kurdish policy as recommended by the Frontier Commission and that adopted by the Iraq Government.

14. Possibly the best indication that the Iraq Government fully realise their responsibilities towards Kurdish sentiment, and the best earnest of their determination to continue and if necessary extend their present liberal policy of granting the widest opportunities for the development of Kurdish cultural and linguistic aspirations within the State of Iraq, is provided by the following extract from a speech made by the Iraq Prime Minister in the Chamber of Deputies on the 21st January last. He said:—

"Gentlemen, This country cannot live unless it gives all Iraqi elements their rights. We should give the Kurds their rights. Their officials should be from among them, their tongue should be their official language, and they should learn in their own tongue in the schools (applause). It is incumbent upon us to treat all elements, whether Moslem or non Moslem, with fairness and justice and give them their rights."

15. The speech of the Prime Minister, which was followed up by the issue to all Iraq Ministries of the circular instructions which are quoted below:—

"Your Excellency has no doubt seen the speech made by the Prime Minister in the Chamber of Deputies and published in the press on the following day. This speech embodies the policy which the Government pursued and will pursue in the administration of the Kurdish zone, namely, that the officials should be Kurds and the official language the Kurdish. His Excellency has therefore directed me to request you to ensure that the policy is adhered to in all that appertains to the establishments of the zone in question."

16. Further evidence of the Iraq Government's intentions is afforded by the speeches made on the occasion of a banquet given at the British Residency to celebrate the signing of the new treaty. In the course of his speech the Acting High Commissioner defined the aim of the Iraq Government in the following terms:—

"The aim of the Iraq Government should be, and is, to make all its component elements into good citizens of the Iraq State, and it will do this best by encouraging each element to retain its own individuality. The Kurd is not an Arab, any more than a Scotsman is an Englishman, and you will make him into a good Iraqi citizen not by forcing him to adopt Arab speech and habits, not in short, by trying to make him a good Arab, but by giving him every opportunity and encouragement to become a good Kurd. That unity of the State which is essential to its progress will be obtained not by stamping out the special characteristics of the different component elements, but by encouraging all that is good in these characteristics, and by adapting it to the particular genius of each of them. That is the policy which your Majesty and your Majesty's Government have already adopted and a consistent working of that enlightened policy will do as much as anything else to persuade the League of Nations that the Iraq State is fit to be numbered among her members."

17. In his reply King Faisal also referred to the subject. He said:—

"Among the first duties of every real Iraqi will be to encourage his brother, the Iraqi Kurd, to cling to his nationality and to join him under the Iraq flag—common emblem of their country for the material and intellectual happiness

of all. They will be, by their union and co-operation, active members in the prosperity of a common home. I also have no doubt that every true Iraqi is imbued with this same feeling towards all the racial elements in his country."

London, February 24, 1926

No 24

Consul London to Sir W. Tyrrell — (Received March 9)

(No 6.)

(Telegraphic) R

Geneva, March 8, 1926

FOLLOWING from Mr. Cadogan —

This morning Council met and adopted its agenda. It was decided that item regarding Irak frontier should be divided into two portions—first, examination by Council of instrument giving effect to its decision of 16th December last, second, pronouncement by Council of its final decision in the dispute. For former portion Turkish representatives would not be invited as matter is one between Council and His Majesty's Government, for latter portion they would be invited to attend. Turkish Government have already been invited to send representatives and have replied that they are considering the matter. It was agreed that this question, involving practically only final execution of provisional decision by Council of which Germany was not member, need not await Germany's inclusion in the Council. Rest of agenda postponed until Germany elected.

Replies to general questions on mandate removed from agenda.

This afternoon Assembly met under temporary presidency of Viscount Ishii, president of Council, and elected Senhor D. Costa, Portuguese delegate, its president. It also nominated two committees to deal with (1) Germany's application for admission to the League, (2) the question of the frontier between Turkey and Irak. Secretary of State is chairman of the former committee, which meets to-morrow afternoon.

E 1729 44 65]

No 25

Thirty-ninth Session of the Council, League of Nations.—Extract from Minutes of the Second Meeting, Public, held on March 11, 1926, at Geneva.—(Received in Foreign Office, March 15)

1600 Irak: Application of the Principles of Article 22 of the Covenant to Irak and Administration of the Kurdish Districts in Irak

M. LINDEN submitted the following draft resolutions —

"1. The Council of the League of Nations, supplementing its decision of the 27th September, 1924, approves the terms of the letter from the British Government dated the 2nd March, 1926, to which the text of the Treaty between Great Britain and Irak dated the 13th January, 1926, is annexed, as giving effect to the provisions of article 22 of the Covenant.

"2. The original of the letter of the 2nd March, 1926, from the British Government and the copy of the treaty communicated therewith shall be deposited in the archives of the League of Nations. Certified true copies of these documents and of the present report and resolutions of the Council shall be forwarded by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations to all members of the League.

"3. The Council forwards to the Permanent Mandates Commission the memorandum from the British Government dealing with the administration of the Kurdish districts in Irak, with a request that they submit to the Council such observations upon this matter as they may deem desirable in view of paragraph 3 of the Council decision of the 16th December, 1925, and of the recommendations on this subject, which are contained in the final conclusions of the report of the Commission of Enquiry which considered the question of the frontier between Turkey and Irak.

4. The Council decides to communicate a copy of paragraph 4 of its resolution of the 16th December to the Permanent Mandates Commission with the request that its provisions be taken into consideration when the annual reports concerning Irak are examined.

(The resolutions were adopted.)

E 1732 62 65

No 26

Thirty-ninth Session of the Council, League of Nations.—Extract from Minutes of the Second Meeting, Public, held on March 11, 1926, at Geneva.—(Received in Foreign Office, March 15)

1601 Question of the frontier between Turkey and Irak Entry into force of the Council's Decision of December 16, 1925 fixing the Frontier between Turkey and Irak

M. LINDEN read the following report and draft resolution —

"By its resolution dated the 16th December, 1925, the Council decided

"1. That the frontier between Turkey and Irak should follow the so-called Brussels line,

that "2. The British Government is invited to submit to the Council a new treaty with Irak, ensuring the continuance for twenty five years of the mandatory regime defined by the Treaty of Alliance between Great Britain and Irak and by the British Government's undertaking approved by the Council on the 27th September, 1924, unless Irak is, in conformity with Article I of the Covenant, admitted as a member of the League before the expiration of this period.

"As soon as, within a period of six months from the present date, the executive committee has submitted its report, the Council shall declare that the present decision has become definitive and shall be in force from the date of its adoption, and shall be the basis of the frontier line.

"3. The British Government, as mandatory Power, is invited to lay before the Council the administrative measures which will be taken with a view to securing for the Kurdish populations mentioned in the report of the Commission of Enquiry the guarantees regarding local administration recommended by the commission in its final conclusions.

"4. The British Government, as mandatory Power, is invited to act, as far as possible, in accordance with the other suggestions of the Commission of Enquiry as regards measures likely to ensure pacification and to afford equal protection to all the elements of the population, and also as regards the commercial measures indicated in the special recommendations of the commission's report."

The British Government forwarded officially to the secretariat, for communication to the Council, the new treaty, which was signed at Bagdad on the 13th January, and accepted by the Irak Chamber of Deputies and Senate on the 15th January, and which has since been approved by the British Parliament. The Turkish Government was immediately informed and invited to send a representative to the present session of the Council. The reply of the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs has been brought to the knowledge of the Council.

* Telegram from the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Secretary-General.

"Following upon my telegram of yesterday I have the honour to inform you that I have submitted to the Council your telegram of the 11th March inviting us to attend the Council on the 16th March. Though, as I have already stated, we did not receive it until the evening of the 11th, the treaty between the British Government and Irak and the covering letter from the British Government, which you informed us had been despatched by the same mail, have not yet been received, and we are therefore, of course, still ignorant of their contents. Under those circumstances it is obvious that any participation by the Government of the Turkish Republic in this session has become impossible. Further the Turkish Government's views on the Mosul question were clear. The Turkish delegation at Geneva at the earlier meetings of the Council at which the question was not merely not decided, but was left open.

The Council has just approved the conclusions of my report on the application to Iraq of the provisions of article 22 of the Covenant. From an examination of the new treaty upon which this first report is based, it is clear that that treaty which was brought to the knowledge of the Council before the expiry of the time-limit of six months laid down ensures the continuance for twenty-five years of the mandatory régime under the conditions stated in the Council Resolution of the 16th December 1925. I think, therefore, that the Council will be prepared to declare that its decision of the 16th December 1925, has thereby become definitive.

As regards the measures required to ensure the delimitation of the frontier line on the ground, the Council will no doubt desire to postpone the examination of this question to one of its forthcoming sessions.

I therefore propose the following draft resolution.—

"The Council,

"Having regard to paragraph 2 of its resolution dated the 16th December, 1925, which reads as follows

"2 The British Government is invited to submit to the Council a new treaty with Iraq, ensuring the continuance for twenty-five years of the mandatory régime defined by the Treaty of Alliance between Great Britain and Iraq and by the British Government's undertaking approved by the Council on the 27th September, 1924, unless Iraq is, in conformity with article 1 of the Covenant, admitted as a member of the League before the expiration of this period.

"As soon as, within a period of six months from the present date, the execution of this stipulation has been brought to the knowledge of the Council, the Council shall declare that the present decision has become definitive and shall indicate the measures required to ensure the delimitation on the ground of the frontier line.

"And having taken note of the new treaty between Great Britain and Iraq signed at Bagdad on the 19th January, 1926, and approved by the House of Commons and by the Iraqi Chamber of Deputies and Senate

"considers that this treaty, which was brought to its knowledge within the time limit laid down in the Council's resolution of the 16th December 1925, ensures the continuance for twenty-five years of the mandatory régime under the conditions laid down by it, and accordingly declares that its decision of the 16th December, 1925, has become definitive."

(The resolution was adopted.)

No. 27

Mr. House to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 17)

(No. 35)

(Telegraphic) R

Constantinople, March 16, 1926

PRESS reports repulse of attempted raids from Iraq in neighbourhood of Jeziret Ibn Omer and Midiat.

I telegraph as report may be prelude to frontier incidents.
(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 5.)

[E 2137/1927 65]

No. 26

Sir E. Drummond to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 31)

League of Nations, Geneva, March 27, 1926

WITH reference to your telegram of the 25th March concerning the sending of two officers to the Iraqi frontier in accordance with the Council's decision of the 16th March, I have the honour to confirm a telegram which I sent to you yesterday in reply thereto, the text of which is as follows—

"Am submitting your telegram of 25th March concerning officers on Iraqi frontier to Acting President Council. Think he may wish to have your views on the following points: (1) minimum period of appointment, (2) whether you prefer exclusively military officers; (3) whether both officers of same nationality

Difficult to give approximate estimate before consulting Government or country supplying officers but inclusive monthly sum of about £150 for each would seem reasonable, travelling expenses to and from Iraq extra. What would lieutenant colonel employed staff duties Iraq receive, allowance included?—DRUMMOND.

I suggest that it might facilitate the task of the Acting President of the Council in finding these two officers if you would be so good as to indicate as precisely as possible the functions which His Britannic Majesty's Government would wish these officers to perform.

The mission confided to General Landower, and subsequently continued by some of his subordinates, arose out of certain specific charges and counter-charges presented to the Council by the British and Turkish Governments in connection with the Iraqi frontier settlement. It may be that the mission to be given to the new officers may be considered to be of a somewhat different character, and I do not doubt that the Acting President of the Council would be glad to have the views of His Britannic Majesty's Government on the subject.

I have, &c.

ERIC DRUMMOND,

Secretary-General

No. 20

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Mr. House (Constantinople)

(No. 31)

(Telegraphic) R

Foreign Office, March 31, 1926

LAGDAD telegram No. 110 of 22nd March to Colonial Office, repeated to you. Visits of Turkish troops to Sul Nuzur and Sinat.

You should address note to Nuzur stating that Turkish forces are reported to have visited Sul, Nuzur and Sinat despite fact that these villages, though wrongly marked on map, unquestionably lie to south of Brussels line as explained in conclusion No. 2 of Landower report. You should inform Nuzur that as contingents of Iraqi troops are about to be sent to the district, and ask him to arrange for immediate instructions to be sent to Turkish frontier authorities in order that all risk of incidents may be avoided.

No. 24

Mr. House to Sir Austen Chamberlain (Received April 1)

(No. 30)

(Telegraphic) R

Constantinople March 31, 1926

NEWSPAPER "Millet" published on 30th March what purported to be telegram from London correspondent to the effect that His Majesty's Government are considering following three proposals:

1. Iraq to retain Mosul and Great Britain to guarantee integrity of Turkey.
2. Turkey to receive 50 to 100 kilom. (presumably east to west) of frontier and economic advantages in Iraq.
3. Mosul to be demilitarised neutral zone under neither Iraq nor Turkey.

E 2176 62 65

No. 31

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir H. Loudon (Constantinople.)

(No. 305.)

Sir

Foreign Office, April 5, 1926.

HIS Majesty's Government have had under consideration your Excellency's reports on your recent conversations with the Turkish Government at Angora with a view to arriving at a final and friendly settlement of the Iraqi frontier dispute; and the question has further been discussed with you, during your visit to London for consultation regarding the proposals which you should be authorised to make to the

[1926]

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Turkish Government on your return to Angora. As a result of these discussions, the following instructions have been prepared for your guidance.

2. Your Excellency is already aware that His Majesty's Government are desirous of coming to a friendly agreement with the Turkish Government in regard to a definite frontier between Turkey and Iraq, and thus removing the one subject which has of late rendered difficult the relations of friendship which both countries are anxious to see restored. Such an arrangement should, moreover, be one that will benefit the populations on both sides of the frontier.

Your main object on your return to Angora will therefore be to conclude an Anglo-Turkish Treaty laying down a frontier which, while involving substantial concessions to the Turkish Government, should not involve such considerable transfer of population as would create serious unrest throughout Iraq, increase the administrative difficulties and military expenditure of His Majesty's Government in that country, and be out of harmony with the principles of the League of Nations. The terms of the proposed treaty will be communicated to you separately.

4. In view of the responsibilities assumed by His Majesty's Government towards the League of Nations in respect of Iraq, as set forth in the League Council's decision of the 27th September, 1924, in the Anglo-Iraq Treaty of 1922 annexed thereto, and in the new Anglo-Iraq Treaty of the 13th January, 1926, which was approved by the League Council on the 11th March, 1926, the sanction of the Council will have to be obtained before any territory now included in Iraq is transferred to Turkey. Article 8 of the 1922 Treaty provides that no territory in Iraq shall be ceded or leased or in any way placed under the control of any foreign Power; paragraph IV of the British undertakings accepted by the League Council on the 27th September, 1924, provides that no modification of the 1922 Treaty will be agreed to by His Majesty's Government without the Council's consent; and the Council on the 11th March 1926, pronounced the "Brussels" line, as described in their decision of the 18th December, 1925, to be the definitive frontier between Turkey and Iraq, while postponing to a later date consideration of the steps required to ensure its demarcation. The sanction of the Council will therefore be required for the transfer to Turkey of any territory south of the "Brussels" line, the most convenient time for obtaining such sanction will probably be after the signature of the treaty and before the exchange of ratifications.

5. As regards the general form of the treaty, it should be concluded, in view of the international status already acquired by Iraq as a State capable of making treaties, between Great Britain and Iraq of the one part and Turkey of the other part. The terms of the treaty should be such as to enable you to act as sole negotiator and signatory on behalf of both Great Britain and Iraq is reserved for further consideration. You should ascertain from the Turkish Government as soon as you arrive at Angora whether they agree that an Iraq plenipotentiary should take part in the negotiations and sign the treaty; and you should at once report their reply to His Majesty's Government. Further instructions will then be furnished to you on the point with the least possible delay.

6. It appears preferable that the treaty shall be drawn up in the French language. If they insist on an authentic Turkish text also, you will explain that His Majesty's Government and the Iraq Government must in that event claim authentic texts in English and Arabic.

7. In accordance with the usual practice as regards treaties laying down frontiers the treaty shall not contain any clause limiting its duration to a particular period. It will, however, be necessary to include in it a provision releasing His Majesty's Government, on the termination of the special Anglo-Iraq relations created by the existing Anglo-Iraq treaties and the League's decisions in regard thereto, from any obligations under the new Anglo-Turco-Iraq Treaty except those mentioned in paragraph 9 below.

8. No full and accurate geographical survey has yet been made of the country necessary, in defining the frontier in the treaty, to indicate as far as possible the position of the frontier line. This description must cover the whole line from Syria to Persia, including the portion of the "Brussels" line which it is not proposed to alter. The actual demarcation of the frontier line should, in accordance with the usual procedure, be effected by a commission composed of representatives appointed by the contracting parties, with a neutral president chosen by the Council of the League of Nations.

9. His Majesty's Government regard it as important that the treaty shall provide that the contracting parties accept as final and definitive the Turco-Iraq frontier laid down therein, and will make no attempt to alter it.

10. Apart from the territorial clauses indicated above, the treaty should comprise articles designed to promote good-neighbourly relations between Turkey and Iraq, by means of provisions dealing with matters such as tribal disputes, migrations, brigandage, and in general all matters usually regulated by a treaty of *bon voisinage*. It should provide, in particular, for the establishment of a standing joint commission meeting periodically, to discuss questions arising out of matters of this kind and to settle them in an amicable manner.

11. The treaty should contain provisions on the lines of those in the Treaty of Lausanne regarding the nationality of residents in transferred territories and their right to opt within a certain period for Iraq nationality.

12. It should, if possible, be laid down in the treaty that the Council of the Ottoman Public Debt shall decide what portion of the debt attributable to the former Mosul Vilayet shall be borne by Turkey and Iraq respectively in consequence of the new determination of the frontier. This arrangement should be proposed to the Turkish Government as a reasonable and equitable solution, but you are authorised to drop the proposal if they make serious difficulty regarding its acceptance.

13. The treaty should provide for the application as between Turkey and Iraq, of (a) the convention respecting conditions of residence and business and jurisdiction, and (b) the Commercial Convention, both signed at Lausanne in 1924.

14. His Majesty's Government would welcome the conclusion of a Turco-Iraq extradition treaty in accordance with the usages prevailing among friendly States; and the agreement of Turkey and Iraq to enter into negotiations for this purpose as soon as possible might well be embodied in an article of the new Anglo-Turco-Iraq Treaty.

I am, &c.
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

E 1914 44 65

No. 32

Foreign Office to League of Nations.

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 12, 1926.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Austen Chamberlain to inform you that he exchanged with the Iraq diplomatic agent in London on the 30th March the ratifications by His Majesty the King and by King Faisal of the treaty signed at Bagdad on the 13th January, 1926, which was approved by the Council of the League of Nations on the 11th March.

I am to transmit to you herewith, for registration, and for entry in the archives of the League in accordance with the final clause of the treaty, one of the three original signed texts of that instrument.

I am, &c.
LANCLOT OLIPIANT

E 2244 27 65

No. 33

Sir Austen Chamberlain to M de Fauriol

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, April 14, 1926.

IN your note of the 21st November, 1925, you submitted certain considerations in support of the argument that your Government are entitled to share in the development of oil fields in the Vilayet of Basra.

2. I have carefully considered the matter, but I must confess to some perplexity in regard to the French Government's claim, since it is largely based upon a number of inevitably hypothetical assumptions. In the first place, there is at present little reason to suppose that oil deposits exist in this vilayet, and there certainly was not, at

the time when the San Remo Agreement was signed and reason to suppose that the Basra Vilayet had oil potentialities. It was probably large, owing to this circumstance that the Mesopotamian oil-fields were not defined in the San Remo Agreement as meaning oil-fields in the Vilayets of Bagdad and Mosul, since it was not then supposed that there existed oil-fields outside these vilayets.

3. In your note your Excellency claims that the letter signed by M. Berthelot and Sir John Cadman on the 29th January, 1921, can only be held to interpret the second part of article 7 of the San Remo Agreement, which refers to the eventuality of the development of oil in Irak by a private company, and that it does not affect the first part of article 7, which provides for the development of oil-fields in Irak by Government action.

4. It is the belief of His Majesty's Government that the development of oil-fields in Irak by Government action is an eventuality so remote as to be negligible. Should it, however, happen during the continuance of the present special relations between His Majesty's Government and Irak, that the Irak Government decide to develop the hypothetical oil-fields in the Basra Vilayet, I shall be happy to inform your Government and to co-operate with them in the application of the first part of article 7 of the San Remo Agreement to this eventuality.

5. In the remote event of oil deposits being discovered in the Basra Vilayet and of their development by a private petroleum company, it seems unlikely that such company will be other than the Turkish Petroleum Company, in which His Majesty's Government have already placed a shareholding at the disposal of the French Government. If, however, a private petroleum company, other than the Turkish Petroleum Company, obtains from the Irak Government a concession for the development of such oil in Basra Vilayet, His Majesty's Government cannot admit that they are under any obligation, under the San Remo Agreement and the authoritative interpretation of that agreement contained in the letter of the 29th January, 1921, to place at the disposal of the French Government a share of 25 per cent. in any such company.

6. They are compelled to take up this attitude in view of the fact that they are not in a position, and never have been in a position, to promise to the French Government a shareholding in any private petroleum company used for the development of oil-fields in Mesopotamia other than the Turkish Petroleum Company. It was in order that the situation in this respect might be clearly defined that the letter of the 29th January, 1921, signed by M. Berthelot and Sir John Cadman, was drawn up and signed, and from the fact that your note contends that the letter in question interprets only the second paragraph of article 7, I infer that the French Government do not now dissent from this view of the situation.

7. With regard to the transferred territories, to which your communication incidentally refers, I regret that I must hold to the opinion expressed on this subject in my memorandum of the 8th October, 1925.

I have, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

[E 2287 1827 65]

No. 34

Foreign Office to League of Nations

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 16, 1926.

WITH reference to your letter of the 27th March and previous correspondence relative to the despatch of two neutral officers to the neighbourhood of the Turco-Irak frontier, I am directed by Secretary Sir Austen Chamberlain to return the following replies to the questions raised in that letter and in your telegram of the 26th March:

1. It will be sufficient if the officers are appointed for six weeks in the first instance, at the end of which period the necessity for retaining them could be reviewed in the light of the circumstances then existing.
2. It is considered preferable that military officers should be selected for this duty.
3. It is desired that, if possible, the two officers selected should not be of the same nationality.
4. A British lieutenant-colonel employed on staff duties in Irak would receive emoluments of approximately £4 18s. 6d. a day, including pay, subsistence allowance, marriage allowance and colonial allowance.

5. As regards the functions which the two neutral officers should perform, His Majesty's Government consider that, pending the formal recognition of the Council's frontier decision by the Turkish Government, the presence in the frontier region of officers appointed by the League of Nations, who could note and report to the Council the manner in which that decision is being observed, would have a quietening effect and thus a direct bearing on the incidents which previously led to charges and counter-charges by the British and Turkish Governments.

I am, &c.

LANCELOT OLIPHANT.

E 2499 228 65

No. 35

Report by Colonel Jac and M. Markus respecting the Frontier between Turkey and Irak

Note by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations.—(Received in Foreign Office April 20.)

(C 23.)

Geneva, April 14, 1926

The following report from Colonel Jac and M. Markus, dated the 12th April, is circulated for the information of the Council.

Report by Colonel Jac and M. Markus

(Translation.)

Geneva, April 12, 1926.

When General Landoner left Mosul on the 2nd November 1925, two members of the mission—Colonel Jac and M. Markus—remained behind, in accordance with telegraphic instructions received from the Secretary-General, to carry on the mission until the question of the frontier was finally decided by the Council which was to meet in the first fortnight of December. The task of the mission remaining in Mosul did not differ from that of the Landoner Mission, its chief duty being to watch the situation in the disputed territory, the main part of the work, namely, the enquiry concerning the situation of the frontier, being left in the hands of the spot of certain disputed points in the frontier district, having already been done by General Landoner.

During this period the mission has been able to ascertain, by visiting various localities and by talking with the representatives of the Irak and Turkish Governments, and with the local population, that peace and order have not been disturbed either on the provisional frontier or in the interior of the territory.

The Council having in December adopted the Brussels line as the final frontier the mission, in accordance with the Secretary-General's instructions, remained on the spot until the decision became final, in accordance with the conditions referred to in the Council's resolution.

In the opinion of the mission, its duties assumed a different character at the end of this first period its stay at Mosul being prolonged in order that it might observe (1) the manner in which the Council's decision was accepted by the population; (2) the situation on the frontier which had now become the final frontier, and (3) the situation of the Christian refugees in the Goyan district.

The mission did not consider itself authorised to touch upon the domestic questions referred to in the December decision, being of opinion that these were matters of internal policy.

This second period has been characterised by absolute tranquillity within and without the territory, and by the absence of any incidents which could be regarded as serious.

In particular, the mission has the honour to report as follows:—

1. The decision reached by the Council in December has been accepted with enthusiasm by the educated classes of the Irak and with feelings of satisfaction by the masses. The people are glad to have obtained, after a long and painful period of uncertainty, a solid foundation for the economic restoration of their country. These feelings have found expression not only in the manifestations and ovations with which the mission was everywhere received by the authorities and the population, but

also in a more tangible form; after the decision, the population of the Lawa of Mosul paid 90 per cent. not merely of the taxation of the last fiscal period but also all taxes in arrears for the last two years, and this without any special action being taken by the authorities.

The mission would point out in particular that, although it has enjoyed complete freedom and has had every opportunity of coming into direct contact with the population, no single manifestation of discontent with the decision has ever come to its notice.

2. Peace and order in the frontier district has not been disturbed to any serious extent during the whole of this period. The mission was, it is true, informed that Turkish patrols had visited the villages of Sul and Nuzdur to the south of the frontier on the 14th January and 22nd January and again on the 21st February and 23rd February; that they had spent the night there and had commandeered supplies from the inhabitants. The mission did not consider these incidents to be of particular importance from the point of view of general peace, because (a) in its opinion the incidents were not organised by the higher Turkish authorities, but rather by local subordinate commanders or even by soldiers individually responsible; (b) in all the cases reported, the number of soldiers was insignificant (three soldiers); (c) the Irak Supreme Command can at any time prevent the repetition of these incidents by sending outposts to occupy effectively all the villages in the frontier district which, according to the Council's decision, are without doubt situated in Irak territory.

Among the more important events which occurred in the frontier zone during this period, we should mention the emigration from Turkey into Irak of Nafi Bey, chief of the Kurdish tribe of Miran, with most of his tribe (according to his own estimate 1,000 persons). As the mission has not been able to ascertain the causes of this exodus, it can only report the fact.

3. The Christians of Goyan, who were concentrated by the Turkish authorities in the district of Elki last year, continue to cross the frontier in small groups or singly, in most cases they are persons who have maintained relations with the refugees that came into Irak last year and are now in the concentration camps of Zakho and Barani.

The general impression of the mission leaving the territory is that peace and order reign along the frontier and in the interior of the country under a well-derivated administration whose work has been crowned with remarkable success.

In conclusion, the mission feels bound to make special mention of the extraordinary co-operation displayed by the Irak and British authorities.

In particular, the mission tender its thanks to his Excellency, Mr. Bernard Henry Dardillon, C.M.G., Acting High Commissioner, Mr. Jardine, administrative inspector at Mosul and his Excellency Abdul Aziz-el-Karab, Mutessarif of Mosul.

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL RUD JAC
(Czechoslovakia).
N. MARKUS (Estonia).

E 2577 62 65

No 36

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir R. Lindsay (Constantinople).

(No. 850)

Sir

THE Turkish Ambassador asked to see me to-day.

He expressed the hope that I was satisfied with the turn which negotiations had taken. I replied in the affirmative and added that it had given me great pleasure to see that our friendly intentions towards Turkey were finding reciprocal expression in the attitude of the Turkish Government in these conversations. I added that I had this morning received from you what was evidently a most important proposal, but that the text was so corrupt that at present we were able to make out little more than the subject with which it dealt.

I expressed to him the utmost desire of the Turkish Government with the utmost desire to find in them a solution of the question, and that we should act with all the expedition possible in dealing with the matter. I also to be consulted.

The Ambassador said that he attached great importance to the avoidance of delay. Circumstances were now favourable, but it was the character of his people to prolong negotiations, and it was important that we should strike while the iron was hot.

His Excellency then enquired whether he might ask whether I had any information about the reported agreement between Italy and Greece, and he showed considerable concern as to Italian intentions and a great desire to know whether there was anything in the notes exchanged between us and the Italian Government which would point to Abyssinia as a derivative for any Italian ambitions. As he continued to press me about M. Mussolini's intentions I laughingly replied that I supposed my proper course would be to try to increase his anxiety, but I was not going to do so. I believed that M. Mussolini had already instructed his Ambassador at Ankara to give reassuring explanations to the Turkish Government. For myself I should accept such assurances as given in good faith. I thought the Italian and Greek Governments had felt the necessity to put an end to the tension which had existed between them ever since the Corfu incident, but I had no reason to suppose that they were contemplating any aggressive action or that they had completed any pact. As to our negotiations about Abyssinia, they were directed to clear up our respective positions under the agreement of 1906, in which, as I observed, France was also concerned. They dealt purely with economic and industrial relations and in no way with territorial claims or ambitions. The three Powers had undertaken to respect the independence of Abyssinia, which country, by the way, was a member of the League of Nations and enjoyed the protection which that membership secured, and none of the three Powers had any desire to invade Abyssinian rights or partition Abyssinian territory.

I am, &c.
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

T 5095 508 381

No 37

League of Nations to Foreign Office.—(Received April 25.)

Sir,

Geneva, April 22, 1926.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 12th April, 1926, and to inform you that the text of the treaty between Great Britain and Irak signed at Bagdad on the 13th January, 1926, has been deposited in the archives of the League of Nations in accordance with the final clause of the treaty, and for registration, one of the three original signed texts of the treaty between Great Britain and Irak signed at Bagdad on the 13th January, 1926.

Under the terms of article 18 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the above-mentioned treaty was registered with the secretariat of the League of Nations on the 11th April, 1926, and will be published as soon as possible in the "League of Nations' Treaty Series." The certificate of registration is forwarded to you herewith. The text of the said treaty has been duly deposited in the archives of the League of Nations.

I have, &c.
H. McKINNON WOOD,
Acting Director of the Legal Section

E 2642 62 65]

No 38

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 27)

(No. 193)

Sir,

Ankara, April 18, 1926.

I HAVE the honour to report that I arrived here on the 17th instant and the same evening had an interview with Tewfik Rushdi Bey in which we entered on the negotiations for the fixation of the Irak frontier.

I proceeded to give him a general sketch of the sort of treaty which His Majesty's Government would wish to conclude with Turkey for the settlement of this question, and he made comments on the various points as I developed them. With the broad principle of a tripartite treaty to which Irak would subscribe he was in

agreement, and he appeared to consider that it would be to the advantage of Turkey to settle the whereabouts of the frontier, however, he maintained that the wording of the Treaty of Lausanne (article 3 (2)) actually precluded him from discussing it with anyone but Great Britain, and, though this theory may lead to strange and illogical results, he was not to be moved from his view. In regard to the suggested arbitration, he was inclined to demur, though without much conviction, to the provision of a neutral chairman with a decisive vote, expressing a preference for a stipulation for arbitration if necessary, but he did not press this idea with any vigour.

3. As to the provisions for the treatment of populations in transferred territory, he maintained that those who opted to preserve their present nationality should have to liquidate their property within a stated period—a proposal which rather horrified me, this, too, however, he did not press strongly.

4. The general lines of the *bona fide* articles excited little comment from him, and he had no *prima facie* objections to make against the suggested permanent front or commission.

5. He seemed to regard as perfectly natural the suggested division, according to the new frontier line, between Turkey and Iraq by the Ottoman Debt Commission of the amount of debt allocated by that commission to the former Vilayet of Mosul.

6. When I referred to the provision by which Turkey would explicitly accord

the privileges secured to foreigners in Iraq by the Anglo-Iraq Judicial Agreement of the 25th March, 1924, and said that Turkey would have to claim the extension of them to her subjects. I am aware how difficult, if not impossible, it would be for the Iraq Government to meet this request, and shall not fail to keep you closely informed of any developments of this question.

7. Tewfik Rushdi Bey welcomed the suggestion that provision should be made for the early negotiation with Iraq of conventions governing subsidiary matters—sanitation, veterinary, plant diseases, insect pests and extradition, especially extradition.

8. He quite appreciated the force of the provision by which His Majesty's Government, when the special relationship between themselves and Iraq came to an end should cease to be bound by the treaty except by those articles defining and guaranteeing the frontier.

9. He demurred with an insistence that rather surprised me to the mention in the treaty of approval by the League of Nations to the treaty prior to its ratification. He said that if we were to do this we should be bound to do so at this point and without dissent to the League we could not omit it; he maintained that it was a mere matter of internal concern for us, perhaps a necessary step for us to take before we could ratify, but that as such there was no necessity for us to mention the point in the treaty. This is another matter which I may have to refer to you later on.

10. I then handed to the Minister the description of the new frontier line which I had the honour to propose to the Turkish Government, with a map to illustrate it. I attach herewith a copy of the document I gave him. Tewfik Rushdi Bey glanced at it, but realising that he would not be able to grasp its import, set it aside for more leisurely study.

11. His remarks throughout were nothing but first impressions, and too much importance should not be attached to them.

12. I saw Ismet Pasha this morning. After some general talk we soon got on to the subject of the proposed treaty, but we spoke only of the territorial and political aspects of the question. He said that the transfer of territory was "the whole question," and that what I had to offer was "nothing at all." He spoke at length of Turkey's desire for security and of the apparent impossibility of getting it, and he complained of the difficult position in which the Turkish Government was placed. I said that His Majesty's Government desired earnestly to be on friendly terms with Turkey, and to endeavour to attain that object was spontaneously agreed to by both Governments. When any definite proposal could be found? They also desired that Turkey should feel secure within her own frontiers. The British Empire was slowly advancing further and further northwards till nobody

* Not printed

imagined it would ever stop, well' here was the line not merely stopping, but turning back again to the south. This treaty would not merely convince the local populations that finality had been reached, it would also put an end to the atmosphere of perpetual crisis that had for the past years pervaded Anglo-Turkish relations between the two countries.

13. Ismet Pasha said that this was all very fine and he had little doubt of the desire of His Majesty's Government to be on good terms with Turkey, but His Majesty's Government was one thing and their local agents another. He had himself served in olden days in Yemen, and he knew the mentality of frontier officials in distant regions, they could not keep quiet, and must always be agitating the frontier regions were now in hopeless disorder, and it was no investigation from across the border. I denied this warmly and gave Ismet Pasha a personal word for it that Iraq officials for years past had actively provoked instigations to disorder in Turkey from Iraq territory. I knew perfectly well that in Iraq all was quiet and that in Turkey all was confusion, but this was because the Turkish Government had seen fit suddenly to close tekkes and to make everyone wear hats. Ismet said that this could not be the reason of the disorder because even the "Nestorians" in Turkey were protesting against hats, and I answered that hats had very little to do with it, what had driven people in Turkey into revolt was the violent interference by the Turkish Government with the ancient habits of a backward and primitive people. Iraq officials had nothing to do with it, there were, I said, Kurds from almost every tribe in Turkey who had taken refuge in Iraq; if we had wanted to cause trouble in Turkey we could have lighted up rebellion from end to end of the country, but we had not done so, and he must know it. Did he not remember an observation I made to him last year in March when Sheikh Said a rebellion was at its height? I had then said to him that doubtless Turkey would soon crush the rebellion, that prisoners would be taken and examined and close enquiries pursued, but that I could then tell him that no trace of British instigation of the revolt would be found. And what trace of British instigation did you find?

14. This seemed to strike Ismet rather forcibly. He admitted remembering my statement of last year, and he did not attempt any accusation that we had had any part in the Kurdish rising of 1925; but, he said, if you hold that your Iraq officials are now having no part in our present troubles, I will ask Tewfik Rushdi to give you some precise details to prove the contrary. I said that if Tewfik Rushdi would do this I should have pleasure in giving him answers (and I have no doubt that with Mr. Jardine's help I shall be able to do so), but I hoped that care would be taken that we should not get into an acrimonious correspondence of a nature to injure our present negotiations. To this Ismet Pasha assented, and the conversation terminated soon afterwards. It was quite friendly in tone throughout.

15. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Iraq.

I have, &c.
R C LINDSAY

E 2772/63 65)

No. 29

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 3)

(No 203)

Angora, April 24, 1926

WITH the formulation of Turkish counter-proposals on the Iraq frontier question a new phase in the negotiations is entered upon, and in the interval I venture to submit some observations for the sake of record perhaps rather than of enlightenment, as I have reported fully by telegram.

2. The Turkish counter-proposal is indeed only put forward unofficially, yet the whole case. Tewfik Rushdi may have said to himself that he can always throw up his hands in theory he may be right, but in practice he can only do so with an immense loss of leverage. The Turkish Government then has rejected one solution of the question—and a solution which would undoubtedly have caused acute internal difficulty in Iraq, when, as they must have guessed, it had only been half formulated

to them. They have also taken no care whatever to secure to themselves previously an alternative satisfaction. They have indeed put forward simultaneously with their rejection of territory three other proposals: two of them, a guarantee of mutual neutrality and some shadowy continuance of Turkish sovereignty over Irak, were respectively dropped or emasculated by Tewfik Rushdi Bey himself almost in the very first stage of the negotiations. I had expected that it would appeal to Turkey. I am now somewhat afraid that the arrangements of the Turkish Petroleum Company and of the Irak Government may be so complicated now that they are settled that a concession to Turkey in the matter of oil, even if the Irak and British Governments accepted it in principle, may in practice require many weeks of elaboration, and if so the third satisfaction asked for by Tewfik Rushdi would vanish not through reluctance of the two Governments but from their sheer inability to give it. I am, however, pinning my hopes on the possibility of doing something in the way of royalties. At first, under the influence of Tewfik Rushdi's suggestion of a nominal continuance of Turkish sovereignty over Irak, I was greatly afraid of touching royalties, and I took great care not to mention the word; but, on second thoughts, it seems to me that if we could definitely establish with the Turkish Government that sovereignty passed unequivocally to Irak, a concession in the form of royalties would be a very small price to pay for a great danger, and might constitute a fairly cheap solution of the question. To this point of cheapness I will revert later.

3. Diplomacy could hardly have fallen more heavily between two stools than has that of Tewfik Rushdi in this matter, and it is all rather typical of his precipitate method of doing things without previously thinking them out. He has thrown away the best part of three possible satisfactions and is now reduced to one only, and that is a concession over oil. If we are able eventually to reach a settlement on surprisingly easy terms it will be due mainly to the extremely parlous state of the country at the present moment. The disorder in finance is showing itself in the non-payment of salaries and of contractors for public works, of which instances are coming to light with far greater frequency than ever before in the two years I have been here. The discontent with the Government's policies has extended to the west, and, from what Mr Jardine tells me, it must have made the Government's position in the eastern and south-eastern vilayets much weaker than I had imagined. Finally, we have just had partial mobilisation, as everyone says, against the Italian menace. What the Italian menace amounts to at this moment nobody here seems to know, but panic fear is of its essence unreasoning. It is also symptomatic of conscious weakness. Now, as it seems to me, it is not to the interest either of Great Britain or of Irak, whose fortunes for some years will be closely bound up with those of Great Britain, that Turkey should be unduly weak, and you, Sir, may shortly find it necessary to decide how far it is right or wise to profit by Turkey's present weakness in driving a bargain.

4. If we are able eventually to reach a settlement on surprisingly easy terms it will be due mainly to the extremely parlous state of the country at the present moment. The disorder in finance is showing itself in the non-payment of salaries and of contractors for public works, of which instances are coming to light with far greater frequency than ever before in the two years I have been here. The discontent with the Government's policies has extended to the west, and, from what Mr Jardine tells me, it must have made the Government's position in the eastern and south-eastern vilayets much weaker than I had imagined. Finally, we have just had partial mobilisation, as everyone says, against the Italian menace. What the Italian menace amounts to at this moment nobody here seems to know, but panic fear is of its essence unreasoning. It is also symptomatic of conscious weakness. Now, as it seems to me, it is not to the interest either of Great Britain or of Irak, whose fortunes for some years will be closely bound up with those of Great Britain, that Turkey should be unduly weak, and you, Sir, may shortly find it necessary to decide how far it is right or wise to profit by Turkey's present weakness in driving a bargain.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Irak.

I have, &c.
(For the Ambassador)
R. A. LEEPER

[E 2717 1827 '65]

No 40

Foreign Office to League of Nations.

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 4, 1926.

WITH reference to my letter of the 16th April, relative to the despatch of two neutral officers to the neighbourhood of the Turco-Irak frontier, I am directed by Secretary Sir Austen Chamberlain to inform you that this question has now been further discussed in London with Major Abraham, of the League of Nations secretariat. As the result of these discussions, the following information has been furnished to Major Abraham:

2. The object of His Majesty's Government in making the request for the presence of neutral observers in the neighbourhood of the Turco-Irak frontier is to have present at the League of Nations the results of the negotiations proceeding between the Turkish and British Governments. His Majesty's Government will not raise objection if the officers selected for this duty are both of the same nationality, and that the period of their employment should be three months, counting from the date of their departure from the capital of their own country to the date of their return thither. In the event of the negotiations with the Turkish Government proving successful within the period of three months, His Majesty's Government would probably desire that the officers should return home prior to the expiry of that period, and similarly, if the course of the negotiations were delayed, His Majesty's Government might desire to extend the period of the officers' employment.

3. I am to add that His Majesty's Government are prepared to agree to the two officers selected being paid an inclusive salary at the rate of £150 per mensem each for the period of three months mentioned above, together with the cost of their passage to and from Irak, the cost of insurance and an outfit allowance of £100 each.

I am, &c.

LANCELOT OLIPHANT

[E 2584, 112 65]

No. 41

Foreign Office to League of Nations.

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 7, 1926.

IN your letter of the 19th April you informed Secretary Sir Austen Chamberlain that the Permanent Mandates Commission will hold their ninth session at Geneva on the 8th June next, and that they hope at that meeting to examine *inter alia* the reports of His Majesty's Government on the Administration of Irak for the periods April 1923 to December 1924 and January to December 1925, which are expected to reach Geneva by the 30th May. You further requested the Secretary of State to acquaint you in due course with the names of the representatives designated by His Majesty's Government to attend that session for the examination of the above-mentioned reports.

2. As you are aware, the first of these two reports has already been laid before the commission, to whom it was suggested that that report might be discussed at the extraordinary session held in Rome in February last (see my letter of the 11th January). The second report is expected to reach Geneva by the 30th May, and will be examined on that occasion. As regards the second report, every effort is being made to ensure that it shall reach you by the 20th May.

His Majesty's Government are anxious to be represented by His Majesty's High Commissioner for Irak, Sir Henry Dobbs, on the first occasion when their reports on Irak are to be examined by the commission. They are, indeed, reluctant, in view of the fact that Sir H. Dobbs would be deputed for the purpose. They are, moreover, confident that the attendance of the High Commissioner himself would be welcome to the commission and assist them materially in the examination of the reports.

4. A serious practical difficulty arises, however, as regards the attendance of Sir H. Dobbs at the June session of the commission. He has only recently returned from Irak, and is, therefore, somewhat fatigued. He has also, on several occasions, been the subject of objections for administrative reasons to requiring him to leave his post again so early. In these circumstances His Majesty's Government earnestly hope that the commission, bearing in mind how far more profitably the Irak reports could be discussed in the presence than in the absence of Sir H. Dobbs, may be willing to postpone the examination of the reports until the 1st of September. This would also present the additional advantage of giving the commission the opportunity of studying at their leisure the voluminous documents which will come up for the first time for their official consideration.

I am, &c.

LANCELOT OLIPHANT.

[15026]

R

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain—(Received May 17.)

(No. 227)

Sir,

Constantinople, May 13, 1926.

I HAVE the honour to report further on the Irak frontier negotiations, in continuation of my despatch No. 203 of the 24th April.

When the Turkish Government put forward its request for participation in Irak oil instead of for territory, a considerable pause ensued while the complicated issue thus raised was undergoing examination by His Majesty's Government. In the first days of May I began to fear that the atmosphere, which had been very favourable, might deteriorate, and that, in view of the preoccupation of His Majesty's Government with the strike situation in England, the British reply to Turkish overtures might be still further delayed. Accordingly, on the 5th May, in order to keep Tewfik Rushdi in play, I visited him and expressed to him unofficially my personal conviction that an allotment of shares in the Turkish Petroleum Company would be almost impossible, but that it seemed to me likely that something might be done in the way of assigning to the Turkish Government a share in the Irak Government royalties. As to sovereignty, I handed to him, unofficially and without prejudice, the document, of which I enclose a copy herewith, to show him, as I said, how ideas on the subject were moving in London. I expressly warned him that this document was not a draft, and that the ideas in it had not yet been approved by His Majesty's Government. We separated on very friendly terms, agreeing to meet again in three days' time.

3. That was on Wednesday, the 5th May. That very afternoon I received your long telegram No. 14 of the 4th May, telling me exactly how far I might go in the direction of offering to Turkey a participation in the Irak Government royalties. The same afternoon, or in the evening, Tewfik Rushdi met the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Assembly (thru I have from a member of the committee, who told me about it on the 8th May), to whom he repeated what I had said, and showed my formula about the reserves, which is forming the subject of separate discussion with you by telegram, and, according to my informant, to have expressed an actual preference for royalties over shares as regards.

4. On Thursday, the 6th May, I met the Minister for Foreign Affairs again by appointment at 10 o'clock. By 11 o'clock he had just come out of one of the interminable Cabinet meetings in which Turkish Ministers indulge. It had lasted for seven hours. His own affairs had come up, but he had no time to see me. He was much excited; if he had not been so he might have wished to see me at 10 o'clock at night, as it was, he gave me a short interview. He said that he had been very busy, but that he would give the Minister the idea of what sort of participation in royalties the Turkish Government might hope to get.

5. I have reported this in some detail to show you to what lightning and radical changes of mind the Turkish Government is liable. I saw Tewfik Rushdi Boy on the 8th May, just before he was to leave for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He said that they were being treated à la Hyères. I said we had been beating about the bush long enough, and the time had come for us to get to business and stick to it. I hoped there would be no more of this sort of thing. He said that he would give the Minister the idea of what sort of participation in royalties the Turkish Government might hope to get.

I can only suppose that the financial shoe is pinching very seriously. A great effort is being made to raise a budget for 1926-7, but the Government is unable to increase revenue, and measures, which seem equally drastic to Turkish Ministers, to reduce expenditure. Thus, the Minister, who is perpetually at loggerheads with all his colleagues, who complain that they are being

expedited at a very low price, but for the whole-hearted support of the Government, the price of peace is a high one. The Government is now in a position to offer a sum of £500,000, which is a very large sum for the Government to offer.

7. I am, Sir, very respectfully, Sir, Your obedient servant, R. C. LINDSAY

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY

Enclosure in No. 42.

(A).—Dans le Préambule.

Des "considérants"

1. Rappelant les prévisions du Traité de Lausanne d'après lesquelles certaines questions relatives à l'avenir des territoires au sud de la ligne de 1924 sont à résoudre à l'amiable entre les intéressés.

2. Reconnaisant que l'Irak est devenu un État capable de se gouverner librement, sous réserve du traité d'alliance entre l'Irak et la Grande-Bretagne.

3. Exprimer le désir de reconnaître comme frontière définitive la ligne provisoire de 1924 et de reconnaître que la souveraineté sur les territoires au sud de cette ligne est passée au Irak.

4. Exprimer le désir de prévenir pour l'avenir tout incident de frontière qui pourrait déranger la tranquillité de ces régions.

(B).—Dans le Corps du Traité.

Un article donnant une description détaillée de la ligne de 1924, et reconnaissant formellement que la souveraineté sur les territoires au sud de cette ligne est passée entre les mains du Irak.

No. 43

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain—(Received May 18)

(No. 23)

(Telegraphic) R

Angora, May 18, 1926

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs tells me that Shemadinan has been attacked by 400 men under four leaders, namely, Seyed Abdullah, Seyed Felim, Oghus and Ahmed, aided or incited by Seyed Taha. He will send me further details in an ordinary letter.

No. 44

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain—(Received May 20)

No. 36.)

(Telegraphic)

Angora, May 20, 1926

AFTER an interview with Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 25th May I thought Turkish Government were going to accept £500,000. Yesterday, however, he told me that difficulties of agreeing to this sum were very great, and asked me what we would give in royalties instead. I offered him 10 per cent. for twenty five years.

I think it likely that he will revert again to capital sum, and I should hope not to utilise authority given in your telegram No. 25.

I am confident Turkish Government hope to sign treaty and have ratification authorised by Assembly in its present session.

(Sent to Bagdad, No. 34.)

No. 45

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 29)

(No. 38)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Angora, May 28, 1926

I HAVE received Turkish counter draft.

The first important point is that it omits all mention of League of Nations, viz., article 3, where a Swiss is to act as president, and where League of Nations is left out of last paragraphs, article 20, where mention of League of Nations is also expunged. Paragraph 3 of preamble is also omitted.

On the other hand, article 1 says definitely that "frontier line is that laid down by the Council of the League on 27th September, 1925."

I trust that British and Irak Governments can accept this.

The Turkish counter-draft inserts another article 1 (a) by which Turkey renounces in favour of Irak all sovereignty south of the line
(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 36)

No. 46

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 29)

(No. 39)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Angora, May 28, 1926

MY immediately preceding telegram

Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs obstinately refuses to admit any mention in treaty of special relations between His Majesty's Government and Irak. In preamble of paragraph 2 he puts "In view of alliance between Great Britain and Irak." In article 19 he provides that articles 1 to 5 shall be permanent, and remaining articles may be denounced by any party after years on giving six months' notice.

As to first point, I will urge him to accept words "special relations" instead of "alliance." Please telegraph if it is of importance to win on this point.

As to the second, only possible date is 1928, which is earliest moment at which Irak can terminate present relations with His Majesty's Government. As article 18 contemplated revising frontier agreement after two or three years, perhaps His Majesty's Government might accept freedom of all parties to denounce it in 1928
(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 37)

No. 47

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 29)

(No. 40)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Angora, May 28, 1926

MY immediately preceding telegram

Turkish counter-draft says: "Turkey and Irak shall give each other most-favoured nation treatment both in matters of commerce and establishment." But Minister for Foreign Affairs insists that it must be both or neither. Simplest thing would be to omit the article altogether and rely on articles of Lausanne Conventions for protection of Irak interests. If this course were adopted it would become more important to obtain some recognition of existence of special relations with Irak
(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 38)

No. 48

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 29)

(No. 41)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Angora, May 28, 1926

TURKISH re-draft of treaty

Following are various other amendments —

- (i) Frontier zone is 75 kilom. instead of 50
- (ii) Article 4 Turkey reserves the right to refuse Turkish nationality to optants.
- (iii) Add at end of article 14 "They undertake to allow on their territory, and especially in frontier zone, no meeting or organisation of propaganda directed against each other."
- (iv) Article 16 This paragraph is omitted. Minister for Foreign Affairs says that this will be arranged by diplomatic note, which is the more ordinary procedure.
- (v) New article 17a inserted, by which Irak undertakes not to disturb or molest persons inhabiting ceded territory on account of political opinions or conduct previous to signature of present treaty and to accord to them full amnesty. Sentences pronounced for above reasons shall be annulled and any proceedings instituted stopped. Compare amnesty declaration of Treaty of Lausanne.
- (vi) Article 18 is excised and also words in article 15 "notably pasturage and tribal migrations," idea being to leave all these things the more favourable to Frontier Commission.

Unless I hear to the contrary I shall assume that there is no objection to these
(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 39)

No. 49

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 30)

(No. 42)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Angora, May 29, 1926

YOUR telegram No. 26.

For [sic] preamble of paragraph 1 is as follows "In view of the provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne regarding settlement of the frontier between Turkey and Irak." Paragraph 2, as in my telegram No. 39. Paragraph 3 omitted, but substance inserted in article 1 (a).

There are of course numerous more verbal changes throughout the counter-draft not worth telegraphing.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 40)

E 3317 62 65

No. 50

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 31.)

(No. 44.)

N.

Angora, May 22, 1926

IN continuation of my despatch No. 227 of the 12th May, I have the honour to report in general on the progress of the negotiations with the Turkish Government over the Irak frontier.

I had then received no instructions from you as to offering a lump sum to the Turkish Government, and, as we had then been marking time for ten days, I thought well to see the Minister for Foreign Affairs on Monday, the 17th, to keep him in play. As I could make him no offer, our conversation was mainly on matters of secondary importance. I gave him a copy of the preamble of our draft treaty and asked him to send it to the National Assembly. I have since had word from the National Assembly was to adjourn within the next week or so, concerning which I had heard

[15026]

E 3

some rumours on my arrival at Angora and learned that it was likely. This surprised me a good deal, as the last time I had seen Tewfik Rushdi he had told me that he was arranging to have the budget of his department discussed the next of all so that he

affairs of Turkey. I expressed to him my disappointment, as it would postpone the ratification of the treaty which we hoped to sign, and he replied that things had gone much faster than he had expected, that his own budget was now passed, and that the Assembly had never before continued its sittings beyond the middle of May.

17th May went first to Constantinople. It was repeated to me here and arrived on Wednesday, the 19th, but in so corrupt a form that my staff had to work on it literally all that night to extract sense from it. It contained your instructions as to the offer of a lump sum to Turkey, and I arranged to see the Minister for Foreign Affairs on Thursday evening at 7.30.

4. Now you instructed me here to endeavour to purchase Turkish consent for a sum of from £300,000 to £500,000—the figures I had myself suggested in my telegram to you No. 77 of the 11th May. Though with every desire to spare the pocket of the Turkish Government, I decided to go at once for the maximum figure named by you, for the following reasons: In the first place, the very unfavourable view of Turkish finance which I had gathered at Angora in the first days of May was corrected by far more reliable information I obtained when I returned to Angora. The Turks were not as pressed for cash as I had thought. This was confirmed by the fact that the Government did not propose to keep the Assembly sitting, and if they were prepared with unanimity to postpone till late autumn ratification of any treaty we might

them. Finally, I thought it worth trying to get the adjournment of the Assembly postponed for a while so as to secure immediate ratification, especially in view of the contents of Sir H. Doherty's telegram from Bagdad No. 91 S of the 19th May, but if there was to be any chance of this being achieved I must myself do all I could to hasten the negotiation, and there would be no time for slow bargaining. I therefore decided to go to your limit at once.

5. I opened the conversation on the evening of the 20th with the subject of the adjournment of the Assembly, urging the Minister strongly to postpone it as long as possible. He was very diffident on the subject, remarking that the signature of the treaty was what mattered and that ratification followed automatically. I strongly contested this view, it was mutual security that mattered and its achievement at the earliest possible moment, and nothing could achieve it but signature and ratification.

definite ratification of a treaty, and till then morally and legally both parties had their hands completely unfettered. There was no telling what dangers might arise between now and next winter. Tewfik Rushdi Bey said that he himself would greatly prefer ratification immediately, and would gladly make an effort if it were a matter of two or three days only, but it would be difficult to keep Deputies back for longer, however, he promised to see what he could do, but in a very half-hearted manner, and I doubt his real intention of exerting himself, unless, in the sequel, it is only the question of two or three days.

6. After this I brought up the preamble to the treaty, of which I had given him a copy. He stood this test quite satisfactorily, and talked quite openly about the unreserved cession of both to Irak—but he rather surprised me by asking where the stipulations for mutual neutrality came in. This was a try-on, and I hear he has informed one of my colleagues that mutual neutrality will be provided for in the treaty. I went over the ground again as I had done once before to him, and told him that we could not have it, but that he might choose for himself the form of words in which we should bind ourselves to respect the frontier which the treaty will lay down.

7. We then came to the last important point between us, that of the figure. I said that I had now dealt with his Excellency for fifteen months, and from my experience of him I had reached the conclusion that he was a man with whom it was best to go straight to the point and with whom it was possible to do business without haggling. I had been instructed to offer a certain sum to the Turkish Government and given authority to go if necessary up to another figure which was the absolute maximum. At the risk of appearing to present him with an ultimatum, I would so far ignore my instructions as to name to him at once the maximum sum which His

Majesty's Government would offer, viz., £500,000. A long silence ensued; his emotion was quite visible, and I could see that his lips had gone quite dry. He rang for water, drank off a glassful, and in a crushed voice said he could not disguise from me his extreme disappointment. Whatever sum I had named he would have been unable to agree off-hand without consulting his colleagues, he must, of course, do so now, but he had no doubt as to their views. We continued talking on various aspects of the affair for some time, and I came away without any idea whether the Turkish Government would accept its half-million or not, but I think I did convince Tewfik Rushdi that His Majesty's Government would not give more.

8. On Friday, the 21st, I received a request to call on Tewfik Rushdi Bey at 5 o'clock in his private house, about 150 yards from the Embassy. We plunged straight into business, and in half a minute my head was in a complete whirl. I cannot reproduce the obscure and confused language in which Tewfik Rushdi did not even pretend to express his views, but I can say that he did not give me any sense at all out of his proposal. However, it was clear that his colleagues had

new scheme to propose by which Turkey would get legitimate satisfaction and under which His Majesty's Government need pay practically nothing. Turkey was to be relieved by the Irak and by His Majesty's Government of the payment of the first three annuities that would become due to the bondholders of the old Ottoman Debt under the debt settlement which must some time be arrived at whatever those annuities might amount to. The second part of the proposal, which I never entirely fathomed and which I did not mention to you at all in my telegraphic report because it seemed to me so futile, was that by some mysterious juggling of figures and of interest rates in the debt negotiations between the British and French Governments, His Majesty's Government might be able either to recover the sums paid by them in the shape of the three annuities or might otherwise smuggle them up and make them disappear. I do not see that I need mention this second part of the proposal again. It gradually disappeared from our conversation when I realised its character.

9. However, on the first part, which amounts for His Majesty's Government to an invitation to take a dip into the lucky bag we had plenty of discussion. I expressed my lively indignation at this attempt to introduce into the negotiation of a frontier line the altogether extraneous subject of the Ottoman Debt. It was the third time that his Excellency had set back the whole negotiation by changing his mind and introducing new and unexpected proposals. After a month's talk we were now to launch into yet another untrodden path. It seemed to me that the Turkish Government were not behaving seriously and that they were in no anxiety to have any treaty at all. As for the monetary value of what he was proposing, taking the mean between what Turkey had offered at Paris and what the bondholders had asked for (viz., £T 2 million gold), I supposed he was now claiming about £T 5 million gold, which was quite preposterous. The claim must be rejected out of hand by His Majesty's Government.

10. Tewfik Rushdi Bey protested that he was most anxious for a treaty, but that he did not know what to do. His Majesty's Government would not give more than half a million, his colleagues and he were entirely agreed that they could not accept that, and he had to seek some device for escaping from the impasse. The Turkish Government could not face the Assembly with a treaty offering so insignificant a sum, when he could not point to any material stipulation in the treaty guaranteeing to Turkey the friendship or even the neutrality of Great Britain. It was impossible for the present Turkish Government to disinterest themselves from Irak with a satisfaction less than had been accorded by Austria-Hungary to the first Government of Turkey for the seizure of the sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina. He believed that £T 2,500,000 had been paid on that occasion (I shall be able to verify this to-morrow), and the republic could not take less. He believed this was just about the present value of the three annuities he had proposed, for Turkey would not increase her offer of £T 1,500,000 gold, some time might elapse before a settlement was reached, and then that settlement would certainly provide for a moratorium of some years, so that the present proposal he had made roughly coincided with the Bosnia-Herzegovina settlement in value. It would be an indignity for the Turkish Government to accept the offer of His Majesty's Government. It only represented six days' revenue of the Turkish State.

A very long discussion ensued. I absolutely rejected the comparison with the Bosnia-Herzegovina case, reminding him of the attitude of protest against Austrian action which His Majesty's Government had adopted at the time. We

talked about the measure of security which Turkey would acquire by the conclusion of a treaty, and I reminded him of the dangers attendant on any prolongation of the present unsettled state. I called to mind the language used by you to Ferid Bey last November, in which you undertook to seek any accommodation by which any verdict adverse to Turkey might be rendered more easy of acceptance, and I pointed out that you had never intended materially to enrich Turkey or indeed to do more than precisely what you said. The offer now made represented a fair fulfilment of your promise, if the Turkish Government could not accept it, they could fall back on the recurring alternative of royalties, but this would afford them even less satisfaction. Tewfik Rushdi said that he would gladly have taken shares, but he did not want royalties, they would only constitute a possibility of quarrel in the years to come. I said that the preferability of a capital over royalties from the political point of view had been taken into consideration by His Majesty's Government. I could hold out no hope of the offer being increased, and I must beg him to consult with his colleagues again.

12. Twice in the course of the conversation Tewfik Rushdi Bey dropped to me the remark that in his most pessimistic moments he had never expected that His Majesty's Government would offer less than £1 million, and one must take this as a suggestion that the Turkish Government would accept that sum as a complete settlement. Just as we decided to offer from £300,000 to £500,000 to the Turks, on equally simple reasoning, hoped to get something between 1 and 2½ millions. I think I tried to try awhile longer to get our offer accepted. I doubt the Turkish Government suffering much loss of prestige if they do accept it, for it was to the most of Mosul territory that the flag was nailed, and public opinion has been entirely reconciled to the loss of all the territory of the Mosul Vilayet. Personally I am still of the opinion that the Turkish Government would accept a sum of £1 million as a complete settlement. I have asked the Prime Minister to consider the offer, and he has agreed to do so. I have also asked the Prime Minister to consider the offer, and he has agreed to do so.

I have, &c.
(For the Ambassador)
R A LEEPER

No. 51

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 31)

(No. 43)
(Telegraphic) R. Angora, May 30, 1926
MINISTER, For Foreign Affairs, I beg to inform you that the Turkish Government accept 10 per cent. for twenty-five years.
I have asked Irak plenipotentiary to proceed immediately.
Assembly is being kept in session in order to ratify at once.
(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 41, and Constantinople, No. 9)

No. 52

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 31)

(No. 44)
(Telegraphic) R. Angora, May 30, 1926
ROYALTIES
1. I have had to give Minister for Foreign Affairs a formula and have drafted following text—

For period of twenty-five years after ratification of present treaty Irak will pay to Turkey 10 per cent. of all royalties which it may from time to time

- "(a) From Turkish Petroleum Company in virtue of concession of 1914
- "(b) From companies or persons exploiting oil under article 6
- "(c) From subsidiary companies to be constituted under article 33.

I presume that the other stipulations in your telegram No. 22 need not be introduced unless asked for.

2. As introduction to above I proposed following text—

Desiring to share her material resources with Turkey and thus widen the field of common interest between the two countries

3. Minister for Foreign Affairs says that Turkish Government will have no objection to binding themselves to refer first to British or Irak Government if they ever wish to sell their interest in royalties.

If you wish this done please telegraph formula urgently
(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 42)

No. 53

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 31)

(No. 45)
(Telegraphic) R. Angora, May 30, 1926
MY telegram No. group undecypherable
Minister for Foreign Affairs reason for rejecting recognition of special relations was the fear that it would involve Turkish Government in League of Nations recommendation about Kurdish régime. He has now withdrawn objection and would accept paragraph 2 of preamble as follows—

Recognising Irak as an independent kingdom having special relations with Great Britain in virtue of treaties of 1921 and 1926

He will not admit mention of League of Nations decisions in this connection
I trust that above is satisfactory

If you regard it so, may I simply omit article 18 (see my telegram No. 40)?

I hope to get article 19 restored substantially in its original form, though without mention of League of Nations decision. It will, however, be necessary to allow Turkey to denounce part of treaty affected when His Majesty's Government withdraw or if any modification is made in existing treaties between Great Britain and Irak.

Would this meet your wishes?

If anticipations in above paragraph are wrong may I accept 1926 as date for demarcation (my telegram No. 39)?
(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 43)

No. 54

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 31)

(No. 46)
(Telegraphic) R. Angora, May 30, 1926
MY immediately preceding telegram
In return for recognition of special relations, Minister for Foreign Affairs requests insertion of some formula to increase security. What he wants is something anti Kurdish but he recognises that he cannot have that. I suggest the following to be inserted as first article of Part 2 (article 5 (a)) "Turkey and Irak, convinced that it is to their mutual interest that a state of peace and order be maintained on both sides of common frontier, will endeavour each in its own territory, and subject to their rights of sovereignty, to check (curb) any move aimed at creating trouble in territory of the other.
Please telegraph if you agree
(Sent to Bagdad No. 44)

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 31)

(No. 47)

(Telegraphic) R.

Angora, May 30, 1926

IRKISH re-draft changes article 9 as follows —

Shall arrest these persons and put them at the disposal of the other party, of which they are the subjects, with their arms and booty

Last sentence is cut out because Turkish Government could no longer get law to enable them to take cognizance of offences committed by their nationals in the country

Minister for Foreign Affairs recognises that article as regards

He hopes that Frontier Commission will be able to arrange mutually method e.g. by compelling them to reside in a district far from the frontier

Article 10 is omitted altogether

I trust that above may be

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 1)

No. 56

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 31)

(No. 48)

(Telegraphic) R.

ARTICLE 8

Angora, May 30, 1926

Minister for Foreign Affairs wants stipulation added "They will forb of passage of frontier to persons carrying arms unless these persons shall have obtained licence from competent authority

Can this be agreed to?

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 48)

No. 57

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 31)

(No. 50)

(Telegraphic)

Angora, May 30, 1926

I wish to finish and sign as quickly as possible. I will try to refer important questions, but one of my difficulties is that Minister for Foreign Affairs changes his mind twice a day. I hope, therefore, you will treat my telegrams with the utmost expedition, and perhaps you would give some latitude of decision to me and my Irak colleague, who should be here about 1st June

(Sent to Bagdad, No. 47)

No. 58

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 31)

(No. 52)

(Telegraphic)

Angora, May 30, 1926

BAGDAD telegram to Angora, etc)

If I can receive answers to my numerous telegrams and if His Majesty's Government will give me and my Irak colleague some latitude we should be able to sign treaty here about 1st June. As Bagdad will plenipotentiary returns, it seems to me almost inevitable that extraordinary session will be required

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 50)

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 1)

(No. 54)

(Telegraphic) R.

Angora, May 31, 1926

BAGDAD telegram No. 111 S. Amnesty

I will try for this solution

Alternatively could we say "persons inhabiting frontier zone" (of 75 kilom) ?

Which is better ?

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 51)

No. 60

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir R. Lindsay (Angora)

(No. 50.)

(Telegraphic) R.

Foreign Office, June 2, 1926

YOUR telegrams Nos. 34 to 52 of 26th to 30th May Turkish negotiations.

I will deal with various points in order —

Your telegram No. 37 Rectification of frontier

See Bagdad telegram repeated to you as No. 110

I agree to proposed rectification (see my telegram No. 31)

Your telegram No. 38

See my telegram No. 31

We cannot accept the Turkish draft in article 1 (a). According to our view sovereignty over territory to south of Brussels line is already vested in Irak in consequence of Council decision and article 16 of Lausanne. We know that Turkish view is different, and our article 1 was so worded as to enable Turks to accept it without abandoning their point of view but we are not prepared to accept wording of theirs which involves express abandonment of our view and acceptance of theirs. We will accept any form of words which you may think suitable and which does not in fact run counter to our view regarding transfer of territory

Your telegram No. 39

See replies to your telegrams Nos. 42 and 45

Your telegram No. 40 Article 16

Paragraph 1 may be omitted. As suggested in your telegram No. 41, paragraph 2 may be embodied in an exchange of notes, material parts of which should read —

The Government of the Turkish Republic recognise the right of the British diplomatic and consular authorities to protect Iraqi interests in Turkey until such time as these duties are taken over by Iraqi diplomatic and consular representatives."

You may agree to Turkish suggestion of most favoured nation clause, but it should be made quite clear that the word "establishment" does not include special privileges enjoyed by British and French in Bagdad (see telegram No. 100 to you). In last resort clause might be omitted altogether.

Your telegram No. 41

Amendments (i) to (iv) are agreed to, subject as regards (i) to any objection by High Commission.

(v) Amnesty. See Bagdad telegram repeated to you No. 111. You should try to secure a redraft on the lines of clause 2 of the Lausanne declaration to cover all cases up to the date of signature of the treaty. You should also try to secure reciprocity but you need not insist on it

(vi) Agreed

Your telegram No. 42

Text of paragraph 1 of preamble agreed to. Text of paragraph 2 in your telegram No. 45 agreed to. Paragraph 3 and new article 1 (a), see reply to your telegram No. 38.

Your telegram No. 44 Royalties

1 Your formula is accepted subject to following modifications:—

At end of (a) substitute words "in virtue of article 10 of their convention with the Irak Government dated 14th March 1925."

In (b) after words "article 6" insert words "of the same convention"

In (c) add same words after "article 33."

Other stipulations in my telegram No. 22 need not be introduced

2 Text accepted.

3. Now see Bagdad telegram No. 113 S to you of 31st May. I suggest the following formula, but I am prepared to leave precise wording to you

"The Turkish Government undertake not to part with their interest in the said royalties without previously giving the Government of Irak the opportunity of purchasing such interest at a price not higher than that offered by any third party"

Your telegram No. 45

Preamble, paragraph 2. See reply to your telegram No. 42

Article 16. See reply to your telegram No. 40

Article 19. There is no objection to the Turkish right to denounce. As regards question of the omission of references to the League of Nations, see my telegram No. 41

Your telegram No. 46

I agree to the text proposed, but I am not clear from your telegram where it is to be inserted. Please elucidate.

Your telegram No. 47

See Bagdad telegram No. 117 S of 31st May, with which I agree. Unless the High Commissioner's suggestion can be adopted I consider that articles 9 and 10 should be omitted.

Your telegram No. 49

See Bagdad telegram No. 116 of 31st May

Article 6. If egross only is intended, as I assume, no objection to proposed stipulation subject to any observations by High Commissioner at Bagdad as to practicability of enforcement

Your telegram No. 50

The various points raised in your telegrams under reply have been dealt with as expeditiously as possible, but you will, I feel sure, realise that the necessity of consulting other Departments and Irak Government inevitably involves certain delay. I am, however, particularly in connection with points with which this Department alone is concerned.

Your telegram No. 52

It has been suggested to the High Commission that Irak Parliament might be adjourned at once till signed text of treaty is available and so avoid need for extraordinary session.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 8.)

No. 61

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir R. Lindsay (Angora)

(No. 31)

(Telegraphic) R.

Foreign Office June 2, 1926

My immediately preceding telegram Turkish negotiations

I accept the omission from the treaty of the references to the League of Nations. I shall make the necessary communications unilaterally and ask the Council's consent at its meeting next week to the slight rectification of the frontier

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 9.)

No. 62

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 3)

(No. 55)

(Telegraphic.)

Angora, June 2, 1926

TURKISH attitude towards forthcoming treaty is one of openly expressed disappointment combined with resignation which is almost resentful against hard terms imposed. I think it would be wise if British press comment could be influenced in following direction:—

I am sure that the Turkish Government in the face of difficult situation. Great Britain will now feel confident that new Turkey has no desire to recover territory lost by old Ottoman Empire. Republic has been assured that there will be no aggressive tendencies from the south and no incitements thence to Kurdish separatism in South Eastern [group undecipherable] Path is clear for development of close relations between Great Britain and Turkish Republic, with strengthening of Turkey's international position. Only [undecipherable] lies in obstacles put in the way of development of economy. Exaggerated nationalism due largely to Turkey's inability to [undecipherable] that Capitulations have been abolished for ever. She fears that in allowing foreigners rights which they enjoy so far in every country she will open the door to re-establishment of privileges which are things of the past

No. 63

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 4)

(No. 57)

(Telegraphic) R.

Angora, June 4, 1926.

AFTER long interview with Minister for Foreign Affairs last night, all points except one or two of minor importance were settled and I hope to sign the treaty to-morrow

Following are the only important changes:—

Article 1 (a) *Sovereignty*.—As Minister for Foreign Affairs would not agree to our requirements, we decided to omit the article altogether

Royalties.—Minister for Foreign Affairs asked for option to capitalise for one year at £500,000. I agreed

I hope you will not disapprove

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 52.)

No. 64

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 4)

(No. 58)

(Telegraphic) R.

Angora, June 4, 1926

BAGDAD telegram No. 262.

Minister for Foreign Affairs accepted my draft, which says "sum which third party may be prepared to pay"

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 53.)

No. 65

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir R. Lindsay (Angora)

(No. 32)

(Telegraphic) R.

Foreign Office, June 4, 1926.

YOUR telegram No. 54 of 31st May. Amnesty clause in Turkish treaty

Please see High Commissioner's telegram to you No. 120, with which I agree

Failing either of these alternatives, you should in last resort accept the Turkish

Rushdi, the fight was over; but doubtful as to what the effect would be on him of consultation with his colleagues.

On the 27th May, Mr. H. Lindsay, Minister for Foreign Affairs, presenting to me his counter-draft of the treaty, which we went through in a cursory manner and the nature of which I have reported to you by telegram. Then, after repeating much of what he had said before about the difficulty of accepting half a million, he asked what we were prepared to offer in royalties. Now, I have had so many surprises from Tewfik Rushdi that I ought to have been prepared for this, especially as I had always told him that, if he did not like our money offer, he could always have royalties; yet I had never had occasion to name a percentage, and he had never asked me to do so; and now, naturally enough, the Ministers, tardily repairing Tewfik Rushdi's negligence, would wish to ascertain the alternative before dealing with the pecuniary offer. Yet, I was taken aback, but on the spur of the moment I shot off at him: "10 per cent. for twenty five years." He asked me to give him a formula, and to-day I sent to his house the document enclosed herewith.

9. I do not know what the next development will be, for, so far as the British and Irak Governments are concerned, my royalty offer may be intrinsically less valuable than the £500,000, but politically a capital payment is preferable to an annual one. As for the Turks, they have to compare the dignity of the per cent. with the dignity of half a million, and I have no idea how or what they will decide.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY

Enclosure in No. 67

Formula sent to the Turkish Government by Sir H. Lindsay on May 27, 1926

PENDANT une période de vingt-cinq ans à partir de la ratification du présent traité, le Gouvernement irakien payera au Gouvernement turc 10 pour cent sur toutes redevances qu'il pourra de temps en temps recevoir

- (a.) De la Turkish Petroleum Company en vertu de sa concession du 14 mars 1925;
- (b.) Des compagnies ou personnes qui pourront exploiter le pétrole en vertu des termes de l'article 6 de la concession susmentionnée,
- (c.) Des compagnies subsidiaires qui pourraient être constituées en vertu des termes de l'article 33 de la concession susmentionnée.

[E 3446 62 65]

No. 68

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 7.)

(No. 263.)
Sir,

Angora, May 31, 1926.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 262 of the 28th May respecting the conduct of the Irak frontier negotiations, I have the honour to report that on the 29th May I had a long interview with the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. H. Lindsay, but must wait to ratify the treaty with Great Britain and Irak. I realised at once that this could only mean that the Turkish Government had decided definitely to accept one of the offers I had made to it on behalf of the British and Irak Governments, otherwise they would never have burned their boats by making Deputies postpone their vacation.

2. Accordingly, when I saw Tewfik Rushdi Bey that evening, I neglected the main point of the negotiation, but attacked him very strongly on the most important secondary point on which we desired a satisfaction I had hitherto been unable to obtain, viz., the recognition of the special relations existing between Irak and Great Britain. I had the utmost difficulty in eliciting from him the reasons for his refusal to accept this recognition, but once he had admitted that he feared lest the Turkish Government should lose the support of the Kurds of Irak, his opposition collapsed fairly soon, and he assented to the insertion

of a formula in the preamble of the treaty in a sense which I imagine will be satisfactory to the Irak Governments. I have reported on this point by telegram. I have also, for some form of words to help him to show to the Turkish Government some security out of this treaty. He begged

His Majesty's Government that they would have nothing to do with any sort of K. I have, however, on the same breath, remembering that His Majesty's Government were prepared to let the Turks say anything they liked within reasonable limits in article 3 of the treaty, I said I would try to devise something; and I yesterday telegraphed to you a text for your approval.

3. On the main point, that of the accommodation to be accorded to Turkey, he made, asking me only to lend him a copy of the Turkish Petroleum Company's concession, as he had lent his own to Ismet Pasha and could not get it back. He assured me, when accepting, that he was speaking officially as Minister for Foreign Affairs on behalf of the Turkish Government. This was rather a lame ending to a very long game.

4. It is to be presumed that the signature of a treaty will now ensue, as the remaining points in discussion are hardly such as would justify either Government in breaking off negotiations.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Irak and to His Majesty's Minister in Ankara.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY

E 3446 62 65

No. 69

to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 7.)

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch of the 27th May, and to inform you that I have also enclosed copy of the Turkish Petroleum Company's concession to Ismet Pasha on the 27th May.

Neither of these drafts, of course, has any mention of the accommodation which His Majesty's Government is preparing to offer the Turkish Government, and which was still under discussion when they were prepared.

3. I am sending a copy of this despatch and its enclosures to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Irak.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY

No. 70

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 7.)

(No. 59.)

(Telegraphic) R

Angora, June 6, 1926

TREATY was signed last night. I return to Constantinople to-morrow.
Repeated to Bagdad, No. 54.)

No. 71

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 7.)

(No. 60.)

(Telegraphic) R

Angora, June 6, 1926

FRONTIER treaty

Following are principal last moment changes:—

1. Formula about security (see my telegram No. 48) has been dropped altogether.

* Not printed.

(15026)

2. Also provisions about crossing frontier with arms in article 6

3. Article 14. Prohibition of propaganda is only in the frontier zone

4. Royalties. At the request of Minister for Foreign Affairs we have transferred to an exchange of notes, having equal force with the treaty, provisions by which the Turkish Government undertakes not to sell its rights without reference to Iraq and by which the Turks received [group undecypherable] for one year to sell rights for £500,000 to Iraq

5. I greatly regret I could not persuade Minister for Foreign Affairs to admit Iraq [mandate] under Lausanne Commercial and Establishment Conventions. Group undecypherable was judicially privileged in Iraq. Article 16 is therefore omitted altogether

6. Part II of the treaty remains in force for ten years but after two years any part [sic] party may denounce it for himself alone on giving one year's notice

Copy of treaty by bag
(Reputed to Bagdad No. 55)

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir R. Lindsay (Constantinople)

(No. 61)

(Telegraphic) R

Foreign Office, June 7, 1926

YOUR telegram No. 29 from Angora of 21st May: Occupation of three villages of Sul, Sinat and Nazur

In order to avoid friction, Iraq High Commissioner is prepared to allow the question of the occupation of Sul, Sinat and Nazur to be left over pending final decision. The Turkish Government are requested not to reoccupy these villages in the meantime

Please ascertain whether Turkish Government are willing to give such undertaking, unless you see strong objection to this course

No. 73

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir R. Lindsay (Constantinople)

(No. 62)

(Telegraphic) R

Foreign Office, June 7, 1926

YOUR telegram No. 58 of the 6th June: Signature of treaty

His Majesty's Government have learned with utmost gratification of the signature of the Treaty of Angora, and desire to congratulate your Excellency most heartily on the skill with which you have brought the difficult negotiations to such a satisfactory issue

I desire to add my personal congratulations and thanks for your untiring energy and help throughout

No. 74

Consul London to Sir W. Tyrrell (Received June 8)

(No. 113. L.N.)

(Telegraphic) R

Genoa, June 7, 1926

FOLLOWING from Secretary of State —

At this morning's session of the Council I stated, in accordance with wish expressed by President at December session of Council and with declaration which I had made on behalf of His Majesty's Government in reply to this request, negotiations had been proceeding with a view to a friendly settlement between Great Britain, Turkey and Iraq of frontier of Mosul. I was happy to inform Council that these negotiations had been successful and that treaty either had been signed yesterday or was on the point of signature. I thought it right to call attention of Council to a slight modification which had been made in Brussels line with the object of leaving in Turkish territory road from Alai Mun to Ashuta. I explained with reference to a map the very slight

territorial modification which was involved. I also informed Council that Governments concerned had agreed to provide for delimitation of frontier by a commission composed of their representatives with a president nominated by President of Swiss Confederation. It would therefore be unnecessary to trouble Council further with the question of delimitation. I added that treaty would in due course be registered by His Majesty's Government with Secretary-General in accordance with article 18 of the Covenant

Signor Scialoja, who was president at the December session, and Senor Guani, who is presiding over the present session, expressed great interest in the treaty. The Council of the League in dealing with problems of this kind and Council formally took note of above mentioned modification of frontier

No. 75

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain. (Received June 9.)

(No. 82)

(Telegraphic) R

Constantinople, June 8, 1926

RATIFICATION of treaty authorised yesterday by the Assembly after a lively debate in which Opposition seems to have taunted the Government with their mismanagement in the past of Mosul question

Discussion of treaty by Government party in secret on 6th June was also prolonged and angry, and Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was in charge, had to send for Prime Minister to help him out. I am informed that opposition here was from a handful of extremists protesting against cession of any territory

(Reputed to Bagdad No. 25.)

E 3621 62 65

No. 76

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain. (Received June 14)

(No. 277)

Sir,

Angora, June 6, 1926

IN continuation of my despatch No. 263 of the 31st May, it is pleasant to be able to report that these wearisome negotiations over the Iraq frontier are at last terminated, a treaty having been signed last night by the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs of the one part, and myself and Nuri Pasha Said, the Iraq plenipotentiary, of the other

2. In the course of the 31st May I received from Tewfik Rushdi Bey a counter-proposal about royalties, the gist of which was that Turkey should receive 5d per ton on oil produced in the area of the concession for twenty five years from the moment when oil was first produced. I called on him late that night and found him in a terribly nervous and jumpy state, but persuaded him eventually to put up with the offer I had already made, but when I tried to do other business with him he was so childishly unreasonable that serious work was impossible

3. For the next two or three days, while I was awaiting your instructions on the numerous points raised by the Turkish counter-draft, I was in some suspense as to how Tewfik Rushdi would finally react to the treaty, the general purport of which was now virtually settled. He meanwhile sent along to me a counter draft on what he and I call "security," of which more hereafter, and a preposterous draft "Protocole de signature," of which I enclose a copy herewith

4. On Wednesday evening, the 2nd June, Nuri Pasha Said, the Iraq plenipotentiary, arrived from Bagdad. On the 3rd June I received your long telegram No. 30, dealing with virtually all points in doubt. After mastering its contents and explaining the whole position to Nuri Pasha, he and I called in the morning on Tewfik Rushdi Bey, and we were fortunate enough to find him at his very best. The "Protocole de signature" soon went by the board, and in the course of a couple of hours we went through and decided every point except that of "security," in regard to which I undertook the forlorn task of trying to give my own draft a more appetising appearance. That evening I and my staff evolved a complete new counter-draft embodying the result of all discussions, which I delivered at his house on the morning of Friday, the 4th June. On Saturday, the 5th, Nuri Pasha and I met him again in the afternoon, when he made a last supreme

[15036]

F 2

but vain effort to get out of recognising the special relations of His Majesty's Government with Irak, and we signed on the 5th June at about midnight. I will now deal with various main aspects of the treaty, both general and particular.

Turkish General Attitude towards the Treaty

5 The truth is that in this long drawn out diplomatic struggle over Mosul, they returned to Turkey from the League meeting of September last. The press was, indeed, allowed or encouraged to give tongue until December, but ever since you wisely promised the Turkish Government some *accommodement* to help them towards the acceptance of an unpalatable verdict, they made up their minds that they must have peace somehow, that with relations towards Great Britain unsettled they could never feel comfortable internationally, and that the sooner they came to terms with His Majesty's Government the better it would be. The Italian scare of April came as a practical illustration of the truth of these conclusions, and for the past month or so the only question for them has been how much face they would be allowed to save. They know they could not have Mosul town and abandoned their territorial claims after a very perfunctory consideration of the matter, thinking perhaps, too, wisely enough that the less Kurds they had, the less immediate trouble there would be. Probably they fixed on £1 million as the very minimum *accommodement* they would accept and there is no telling how far the ebullient Tewfik Rushdi may have gone in assuring his colleagues that he would be able to extort this much satisfaction out of His Majesty's Government, to save the prestige of the republic, for the new régime in Turkey is a vigorous plant indeed but its roots have not yet struck deep in the soil. For the other members of the Government the mere fact of coming to terms with Great Britain and signing a treaty is an honour, so high does the honour of His Majesty's Government stand in the world, still more so perhaps for the ordinary Turk, unconnected with Angora and the Government and concerned only slightly with politics, for these men the treaty may

then, that he has spent six weeks or so in twisting and turning and seeking to devise ingenious forms by which he can hide up an unmistakable diplomatic defeat.

His mood was gloomier than he was last night when he signed the treaty. He has said to me frequently in substance, "A mere treaty with you is not enough, half a million is nothing and I must have something tangible to show. Give me international security, a promise of your general neutrality, a nominal sovereignty over Irak, something really anti-Kurdish, something resembling the Austrian reparation for the Bosnia Herzegovina *coup de main*, or even something completely incomprehensible about oil, but as it is I have nothing in this treaty to flourish about." I have really at times, felt quite sorry for the horrid fellow, but when you have a fish by the tail, you cannot relax the grip even of your little finger without its slipping back into the water again.

6 I will now deal with various particular points in the treaty which have formed the subject of telegraphic correspondence with you lately and may require some elucidation.

7 When Tewfik Rushdi agreed to recognise explicitly the special relations existing between Irak and Great Britain, he asked me to give him in exchange something about security and to show him some formula. He would not define what he wanted but probably he hoped against hope for some definite and tangible thing, or whom he has always professed contempt to me. The utmost I could venture to was the following, for insertion in the "Bon Voisinage" agreement —

"Il est de leur intérêt mutuel de maintenir la paix et la tranquillité de leur frontière commune, de respecter la souveraineté, d'empêcher tout mouvement qui pourrait avoir pour but la création de trouble dans le territoire de l'autre."

Tewfik Rushdi's criticism of this was that he wanted something from Great Britain, really — something more than the mere guarantee of execution involved by the British signature of the treaty, and that an undertaking in which Irak was the beneficiary. He said that he might, by slightly changing his line, make something out of my draft, so he made me an anti-Kurd counter proposal in the following terms —

"Dans l'intérêt mutuel du maintien de l'ordre et de la paix des deux côtés de la frontière, l'Irak s'engage, sous réserve de ses droits de souveraineté à ne créer aucun régime politique local susceptible de troubler l'état de choses existant dans le territoire de la Turquie."

Of course, it was out of the question to accept anything so obviously intended to annul the League's inept recommendations in favour of Kurdish local administration in Irak; at Tewfik Rushdi's further request I did what I could with my own draft to make it look a little more palatable but on the day we signed he told me he had no use for a rind with no fruit in it and preferred to drop the article altogether.

8 The same fate at the same time overtook his proposal to prohibit the passage of the frontier by persons carrying arms unless they had a permit. The final form which I proposed to him for this, after discussing it carefully with Nuri Pasha, was as follows —

"Autant que possible les hautes parties contractantes défendront à toute personne de sortir de leur territoire dans le territoire de l'autre partie avec des armes à feu sans s'être préalablement munie d'un permis pour le port d'armes donné par l'autorité compétente."

I feel fairly sure that Tewfik Rushdi's real aim in bringing this in was to get some stipulation into the treaty which would protect the whole of her frontier population.

9 I was very glad at the dropping of these two provisions from the treaty. At the best they could have been of no practical utility. Quite possibly, from their very vagueness, they might have been dangerous.

Royalties

10 There is not much to be said about this. I was surprised when, having once talked about cash, he should have reverted to oil, and still more so when he accepted the 10 per cent. for twenty five years which I offered. I never hid from him my personal conviction that the half million was worth more than the 10 per cent. He said quite frankly that he shared my belief, but that for face-saving purposes an unknown quantity with an oily glamour to it was better than the cash. However, he relented on the day of signature — perhaps his Cabinet colleagues told him not to be a fool — and I was glad enough to give him a year in which to take the cash and let the credit go. I should think that by next autumn the Turkish Government will be exercising its right, and I daresay the Irak Government will be glad enough to pay up and have done with it.

11 He insisted on having this option and the obligation on Turkey to refer to Irak if she wanted to sell her oil rights put into a subsidiary exchange of notes. He has a perfect lust for protocols, "actes additionnels," appendices, and tags of all sorts to treaties, and I do not know how many I did not head him off from in the course of the negotiation, but within a few hours of signing one is too tired to be more amiable weakness, and I contented myself with stipulating that His Majesty's Government should be entitled to give the same measure of publicity to the exchange of notes as to the treaty itself.

Diplomatic Representation

12 In this matter we came across Turkish *amour-propre*. He first said that he would prefer to arrange for British protection of Irak interests in Turkey by ordinary notes, and that no difficulty could arise but when we came to talk about the notes, he said he would take advantage of the occasion to appoint a Turkish consul-general in Bagdad. I remembered hearing Sir H. Dobbie say in London last March that he would sooner not have a Turk in Bagdad yet awhile, so I answered at once by saying that we should in that case want to have a British consul at Van, and there we were at once talking about reciprocity, in which Tewfik Rushdi found the scale inclined against Turkey. We had a long wrangle, but finally I had to give up all idea of having any special stipulations at all on the subject, consoling myself only

with the thought that it might well end by having no practical importance, and that Turkey would certainly take care not to lose touch with Iraq so long as there was a chance of there being some money in the contact.

Commercial and Establishment Conventions

13 I am disappointed not to have induced Tewfik Rashedi to admit explicitly that Iraq must benefit by the stipulations of these two Lausanne conventions but here, too, I came up against Turkish *amour propre*. On the last day I made a strong appeal to him, but without avail. He had made a perfectly fair offer of mutual most favoured nation treatment in both matters for an unlimited time and the existence of some petty privileges in judicial matters in favour of the subjects of European States (will, the nature of which he was perfectly familiar), to which Turks could not possibly be admitted, made acceptance impossible. I was able to offer the perfect reciprocity of the two Lausanne Conventions but that was no use to him. He explained that modern Turkey considered herself as entirely European, that it was her ardent desire to be regarded so by other Powers and that he simply could not be supposed putting Turkish citizens abroad on a footing with Asiatics—from whom, naturally, the Japanese were excluded. The difficulty proved quite unarguable as I might. He suggested that we provide for the negotiation of commercial and establishment conventions in article 16. This I could not accept because it implied an admission that Iraq had no inherent right to come under the Lausanne conventionary thereupon, in a fine frenzy, he struck out of that article the promise to negotiate with Iraq sanitary, veterinary, locust and customs agreements. It is a pity. I have little doubt that if it is desired to negotiate these latter agreements he will not refuse and he has not actually said that the Turkish Government will refuse to Iraq subjects the benefits of the Lausanne Commercial and Establishment Conventions. But I greatly regret not having been able to settle the matter beyond possibility of doubt.

14 I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Iraq and His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY

Enclosure in No. 76

Protocole de Signature

Al moment de procéder à la signature du présent traité, les parties contractantes sont convenues des dispositions suivantes:

- 1 Il est entendu que le présent traité ne porte aucune atteinte aux dispositions du Traité de Lausanne du 24 juillet 1923.
- 2 La Turquie, en renonçant, en faveur de l'Irak qui se gouverne librement, à tout droit de souveraineté sur les territoires situés au sud de la ligne déterminée à l'article premier du présent traité, confirme les déclarations d'Ismet Pacha à Lausanne en ce qui concerne l'établissement de mandats sur les territoires détachés de l'Empire ottoman.
- 3 Il est convenu que les articles permanents ainsi que ceux d'une durée limitée du présent traité constituent un tout indivisible jusqu'à l'année 1930.
- 4 Le présent protocole fait partie intégrante du traité signé à la date d'aujourd'hui.

E 3623 62 65]

No. 77

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 14.)

(270.)

Constantinople, June 9, 1926.

I HAVE the honour to report that on the 7th instant I called on Ismet Pasha to take leave of him on the termination of the negotiations about the Iraq frontier.

I said to His Excellency that now that the treaty was signed I did not desire to speak to him about the past but rather to look to the future, and I was anxious to the first place to call his attention to one particular article in the treaty, viz. that instituting a Permanent Frontier Commission. I assured him that His Majesty's

Government and the Iraq Government were as anxious as he could possibly be that a treaty to that end had been stipulated in the "Bon Voisinage" chapter. It was not, however, possible to do all by the formulation on paper of mutual assurances as I guaranteed, and the Frontier Commission was devised and endowed with wide powers in order that a serious effort might be made in practice to bring about co-operation between the frontier authorities, so that the real objects of both parties might be attained. I attached the utmost importance to the successful working of the commission, and I begged him to do the same. I would ask him to appoint as the Turkish representative some man endowed with qualities of statesmanship who would have the courage to tell his colleagues of the other side what he wanted and the wisdom to realise that even though they might not be able to do all he wanted, yet they would be disposed to go as far as they could to help him. In this way, with mutual forbearance and mutual help where it was possible, I believed that much more might be done in the commission in fact than was capable of being expressed in formal treaty undertakings.

3. Ismet Pasha listened intently to what I said, and promised to attend to the matter. At his request I promised to write to the High Commissioner for Iraq expressing my views and the hope that the Iraq representatives on the commission would inspire themselves with something of the spirit of my language to him.

4. I then turned to economic matters in general between Turkey and Great Britain. I said that, having cleared away political difficulties, the next step would be

to consider the Turkish debt. I was not prepared to talk about the debt, so I said that I agreed that this stood in the foremost rank, what I was thinking of was

obstacles put by the Turkish authorities everywhere in the way of every form of foreign enterprise throughout the country—to such a point that the impression was abroad that Turkey desired to see the last of foreigners on Turkish soil. I then, at his request, gave him three or four prominent instances, with the details of which I need not trouble you. I said that I perfectly understood the nature and causes of Turkish nationalism and I had sympathy with its reasonable objects, but it was being pushed to exaggerated lengths as is usually the case. Turkish nationalism tends to constitute a great impediment in the way of international harmony and co-operation. The Turkish Government was still inclined to confuse foreign privilege as practised in the old days with foreign rights as accorded to strangers by every Government in the world. Between the aims of a nationalist Turkey and the due respect for foreign enterprise it was perfectly possible to find a compromise. An opportunity for doing so was presented to Turkey, and I earnestly hoped he would not let it slip.

Ismet Pasha listened closely to what I said, and we had some discussion on more than one of the points as they arose. I think he was impressed with what I said, and I hope he understood; but he is so ignorant of all economics that I cannot feel sure.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY

E 3641 63 66]

No. 78

Sir R. Graham to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 14.)

(271.)

Rome, June 11, 1926.

THE weekly press summary contains a résumé of the opinions in the Italian news. I am Secretary-General to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs recently congratulated me on the fact that the Italian Government had decided to apply for admission to the League of Nations. I said that I knew nothing beyond what had appeared in the press. Count Bordonaro replied that he understood that Turkey attached the condition of a permanent seat on the Council to her application. He added that Signor Mussolini had been pleased to hear of the agreement reached after what had appeared to be a rather sudden Turkish volte face in the matter. His Excellency had remarked, smiling, that he thought that His Majesty's Government owed the success of the negotiations to his own voyage to Tripoli and to my own efforts. Count Bordonaro added that the Italian Government were doing all they could

I have, &c
R. GRAHAM

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

was entirely unable to master the opposition of some extremists who preferred war or anything else rather than the surrender of an inch of the fatherland, and finally Ismet Pasha was sent for, and had to make a long speech to quiet the opposition.

9. On the whole it is a good sign that for the last few days the press has ceased to write about Mosul, and I hope we may infer that Turkey will remember her lesson, but forget her resentment.

1. The foreign diplomats in Turkey, in their private utterances, have greeted the termination of the Mosul question with outspoken pleasure, and seem to expect that henceforth half their difficulties with the Turkish Government will vanish. I hope their expectations may not be deceived.

10. Even my Russian colleague, in talking to Mr. Knox, has expressed satisfaction at the conclusion of the treaty, to which he added his appreciation of the moderate and moderating attitude His Majesty's Government adopted over the matter of the recent Russo-German Treaty. You may also recollect the similar language he used to me, as reported in my despatch No. 201 of the 23rd April. Nevertheless, there may be some doubt as to what Russian views really have been. In Angora, in the first days of May, I heard that the Russians were putting it about that the general strike in England would assume such proportions that negotiations at Angora would have to be interrupted, and the utterances of the Izvestia and the Pravda about that time (Sir R. H. Lytton's No. 376) breathe anything but goodwill to Anglo-Turkish relations. One of my Russian colleagues tells me that M. Suritz was very angry because from the first Tewfik Rushdi kept him completely in the dark as to the progress of the negotiations, that he then spoke, as stated above, about the general strike, and that he suffered a set-back in prestige when his prognostications were disproved by events. A Turkish Deputy told me that he had called on M. Suritz soon after the treaty had been signed and found him more critical of it than any Turk.

11. And finally, there is a risk that the treaty would vanish the moment a treaty was concluded, and rumours to this effect were very rife indeed as the moment drew near. Now his stock has risen slightly in the market. It is said that a telegram came from the Ghazal at Brusa, refusing his resignation, and that it helped the passage of the treaty through the People's party on the 6th June. Indeed, if Tewfik were to go now, it would be hard for the Government to get the best they can of the treaty, as they are now doing. Tewfik always says he is the best man for the job, and he has gone to Smyrna on leave, and it is said that later on he may go to Caribad for a cure.

(Copy of this despatch has been sent to Bagdad.)

I have &
R. C. LINDSAY.

CHAPTER II. ARABIA

F 180 180 91

India Office to Foreign Office (Received January 7)

India Office January 6, 1926

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to transmit to you, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, on the subject of relations between Ibn Saud and Great Britain.

I am &
A HIRTZEL.

Enclosure in No. 83

Viceroy to Secretary of State for India (Received January 5)

(Telegraphic)

Shillong January 5 1926

JEDDAH telegram No. 191

Presumably Ibn Saud, in his public reference to his relations with Great Britain, spoke deliberately merely as the ruler of Nejd and not as the holder permanently or temporarily, of the Hejaz. His possession of the Hejaz has clearly brought about a completely different situation from that which the 1916 treaty was designed to cover. What was then appropriate is no longer appropriate when applied to Moslem Holy Land, and Ibn Saud's consciousness of the danger to himself of admitting any Christian Power to any sort of exclusive or protectorate position in the Hejaz, such as is accorded to Great Britain by articles 2, 3, & 4 of the 1916 treaty, is possibly at the back of his desire for a new treaty. (See Clayton's letter of 1st December to London Colonial Office.) Point is no doubt clear to His Majesty's Government, question is of importance in India because though it appears beyond question that the existing treaty only applies to territories possessed by the Sultan of Nejd at the time of signing that treaty, Ibn Saud's public utterances above referred to, as reported, may give rise in India to the misconception that the terms of the treaty may be taken to cover territories in the Holy Land now acquired by him. It is most desirable, as far as India is concerned, to avoid any such misconception by the Moslem public.

No. 84

Sir W. Tyrrell (for the Secretary of State) to Mr. Jordan (Jeddah)

Foreign Office, January 7, 1926

You R telegram No. 194 of 25th December. Sir G. Clayton's mission to the

You may inform Ibn Saud that object of Sir G. Clayton's proceeding to Sudan is to endeavour to conclude with the Imam a treaty of amity, for which negotiations have long been in progress.

You should explain to him that even if it is not feasible to keep you in touch with trend of negotiations, we will inform you of result in due course for communication to him.

Sir W. Tyrrell (for the Secretary of State) to Lord Lloyd (Cairo)

(No. 3)

(Telegraphic)

Foreign Office January 8, 1926

THE Idriat, Seyid Ali is reported deposed by his uncle Sevid Hassan. Resident at Aden has been authorised to offer him temporary refuge at Aden or Perim and asks whether arrangements can be made to admit him to Egypt, if necessary as Idriat has relatives of good position there. Please telegraph your observations.

N 50

Sir W. Tyrrell (for the Secretary of State) to Lord Lloyd (Cairo)

(No. 4)

(Telegraphic) R

Foreign Office, January 9, 1926

PLEASE telegraph following instructions to His Majesty's consul at Jeddah—

Your telegram No. 103 of 28th December Appointment of Nejdian representative at Cairo

Please inform Ibn Saud that His Majesty's Government have no objection to his appointing an official representative in Egypt and that His Majesty's High Commissioner in Cairo will accord his good offices to his Highness. Ibn Saud will realise, however that he must obtain the consent of the Egyptian Government.

N 57

Sir W. Tyrrell (for the Secretary of State) to Lord Lloyd (Cairo)

(No. 5)

(Telegraphic) R

Foreign Office January 9, 1926

YOUR telegram No. 465 of 30th December Nejdian representative at Cairo. Mr. Jordan's relations with Ibn Saud already amount to recognition of his Highness as *de facto* ruler of the Hejaz but we do not anticipate a request from him for *de jure* recognition in view of his published projects for self government in the Hejaz under joint patronage of various Moslem States.

Nejdian representative at Cairo would represent Ibn Saud primarily as Sultan of Nejd in which capacity he has long been recognised by His Majesty's Government and only incidentally as *de facto* authority in Hejaz.

Please repeat to Jeddah.

N 58

(No. 6)

(Telegraphic) R

Jeddah, January 11, 1926

IBN SAUD has been acknowledged of the Hejaz by notables of Hejaz on 28th January.

He now assumes the title "King of the Hejaz and Sultan of Nejd and its Dependencies."

He declares that Hejaz administration shall be kept separate from that of Nejd and that Hejaz is for the Hejazis, but that public security and safety of roads will be maintained by his arms.

(Sent to India, Cairo, Jerusalem, Bagdad and Aden.)

E 363 11 911

No. 60

Acting Consul Jordan to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 18, 1926.)

(No. 120.)

Sir,

Jeddah, December 28, 1925

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith a report of negotiations with King Ali and the Sultan of Nejd whilst acting as intermediary for the submission of the Jeddah garrison and town.

2 Copies of this despatch and of its enclosures are being sent to Egypt, India, Palestine and Iraq.

I have, &c.

S R JORDAN

Enclosure 1 in No. 60

Report of Negotiations with King Ali and the Sultan of Nejd whilst acting as Intermediary for the Submission of the Jeddah Garrison and Town

The series of events which eventually led King Ali to request refuge on British territory and also that His Britannic Majesty's representative in Jeddah should act as intermediary between him and his people and Ibn Saud for the peaceful submission of the town have been outlined in the various periodical reports on the internal situation circulated by this agency.

On the evening of the 9th instant some days after King Ali had received news of the fall of Medina, he, accompanied by the Foreign Minister Fuad, visited this agency and talked for some time on various subjects, and, just prior to their departure, requested advice as to their future actions. I informed King Ali that I was not in a position to give him advice in view of the strictly neutral attitude adopted by His Majesty's Government. He thereupon left, and on the morning of the 10th requested me to call and see him. This I did, and again the question of his future actions was brought up, but I again replied as previously.

Eventually, as the situation was becoming more and more critical, on the evening of the 13th instant, King Ali verbally requested me to act as intermediary for the surrender of the town. I informed him that I would refer the matter to His Majesty's Government and would acquaint him with the reply in due course. He also requested permission to be allowed to reside in Palestine, Transjordan or Mesopotamia, stating that he was an Arab and wished if possible to live in an Arab country and near his brothers Faisal or Abdallah.

In anticipation of permission being granted by His Majesty's Government, Ali, on the morning of the 14th, confirmed his verbal request in writing (Enclosure 2), and submitted a list of conditions to serve as a basis for the mediation.

He also stated verbally that at least fifteen to twenty days were required to arrange for his personal effects to be packed and prepared for transport.

His Majesty's Government's permission for me to act as intermediary was received on the morning of the 10th instant, and I thereupon sent a letter (Enclosure 4) to Ibn Saud by Ihsanullah, an Indian member of the staff of this agency, asking for an audience at Ragama, some twenty-five minutes from Jeddah in the direction of Mecca.

I sent my communication by motor car, and just after the car had passed Ragama and was on the way to Bahra, Ibn Saud's car was seen in the distance.

After reading my letter he informed Ihsanullah that another twenty-four hours would have been too late, as he was actually proceeding to Ragama to direct the attack against Jeddah the next evening at the request of certain people within the town of Jeddah who had promised to assist him. He thereupon proceeded to the camp and dictated a reply (Enclosure 3) agreeing to meet me the following morning.

On Thursday the 17th instant I proceeded to Ragama accompanied by Ihsanullah to act as interpreter, and having met the Sultan Abdul Aziz (Ibn Saud) I informed him of the situation, and, after a lengthy conversation of a most amiable nature drew up, on the basis of the conditions submitted by King Ali, a series of seventeen conditions (Enclosure 6) which approximately concurs with the conditions set forth by Ali.

During this my first meeting with the Sultan Abdul Aziz, I could hardly withhold my admiration for his charm of manner and the generosity of his nature.

in his hour of victory. Many of the conditions are pure acts of generosity, and greatly helped to assure the success of the efforts for peace and the prevention of bloodshed.

He also, at my request, gave me letters addressed to his commanders outside Yambou and requesting them to get into touch with the commandant of Yambou garrison, a certain Hamdi Bey (as the Emir Shakir had left Yambou some days previously and come to Jeddah), and assure the safety of all the army and residents. These, with a letter from Ali, I sent by the Khedivial boat to the Yambou garrison commander, and on the 22nd instant news came through that Yambou had been surrendered in a peaceful manner.

In order to illustrate how anxious the Sultan Abdul Aziz is to avoid bloodshed and possible censure at the hands of the foreign Powers for barbarous methods, I enclose a copy of a letter (Enclosure 7) received from him the day after my visit, requesting that the letters should not be sent by aeroplane, as was at first mooted, owing to the possibility of it being fired upon and the occupants injured.

Immediately after dinner I saw King Ali, who demurred considerably over the conditions, and which, in reality, were better than he had hoped to obtain, and indeed, more than he had asked for in some respects. Eventually he accepted and signed them, but requested me to keep it secret for twenty-four hours from the townspeople and my colleagues, as he was afraid of trouble amongst the soldiers and population.

I was at first at a loss to account for his fear, which was most apparent, and which he endeavoured to veil by his concern for the people, but from a chance word gathered that he was afraid of, amongst other things, the Nationalist party so-called, formed by a patriot named Sadik Bey, who had gathered unto him most of the officers and a number of non-commissioned officers and secured their signatures under oath on the sword and Koran to fight to the last against the Wahabites.

In order that the actual situation may better be realised I should point out that the conditions at Jeddah were quite different from any of the other Hejaz towns. The soldiers manning the defences were, with the exception of perhaps 150-200, a pack of nondescript cut-throat mercenaries, and the conditions under which they had been serving for the last fifteen months were hardly calculated to develop their finer feelings. Besides Palestinians and Syrians, there were Sudanese and Somalis, Tukuris, Yemenis, Hejazis and all sorts and conditions of tribesmen from all over Arabia. Each party distrusted the other and, as is general in such cases, would cut one another's throats for trouble and never for good.

This Nationalist party was in fact not so strong as the King imagined, and throughout the whole proceedings I was astounded at the King's lack of appreciation of the true state of affairs.

Despite the fact that Ali had begged me to keep secret the fact that he had signed the conditions, I was obliged to inform the King, after my departure, had sent his aide-de-camp to inform Sadik Bey that he had received certain conditions from Ibn Saud.

During the night of the 21st, I was informed by the King's aide-de-camp that the King, after my departure, had sent his aide-de-camp to inform Sadik Bey that he had received certain conditions from Ibn Saud.

He came next morning, Friday, at 7.30 A.M., and after a talk of half an hour, I learned that he was an honest man and well intentioned, and knowing that the conditions signed by Ali the previous night were known in many quarters, I decided to take them to Sadik Bey and ask him if they were not generous and acceptable. He told me that they were and, as the King's aide-de-camp had already been around asking me to see the King as soon as possible, as he had not slept and was threatening to commit suicide, I informed Sadik Bey to precede me to the palace, and that, after I had ascertained the King's wishes, I would ask that he be called in to assist in the deliberations.

When I arrived at the palace I was admitted immediately to the King, and such a sight as met my eyes is not easily described. He was in such a state of nervous collapse or funk that he could not control his lips to give the conventional greetings. In order to give him time, I spoke of various little questions of an administrative nature pending between the agency and the Foreign Ministry, and eventually he

started to talk of the conditions and to request further concessions, as he was sure the people would not be satisfied, and surely harm would come of it. It was at this point that I requested that Sadik Bey should be called, and, after a few moments' thought, he asked if about five others of his entourage might come in. I politely requested that he should see Sadik Bey first, and later the others if necessary. He agreed and later Sadik Bey came, and after a short talk, I dismissed him. This reassured Ali, and, after Sadik Bey's assurance that the conditions were acceptable to the soldiers and that they would surrender their arms, the King thereupon named him commander-in-chief of the forces and became almost gay, laughing and even joking, at the fact that he would surely be sea sick when he left on board His Majesty's ship.

I left the palace at once and proceeded to Ragama to inform Sultan Abdul Aziz of Ali's acceptance, and also to put several other demands to him from Ali, the chief of which was regarding the return of his wife's property in Taif and Mecca, and, if possible, to increase the amount of £5,000 to £7,500.

To both these Ibn Saud agreed and again greatly facilitated matters.

I then, at Jeddah, called on the British, French, and Italian consuls, and told them briefly of exactly what had taken place and my suggestions as to my future actions.

This was in order to keep them informed and to ensure their co-operation if necessary in view of India's telegram of the 16th instant. During the whole of the negotiations I kept them daily informed and discussed various points raised with them.

I approved of all actions taken and had no suggestions to offer to improve upon what was being done.

On the afternoon of the 19th instant I again saw King Ali, who had signed and issued his formal notice of withdrawal from the Hejaz, and sent an identical note (Enclosure 8) to the foreign representatives in Jeddah.

It was on the morning of the 19th that I received an urgent telephone message from Sadik Bey, who had assumed his duties as commander-in-chief, begging me to go to the barracks to assure the officers and non-commissioned officers who were gathered there that this was not a further ruse on the part of the Hejaz Government to deceive them. I at once proceeded, and produced the agreement, which most of them had not seen, and Sadik read it over to them. This satisfied them, but they were still unwilling to disarm as long as Ali remained on the throne.

It was in consequence of this that I informed King Ali of the actual state of affairs and requested him to hand over to the Provisional Government and embark on H.M.S. "Clematis" to facilitate the carrying out of the clauses of his agreement with Sultan Abdul Aziz.

He eventually agreed to embark next morning, the 20th instant, at 9.30, and this, in fact, was done. Immediately his departure became known, disarmament of several batches, none of which developed into serious trouble, took place in the afternoon of the 21st.

Or, at least, what might have been the most serious trouble, which fortunately I was able to avert, was that the Palestinians and Syrians still remaining in Jeddah, and before they became cognizant of the real state of affairs, wrote to this agency and the French consulate threatening to destroy the town unless they received their full arrears. I have not seen the document sent to the French consulate, but the one addressed to me contained some thirty signatures, of which not more than eight were genuine. So I sent for five of them who were known to me and requested an explanation of their action.

They expressed their sorrow, and stated that the document was written before they knew the true state of affairs, and begged leave to withdraw it, and promised to afford Sadik Bey every assistance. This, in fact, they did.

Ali, as stated above, was embarked on H.M.S. "Clematis" on the morning of the 20th and left Jeddah in H.M.S. "Cornflower" on the morning of the 22nd. After paying a final visit to King Ali, I again proceeded to Ragama with the head of the Provisional Government and the commander-in-chief, Sadik Bey, where they officially surrendered to the Sultan Abdul Aziz before his full divan, composed of his brother, Emir Abdullah, his son Emir Faisal, and some thirty notables, and continued their functions thereafter in his name.

I informed the Sultan that, as the disarmament was practically completed and the heads of the Provisional Government and army had submitted, my duties as intermediary were now finished.

I thanked him for his helpfulness and generosity throughout the negotiations and assured him that His Majesty's Government had allowed me to act as intermediary solely on humanitarian grounds and to prevent further bloodshed in their holy land, to assist in bringing peace and prosperity on the country and to assure the safety of the pilgrimage for the millions of true Moslems whom His Gracious Majesty King George V had for his loyal subjects.

The Sultan, before his full divan, replied, warmly thanking His Majesty's Government for allowing their representative to act as intermediary, and thanking myself for the noble and successful task which I had accomplished in preventing further bloodshed and assuring the safety and prosperity of Jeddah and its people. He thanked His Majesty's Government and myself in his own name, the name of his people and on behalf of the Moslem world.

He went on to say that all Western Powers had allies, and that this was also most essential for Oriental Powers, and that his sincere friends were the British only, and that he had, and would have, no relations with any other European Power big or small.

This last the Sultan repeated several times with much vehemence and sincerity, lending power to his expressions by clenching his hand and emphasising each word with a motion of his clenched fist.

He continued, stating that according to the Holy Word, his religion and that he is bound to recognise and execute the treaty existing between Great Britain and himself, and that he is in full accord with his friends and allies the British people whose politics were his politics, and that as long as the British respected two things which he held dearer than life and for which he would shed his last drop of blood, that is to say, his religion and his honour, there would, "Insha Allah," always be the closest ties of friendship between himself and his people and Great Britain. He ended by again thanking His Majesty's Government and myself.

Other than the above and in order to show how much the action of His Majesty's Government was appreciated by the Sultan Abdul Aziz, I enclose a letter dated 19th December 1925 to this agency on the 20th instant, together with a letter dated 20th December 1925 to be handed to the kaimakam in which the following appears: "I am most grateful for the splendid services you have rendered to your country and to the Moslem world."

His Majesty's Government also sent me a letter dated 19th December 1925 upon embracing me with his hairy face on each cheek.

This ordeal I again sustained with great fortitude on the occasion of my farewell visit to King Ali on the morning of his departure. He, in order to show his gratitude to His Majesty's Government, insisted on doing it twice, once when I arrived and also when I left the ship much to the delight of some sailors who were on the quarter-deck.

The Sultan Abdul Aziz entered Jeddah on Wednesday morning the 23rd instant, and a reception was held, which all foreign representatives attended in uniform, well as all the notables of Jeddah and the population who flocked to see the Sultan.

His Majesty's Government also sent me a letter dated 19th December 1925 upon embracing me with his hairy face on each cheek.

His Majesty's Government also sent me a letter dated 19th December 1925 upon embracing me with his hairy face on each cheek.

I take this opportunity of bringing to the notice of His Majesty's Government my appreciation of the help I received during this difficult period from the staff of this agency, who helped me unflinchingly throughout.

Also particularly the good work done by Munshi Ihsanullah, whom I employed as interpreter during this period on account of his known ability and discretion and his knowledge of local affairs, and whose invaluable help was of the greatest assistance.

I enclose also (Enclosure 10) a translation of an identical note sent to all foreign representatives in Jeddah by the Sultan on the evening of Christmas Day.

S. R. JORDAN

Enclosure 2 in No. 89

King Ali to Acting British Agent and Consul, Jeddah

25 5 1344 (December 14, 1925).

FOR the sake of avoiding bloodshed I have decided to withdraw and leave the country. I wish to reside in Transjordan or Bagdad or Palestine.

2. I should like that His Britannic Majesty's Government would mediate in the matter of surrendering the country in such calm and peaceful manner that will guarantee the comfort and safety of all the civil and military employees, shereefs and Bedouin, and provide means of transport for those who wish to leave with me from my private suite and those who wish to go back home.

3. Please find enclosed herewith some points which I beg that necessary steps should be taken to carry out.

ALI BIN HUSSEIN

Enclosure 3 in No. 89

List of conditions submitted by King Ali.

IN order to avoid bloodshed and anarchy in the interior of the country, I found it better, in the name of humanity, to ask His Britannic Majesty's Government to mediate (separately or jointly with some or all of the Powers who have subjects in the Hejaz as His Majesty's Government would like) and to take the necessary measures regarding the following points:

1. I have decided to leave and depart from the country in order to avoid bloodshed. I wish to reside with my private suite either in Bagdad, Transjordan or Palestine.

2. Immediate steps to be taken to stop the war going on between us and the Government of Nejd for a period long enough to transport me together with my belongings, etc. and to transport my suite and their properties and to provide us with necessary means for transportation.

3. His Majesty's Government should facilitate the transportation of the regular troops, shereefs, warriors and Bedouin who wish to be repatriated.

4. Ibn Saud should be asked to desist from the properties of all the natives of the country the regular and Bedouin troops—natives or otherwise—and that he should overlook all their past faults.

5. Ibn Saud's army should not enter Jeddah until I have left.

6. For carrying out the affairs of the country and in order to avoid any anarchy, a native local Government should be organised under the command of the British Government until the Wahabi troops enter Jeddah.

7. As the Hejaz Government have no money, the necessary expenses for carrying out articles 1, 2 and 3 should be provided by Ibn Saud.

8. The return of our families, our properties which are lawful belongings and the return of the properties of our relations, and that they should not be damaged.

9. Settling the Government debts taken from the inhabitants as loan and paying even a part of the arrears of pay of the soldiers, officers and employees.

ALI BIN HUSSEIN

25 5 1344 (December 14, 1925).

Acting Consul Jordan to Ibn Saud

(After respects.)

Jeddah, December 18, 1925.

FOR the sake of humanity and in order to facilitate the return of peace and prosperity in the Hejaz, I wish to be met by your Highness's agents to meet me at Ragama to-morrow, Thursday, in the forenoon or as soon after as possible.

(Compliments.)

S. R. JORDAN

[15026]

Enclosure 5 in No. 89

Ibn Saud to Acting Consul Jordan

(After greetings.)

30 5 1344 (December 16, 1925)

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your Excellency's letter dated the 16th December 1925, noted its contents, and came down at once to the camp to meet your Excellency in the place which Munshi Ihsanullah will tell you of

With respects,

(Seal of Ibn Saud)

Enclosure 6 in No. 89

Agreement forwarded by Ibn Saud to Acting Consul Jordan

(After greetings and respects.)

1 6 1925 (December 17, 1925)

IN consideration of the abdication of King Ali and of his leaving the Hejaz and surrendering Jeddah, Sultan Abdul Aziz guarantees the personal safety of the civilian and military employees, the sheriffs, all the natives of Jeddah, the Arabs, the citizens and tribes and their families, and the safety of their properties

2. King Ali undertakes to hand over immediately all prisoners of war in Jeddah, if there are any

3. Sultan Abdul Aziz promises to grant an amnesty to all those mentioned above

4. All officers and soldiers must surrender at once to Sultan Abdul Aziz with all their arms—rifles, machine guns, guns and aeroplanes, &c., and all war materials and equipments, or such arms and war materials should be kept in the safe custody of the British agent at Jeddah until His Highness the Sultan enters Jeddah

5. King Ali and all officers and soldiers promise not to damage or to dispose of any of the said arms and war materials

6. Sultan Abdul Aziz undertakes to repatriate all officers and soldiers who wish to do so

7. Sultan Abdul Aziz undertakes to distribute in a fair proportion amongst all officers and soldiers in Jeddah a sum of £5,000

8. Sultan Abdul Aziz promises to retain in their posts all civil Government employees whom he finds capable of performing their duties honestly

9. Sultan Abdul Aziz undertakes to grant King Ali the right to take with him his personal belongings, including his motor car, carpets and

10. Sultan Abdul Aziz undertakes to grant to the family of Al Hussein all their personal properties in the Hejaz, provided it is proved that such properties were actually inherited and do not include the immovable properties transferred from the Wakfs by Hussein to himself, neither should they include such buildings erected by Hussein during his reign as King over the Hejaz

11. King Ali undertakes to quit the Hejaz before next Tuesday evening

12. All steamers in the possession of the Hejaz, "Tawil," "Ragmatan," "Rahdi" and "Radwa" should pass into the possession of Sultan Abdul Aziz. In the meantime, the Sultan, if necessary, would allow the steamship "Ragmatan" to be used by King Ali and the British agent should arrange for the return of the steamer to Jeddah

13. King Ali, his people and the citizens of Jeddah undertake not to sell, destroy or otherwise dispose of any public property, such as launches, minarets, &c.

14. Sultan Abdul Aziz undertakes to grant all citizens, officers and soldiers at Yambo the aforesaid privileges and rights, except the distribution of money

15. Sultan Abdul Aziz undertakes also to grant within the general amnesty pardon to the undermentioned persons

Abdul Wahab, Mohammed and Bakr, sons of Y...

Abdul Haze-bun Abd Kazzaz

Ahmed and Saleh, sons of Abd al Rahman K...

Ismail bin Yahya Kazzaz

Sheikh Mohammed Ali Batawi and his brothers Ibrahim and Abdul Rahman

Batawi, sons of Mohammed Ali Saleh Batawi, their sons and their

consins Hassan and Zaim Batawi

Sheikh Yusuf Khushairim and Sheikh Abbas-bun Yusuf Khushairim

Sheikh Yassin Basant

Essayed Ahmed el Sagrofi

and the families and property of all the above mentioned

16. In case King Ali or his men break or fail to perform any one of the above mentioned articles, Sultan Abdul Aziz will consider himself in such case, not responsible on his part for putting into effect the obligations in this agreement

1. The two parties, Sultan Abdul Aziz and King Ali, undertake to stop hostilities during the progress of the negotiations

With best respects

ABDUL AZIZ BIN ABDUL RAHMAN
ALI BIN HUSSEIN

Enclosure 7 in No. 89

Ibn Saud to Acting Consul Jordan

(After greetings.)

2 6 1344 (December 18, 1925)

IT is reported that Yambo has surrendered. As you have informed me that you are going to send the letters to Yambo by the aeroplane, will you kindly make sure of the news and ascertain telegraphically whether Yambo has really surrendered or not, as I fear that if it has actually surrendered the troops will fire on the aeroplane if they see it, and will probably hurt its occupants. If you see the question is complicated you may send the letters by the steamer

I have also learned that the aviators are resigning their posts and are going to leave the aeroplanes. Please see that they hand them over in good order before they leave

With best respects,

(Seal of Ibn Saud)

Enclosure 8 in No. 89

King Ali's Notice of Withdrawal from the Hejaz

His Excellency,

3 4 1344 (December 19, 1925)

FOR the sake of peace and in order to safeguard life and property and to avoid bloodshed and to shorten the duration of the war which brought distress, ruin and trouble to the country, I have decided to withdraw, and to leave Jeddah on Tuesday, 6 6 1344 (December 22, 1925), and I have formed a native Provisional Government to carry out matters and affairs under the presidency of the Kaimakam of Jeddah, Sheikh Abdullah Reza. Native employees are remaining at their posts

I hasten to send this for your information

Ali

(Identical note sent to all foreign representatives)

Enclosure 9 in No. 89

Ibn Saud to Acting Consul Jordan

(Greetings and respects.)

3 6 1344 (December 19, 1925)

I AM sending seven flags for distribution "Insha'lah" among places. I am also sending telegrams for favour of despatch to their destinations, especially that one for His Majesty my father, and that for Medina. You will, "Insha'lah," try to send them all as soon as possible

I am sincerely thankful for the splendid services you have rendered to your country and to the Moslems

For such services you will, "Insha'lah," attain honour in all the Moslem world

respects.

(Seal of Ibn Saud)

Ibn Saud to Acting Consul Jordan

(Translation)

(Greetings and respects.)

9 6.1344 (December 25, 1925,

I AM pleased to inform your Excellency that the war in the Hejaz has come to an end by the withdrawal of Shereef Ali from Jeddah and his abdication. I have taken delivery of the besieged garrisons which were resisting our army in the Hejaz. Thus tranquillity and peace prevail throughout all the blessed Hejaz territories.

I have been compelled in the past to enter into wars and defence, in which I endeavoured not to harm anybody and to decrease the losses of the war as low as possible, bearing its troubles and its various difficulties, including the stretching out of period so that no loss of life may take place among the innocents and in mercy for the poor.

I have invited the leaders of Modern Governments, parties and committees to a conference that will be held in this blessed land for deciding the suitable condition as regards the comfort and interests of pilgrims who come to this country. I am best to make equality and security prevail over all the inhabitants of the Hejaz and to introduce reforms in administrations and branches, so that the Hejaz may attain its prosperity and comfort.

I have to thank your respectable Government for their neutral state in the case, and to thank your Excellency for the efforts you have done for peace and tranquillity in Jeddah during the hours of the last change.

Respects

(Seal of Ibn Saud)

E 364 180 917

No. 90

Acting Consul Jordan to Sir Austen Chamberlain - (Received January 18, 1926)

(Secret and Confidential)

NY

Jeddah, December 25, 1925

I HAVE the honour to report that on the afternoon of the 17th instant, whilst the negotiations for the submission of Jeddah were proceeding between the Sultan Abdul Aziz and myself, he took the opportunity, whilst waiting for the translators to finish their work, to talk of the situation in and around the frontiers of the territory occupied by him.

2. Referring to Syria and the revolt in the Jebel Druse I received many appeals for assistance, but I have not been able to follow the British policy in all respects as regards that part of the world. Further, he stated that a great deal of Bolshevik money was being applied to the insurgents, who though not Bolshevik themselves, were only too glad to avail themselves of the help thus afforded. He continued, and under great secrecy for the British Government only to inform me that the headquarters of the Bolshevik organisation was in Damascus and carried on from the Persian consulate general. He assured me of this information, and had received it from a most reliable source.

3. As regards Irak, he stated that he had heard nothing but most favourable reports of the situation in that country, and no trouble was to be feared there at present—excluding, of course, tribal raids and suchlike, which were but normal occurrences.

4. He expressed great concern for Transjordan and Palestine, and earnestly wishes to warn the British Government of danger from that quarter where, he stated, Bolshevik money and influence were gaining ground. He several times reiterated this warning and appeared most sincere.

As for the Yemen and Asir (Hirah country), he stated that he was on terms of friendship with both of them, but that the situation at present was uncertain and difficult. I gathered that the trouble actually is the division of the Asir between himself and the Imam Yahya, but he did not enlarge on this point.

6. With reference to my telegram No. 194 of the 28th December, 1925, he later showed a keen interest to know what actually was Sir Gilbert Clayton's mission to the Hejaz, as practically any arrangements, other than on the southern boundary of the Yemen, will vitally affect his interests in the Arabian peninsula.

7. Continuing on the general subject of Bolshevism, he described a visit he had received from a Bolshevik envoy during the course of hostilities with the Sherifs in the Hejaz. It appears that after a long discussion on various subjects, the Bolshevik envoy asked the Sultan in a most direct manner, "What is it you most want on earth?" Sultan Abdul Aziz explained that he was surprised at the directness of the question and for a few moments did not answer, but eventually said "Money, I suppose." The Bolshevik envoy stated that he was prepared to give him that, and what else did he want? The Sultan then replied, "Arms and ammunition." To which the Bolshevik replied, "And aeroplanes and guns also if you wish." The Sultan, more and more surprised at the generosity of his visitor, then replied, "Yes, but what do you want from me?" To which the Bolshevik replied that of course there were certain conditions, but that he did not think the Sultan would find them impracticable, and that all he wanted was that the Sultan should "make trouble with the British."

8. His Majesty the Sultan ended with again assuring me of his friendship and the correctness of his information and even went so far as to state that in case of trouble in Transjordan he would assist His Majesty's Government.

Copies of this despatch have been sent to Palestine, Beirut and Cairo.

I have, &c

S. IL JORDAN

E 366 366 91

No. 91

Acting Consul Jordan to Sir Austen Chamberlain - (Received January 18, 1926)

(Secret)

NY

Jeddah, December 30, 1925.

WITH reference to Foreign Office despatch No. 108 of the 20th September, 1925, addressed to the Acting High Commissioner, Cairo, and to the despatch No. 117 of the 22nd October, 1925, addressed to the Acting High Commissioner, Cairo, I have the honour to inform you that the Sultan Abdul Aziz would appear to be a most cautious question.

2. The Sultan Abdul Aziz holds for His Britannic Majesty's Government a desire to appear modern and civilized, I am of the opinion that he will accept any reasonable arrangement to secure permanent and satisfactory communication with the outside world.

3. He has in fact, already requested that his wireless station at Medina, which is more powerful than the others, should be officially recognised under the British Convention and opened for international traffic as soon as possible.

4. I enclose a copy of my letter addressed to the Director of Posts and Telegraphs, Khartoum, on this subject.

I would respectfully suggest that a conference, composed of representatives of the Sultan's Government, the British Government, the Egyptian Government, and the Government of His Britannic Majesty's Government, might be called at either Jeddah or Cairo, and an effort made to settle the question on the basis of the proposals contained in the Foreign Office despatches under reference.

6. Copies of this despatch and of its enclosure are being sent to Cairo and Khartoum.

I have, &c

S. R. JORDAN

Enclosure in No. 91

Acting Consul Jordan to Sudan Government

SIR,

Jeddah, December 28, 1925.

WITH reference to my letter of the 3rd instant, relative to the inter wireless communications within the Hejaz, I have the honour to state that the Hejaz has now been completely overrun by the Wahabi forces and that King Ali left Jeddah on the 21st instant, since which date the Wahabis have been in possession of the Hejaz and have taken over control.

This change will, of course, bring about an entirely new aspect of the vexatious
between ourselves and the Hejaz Government

I have been approached by the Sultan Abdul Aziz on this question, and I
informed him that I would refer the matter to you

He requires the wireless stations under his control to be officially recognised
glad if you will inform me if there is any objection at present to this course, and, if
how it may be overcome

I should add that the Sultan Abdul Aziz is an infinitely more reasonable being
than the late King Hussein, and I have every reason to hope that no sensible arrange-
ment will be refused by him

The Medina station is, I believe, not working at present owing to lack of petrol
Also, the Tebuk station was dismantled and carried over the border into Trans-
jordan by the refugees from that place flying before the forces of the Sultan Abdul
Aziz

I beg to inform you that I am addressing a despatch to His Majesty's Govern-
ment on the matter and requesting that the question of the ownership of the cable
may now be settled

I have, &c
S R JORDAN

E 367 367 91

N 2

Telling Consul Jordan to Sir Austen Chamberlain — (Received January 19, 1926)

(No 125 Secret)

Sir,

Jeddah, December 31, 1925

I HAVE the pleasure to enclose a report on the situation covering the period
from 21st November to 31st December

2. This despatch and of its enclosure are being sent to India, Egypt,
Aden, (through Port Sudan), Jerusalem, Bagdad, Beirut (for Damascus), Aden,
Singapore, Buhaira, Kuwait, Bahrein and Muscat

I have, &c
S R JORDAN

Enclosure in No 92

Report for the period November 21 to December 31, 1925

(Secret)

1. DURING the period under report events have succeeded each other with
 kaleidoscopic rapidity, and the Hejaz has at last surrendered to His Highness the
 Sultan Abdul Aziz of Nejd

2. Medina capitulated on the 31st instant, and as it was realised that the fall
 of Medina would also mean the end of Ali's régime, Jeddah was expected to
 fall late soon after

Events, however, rendered the situation at Jeddah very critical, and I am
reporting that owing to the efforts of His Majesty's Government

3. We have been informed that on the 21st instant Yumbo and Wedj followed suit, and now the whole of the Hejaz
 is under Wahabi domination

4. The British entered Jeddah on the morning of the 23rd December and a
 conference of representatives and notables was held

5. The last days of King Ali's reign were particularly eventful and trouble-
 some, and the trust placed in His Majesty's Government by the people of this country

6. Since the revolts of the fighting forces mentioned in my last report a further
 series of demonstrations and protests have been held, and on the 20th November a
 number of Palestinian troops barricaded themselves in the main mosque of Jeddah
 and refused to leave unless their demands were granted

The events leading up to this were as follows. On the afternoon and evening
 of the 20th November the whole of the forces defending Jeddah decided to combine
 and loot the town the following morning. The King, hearing rumours to this effect
 about midnight on the 20th immediately sent for the sheikhs of the Yemeni
 and Hejazi tribes and begged them to dissuade their troops from this action. The
 sheikhs were successful, but the Palestinian and Syrian forces were not contented
 and so took action as mentioned above. The mosque was immediately surrounded
 by the King's bodyguard and armed slaves, and fearing that the Government were
 preparing to take offensive action against the demonstrators, who were peacefully
 inclined, I, with my Italian colleague, temporarily charged with French interests,
 protested against force being employed against the nationals of our respective
 related territories, in view of the possibility of trouble in the town and also in
 view of the legitimacy of the soldiers' protest. This action on our part was
 successful, and the slaves and troops were withdrawn. The men given food and water,
 and eventually, after much discussion, the King persuaded them to return to the
 trenches, promising to repatriate them within seven days

7. During this period the Hejaz Government, driven to desperation obtained
 a fetva from a certain sheikh named Shengelli authorising the army to bomb the
 Haram (Mecca) and to use Christian aviators for the purpose. This, in fact, was
 done, and the aeroplanes, sometimes singly and sometimes two at a time, duly flew
 over Mecca at first dropping proclamations only and as a display of force, but later
 bombing the barracks on the edge of the city itself and the home of one Saggof, where
 Ibn Saud was supposed to be residing

No great damage was done, but in view of the congested state of the city and
 the fact that it was decided by the foreign repre-

8. King Ali and his Ministers that our Governments
 would hold them personally responsible for any loss of or damage to the lives and
 property of our respective nationals caused by the bombing or machine-gunning of
 Mecca. This was done verbally on the evening of the 4th instant and confirmed in
 a letter from the British and French Governments to the Hejaz Government

9. In view of the bombing operations, promised to take all possible precautions to safeguard foreign
 subjects, but in fact did cease bombing, and after our joint protest the aeroplanes
 went to Mecca but seldom and confined their efforts to the dropping of proclamations

10. A Nationalist movement in the forces and town, with the declared object of never
 submitting to the Wahabites and fighting till the last to support the Sherعية cause.
 He enlisted practically all the officers and a number of leading townspeople
 fired them with his enthusiasm that if events had not gone so far before he started
 movement it might possibly have been the salvation of the Sherعية cause in the
 Hejaz. Owing to his efforts the soldiers and officers were more or less contented
 for a few days, and it was not until some days later that the Syrian and Palestinian
 soldiers, seeing no preparation for or possibility of their promised repatriation,
 protested and threatened to drag the King to this agency and make him
 responsible before the British Government

11. Several of the soldiers came to the agency and informed me of their intentions,
 and I was able to dissuade them from this action, and pointed out that so long as
 they behaved in a peaceful manner and in view of their pitiable condition I would
 take such action as I was permitted to secure their early repatriation, but that if
 they used force I should be helpless and obliged to admit the right of the Hejaz
 Government to suppress revolt and maintain order with whatever means were to
 their hands

12. Eventually, after further discussions, the dissatisfied agreed to accept £1 each
 fifteen days' provisions and repatriation by the 10th December

13. Another difficulty thereupon arose as the Hejazi and Yemeni soldiers became
 discontented at this preferential treatment and the situation became very critical
 and at times it appeared as if the town must be sacked by the combined forces

14. On the 6th it became generally rumoured that Medina had fallen, but as
 the telegram announcing the intention of the garrison commander to capitulate
 direct to the King in cypher there was no confirmation until the 10th instant, when
 Sheikh Hafiz Wahba, who was proceeding to Egypt on the Khedivial steamship
 "Mansourah," broadcasted the information by wireless

15. It at once became evident that the situation in Jeddah was desperate, as
 at most three weeks would be necessary for Ibn Saud to transport the guns, &c,
 captured in Medina and blow Jeddah to pieces

11 Besides the difficulties in the army the population were intriguing for the Sherrefian cause, and in fact, the party in favour of Ibn Saud had gained several of the army officers to their cause and had made many arrangements to facilitate the capture of the place by Ibn Saud such as the disconnection of the searchlights along the front line trenches, the breaking of the wire entanglements in certain places, &c. Had they been successful in their efforts to induce Ibn Saud to attack towards the first week in December much bloodshed would have resulted, as even the townfolk, who are all armed would no doubt have defended themselves before a lot of Wahabis popularly supposed to be wild men.

12 On the 10th instant it became evident that the end of the Ali régime was at hand, but owing to the intrigues and counter intrigues and the efforts of many of the leading Ministers and notables of the town to secretly convince Ibn Saud that his eventual victory was entirely due to them and their total indifference as to what happened to the inhabitants or the soldiers, the situation was anything but pleasant, and at any moment serious incidents might have taken place.

13 On the 10th instant the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sheikh Fud, and the Prime Minister, Abdullah Fud, left Jeddah to proceed to make, so they said, a last effort to secure support for the Sherrefian cause in the Hejaz. Fud carried letters to King Fud and to Lord Lloyd, but before he had had time to deliver them the fate of the Hejaz had already been decided.

14 As King Ali is a very weak person and easily deceived I have no doubt that the actions of Fud and Abdullah were those of a man who has been going to endeavour to enlist sympathy for Ali, they were primarily saving their hides. Fud had been responsible for the whole of the scurrilous and lying propaganda conducted in the last months of the war and also responsible for the proclamations dropped on Mecca, in which the terms used against Ibn Saud were of a nature to shock the least susceptible.

Another thing which materially affected the decisions of Fud and Abdullah that they were safer away from the Hejaz was that they had been engineering a revolt in Mecca and which, indeed, very nearly came to a head but of its eventual failure there could have been no doubt. Owing to the faithlessness of one of the participants the whole of the details came to Ibn Saud's ears, and he had all the conspirators arrested. Ibn Saud himself was to have been murdered as he went to or was in the mosque and his body treated in a particularly atrocious manner. These facts no doubt contributed to hasten the departure of these two from the Hejaz and it was also the failure of this plot, which even more than the distress of his soldiers and people, that hastened Ali to take a decision.

15 Even when he could no longer hide the news of the fall of Medina and after being deserted by his more responsible Ministers and the commander-in-chief of the forces, one Tahsin Pasha, and knowing that discipline no longer existed in the army and intrigues were rampant in the town he still could not make up his mind to any definite line of action, and from the 10th till the 13th instant was in his palace in a state of mental terror and indecision that was

His main idea were: Firstly, to proceed to the Yemen with the Hejaz steamers at his disposal and join the Imam Yahya, taking with him such war materials as could be loaded conveniently and continue the war against Ibn Saud from the Aden side.

There were several objections to this course, of which the main was perhaps the objections of the townfolk to the war materials being taken from Jeddah, as this action might incense Ibn Saud after his entry and lead to punishment of the townpeople themselves. Also, the soldiers refused to disarm until they were paid or repatriated, and consequently, as Ali had no money to pay them, the idea was owing to his indecision dropped.

Secondly, he had a desire to request refuge on British territory, but again was deterred from taking for this even though he had been offered refuge over again, as he was afraid of a rebuff from His Majesty's Government.

16 On the 12th instant 220 Palestinian and Syrian soldiers left for Akaba on the steamship "Rushdi".

17 On the 13th instant Ali at last requested refuge on British territory, also that His Britannic Majesty's representative in Jeddah should act as a intermediary between him and his people and Ibn Saud for the surrender of the town.

Both these requests were granted, and on the morning of the 17th instant His Britannic Majesty's representative met Ibn Saud and arrangements were made for

the submission of the town, which was satisfactorily accomplished by the 21st instant.

18 Owing to the difficulty of disarming the soldiers whilst Ali was still in Jeddah he was on the morning of the 20th embarked on H.M.S. "Clematis," lying in Jeddah harbour, and a provisional government under his leadership. The local Governor (Kaimakam) was appointed. This Provisional Government was to deal with the main administrations, but, properly speaking, never functioned.

19 The head of the Provisional Government and its commander-in-chief of the forces officially surrendered to Ibn Saud on the morning of the 21st, and after that date functioned in his name.

20 King Ali left Jeddah in H.M.S. "Cornflower" on the 22nd instant for Aden, after which he will proceed to Bagdad.

21 Ibn Saud with a strong bodyguard entered Jeddah on the morning of the 21st, and for the present none of the civil employees have been interfered with or replaced.

He intends to remain in Jeddah for some weeks to thoroughly reorganise the administration in view of the forthcoming pilgrimage, and expresses the hope that greater comfort and security will be provided than has even been provided formerly.

22 To date no actual appointments have been confirmed but a certain number of Turkish has the direction of customs in place of Towal Bay, and a certain number of British have been appointed Acting Director of Public Health and Quarantine Administration.

23 The town is quiet and prices of food stuffs falling rapidly and there is a hope of a period of peace and tranquillity in this part of the world for several years to come.

24 Sheikh Hafiz Wahba left Rabigh on the steamship "Mansourah" on the 14th instant to visit King Fud of Egypt and to present him with a costly sword. He also received permission to proceed to Palestine in order to make pilgrimage arrangements, &c.

25 Mr. Philby, who was reported to have left for Lith, actually left for Rabigh, and met Ibn Saud somewhere outside Mecca and afterwards left Rabigh to Aden and proceeded to Port Sudan, from whence he arrived in Jeddah on the 30th instant.

26 Twenty-seven slaves were repatriated during the period under report and handed over to this agency for repatriation.

S. R. JORDAN

No. 95

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Mr. Jordan (Jeddah)

His Majesty is glad to

No. 96

Letina Agent, Jeddah to Sir Austen Chamberlain (Received January 25)

(No. 10)

1st January 1920

Jeddah, January 25, 1920

It cannot be expected to produce even present results for three months without extensive repairs. Fourteen boiler tubes are already

[...]

I understand that Italians have offered to supply and erect new condensers at two and a half months.

If British firm cannot complete by 15th-25th May and as matter left entirely in our hands by Ibn Saud, it is only fair that I should make some arrangement to have the work done by the Italians. The Italians are well known to health and is main factor in prevention of epidemic diseases.

No. 95

Acting Agent, Jeddah, to Sir Austen Chamberlain. (Received January 25)

(No. 12)

(Telegraphic) R

Jeddah, January 25, 1926

IBN SAUD states that he is transferring all war material captured at Jeddah to Taif, including aeroplanes.

He wishes to employ a British pilot and engineer to take charge of captured aeroplanes and fly same for commercial and postal services only between various towns in Arabian Peninsula.

He requests to be informed if there is any objection to this on the part of His Majesty's Government, and, if not, that he may be informed of best channel through which these persons could be engaged.

E 734/7/91

No. 96

Free-Consul Jordan to Sir Austen Chamberlain. (Received February

No. 3.)

Sir,

Jeddah, January 12, 1926.

I HAVE the honour to confirm my telegram No. 6 of the 11th instant, and to forward herewith a translation of a letter received from Abdul Aziz, Sultan of Nejd, proclaiming his election to the kingship of the Hejaz.

Also the translation of a proclamation published by him in the Mecca newspaper, "Umm al-Kura" on the 10th of January.

Copies of this despatch and of its enclosure are being sent to India, Cairo, Jerusalem, Bagdad and Aden.

I have, &c.

S. R. JORDAN

Enclosure 1 in No. 96.

Translation of Letter from Abdul Aziz-bin-Abdul Rahman-al-Faisal-al-Saud, King of the Hejaz and Sultan of Nejd and its Dependencies, dated 24th Jamad-ul-Thani, 1344 (January 9, 1926).

ROYAL PROCLAMATION TO FRIENDLY GOVERNMENTS

BY the grace and help of God the people of the Hejaz have recognised us as King of the Hejaz, ruling according to the Book of God (Koran), Tradition of His Prophet, and the path of the distinguished Caliphs who came after him, and to establish a Government in which the affairs of the Hejaz will be left to its own people.

In asking for God's help and succour, we have been pleased to accept that recognition and have assumed to ourselves the title of "King of the Hejaz and Sultan of Nejd and its Dependencies."

We shall restore peace, tranquillity and prosperity and try to bring happiness and content to the inhabitants of the Kingdom. We shall try our best as regards the fulfilment of all the wishes of the Islamic world, and shall make them pleased by the administration in this holy land.

We entreat the Almighty to help us in assuming the duties of that affair. God alone grants success.

Enclosure 2 in No. 96.

Extract from Mecca Newspaper, "Umm-al-Kura," dated 23rd Jamad-ul-Thani 1344 (January 8, 1926).

GENERAL PROCLAMATION

TO ALL MUSLIMS

PRAISE be to God. We have been privileged to see the Sultan of the Hejaz, His Majesty Abdul Aziz-bin-Abdul Rahman-al-Faisal-al-Saud, in person, and to have the honour of his presence in the city of Mecca.

He has been so kind as to visit the city of Mecca, and to have the honour of his presence in the city of Mecca, and to have the honour of his presence in the city of Mecca.

He has been so kind as to visit the city of Mecca, and to have the honour of his presence in the city of Mecca, and to have the honour of his presence in the city of Mecca.

The Almighty God has graciously granted success, conquest of the country and peace. The Moslem world (the Hejaz being part of same) will give with regard to the

I have already on more than one occasion called on the Moslems in general, asking them to hold a Moslem conference to decide what they think best regarding the future of the Hejaz.

I have again made a general and private call and sent a letter to the Moslem Governments and Nations on 10.4.1344. That letter has been published in all the newspapers of the world.

It is now more than two months since the date of that letter and I have not received a reply from anybody except the Caliphate Society in India. For they say God bless them have and are doing all they can for the order and happiness of the Hejaz.

When the Hejaz question was ended in this manner, for which we thank God, the Hejaz was divided into two parts, the Hejaz and the Nejd, and the Hejaz was given to the King of the Hejaz, and the Nejd was given to the King of the Nejd.

Caring only for the good and welfare of the people and for the success only from God, on whom I rely and to whom I go back.

ABDUL AZIZ-BIN ABDUL
RAHMAN-AL-FAISAL-AL-SAUD.

E 882/7 91

No. 97.

Sir H. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain. (Received February 8.)

(No. 49.)

Sir,

Constantinople, February 2, 1926

WITH reference to my despatch No. 296 of the 13th April last, I have the honour to inform you that the Sultan of the Hejaz, His Majesty Abdul Aziz-bin-Abdul Rahman-al-Faisal-al-Saud, has been so kind as to visit the city of Mecca, and to have the honour of his presence in the city of Mecca.

He has been so kind as to visit the city of Mecca, and to have the honour of his presence in the city of Mecca, and to have the honour of his presence in the city of Mecca.

He has been so kind as to visit the city of Mecca, and to have the honour of his presence in the city of Mecca, and to have the honour of his presence in the city of Mecca.

He has been so kind as to visit the city of Mecca, and to have the honour of his presence in the city of Mecca, and to have the honour of his presence in the city of Mecca.

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pilgrimages from the British Empire, he therefore hoped that His Majesty's Government would recognise these facts and see fit to help his claims with Ibn Saud, or if not that, at any rate not to oppose them. To all this I returned an entirely non-committal answer to Mohammed Emin. Ali Haidar, I said, knew that His Majesty's Government would on no account intervene in Islamic affairs, and I was entirely unable to see how far such questions as he had mentioned to me were religious and how far political in character.

Mohammed Emin said his father would have liked to come and call on me, but did not dare do so on account of the severity of the present Turkish régime. Ali Haidar was anxious now to leave Turkey and was trying quietly to make arrangements accordingly. He wished to get to Beirut, there to join his son Abdullah, who, you will remember, having married an Ottoman princess, was expelled from Turkey in the spring of 1924 with the rest of the Caliph's family. Once at Beirut Ali Haidar would be able to go anywhere else he liked.

It is difficult to believe that even Mohammed Emin would run the gauntlet of the spies at my gate and visit me in the Embassy without feeling fairly sure that the Turkish authorities would not object, and I should therefore expect that the next news of Ali Haidar will be that of his arrival at Beirut. But though he has property in Turkey, and even if he left Turkey with the connivance of the Turkish authorities, it would not necessarily follow that, once arrived at Mecca, he would be a mere Turkish Agent.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Cairo.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

No. 98

Acting Agent, Jeddah, to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 11)

(No. 10)

(Telegraphic)

YOUR telegram No. 10

Jeddah, February 11, 1926

In view of close relations between His Majesty's Government and Ibn Saud, after I am sure considers recognition by His Majesty's Government as an accomplished fact, merely lacking definite form to date.

I have consistently addressed him as His Highness the Sultan in all communications, but consider nothing can be gained by delay of full recognition.

I would suggest when he visits H. M. S. "Emerald" as being occasion for the inform him of formal recognition.

No. 99

Acting Agent, Jeddah, to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 13)

No. 21

(Telegraphic)

Jeddah February 13, 1926

STEAMSHIP "Alavi," with 300 pilgrims on board, arrived from Mazaran with clean bill of health on 9th February. Ship and pilgrims were placed in quarantine for twenty four hours by local authorities. Dutch consul protested to Minister for Foreign Affairs, who some hours afterwards informed me that he regretted he could do nothing. I therefore telephoned direct to Ibn Saud in Mecca who ordered ship to be released.

As this was the first ship to arrive, and in order to prevent repetition, I sent Muslim clerk to Mecca to approach Ibn Saud, whilst I tackled Minister for Foreign Affairs in Jeddah.

Ibn Saud has now agreed to accept clean bills from recognised quarantine stations, and wishes to become a signatory to International Quarantine Convention, and to send or appoint a delegate to represent Hejaz interests at conference to be held in May or thereabouts.

In view of pilgrimage, Hejaz is probably one of the most important quarantine areas. It is hoped that the above arrangements will greatly add to comfort and safety of pilgrims.

Is it possible for above to be arranged through His Majesty's Government please?

No. 100

Acting Agent, Jeddah, to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 15)

(No. 22)

(Telegraphic)

Jeddah, February 14, 1926

With reference to my telegram No. 21

Ibn Saud now agrees as follows:—

- 1 Pilgrim ships arriving at Jeddah presenting clean bill of health from any immediately after medical examination
- 2 Should an outbreak of disease occur after ship has left quarantine or in disinfection, unless representative of the Power to which ship belongs accepts local quarantine
- 3 Any ship not calling at quarantine station and which on inspection is found to be infected will be quarantined locally
- 4 The sum of 70 Egyptian piastres will be charged to each pilgrim arriving at Jeddah. This fee covers all charges, quarantine, passport, &c., both on arrival and departure but is exclusive of customs duties

and 3 refers to ships carrying less than one pilgrim per 100 tons

The above is a special arrangement for the pilgrimages of 1926 and is not a final agreement is concluded between Hejaz and foreign Powers

Above would appear to agree with conditions of 1-12 and I trust that His Majesty's Government will agree to same and approve of my actions in the matter. My telegram No. 21 has been sent to Cairo and India. Repeated to Cairo and India.

No. 101

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Consul Jordan (Jeddah)

No. 22

(Telegraphic)

Foreign Office, February 19, 1926

With reference to telegrams Nos. 21 and 22 of 13th and 14th February respectively; Jeddah quarantine arrangements for 1926 pilgrimage

Arrangements proposed by Ibn Saud for this year's pilgrimage are acceptable, and your action is approved.

Question of invitation to Ibn Saud to send representative to Paris Sanitary Conference will be addressed to you when decision is reached.

E 1148 187,91]

No. 102

Sir Austen Chamberlain to M. de Fleurbaey

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, February 22, 1926

I HAVE received your note of the 28th July last, relative to the ex-Imperial highnesses in the Red Sea.

2. I regret the delay in replying thereto, which has been occasioned by the necessity of considerable correspondence with the competent departments of His Majesty's Government.

3. I now have the honour to inform you that my Government have reluctantly reached the conclusion that the

practical obstacles to the policy proposed in your note of the 28th July last are so great that they have no alternative but to withdraw their original proposals, which were set forth in my note of the 18th May last

I have, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

No. 103

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Consul Jordan (Jeddah)

1. (R)

Foreign Office February 25, 1926

YOF R telegram No. 19 of 11th February Recognition of Ibn Saud as King of the Hejaz.

You are authorised on suitable occasion to address a note to Ibn Saud using style of 'His Majesty' and informing him that His Majesty's Government recognise him as King of the Hejaz.

You should however specifically add that while thus recognising His Majesty's authority over the Hejaz His Majesty's Government continue to regard the régime of the Holy Places of Islam and all religious questions connected therewith as matters solely concerning Muslims, regarding which His Majesty's Government neither ought nor desire to express an opinion.

As H.M.S. "Emerald" is due at Jeddah on 1st March, visit may furnish desired particulars.

E 1122 80 91

No. 104

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Mr van Swinderen

Foreign Office February 25, 1926

His Majesty's Government have had under careful consideration the proposals set forth in your note of the 23rd September last regarding the administration of the quarantine station at Kamaran. The Government are in order to ensure the proper treatment of pilgrims from the Netherlands East Indies.

2. His Majesty's Government share the view of the Netherlands Government that the International Sanitary Convention should be revised in such a way as to enable pilgrim ships, which call at Kamaran and are ascertained to be free from infection, in certain circumstances to proceed to Jeddah without being compelled to anchor at Kamaran. The Government appreciate the fact that in order to secure the revenues necessary for the maintenance of the quarantine station the pilgrim and other dues levied at Kamaran will normally have to be paid, even if pilgrims are not landed in any particular case. The British representatives at the forthcoming international sanitary conference will be instructed to co-operate with the Dutch representatives in advocating a revision of the clauses of the Sanitary Convention dealing with this point. They will also in collaboration with the Dutch representatives endeavour to secure the revision of the regulations regarding the sanitation of pilgrim ships as to which the hope has been expressed by the Government of India that the maximum number of pilgrims on any pilgrim steamer may be limited to 2,000. In this connection the Government of India would be glad to be supplied with detailed information regarding the arrangements for the sanitation of pilgrim ships.

3. In your note of the 25th September you informed me that your Government considered that the most desirable solution of this question was that of placing the quarantine station under international supervision would be the most desirable solution of this question. As regards the future administration of the quarantine station, His Majesty's Government are disposed, as explained below, to favour its future control by the Netherlands and Great Britain on a footing of complete equality. They do not however regard as practicable a solution which would involve placing the station under any form of international control. This would in their opinion, be likely to lead to confusion

between the duties of the civil administrator of the island responsible to the Government of India and those of the health authorities responsible to the League of Nations or international sanitary body concerned with quarantine administration. In this connection, it must be remembered that Kamaran Island has a not inconsiderable indigenous population, which forms no part of the personnel of the quarantine station. The administration of the quarantine station might consequently suffer in efficiency.

4. The alternative suggested in your note, namely, that two medical officers of equal rank, one Dutch and one British, should be appointed on a footing of equality of position, is open to the objection that the discipline of the quarantine station would be difficult to maintain unless one of the medical officers were to be definitely recognised as the medical superintendent of the station.

5. His Majesty's Government assume in this connection that no question arises of changing the present system of administration of the Island of Kamaran, apart from that of the quarantine station. As the Netherlands Government are no doubt aware, the island is administered by a British civil administrator appointed by and responsible to the Government of India.

6. It therefore appears to His Majesty's Government that the following proposals might provide the basis of an agreement satisfactory to the two Governments—

- (a) The civil administrator appointed by the Government of India shall continue to be responsible for law and order and the administration of the island, including the quarantine station. The medical staff of the quarantine station shall consist of a Dutch medical officer and a British medical officer, to be nominated respectively by the Netherlands Government and the Government of India. The relative seniority of these two medical officers shall be determined by the length of service at Kamaran quarantine station, or in any other way which shall be agreed upon by the Netherlands Government and His Majesty's Government. In effect, the object to be aimed at will be that the British and Dutch medical officers shall rank more or less alternatively as senior medical officer subject to some reasonable maximum period of tenure of the senior post which it is suggested should be limited to four years and be arranged so as normally to permit of each medical officer being in charge for two years.
- (b) The senior medical officer, as medical superintendent of the quarantine station, shall be the technical adviser of the civil administrator in all matters concerning quarantine, except as specified below.
- (c) The administrator shall decide all administrative questions, including the question which ships should be allowed to proceed in either direction without disembarking pilgrims at Kamaran. When his decision in any matter depends essentially on the precautionary measures which have been taken at Dutch East Indian ports, either in regard to the ship or in regard to the pilgrims carried by the ship, the administrator will be guided by the advice of the Dutch medical officer. He will similarly be guided by the advice of the Dutch medical officer in matters which depend upon the nature of the measures which have been taken on a Dutch ship by a Dutch medical officer during the voyage and also in any matters which depend upon the precautionary measures which will be applied to Dutch pilgrims on their return to the Dutch East Indies. If at any time he should think fit to overrule the advice of the Dutch medical officer on the above points, the administrator shall report the fact by telegram to the Government of India, repeating his telegram to His Majesty's Government for the information of the Netherlands Government. In corresponding circumstances in relation to British Indian or Colonial ports pilgrims and ships medical officers, he will be guided by the advice of the British medical officer.
- (d) Under existing arrangements the administrator submits each year, as soon as practicable after the conclusion of the pilgrimage, a report on the working of the quarantine service since the preceding pilgrimage. On the coming into force of the new arrangements now proposed he will attach to this report made to him in respect of the same period by the medical superintendent of the quarantine station, together with any report which

I have received from his colleague on technical questions specially concerning the welfare of the Dutch East Indian pilgrims or of the British-Indian or British-Colonial pilgrims, as the case may be.

The above reports will be communicated by the Government of India or the information of the Netherlands Government and of His Majesty's Government.

- (4) Financial control of the quarantine station shall be exercised by the Government of Bombay through the administrator. The budget estimates for the quarantine station relating to the following year after being framed in consultation with the medical superintendent shall be submitted by the Government of Bombay through the Government of India on the 1st September and sent to the Netherlands Government for observations before being finally approved.

7. The Netherlands Government may not be aware that the deficit incurred by British and Indian revenues on quarantine administration at Kamaran, from the year 1911 when the quarantine station was reopened for pilgrims, until the year 1922 when the quarantine station became self-supporting, amounts to over £44,000.

Government of India. For this reason it would not be possible for His Majesty's Government to agree to a larger measure of financial control by the Netherlands Government unless the latter were prepared to assume their share of responsibility for the deficit by refunding, for division between His Majesty's Government and the Government of India, a moiety of the above sum.

I hope that the above proposals, which are, of course, susceptible of elaboration or modification in detail may prove acceptable to your Government. If they are accepted in their main lines any such modifications in detail as may be deemed desirable might most conveniently be left for discussion until shortly before the International Sanitary Conference, which is due to take place in May 1926 when a representative of the Department of the Government of India responsible for the control of the quarantine stations at Kamaran will be in this country.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

E 1397 200/91]

No. 103

Acting Consul Jordan to Government of India.—(Copy to Foreign Office in despatch No. 8, received March 1.)

(Secret.)

Sir,

Jeddah, January 29, 1926.

IN continuation of my telegram No. 14 of the 28th January addressed to the Foreign Office and repeated to you, I have the honour to transmit herewith a report on the activities of the Khilafat delegation as far as has been ascertainable by the means at the disposal of this agency.

Copies of this despatch and report are being sent to the Foreign Office.

S. R.

S. R. JORDAN

Enclosure in No. 103

Report on the Activities of the Khilafat Delegation.

THE Khilafat delegation, under the presidency of Maulana Zafar Ali Khan, of the newspaper "Zamendar," and with Shuaib Kureshi as secretary, arrived in Rabigh towards the middle of December, and, after a stay of some days in Rabigh, proceeded to Medina to verify the reported acts of vandalism on the part of the Wahabi forces.

Shuaib Kureshi, who called at this office, informed me personally that the reports on this subject were grossly exaggerated and that he found that the dome of the Prophet's Tomb had been hit in three places only, and one of them was certainly by a bullet fired from the "Sultan" headquarters on that hill.

The Sudda Hamza Tomb was intact except for several marks made by shrapnel fired by the Sherhan forces and the fact that some of the carpets or covering of the

repaired.

Shuaib Kureshi also stated that he had taken photographs of the various

several audiences with Bin Saud, but, as far as can be ascertained, they were treated with but scant respect and given to understand that if India really wished to have some say in the control of the Hejaz there were more concrete ways of showing it than by sending penniless delegations who were dependent on the Hejaz even for their food whilst here.

After the fall of Jeddah they came to this place and began to investigate the extent of British interference in the matter of mediation between the Sherhan and Bin Saud and what propaganda they could make out of it.

It must be counted a success on the part of His Majesty's Government's policy that, after these people had been running all over the place endeavouring to find some one to see and hearing nothing but good spoken on all sides and how, had it not been for the actions of His Majesty's representative, bloodshed could not have been avoided, they were, reluctantly perhaps, forced to admit likewise, and remarked to Munshi Ihsanullah, employed at this agency, and several other local Indians gathered in his house, that it was the only good thing that Sherhan Government had ever

promised. The delegation was still in Jeddah when Bin Saud was declared King of the Hejaz at Mecca, and when news reached them to this effect they became very excited and angry, and declared that Bin Saud, by his acceptance of this position, had given the lie to all his previous declarations about the Hejaz, and had thereby insulted the delegation.

They went so far as to excuse themselves in writing when the delegation representative to a reception held at the Governorate, as a protest

Later, when Bin Saud gave a banquet to the foreign representatives and notables of Jeddah, they again refused to attend, though they were accepting his hospitality even to the extent of their daily food.

the first opportunity of leaving, and actually sailed for India by the steamship "Telangana," which left Jeddah on the 24th January.

During their stay in Jeddah they exhorted Bin Saud not to surrender Ma'an and

British, as they considered it holy territory. This point, informed them, also that His Majesty's Government had been paying large sums of money to Bin Saud to keep them somewhat, and they were at great pains to verify this in Jeddah.

They are returning to India rather crestfallen, and it would not be surprising if a policy directed against Bin Saud as soon as they return.

Shuaib Kureshi's application for a visa to proceed to the United Kingdom now appears to have been an excuse for calling at this agency, and as soon as I realised this I took no further action in the matter.

S. R. JORDAN

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No. 106

Acting Consul Jordan to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 1.)

No. 9.)

Sir,

Jeddah, January 30, 1926.

I HAVE the honour to report that His Highness the Sultan has at several in consideration of the fact that he would take the necessary measures to stop the

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exportation of slaves on all sides of the territories under his control, Nejd included. His Majesty's Government would consent to cease giving refuge to slaves at this

The above offer was made after a lengthy discussion of a most amiable nature, and I was, His Highness stated, whilst recognising in principle the necessity of abolishing this barbarous practice, as far as he could go at present without causing much trouble, and possibly revolution, in the country, and that he hoped that eventually slavery, on account of the stoppage of importation, would die out and the necessity for more drastic measures be avoided. His Highness assured me of his ability to stop the importation of slaves, and would back his trade with a religious fetra obtained from the Ulama of Mecca.

3. His Highness further stated that if he abolished slavery at once in the territories he controlled, and more particularly the Hejaz, it would give his enemies an excellent opportunity of inciting the tribes against him, and might possibly interfere with the pilgrimage, which of course he was most anxious to avoid.

4. As against these arguments, I informed His Highness that the slave question was an international question, and not a purely private matter to be discussed between His Highness and His Majesty's Government, even though the great majority of slaves in Arabia originally came from territories now under the control of His Majesty's Government, but that, nevertheless, His Majesty's Government, in virtue of this fact, had a peculiar and particular right to protect the subjects of His Gracious Majesty King George, and I considered, without hindering or committing the Government in any way, that they would be loath to relinquish in any way or in any circumstance other than that of complete emancipation their duty towards British subjects.

5. I further stated that His Majesty's Government were not prepared to accept any arrangement which would involve the sale of slaves to other powers, and that their interests were such that they would not consent to any such arrangement.

6. His Highness stated that he had been thinking of the matter for many years, and that to abolish slavery at once would certainly be a great source of trouble.

7. I then pointed out to His Highness that the complete emancipation of all slaves in His Highness's territories did not necessarily mean that the slaves would be taken away from their masters, but would mean that these fellow-Moslems could not be bought and sold as animals or detained against their wills, and that they would have the liberty of leaving their masters if they so desired, but that possibly not 50 per cent., were they well treated, would avail themselves of their newly-found prerogative, preferring rather to stay and receive a small salary and be no longer considered as slaves but as domestic servants.

8. I further pointed out to His Highness that even the Koran was not in accord with slavery except and unless the slaves were enemies taken in battle, and even this, according to the strict interpretation of the Koran, was to spare the lives of the prisoners and to provide man-power generally lost in battle.

9. Further, I told His Highness of several particularly revolting cases of ill-treatment of slaves that had come under my notice during my stay in Jeddah, and assured His Highness that if he wished further to show himself to the civilised world as the great reformer of the Moslem religion, as he undoubtedly was, no action on his part could be more eloquent or further redound to his credit.

10. After further discussion on the subject, during which His Highness seemed anxious if possible to discover some magic formula to abolish slavery without the necessary trade, &c., I still further informed His Highness that the question could be approached not on humanitarian grounds alone, but also on the religious basis, to which he agreed, and also that now was a most suitable moment as he had in his hour of success shown mercy to his enemies and granted a general amnesty, could he not, as a Moslem, do the same for his fellow-Moslems, who were slaves in bondage in this country.

11. At the end of this discussion His Highness again asked if it would not be possible for His Majesty's Government, in consideration of his stopping the import of slaves, to refrain from protecting slaves at this agency. I informed His Highness that I was not competent to give an answer, but would refer the question to His Majesty's Government and inform him of the reply in due course.

12. The interview, which had been of a most cordial nature throughout, ended by His Highness thanking me sincerely for the frank exchange of views on the subject and assuring me that, in principle, he was against slavery, and would do all in his power to eradicate the barbarous practice from his domains, but that it was necessary to go slowly and explore and utilise every channel possible to satisfy the people whilst assuring the liberty of all slaves.

13. His Highness further promised to consult his Ulama and endeavour by persuasion to obtain from them religious arguments against the practice and so educate the people.

14. His Highness further stated that he was prepared to make many sacrifices and acknowledged as a civilised power, and to that end is prepared to make many sacrifices. I would respectfully suggest that a communication couched in friendly terms from His Majesty's Government to His Highness, pointing out the deplorable practice of slavery in his territories would go far to assist him in his endeavours to abolish the practice of protecting slaves at this agency, irrespective of any action on his part.

15. His Highness the Sultan left for Mecca this morning and has expressed a desire to be kept informed of any further developments on the subject.

16. I venture to hope that any actions in this matter will be approved, and I shall not fail to communicate to you any further expressions of policy or desires on the part of His Highness.

I have, &c.
S. R. JORDAN

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No. 107

Vice Consul Jordan to Sir Austen Chamberlain — (Received March 1)

No. 11 Secret.)

Jeddah, February 4, 1926

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith my report on the situation in the Hejaz during the period the 1st 31st January 1926.

2. I have also the honour to forward herewith 2 Beglas, one to Delhi and Beirut (for Damascus).

3. In view of the cessation of hostilities in the Hejaz I would respectfully suggest that the practice of protecting slaves at this agency should henceforth cease unless there be some special reasons of which I am not cognisant.

4. I shall be glad to receive instructions on this point.

I have &c.
S. R. JORDAN

Enclosure in No. 107

Report for the Period January 1 to 31, 1926

(Secret.)

THE military situation during the period under report has been calm, with perhaps the exception of the attack on the Saudi forces in the Hejaz at Jeddah and Saudi who have been driven from the city and the occupation of Jizan was the immediate result.

2. The King's (Ibn Saud's) representative and Minister for Foreign Affairs in Jeddah, a certain Abdullah Bey Damluji of Mosul origin, informed me that the situation in Asir was by no means calm, but that Ibn Saud has sufficient forces to cope with any eventuality. That the Imam Yahya knew his own strength and the strength of Ibn Saud, and consequently there would not be war between them.

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3 It really appears as if the Idressi as a force has practically ceased to exist and his territories are being divided between Ibn Saud and the Imam Yahya.

4 The Emir Mohammed, Ibn Saud's third son, who went to Medina to receive the submission of that city arrived in Jeddah with a large force of men and arms.

5 The arrangements for the future military control of the Hejaz are as follows: Other than the above, Ibn Saud receives an annual amount of £60,000 as King of the Hejaz and Commander of the military forces. No armed forces, except police, are to be recruited in the Hejaz, and the forces of occupation will be Ibn Saud's own people from Nejd.

6 Two small robberies have occurred on the Jeddah-Mecca Road and consequently a chain of gendarmerie posts have been established to further guarantee the safety of travellers. Ibn Saud has also announced his intention of transferring all war materials taken in Jeddah to Taif including aeroplanes, as the climate of Jeddah is too severe.

7 It is as yet too early to remark upon the financial situation as the many measures economic and otherwise, are still being discussed by the so-called Hejaz Assembly in Mecca.

The majority of the new employees in the various administrations would appear to be Syrians, who are being employed in a more reasonable manner than is at present proposed by certain members of the Assembly.

8 The Assembly, which is supposed to be a representative assembly, can hardly claim that distinction at present, though in Mecca and Medina some freedom was made of an election.

9 The business done to date, with the exception of the formal recognition of Ibn Saud as King of the Hejaz, the nomination of an annual all-Hejaz assembly, and the election of a Council of the Hejaz, has been very little.

10 Various reports are arriving daily from Mecca of the squabbles that are going on, particularly over financial matters and the salaries of the heads of the different administrations.

The following appointments:

1. Mr. [Name] (Syrian), Director General of Health
2. Mr. [Name] (Syrian), Inspector General of Health Department
3. Mr. [Name] (Egyptian), Inspector General of Quarantine
4. Mr. [Name], Chief of Jeddah Hospital
5. Mr. [Name], Chief of Jeddah Prison
6. Mr. [Name], Chief of Jeddah Police
7. Mr. [Name], Chief of Jeddah Customs
8. Mr. [Name], Chief of Jeddah Post Office
9. Mr. [Name], Chief of Jeddah Telegraph Office
10. Sheikh Qusam Ismail of Jeddah, Director General of Customs
11. Mohammed Salih Janjoun, of Jeddah, Chief of Angar
12. Sherif Sharaf el Riza, of Jeddah, Chief of Angar
13. Sheikh Mohammed [Name], Chief of Angar
14. Sheikh [Name], Chief of Angar

The number of Syrians of the medical profession is considerable. Syrians are also well represented in the various commands in the army, details of which I have been unable to secure to date.

Other than the above Dr. Abdullah Bey Damiani, originally from Mecca, is now in Jeddah. He is a well-known physician and has been in the service of the British Consulate for many years.

10 There is a movement afoot, particularly in Mecca and Medina, that only Hejazis should be employed on the administrations, and all the foreigners, i.e., Syrians, Egyptians, &c. should be dismissed.

11 Dr. Abdullah Hadi, mentioned above as Director-General of Quarantine, is all over the place, including Teluk and Taif. He is, so I should judge from a conversation I had the doubtful pleasure of having with him, a man of no

intellectual development whatever, and how he came to be nominated to such a post is quite beyond me.

Should his proposals be put into force it is quite possible that the pilgrims will have to do double quarantine once at Kamaran and again at Jeddah. I have already protested to the King's representative against such an eventuality, and as an example of the régime Hadi Bey would establish, may be cited the fact that he assured me that pilgrims coming from the ships and proceeding to quarantine on the islands would endure no hardships whatever as he was buying a fast tug capable of a speed of 10 knots. The above proposal and the Emir's adaptability of his calculations are on a par with his many other suggestions.

On account of the fact that most of the administrative are in the process of being replaced, and on account of the paucity of the available material for administrative posts, no great improvement on the Sherifian régime can be anticipated for some time to come, but the one asset over the old régime is that the level-headed manner and strength of character with which Ibn Saud is facing the situation, more particularly in regard to the pilgrimage question, will overcome many apparently insurmountable difficulties and tend to make the people cognizant of their own shortcomings.

12. On the 8th January Ibn Saud was by a 'Bayat' formerly elected King of the Hejaz and assumed the title of King of the Hejaz and Sultan of Nejd and Dependencies. The ceremony, which took place in Mecca, came as a surprise to many of the Hejaz people themselves, and was, according to reports, forced upon Ibn Saud not against his will, perhaps, by the Hejaz notables, as they realised that should he hand the government of the Hejaz over to the Hejazis themselves or to a Moslem delegation or council, nothing but internecine strife and contentions would be their lot for months and even years to come, as they would be open to the intrigues of the Ashraf and many other sections of the public.

Therefore, in order to guarantee the safety of the Haramain and the roads leading thereto, in order that Moslems could perform their religious duties in security and, further, in order to secure peace and prosperity to their country, they begged Ibn Saud to accept the kingship.

It is Ibn Saud did but declared that the Hejaz was for the Hejazis, and that in accordance with their wishes, he would assume the title of King and assure the safety of the Holy Places and roads, but that the affairs of Nejd and the Hejaz would be kept strictly separate.

14. On the 22nd instant, Ibn Saud, just prior to observing a self-inflicted fast on account of not having fasted the year previous owing to the war, invited the representatives of the various Powers, the European residents and the notables of Jeddah.

Abdullah Bey read a speech of welcome after which the Sultan addressed the assembled company in the following sense:—

"It is a great pleasure to me to have the opportunity of informing my honoured guests, and particularly the foreign representatives, of my thoughts and desires for this holy territory, and which merits our best efforts to secure its peace and prosperity. I shall devote the whole of my energies to that end. I am aware of the great achievements of the western world and I do not desire them. I feel that the western world owes much to the Arabs, who have, in the past, lost their position in the world because they strayed from the paths set by their ancestors, but I am going to devote my energies to return them back to those paths of righteousness and truth which alone lead to the happiness of the world."

We have our obligations to the honourable foreign Governments by which we will stand, and they have their obligations towards us. We are brothers throughout the world, and we stand as such, and we ask the foreign Governments to facilitate the passage of pilgrims to the Holy Places. And there are obligations greater even than this, and that is, that Arabs and Moslems should be treated with consideration and their interests protected as the foreigners are treated in this Holy Land.

I know that the heart of an Arab and Moslem is good soil, and if it is watered with kindly consideration it will produce good crops, i.e., affection. Therefore I beg that the honourable foreign Governments will not gainsay the legitimate rights of the Moslems in their respective countries. In conclusion I pray God our actions may be greater than our words."

15. His Majesty has, during the course of several conversations I have had with him, raised the question of slavery, and is, in fact, manifesting a desire to control. What the eventual results will be is not yet manifest.

16. During the period under report, orders have been secured for British firms for the supply of a condenser, two motor-cars and 5,000 tons of coal. It is hoped to secure further orders for boats, electric lighting plants, and the supply of an amount of small coinage to replace the small coins of many denominations and nationalities at present in circulation.

There is also in the course of formation a Moslem company to run a service of pilgrimages between Jeddah and Mecca. This company, which will be composed of pilgrims in May-June next but owing to the slowness of the various administrations and the consequent delay in getting the concession, it is doubtful whether it will be possible.

17. I understand that Mr. Philby, who is still in Jeddah, is endeavouring to secure the oil concessions at Duhuk, and, if so, will be returning to England to attempt to raise the necessary capital for the exploration of these fields.

18. Two Indian deputations have been present in Jeddah during the period. One is antagonistic to the Wahabi régime and to the other delegation. The loyalty of the Khilafat delegation to Ibn Saud was badly shaken by the election of this latter as King of the Hejaz, as they through their delegation, were anxious to have the Sultan of Turkey as King of the Hejaz. Both delegations are receiving treatment.

19. Several doctors have recently arrived from Egypt to attempt to restore the health of the Sultan.

20. A wireless set, bought from Marconi in England, is being erected at Jeddah. These are, no doubt, to supply quick and accurate information of the military situation in that direction.

21. Nine slaves have been repatriated during the period under report.

S. R. JORDAN

No. 108

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Mr. Jordan (Jeddah)

(No. 28)

(Telegraphic) R

Foreign Office March 5, 1926

YOUR telegram No. 12 of 25th January. Desire of Ibn Saud to engage British pilot and engineer to operate aeroplanes in his possession.

Please inform Ibn Saud that his request has been sympathetically considered by His Majesty's Government. In order to assist him in forming estimate of personnel and material required for operating air service as contemplated, His Majesty's Government are prepared to send him from Egypt an officer of Royal Air Force on a visit to inspect the aircraft, draw up estimate and advise him generally regarding future requirements.

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No. 109

Letting Consul Jordan to Sir Austen Chamberlain (Received March 5)

(No. 31)

Jeddah February 15, 1926

I HAVE the honour to confirm my telegrams Nos. 21 and 22 in the last part of the telegram respectively and to state that the sequence of events culminating in the telegram was as follows:—

The steamship "Alavi," of the Turner, Morrison line of steamships, arrived in Jeddah on February 10th last. It was found to be carrying a number of

first and second class passengers on board, together with 360 pilgrims and 6205 bales of merchandise destined for Jeddah.

The ship upon arrival was visited by the local quarantine doctor, by name Ramiz Bey, and placed in quarantine for twenty-four hours, irrespective of the fact that the doctor on board presented a clean bill of health from Kamaran, and no sickness had broken out after her departure from the quarantine station. The first- and second-class passengers, mostly the families of the local and Mecca notables, were allowed to disembark but the pilgrims were detained and the discharge of the cargo held up.

As soon as these facts came to my knowledge, I sent a clerk of the agency to the quarantine offices to ascertain the details.

He was informed that the ship had been placed in quarantine for twenty-four hours as she had only done twenty-four hours quarantine at Kamaran, but that he would release the ship if he received an order from Abdullah Bey Damlup, the King's representative and Director of Foreign Affairs.

Upon this, I conferred with my Dutch colleague, and we both visited the Minister for Foreign Affairs and pointed out that the idea of keeping the pilgrims on board ship for twenty-four hours after arrival was unnecessary and futile, as in order to clean the ship, if infected, disinfection would have to be carried out, and the mere holding up of the ship and pilgrims for twenty-four hours in port would produce rather than prevent infection.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs promised to refer the matter to the Sultan in Mecca and inform us of the result in due course. This was about midday. At 3.30 I received a telephone message from Abdullah Bey Damlup, who stated that he regretted he was unable to do anything.

As I doubted if he had referred the matter to the Sultan, I informed him that I would telephone direct to Mecca, which I did.

As soon as the Sultan heard of the situation, he promised to look into it at once, and some one hour afterwards rang me up, stating that Abdullah Bey informed him that there was illness on board. This I was able to refute, and the Sultan thereupon gave orders for the ship to be released pending discussion of the whole affair.

The following morning in order to keep the question to the fore, I sent Ihsanullah of the agency staff, to Mecca to interview the Sultan. I provided him with explicit written instructions, and was in constant touch with him and the Sultan by telephone.

The results of these conversations are summarised in my telegrams above referred to and hardly require to be enlarged upon. I enclose herewith a more exact translation of the agreement suggested and acceptable by Ibn Saud, and I hope that, as these conditions to all intents and purposes agree with the Convention of 1912 and are a great advance on the conditions under the Sheriefian régime, they will be acceptable to His Majesty's Government as a provisional arrangement until such time as the Hejaz becomes a signatory of the International Quarantine Convention.

A desire to this effect has been expressed by the Sultan, who is uncertain as to how it should be done, i.e., whether he should apply direct or through the intermediary of another Power, or await an invitation. As I understand there will be a Sanitary Conference in Paris during the month of May, I would respectfully suggest that the Hejaz should be represented at this conference.

Hejaz thereto, as, unless some definite effort at co-operation takes form soon, there is no apparent reason why the Sultan should not be able to deal with the incapable and bigoted heads of the various local administrations, who have most had experience under the Sheriefian régime, may not adopt their old tactics.

The situation has been rendered rather more difficult by Mr. Philby, about whom I am forwarding a separate despatch, who frequents the society of the various departmental heads and fills them with ideas of non-co-operation and full independence and the inefficiency of the International Quarantine Convention.

On this occasion I have fortunately been able to refute the puerile arguments put forward by him to the local people, but on a future occasion I may not be so successful.

Copies of this despatch and of its enclosure are being sent to India and Egypt. I have, &c.

S. R. JORDAN

Enclosure in No. 109

Translation of Proposed Agreement

In the name of God the Most Merciful

SPECIAL arrangements for the present pilgrimage season until official agreements are made between us and the Governments

1 Every ship coming from countries which are free from a ... possession of a certificate from quarantine following an international law proving that the ship is ...

2 ... use an epidemic disease breaks out after leaving the quarantine and the ... is proved by the quarantine and the ship's doctor jointly, the ship will be sent ... to the nearest international quarantine of that ...

... medical visit the ship will be put under health supervision and the ...

... medical visit the ship will be put under health supervision and the ...

... medical visit the ship will be put under health supervision and the ...

... medical visit the ship will be put under health supervision and the ...

No. 110

Letting Agent, Jeddah, to Sir Austen Chamberlain — (Received March 12)

Jeddah, March 12, 1926
VOL R telegram No. 28
Ibn Saud accepts offer with pleasure. Suggest offer should not leave Egypt ... 1st April owing to my absence in Port Sudan

E 1908 366 91

No. 111

Vice Consul Jordan to Sir Austen Chamberlain — (Received March 22)

Jeddah, February 20, 1926
A continuation of my despatch No. 123 (22), of the 30th December last, relative to the Port Sudan-Jeddah cable. I have the honour to forward herewith a copy of a letter received from the Director of Posts and Telegraphs, Khartum, in answer to my letter No. 602 M of the 28th December last, of which a copy was forwarded to you with my despatch under reference

I have, &
S R JORDAN

Enclosure in No. 111.

Director of Posts and Telegraphs to British Agent Jeddah

(Strictly Confidential)

Sir
General Post Office, Khartum, February 16, 1926
I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter No. 102 M of the 10th December 1925 and copy of your despatch No. 123 (22) of the 30th December 1925, to the Foreign Office

I see no objection to, and am in favour of, the conference which you have proposed in paragraph 5 of your despatch No. 123 (22). I assume however that no further action can be taken pending a reply from the Foreign Office in connection with your suggestion for a conference when I presume the Sudan Government will be asked officially to participate in the conference

2 I am unable to express any very definite views on the subject of the use of the Hejaz wireless stations for international traffic, but the following remarks may be of interest:—

(a) For various reasons, not confined to this particular question, it seems desirable that the Hejaz should notify its adhesion to the International Telegraph Convention and the Radio-Telegraph Convention. I would add, however, that the Sudan, from an international telegraph point of view, is regarded as part of Egypt, and I understand that adhesion to the above conventions must be notified through diplomatic channels

(b) Whether or not the Hejaz notifies its adhesion to the above conventions, it is presumed that any administration working wireless direct to one of the Hejaz stations would require that traffic and accounting procedure should be in accordance with the international regulations. This would involve the employment by the Hejaz Government of officials conversant with international telegraph procedure and practice. I would add that pending settlement of the ownership of the cable, this Administration keeps the cable account, but if the Hejaz adheres to either of the ... it would be necessary that it should have ... and settlement of ...

... compete with traffic now forwarded by cable and as the traffic by the latter is quite small the question as to whether both methods of communication are necessary will require consideration

(d) As the cable is old and the cost of repairs is heavy it may be found desirable to abandon the cable and institute a wireless service between the Hejaz and Port Sudan or Khartum. The whole question is therefore intimately bound up with the question of the disposal of the cable

(e) In view of the above remarks, it would appear advisable that no action should be taken until the proposed conference has taken place or some other arrangements have been made for settling the ownership of the cable and the various cognate questions connected therewith

I have, &
Director of Posts and Telegraphs,
Sudan Government

E 1919 367 91

No. 112

Letting Consul Jordan to Sir Austen Chamberlain — (Received March 22)

(No. 22 Secret)

Sir,
Jeddah March 1 1926
I HAVE the honour to forward herewith my report on the situation in the Hejaz during the period the 1st to the 28th February 1926

2 Copies of this report are being sent to Egypt, Jerusalem (2) Baghdad, Aden, Beir and Beirut (for Damascus)

I have, &
S R JORDAN

Enclosure 1 to N. 11

Report for the Period February 1 to 28 1926

DURING the period under report many changes have taken place in the administration as laid down in my report of ... The most momentous of these changes is perhaps the dismissal of Dr. Hadi Bey, for a short time Director General of the Quarantine, and the curtailment of a considerable part of the power of Dr. Abdallah Bey Damluji, one time King's representative or self-styled Viceroy and Minister for Foreign Affairs, but who is now but a representative of the Foreign Ministry at Jeddah. Moummner Bey, lately representative of the Sultan of Nejd in Egypt, has been appointed head of the Foreign Political Intelligence Department and chief adviser to the King

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2 Several interesting personalities have arrived in Jeddah during this month. Mr. Depin, who has been in the Yemen, arrived as the representative of the High Commissioner of Syria to negotiate a commercial treaty between the Nejd and Syria. His credentials were from the High Commissioner M. de Jouvenel, and Ibn Saud politely regretted being unable to treat with an individual, but expressed his willingness to treat with either the French or Syrian Governments. After some delay, during which no doubt Depin referred the matter to Syria, it was decided that he was negotiating on behalf of the Governments of Syria, who would soon be established on a basis similar to that of the Kingdom of Iraq. Owing to these delays, small progress has been made with the negotiations, as I also understand that the Sultan and his advisers are of the opinion that this move on the part of the French represents a clumsy manoeuvre to gain Hejaz recognition of the mandate in Syria, which has, I believe, been withheld to date. Should the French secure this, it will enable them to exert pressure on Ibn Saud in case it can later be established that Arabs from the Nejd are assisting the Druze revolt.

3 Noori Pasha Shulan, a well known Arab of the Hauran and a prominent nationalist, arrived in Jeddah. Coincidence or otherwise I have not been able to ascertain.

4 A certain Sulaiman Pasha Shafki also arrived in Jeddah during the period. He was a high official in the Ottoman Empire under the old régime. He is an anti Komalst and a nationalist.

5 Other than the above a certain Mr. Ellis, an American journalist also arrived. He was brought to Jeddah by Mr. Philby as interpreter, to meet Ibn Saud. Mr. Ellis, if I am not mistaken, was well known in Constantinople for his anti British sentiments. It is said that he has changed since those days, as during the trip down on the steamer he lost no opportunity of criticising His Britannic Majesty's policy in the Levant.

6 A delegation from the Asir (Hudud) also came to Mecca to meet Ibn Saud. The delegation consisted of a certain Hassan, to wit, and Ibn Saud's statement to them, as published in the Mecca newspaper, is given in enclosure No. 1 to this report.

7 Mr. Philby's activities continue, and he seems to lose no opportunity of creating difficulties between the British Government and Ibn Saud. He is in order to curry favour with the present authorities as a means of facilitating the obtaining of certain concessions or because he happens to be a personal friend of His Majesty's Government seeking revenge is uncertain and beside the point as the results are the same.

8 The Khudam al Haramain delegation, whose arrival I signalled in my last report, has arrived in Jeddah. This will undoubtedly come as a blow to the many Indian Moslems who, under the Holy Land of Islam their own peculiar property. This delegation, upon its arrival, refused the Royal hospitality stating that they could not recognise Ibn Saud in this country. Ibn Saud requested them first to examine the facts of the matter before condemning him, and stated that he believed that with good will on each side it would be possible to settle any points in dispute. Eventually the delegation accepted the Sultan's hospitality. The delegation, upon its arrival, refused the Royal hospitality stating that they could not recognise Ibn Saud in this country. Ibn Saud requested them first to examine the facts of the matter before condemning him, and stated that he believed that with good will on each side it would be possible to settle any points in dispute. Eventually the delegation accepted the Sultan's hospitality.

9 One Syed Taib Huzari, who was a clerk in the Department of Justice, has been brought up under the Turkish régime, is thoroughly corrupt. The unfortunate Huzari brought up under the Turkish régime, is thoroughly corrupt.

10 It would at present appear as if the persons who were prominent in the Sherifian régime are now obtaining many of the more lucrative posts in the new Administration to the exclusion of certain Syrians and other foreigners so-called in the Hejaz. Although this can hardly be considered desirable from the point of view of the foreigners, I mean Christian Powers, it is perhaps the lesser evil as these

people and their peculiarities are known factors, and relations can be established accordingly, whereas such past masters in the art of administrations as, say, Dr. Hadi Bey, must always remain an unknown quantity.

11 The National Assembly has recently voted a further annuity of £21,000 to the Sultan for the upkeep of the aeroplanes and the armoured cars and other technical services. This now brings the amount voted to the Sultan to £221,000, or approximately, one-fifth of the revenue of the country.

12 The concession for the motor service between Mecca and Jeddah has been granted to Abdullah al-Fadli in company with one Delhavi, a prominent Meccan merchant of Indian extraction, and one Amari, together with an Egyptian. Twenty-five per cent. of the profits of this company go to the Government and the remainder is for distribution amongst the shareholders.

Abdullah al-Fadli, the promoter of this company and one of the King's favourite advisers, has also been appointed as the buying agent for the Hejaz, and all Government purchases will in future be negotiated through him. As can readily be imagined, this most lucrative post was eagerly sought after, and El Fadli has no doubt received it in recompense for his services to the Nejd cause during the late war.

13 Recently the authorities published a list of fees chargeable to pilgrims. This is a good step and I understand taken by the Sultan in order to prevent the extortionate charges which have hitherto been levied.

14 A National Committee of Relief has also been appointed in Mecca for the distribution of charities. So far their labours have been restricted to making rules and regulations, as no charities have arrived to date, consequently they have not come in for any criticism, as they are not for the moment prominent in the public eye.

15 His Highness the Sultan has finally decided to disallow the establishment of banks in the Hejaz as their procedure is against the Shari'a law. He was materially assisted in making the above declaration by the local merchants, who exchanged rupees and Dutch guilders and the establishment of a banking house would mitigate against the profitable business done in this respect.

16 From a religious point of view the Wahabism are becoming more exacting as the year goes on. In Mecca several regrettable incidents have occurred, one of which ended in the victim's death. It appears that the victim, an Egyptian chauffeur, was sitting at a coffee shop near the Holy Mosque when a Wahabi, dressed as all Wahabism are, came along and plucked the cigarette from his mouth and started belaying him. The Wahabi then proceeded to strike the victim with a stick, in which the original aggressor received a black eye and other minor injuries. It was not till the parties had been separated and questioned that it was discovered that the aggressor was the grandson of Abdul Wahab, the founder of the faith. As he is a particularly holy man, the chauffeur was taken before the Grand Cadi, who ordered him to be flogged, with the result above stated. Further, four pilgrims, Afghans, went out to the "Jebel-el-Nur," where Mohammed had once hidden from his aggressors, and as they prayed they were fired upon by some Akhwan, who slightly wounded two of them. Several further incidents of a minor nature have occurred, and unless some action is taken by the Sultan to stop these persecutions it will be difficult for him to reconcile the above incidents with his assurances of full religious freedom and safety to pilgrims. In this respect he recently sent to this agent a telegram addressed to the authorities at Singapore, stating that he guaranteed the safety and religious freedom of all who came on the pilgrimage. This action was taken in order to prevent the pilgrims from being hanged back on account of the dangers of the pilgrimage.

In Jeddah also, their strictness is becoming manifest. It may not be generally known that here is the Tomb of Eve, "the mother of the world." The grave is some 200 yards long and some 4 yards wide and has in the middle a small mosque, where formerly on payment of a few piastres bakshish, the keeper of the edifice would lift a flag-stone from the centre of the floor to allow sceptical Christians and pious Moslems an opportunity of admiring the lady's navel. This tomb, until orders were issued to the contrary, used to be the favourite resort of childless wives and languishing maidens, but now has been closed under royal trade and anybody frequenting the place is punished.

17 Owing to the more settled conditions in the Hejaz pilgrims have already begun to arrive and some 2,000 have come from India, Java and Singapore. On the arrival of the steamship "Alavi" with 360 pilgrims on board, the local authorities, despite the fact that the ship had passed through the quarantine at

and had no illness on board, placed the ship and pilgrims in quarantine for four hours. This action on their part was quite unnecessary and unnecessary and of authority. In company with the Dutch consul a protest was made, but no satisfaction was obtained till I telephoned to Sultan direct, who thereupon ordered the ship to be released and later issued instructions that no ships passing any recognised quarantine station and proceeding direct therefrom to Jeddah would undergo quarantine locally unless illness had manifested itself on board after the ship's departure from the quarantine station. Even then if the foreign representative of the nationality of the ship required, the ship would be sent back to the nearest quarantine station. He also requested to become a signatory of the International Sanitary Convention, and desires to send a delegate to the conference to be held in Paris about May next.

Such actions on the part of Ibn Saud show his general disposition towards better relations with foreign Powers and a desire for more modern methods in the Hejaz, and would appear to deserve recording as far as is practicable.

18 The condenser question has finally been settled, and the firm of Messrs. Mirreles, Watson and Co. have agreed to have it constructed and working by the 15th May which will go far towards securing the comfort of the pilgrims on their return from Mecca about the end of June and whilst awaiting shipment to their homes.

19 The Hejaz authorities have also placed a contract with the Royal Mint for the supply of 1 million each of 1 piastre 1/2 piastre and 1 piastre pieces of copper-nickel, to replace the various small coins at present in circulation in the Hejaz. This will tend to restrict the thieving methods of local money-changers who, on account of the multiplicity of currencies employed, have no trouble whatever in confounding and robbing pilgrims who wish to change their rupees or guilders.

20 During the period under report three slaves have taken refuge at this station and been sent to the Sudan.

Enclosure No. 2 to this report is an article published in the "Umm al Kura" under the heading of security, and details the instructions given to the sherikhs of the tribes of the Hejaz.

22 Zakaria Khan, the self-styled Afghan consul left for Bombay en route to Afghanistan a few days ago.

S. R. JORDAN

Enclosure 2 in No. 11

Extract from the Mecca Newspaper "Umm al Kura," No. 60, dated 8th Sha'ban, 1344 (February 19, 1926).

DELEGATION OF THE KING

A DELEGATION from El Sayed Hassan el Idriani under the presidency of Mohammed Bin Hindi el Naami reached Mecca to meet His Majesty the King. The delegation were guests of the King.

It reached us that the delegation have offered obedience and submission in the name of the King. His Majesty answered them in the following summary:

We have no ambition in your country. I only want to make good and set the thing right. You will realise that the question of your country is rather important in my eye owing to the fact that it is near to our boundaries. There is nothing between Imam Yahya and us except friendship. I think it better that we should endeavour to make reconciliation between you and to avoid bloodshed. As to the conditions which should be between us, we will offer them to you. To save Hassan in order that agreement will be made on them.

You must know that our only objects in any one of the Arab countries are (1) to be Muslim brothers and to follow the Koran and the traditions of the Prophet and the customs of the good ancestors and the four Imams. (2) to co-operate for obeying God and to be pious and leave the dispute which leads to bloodshed.

The one who is unable of doing so deserves to keep his territory but as regards the weak, we will discuss his matter, bring about peace and prevent dispute.

1. Enclosure 3 in 112

Extract from the Mecca Newspaper "Umm al Kura," No. 60, dated 8th Sha'ban, 1344 (February 19, 1926).

SECURITY IN THE HEJAZ

HIS Majesty the King has summoned all the chiefs of the Hejaz tribes (Harb, Juhaina, Billi and others).

They all came at the end of the month of Rajab. His Majesty the King saw them in his house and advised them. He then divided the roads in the Hejaz to different parts, making limits for each part, and caused each one of the sherikhs to guarantee the security within his region and will be held responsible for his tribe, and will have to answer for any offence or contradictory action made by him or by one of his men.

His Majesty the King gave them the following instructions:

1. Follow and keep to the Islamic Shari'a law.
 2. Do not allow any representative of His Majesty for everything.
 3. Do not allow any representative of His Majesty for everything.
 4. Do not allow any representative of His Majesty for everything.
- His Majesty the King
- He told the travellers whether they are pilgrims, camelmen or passers-by, and not to cause any disturbance to the pilgrims, and that they are to take anything other former rights being cancelled, and that they are to take only what His Majesty the King allows, and that they are to take from the "Mal" (treasury) of the Muslims as he gives others of his subjects, and that the enemy of the Muslims is their enemy and the friend of the Muslims their friend. They swore by God to do accordingly.

[E 2085/415/91]

No. 113

Acting Consul Jordan to Sir Anson Chamberlain.—(Received March 29.)

(No. 23.)

Jeddah, March 4, 1926.

Sir,

WITH reference to Foreign Office telegram No. 14 of the 4th February last, concerning the visit of H.M.S. "Emerald" to Mecca, I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your telegram of the 14th February last, and to inform you that the visit of the ship to Mecca has been arranged for the 14th March.

The ship arrived at Jeddah on the 14th March, and was met by the Governor of Jeddah, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and many Jeddah and Mecca notables.

Upon His Majesty's arrival on board H.M.S. "Emerald," and as it was by then the hour of prayer, the quarter deck was cleared and His Majesty and his followers performed their religious devotions.

Afterwards the whole party was shown over the ship and His Majesty expressed great admiration and astonishment at such a wonderful ship, and was so interested in all that he saw that he did not hesitate to accept an invitation to see the boiler room, which was throughward of the heat and oil.

Afterwards the party took the opportunity of presenting His Majesty with a check from himself and officers of H.M.S. "Emerald" as a souvenir of His Majesty's visit to the ship. The party thereupon returned ashore having been on board some two and a half hours.

The following morning the King's second son Feisal and his youngest son Mohammed, both of four years, proceeded on board with a further party of notables and thoroughly examined the ship.

Enclosure 2 in No. 114.

Translation of a Letter from Abdul Aziz-bin-Abdul Rahman al-Faisal-al-Saud, King of the Hejaz and Sultan of Nejd, to the Acting British Agent and Consul, Jeddah No. 78, dated 18th Shu'ban, 1344 (March 3, 1926).

(After greetings.)

I BEG to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated the 1st March, 1926, and to state the receipt of His Britannic Majesty's reply thereto to the effect that we are King over the Hejaz, for which I thank the British Government.

There is no doubt that the old relations between myself and the British Government will be strengthened on a steadier foundation and strong base which will guarantee to the independence of such a holy country.

I still keep amongst my aims (i.e., in my heart) the highest and noblest sympathy, affection and respect (for His Majesty's Government), seize this good opportunity and offer to His Britannic Majesty's Government my truly great thanks and gratitude.

With best respects

I have, &
S. R. JORDAN

No. 114

Acting Consul Jordan to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 3.)

No. 25.)

Jeddah, March 4, 1926.

Sir,

WITH reference to Foreign Office telegram No. 25 of the 25th February last relative to the recognition of Ibn Saud as the King of the Hejaz, I have the honour to state that I took the opportunity of informing the Sultan of his recognition by His Majesty's Government as King of the Hejaz on the occasion of the visit of H. M.

"I enclose a copy of the letter addressed to His Majesty in pursuance of your telegram above quoted, together with a translation of his reply thereon.

8 As will be seen from the translation of His Majesty's reply this act of formal recognition by His Britannic Majesty's Government afforded His Majesty great pleasure.

I have the
- R. JORDAN

Enclosure 1 in No. 114.

Copy of Letter from the Acting British Agent and Consul, Jeddah, to His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and Sultan of Nejd, No. 146 M of March 1, 1936.

(After responses.)

I HAVE the honour to inform your Majesty that I have been instructed by His Britannic Majesty's Government to convey your Majesty's letter to His British Majesty's Government now recognising your Majesty as King of the Hejaz. I am, moreover, to add that His Majesty's Government, while thus recognising your Majesty's authority over the Hejaz, continue to regard the régime of the Holy Places of Islam and all religious questions connected therewith as matters solely concerning Muslims, regarding which His Majesty's Government neither ought nor desire to express an opinion.

(Supplements)

E 2067 48 911

No 115

Acting Consul Jordan to Sir Austen Chamberlain—(Received March 29)

(No. 25.)

Sir,

Jedidah, March 5, 1936

WITH reference to Foreign Office telegram No 24 of the 24th February last, relative to a tribal raid into Transjordan, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the letter addressed to His Majesty Abdul Aziz together with a copy of His Majesty's reply thereto.

2. A copy of this despatch and enclosures is being sent to Jerusalem

I have, &c

S R JORDAN

Enclosure 1 in No. 11a

Copy of Letter from the Acting British Agent and Consul, Jeddah, to His Highness Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman al Faisal al Saud, Sultan of Nejd, dated February 26, 1926

(After response)

I AM directed by His Britannic Majesty's Government to inform your Highness that on 17th January last a raiding party composed of about 450 Bedouin of nomadic habits, under the command of Mr. Major von Manteuffel, crossed between

There were casualties on both sides, and a number of animals were looted

The fighting party was distributed under four standards. Sheikhs (1) Ikreyim bin Saud Ateya, (2) Enad bin Saud Iymain, (3) Ahmed bin Saud Farhan, and (4) Sayyah bin Saud Mutair.

The last named belongs to the Ameriza and the remainder to Bani Atiyeh.

The raiders' intentions were to attack the Bani Sakhr tribesmen, and it is reported that while the Wahabi Governor of Ha'il endeavoured to prevent the raiders carrying out their projects, the Governor of Jauf encouraged the raid.

The tribesmen in Transjordan are apprehensive of further raids, and I am to request your Highness to take steps to punish these raiders immediately, thereby discouraging this objectionable practice in the future.

[illegible]

Translation of Letter from the Hejaz Minister for Foreign Affairs
British Agent and Consul Jeddah, No 96, dated 14th Shaaban 1344 March 3
1924

(After respects.)

His Majesty my Lord the King has ordered me to inform you that he has received your letter No. 141 of the 26th February 1924 regarding the attacks against the Transjordanian tribes.

We do not know the names mentioned in your letter and who were said to have made the attacks against the Transjordanian tribes. Therefore we are in doubt about the correctness of the news related about these accidents.

The Amir of Hail, Abdul Aziz-bin Musaid, wrote to His Majesty on 25 6 44 to say that Daghab Abu Tayah and Nawaf el-Awagi their neighbour of Emza have raided a party of Sharanat near El Hawga and captured three of their camels and killed their owners. They again attacked Karim-bin Ateya and captured some of his camels. Then Karim-bin Ateya followed them to take back his camels. We have no further news about him until now. Ende.

To-day we received a telegram from the Amir of El Ula, and we enclose a copy for your perusal, and from which you will know the fact. Nothing has happened besides this.

As to the accusation against the Amir of El Jauf it is not correct at all, because the mentioned man has no connection with those people and their reference is to the Amir of Hail.

The attacks by the Transjordanian tribes against our tribes should not be considered as a general Transjordanian action, but as the bad actions of its tribes.

Now we cannot keep silent in respect of such actions and would rather pressing request the matter to be considered, the things looted to be returned to their owners, and the transgressors to be punished in compliance with the Hadda agreement.

(With respects.)

Enclosure 3 in No. 115

Copy of Telegram to His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and Sultan of Nejd

(Translation.)

El Ula, 18-8-1344 (March 3, 1924)

I BEG to submit to your Majesty that to-day Nafar-el-Fuqara taken [I attacked] with party of Sukhur called El Zubhun came to us.

Ibn Gazi-bin Abian and Mohammed-bin-Oadah-el-Datayah took [I attacked] them. They captured from them thirteen [I sticks], and Oadah-el-Atnah took [I attacked] El Sharanat, capturing six "Aswad". They took them between Teymah and El Jauf.

Those who have done this action is [I Safbah] of Ma'an. They took them on 7-8 1344.

The slave
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No. 116

Letter from Consul Jordan to Sir Austen Chamberlain.-(Received March 29)

(No. 27)

Sir,

Jeddah, March 9, 1924

WITH reference to Foreign Office telegram No. 33 of the 23rd September, 1924, relative to the massacres at Taif, I have the honour to report that I have, since the surrender of Jeddah, been collecting and collating the evidence as to the guilty parties and the claims of the British subjects who suffered at the hands of the invaders.

2. Owing to the difficulty of getting into touch with these people, many of whom are in either Mecca or Taif, I have not yet finished this task.

3. The local authorities, however, hearing no doubt of the activities of this agency, have now published in the "Umm-al-Kura," the Mecca newspaper, an article under the heading of "Compensation for the Refugees of Taif," a translation of which is enclosed herewith.

4. The article states that His Majesty has ordered that a committee be appointed to investigate and assess the damages sustained by everybody, irrespective of nationality, in order that they may receive compensation.

5. His Majesty has no doubt been forced to take this action for two reasons. Firstly, to prevent a full investigation of the atrocities committed, and secondly, to avoid anything in the nature of foreign interference.

6. Whilst His Majesty's Government are greatly concerned for the welfare of His Majesty's subjects in foreign States, and are, at the same time, anxious to avoid anything or anything that may be construed as such, I would most respectfully suggest that a communication couched in terms similar to the following might have the effect of both obtaining compensation for damages or loss of life suffered by His Majesty's subjects, and also show to Ibn Saud His Majesty's Government are desirous of not interfering unless such should be warranted by an injustice to His Majesty's subjects residing within his domains.

I am, with pleasure of the action taken by your Majesty in appointing a committee to assess and compensate the victims of the Taif atrocities. His Majesty's Government will follow with the closest interest and attention the results of the work of the committee appointed by your Majesty as far as it concerns the compensation of the families of the British subjects murdered at Taif and the compensation of the British residents who lost much goods and jewellery during that most regrettable event. I would urge your Majesty to expedite the work of this committee, as the British subjects affected thereby are at present living in great poverty.

His Britannic Majesty's representative in Jeddah has been instructed to afford the committee appointed by your Majesty every facility to inspect the claims of the various British subjects, the majority of which has already been submitted to him.

In conclusion, His Majesty's Government would be pleased to receive from you a list of the British subjects who have received compensation in respect of damages suffered at Taif.

I understand from my Dutch colleague that he is taking action on similar lines.

Copies of this despatch have been forwarded to India and Singapore.

I have, &c.

S R JORDAN

Enclosure in No. 116

Extract from the Mecca Newspaper "Umm al-Kura"

COMPENSATION FOR THE SUFFERERS OF TAIF

WE have published more than once what impression the accident of Taif has made in His Majesty the King's soul, and that it took place in an hour of anarchy, when everything was mixed up and in a state of disorder.

Nothing has deterred His Majesty the King from advancing towards Mecca and Jeddah except his fear lest an hour like that of Taif might occur.

When His Majesty arrived the war was still going on, and it was not possible at that time to do anything for the victims of the disaster.

When everything was put in order and the war was ended, His Majesty the King kindly thought of the sufferers of Taif and gave orders for a committee to be appointed to decide the losses which have occurred in order to compensate the sufferers of whatever nationality they may be.

We pray God may cause happiness and prosperity to continually reign over this country after this day, and that it may not see any further mishap or calamity.

E 2069, 7/91]

No. 117

Acting Consul Jordan to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 29.)

(No. 28.)

Sir,

Jeddah, March 9, 1926.

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith an extract from the Mecca paper "Umm-al-Qura," giving the text of the letter received from the Soviet representative in Jeddah communicating the Soviet Government's recognition of Sultan Abdul Aziz as King of the Hejaz and Nejd and its Dependencies.

I am informed confidentially that the Soviet representative verbally requested Ibn Saud to consider the Soviet Government's recognition as confidential until His Britannic Majesty's Government had notified him of their recognition of His Majesty.

This arrangement, however, no doubt caused the anxiety to Ibn Saud as reported in my telegram No. 23 of the 24th February.

The French consul in Jeddah also informed Ibn Saud verbally of the recognition of the French Republic on the 2nd, as did also the Italian consul, both of which to date have been confirmed in writing.

S. R. JORDAN

Enclosure 1 in No. 117

Extract from the Mecca Newspaper "Umm-al-Qura."

RECOGNITION FROM FOREIGN POWERS FOR ABDUL AZIZ AS KING OF THE HEJAZ AND SULTAN OF NEJD AND ITS DEPENDENCIES

THE King has received on 3.3.14 the following letter from the Russian agent and consul:—

His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and Sultan of Nejd and its Dependencies

(After greetings and respects)

"Supported by the order of my Government, I have the honour to inform your Majesty that the Government of the Soviet Republic, according to the fundamental principle regarding the independence and the freedom of nations, and in regard to the will of the Hejaz people shown in their 'bayat' to your Majesty, the King of the Hejaz, recognise your Majesty as King of the Hejaz and Sultan of Nejd and its Dependencies."

I am sure that the Soviet Government will be able to settle for themselves in suitable conformity with your Majesty's Government

In conclusion, please accept my best respects.

KARIM KHAKIMOV,

Soviet Agent and Consul-General, Jeddah

"3.3.14 (February 15, 1926)."

[E 2071, 43 91]

No. 118

Acting Consul Jordan to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 29.)

(No. 30.)

Sir,

Jeddah, March 10, 1926.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 28 of the 5th instant concerning the raids into Transjordan, I have the honour to transmit herewith a translation of a further communication received from Ibn Saud on this question.

2. His Majesty has on several occasions recently expressed an opinion that the raids conducted from Transjordan are deliberately inspired to create trouble between Great Britain and Nejd, and he requests that immediate action may be

taken to prevent further regrettable occurrences, otherwise it will be impossible for him to restrain the tribes under his care from taking retaliatory measures.

3. A copy of this despatch is being sent to Jerusalem.

I have, &c.

S. R. JORDAN

Enclosure 1 in No. 118

Translation of Letter from Abdul Aziz bin-Abdul Rahman-al-Faisal-al-Saud to the Acting British Agent and Consul, Jeddah No. 112, dated 23rd Sha'ban, 1344 (March 8, 1926)

After respects)

I HAVE written to you about the raids made by the tribes of Transjordan, and I have sent you the telegram received from our Amir at El Ula.

We have to-day received another telegram confirming the occurrence of the same kind of incidents as those that occurred by those tribes. You will find the details in the attached telegram.

Such incidents have occurred in such a dreadful manner that indicates that there are some people working from behind administering these operations and pushing the mentioned tribes to make the attacks.

I am afraid that such incidents may provoke our tribes, who will then take revenge against those who attacked them, and consequently the security at the frontiers will be affected which we are afraid of.

Therefore, I most pressing request that the transgressors should be punished and the looted properties returned to their owners. Otherwise I cannot bear the responsibility of any incident that may occur, and you know the nature of the Arabs.

(With respects.)

Enclosure 2 in No. 118

Translation of Telegram to the King of the Hejaz and Sultan of Nejd

Reply to

I beg to submit to your Majesty that I have ascertained the matter and found it true and certain. Those who were taken [? attacked] have gone to Ibn Mesaud. Those who took [? attacked] them are Hamad bin Jazi and Mohammed bin Kudah Abu Tayeh. Atma Kawin alone took six groups of camels and Daabesh took five groups alone.

Do not be worried, my Lord.

The slave,

IBN NOWEISIR

No. 119

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Mr. Jordan (Jeddah)

N

1.

R

Foreign Office, April 1, 1926

MY DEAR MR. JORDAN, I have to inform you that the Quarantine arrangements for 1926 pilgrimage last year.

Desire of Ibn Saud to be represented at Paris Sanitary Conference and to sign International Quarantine Convention was brought by His Majesty's Embassy at Paris to notice of French Government, who have telegraphed invitation to Ibn Saud through your French colleague and intimate that there will be no objection to his doing so.

You should inform Ibn Saud accordingly making it clear that action of French Government was consequent on our suggestion.

It may interest Ibn Saud to know that Mr. Bullard will be a member of the British delegation.

No. 120

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Mr Jordan (Jeddah)

PLEASE inform Ibn Saud that His Majesty's Government have had under consideration the report of Sir G. Clayton on his mission. They have thus learnt of His Majesty's desire for the revision of the treaty of 1916. They realise that since that date the circumstances have changed and that certain of the articles of that treaty are no longer appropriate. His Majesty's Government therefore will be prepared to discuss the question of treaty revision and hope shortly to address a further communication of the subject to Ibn Saud. The attention of His Majesty's Government has also been drawn to the fact that Ibn Saud is desiring the protection of his subjects in Syria. They do not desire to raise any objection to His Majesty entering into direct communication with the French authorities in Syria through the Nejdian representative there. With regard to proposed Nejdian delegation to India (see Clayton report p 46), you should explain that matter has now been satisfactorily settled in accordance with Ibn Saud's wishes.

No. 121

Acting Agent, Jeddah, to Sir Austen Chamberlain—(Received April 7.)

(No. 36)
(Telegraphic) R.

Jeddah, April 6, 1926

communications re raids carried out against his subjects by tribes of Transjordan and Iraq.

States he has been informed by the Amirs of Jauf and Hail as well as by his father and eldest son in Riyadh that situation is extremely critical and they cannot guarantee to hold the tribes in hand any longer.

He writes to disclaim any responsibility for actions of his people, who can no longer submit to attacks and oppressions of tribes of Transjordan and Iraq, and adds that he has sent messages to all his amirs and tribal chiefs ordering them to be patient for first week in next month (about ten days time), by which time he hopes to receive a final reply.

States also that his tribes are complaining regarding camels returned to the Dhafir whilst those raided by them have not been returned. In this respect I have pointed out that he has not yet supplied Iraq with details of Akhwan claims as requested six weeks ago.

Copy of letter and of my reply follows by bag.

Reprinted to Bagdad, Jerusalem.

E 2260 180 91

No. 122

Consul Smart to Sir Austen Chamberlain—(Received April 8.)

(No. 112.)

Sir,

Dumana, March 26, 1926

With reference to my despatch No. 36, Secret, of the 24th February, 1926, Noori Shalan, Chief of the Huda, who has just returned from Mecca, whether he had gone to pay homage to Ibn Saud, is reported to be inviting his tribesmen to embrace the tenets of Wahabism.

2. If Ibn Saud's power is not destined to suffer any early eclipse, it will be necessary to watch attentively the spread of his influence among the tribes of the Syrian Desert. Frontier lines drawn on maps across desert regions will not prevail in the end against the logic of tribal relations and dependence. Without any formal infringement of the treaties he recently signed with Sir Gilbert Clayton, Ibn Saud's influence might easily spread through the Belouin tribes north of the frontier he has accepted. We might thus gradually find that Ibn Saud was virtually astride of our

17

motor and air communications, as well as the future railway and pipe-line between Iraq and the Mediterranean.

(Copies of this despatch have been sent to Jerusalem (No. 97), Amman (No. 96), Bagdad (No. 91), Beirut (No. 108) and Aleppo (No. 78).

I have, &c.

W. A. SMART

No. 123

Acting Agent, Jeddah, to Sir Austen Chamberlain—(Received April 8.)

(No. 37)

Jeddah (via Port Sudan), April 6, 1926

MY immediately preceding telegram

Nejd is becoming increasingly despotic and there are complaints on all sides of interference with religious matters and no freedom whatever as promised. Pilgrimage will apparently be very small, as Persians have forbidden same and there are rumours of Egypt and Syria not sending Mahmals as was at first contemplated. This coupled with frontier incidents and anti Wahabi propaganda abroad and in the Hejaz seems to be affecting Ibn Saud unfavourably, and complaints in my immediately preceding telegram would appear to be admission of incapability to deal with circumstances. Whole trouble is undoubtedly lack of capable administrators to assist Sultan, as he is surrounded with adventurers and persons contaminated by previous régimes.

Sent to Bagdad, Jerusalem and Cairo.

No. 124

Acting Agent, Jeddah, to Sir Austen Chamberlain—(Received April 8.)

(No. 38)

(Telegraphic) R.

Jeddah, April 7, 1926

YOUR telegram No. 22

Ibn Saud has refused French invitation to attend Sanitary Conference, pretext being lack of expert doctors and exigencies of pilgrimage season.

Attitude inexplicable, except in view of my telegram No. 37.

Despatch follows.

No. 125

Acting Agent, Jeddah, to Sir Austen Chamberlain—(Received April 11.)

(No. 40)

(Telegraphic) R.

Jeddah, April 10, 1926

MY telegram No. 38 and my despatch No. 36 of 7th April

Efforts to secure Ibn Saud's participation at Sanitary Conference in spite of previous refusal have been successful and he appointed Mahmoud Haidi Bey as delegate.

No. 126

Acting Agent, Jeddah, to Sir Austen Chamberlain—(Received April 13.)

(No. 41)

(Telegraphic) R.

Jeddah, April 12, 1926

YOUR telegram No. 38

King of the Hejaz thanks His Majesty's Government for sentiments, and states that Hejaz Government is prepared to enter into friendly negotiations for discussion

of a treaty of friendship and alliance between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the British Empire.

No. 127

Lord Lloyd to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 14.)

(No. 140)

(Telegraphic) R

Cairo, April 14 1926

PRIME Minister I have seen that Ibn Saud is making enquiries about pilgrimage, that he objects to Mahmal being accompanied by usual music and that he disclaims responsibility for any consequences of any such action. King was angry at contemplated possibility of not sending Mahmal.

Prime Minister does not wish to interfere with movement of some 10,000 pilgrims and asked whether H. M. Government would like to see a date for the pilgrimage and whether it would be possible to do so. I added that I could not say whether we could intervene or not.

(Repeated to Jeddah.)

E 2496 806 91]

No. 128

The Marquess of Crewe to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 20.)

(No. 714.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Paris presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and begs to be assured of his sincere interest in the note from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, dated the 17th April, respecting the Hejaz Railway.

Paris, April 19, 1926

Enclature in No. 128.

French Ministry for Foreign Affairs to British Embassy.

PAR une note en date du 10 février 1926, l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté britannique a voulu faire savoir au Ministère des Affaires étrangères que les arrangements pour la mise en état et l'ouverture au trafic de la totalité du Chemin de Fer du Hedjaz.

L'Ambassade de Sa Majesté britannique rappelle à ce propos que le statut de ce chemin de fer a été discuté par M. Bompard devant la Commission économique de la Conférence de Lausanne—déclaration qui prévoit la constitution à M. Bompard d'un conseil consultatif ayant le droit de transmettre aux administrations des recommandations pour l'entretien de la ligne et pour l'amélioration du trafic relatif au pèlerinage.

L'Ambassade d'Angleterre ajoutait que la constitution de ce conseil nécessite la coopération de l'Arabie et la Transjordanie, le Gouvernement de la République française représentant l'Arabie et le Hedjaz.

Ambassade de Sa Majesté britannique exprimait, enfin, sur les recommandations de la République était disposé à coopérer à cet égard avec le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique.

Le Ministère des Affaires étrangères a l'honneur de faire savoir à l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté britannique que le Gouvernement de la République française se met en accord sur la portée et les modalités d'application de la déclaration faite par M. Bompard le 27 janvier 1923. Le Gouvernement de la République française est donc tout disposé à coopérer à cet égard avec le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique.

Paris, le 17 avril 1926

E 2546 344 91]

No. 129

Acting Consul Vaughan Russell to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 22)

No. 12

Sir,

Damascus, April 9, 1926

WITH reference to Mr. Stuart's despatch No. 112 of the 26th ultimo, I have the honour to report that the Damascus Arabic newspaper, "Fatah" of yesterday's date, published the following news item—

"The Bedouins and the Wahhabi faith.

"We learn that Sheikh Nuri Shaalan, the chief of the Rawala tribe, has returned from the chiefs of the Mawali and Hadeediyin tribes, as well as from tribes which pitch their tents within the Syrian zone, the payment of 'Zaka' tax, i.e., one mejdah on each camel and half a mejdah on each head of sheep."

2. This report of the activities of Nuri Shaalan in collecting a tax normally only paid by tributaries of Ibn Saud is very significant and may be the prelude to an important extension of Wahhabi influence.

I am also noteworthy that the promulgating efforts attributed above to Nuri Shaalan be directed to tribes inhabiting the Syrian zone.

This despatch have been forwarded to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

R. VAUGHAN RUSSELL.

E 2431 900 91]

No. 130

Mr. Oliphant to Acting Consul Jordan (Jeddah)

(No. 48)

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 19, 1926

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Austen Chamberlain to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 9 of the 30th January reporting your discussions with Ibn Saud on the subject of slavery in the Hejaz.

2. The Secretary of State approves the language held by you to His Majesty in the course of these interviews.

His attitude towards both the slave trade and domestic slavery in the Hejaz is more enlightened than that of his predecessors, and offers a basis for discussion may be made towards the eventual abolition of slavery within his territories.

It is the policy of the Government of His Majesty to encourage reform which His Majesty may attempt to achieve, it is desirable to encourage him to proceed by gradual stages. The Secretary of State shares the view of Ibn Saud that the first object to be obtained is the complete prevention of the importation of slaves into the Hejaz and Nejd. Undoubtedly His Majesty's efforts to prevent entirely the traffic in African slaves at present carried on by slave dealers. He may, however, have considerable difficulty in preventing the occasional sale by agents of domestic slaves. For this reason alone, His Majesty's Government would be unwilling to abandon the right now exercised by His Majesty's agency at Jeddah to manumit and repatriate slaves. Moreover, the character of the Hejaz officials is not, unfortunately such as to warrant the presumption that they will co-operate loyally with you in stamping out the slave traffic, even though Ibn Saud himself may be anxious to do so. Sir Austen Chamberlain would be anxious to see the exercise of the right of His Majesty's agency to manumit slaves.

The aim of British policy in the Hejaz should be to obtain the fullest cooperation from Ibn Saud in preventing slaves from entering his territories, and to protect the right of His Majesty's agent and consul at Jeddah to manumit and repatriate any slaves who may take refuge with him. The next step would be to induce His Majesty to issue a declaration, preferably backed by the authority of a fetwa by the Ulama of Mecca, condemning the practice of slavery. This declaration might conveniently embody the principles of the Cyprus Involuntary Servitude

Declaration Law of 1879, of which a copy is enclosed herein. You should, on a suitable occasion, invite Ibn Saud's attention to the provisions of this statute, which has recently been adopted *mutatis mutandis* in Tanganyika.

5. The Secretary of State desires you, therefore, to inform Ibn Saud's agent of the conversations with you on the subject of slavery have been reported to the Secretary of State, who has read of them with much interest, and is gratified to learn of the broadminded and statesmanlike attitude which His Majesty is adopting towards this question. The Secretary of State recognises that the abolition of slavery in a country where it has a traditional foothold must be carried out by stages, the first of which should be the abolition of the slave trade and the prohibition of the importation of slaves into the Hijaz and Nejd. The Secretary of State has fully considered Ibn Saud's plea that the right of manumission by His Majesty's agent should be abandoned but he regrets that he is of long standing, and is in no way derogatory to the sovereign rights of the King of the Hijaz. On the contrary, it will enable His Majesty's agent at Jeddah to emphasise to Ibn Saud the importance of stamping out the slave trade. Finally, it is a principle which is recognised throughout the civilized world, and especially by the League of Nations, that the slave trade in the past has been considered a crime.

LANCLOUT OLIPHANT.

E 2368 900 91]

Enclosure in No 130.

THE STATUTE LAWS OF CYPRUS

(1923 Revision.)

Involuntary Servitude

20 of 1879.

doubts as to the Legal Abolition of Involuntary Servitude in Cyprus, and to declare the Law in respect thereof.

ROBERT BIDDULPH.]

[December 27, 1879

WHEREAS doubts have been expressed whether involuntary servitude in this island has been abolished in due form of law, and it is expedient that these doubts should be removed

It is therefore enacted —

1. Involuntary servitude, except for any crime or offence whereof a person shall have been duly convicted, is hereby declared to be unlawful.

2. No rights arising out of an alleged property in the person and services of another as a slave shall be enforced by any civil or criminal court, or other authority whatsoever within this island.

3. No person who may have acquired property by his own industry, or by the exercise of any art, calling, or profession, or by inheritance, assignment, gift, or bequest, shall be dispossessed of it or prevented from taking possession of it on the ground that he or the person from whom the property may have been derived was a slave.

4. No one shall be excused from the consequences of doing any act amounting to a penal offence on the ground that the person to, upon, or against whom the act was done, was, or was believed to be in a state of slavery.

5. This law may be cited as "The Involuntary Servitude Declaration Law, 1879."

In the year 1879, out of involuntary servitude to be enforced.

Right of property

Short title.

[E 2594 80 91]

No. 131

V de Mares van Swinderen to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 24.)

Légation des Pays-Bas, Londres.

le 23 avril 1926

M. le Secrétaire d'Etat,

JE ne suis pas resté en défaut de transmettre en son temps au Ministre des Affaires étrangères à La Haye le contenu de la lettre que vous avez bien voulu m'adresser sous la date du 25 février écoulé, concernant la station quarantenaire de l'île de Camaran.

Le Ministre survisé vient maintenant de me faire connaître et j'ai l'honneur de porter ci-dessous à votre connaissance le point de vue du Gouvernement néerlandais en cette question.

Le Gouvernement de la Reine a hautement apprécié l'esprit dans lequel la réponse anglaise a été rédigée, attendu qu'il appert de cette communication que le Gouvernement britannique s'est efforcé à arriver à un accord qui donnerait satisfaction aux parties.

Le Gouvernement néerlandais regrette cependant de ne pas pouvoir considérer les propositions présentement faites par le Gouvernement du Roi comme de nature à aller suffisamment au-devant des desiderata exprimés du côté néerlandais et jugés équitables par le Gouvernement de la Reine. Mais d'autre part, étant donné que la réponse britannique laisse la voie ouverte à des pourparlers ultérieurs, ce Gouvernement se flatte de l'espoir qu'il sera possible d'arriver à un règlement donnant satisfaction aux parties.

Pour le Gouvernement néerlandais, cette solution satisfaisante n'apparaît possible que si l'accord se réalise sur les points suivants, qui, à ses yeux, sont essentiels. Ces points sont déjà connus du Gouvernement britannique, mais ils sont répétés et résumés ci-dessous pour plus de clarté.

1. Pour ce qui est de la station quarantenaire de l'île de Camaran, on bien qu'elle donne cette administration conjointement à l'Angleterre et aux Pays-Bas, sur le pied d'une parfaite égalité et sous le contrôle international de la Société des Nations. S'il paraissait, au cours des pourparlers à venir, qu'il est impossible d'arriver à un accord dans ce sens, la solution devrait consister dans l'appointement à Camaran d'un médecin néerlandais et d'un médecin anglais ou anglo-indien de même rang et placés l'un et l'autre dans une position identique.
2. Dans ce dernier cas, il faudrait que le Gouvernement ait voix au chapitre en ce qui concerne la visite des navires de pèlerins par le médecin néerlandais ou indo-néerlandais placé à la tête du personnel subalterne, en tant que le médecin néerlandais à Camaran déciderait de son propre chef, pour les navires arrivant des Indes néerlandaises, des mesures à prendre à l'égard de chacun d'eux, conformément aux instructions qui lui seront données par le Gouvernement des Indes néerlandaises dans les limites de la Convention sanitaire (si ce Gouvernement est amené à y adhérer), et ainsi, selon les prescriptions établies ou à établir ultérieurement par le Gouvernement des Indes néerlandaises, prescriptions où forcément il sera tenu compte des principes essentiels de ladite Convention sanitaire.
3. La participation dans le contrôle donné au Gouvernement néerlandais en ce qui concerne les fonds dont l'île de Camaran dispose pour la station de quarantaine s'exercera de cette façon, que chaque année le budget de la station et la communication des modifications à y apporter éventuellement seront établis d'un commun accord entre les Gouvernements anglo-indien et néerlandais.
4. Les articles 2 et 3 seront brièvement résumés dans un règlement commun accord entre les deux Gouvernements. Il y aura également d'un règlement commun concernant la manière dont seront solutionnées, sur le pied de l'égalité des parties, les cas de divergence d'opinion entre les parties contractantes.

Il y a lieu, en outre, de faire observer

1. Que la troisième phrase de l'alinéa 2 de la réponse britannique pourrait prêter à équivoque, attendu qu'il n'est pas tout à fait certain si elle se rapporte à la première ou à la seconde phrase de cet alinéa ;

[15026]

Que, par les soins de l'Etat, les navires de pèlerins au cours de leur voyage
sont traités à Cambray par les navires de pèlerins au cours de leur voyage
le fait est que les navires de pèlerins au cours de leur voyage
savoir que sur ce point il désire réserver tous ses droits.

Etant donné, enfin, que le Gouvernement néerlandais a grand intérêt à ce que le
pays de son Gouvernement de la part de son Gouvernement de la part de son Gouvernement
Joukheer de Karnsbeek serait heureux si vous pouviez me faire parvenir la réponse de
votre Gouvernement dans un délai aussi rapproché que possible.

Veuillez, &c

M. DE MAREES VAN SWINDEREN

[E 2627 367 91

No. 132

Acting Consul Jordan to Sir Austen Chamberlain (Received April 26)

(No 35 Secret)

Sir

Jeddah, March 31, 1926

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith my report on the situation in the Hejaz
during the period March 1 to 31, 1926.

2 Copies of this report are being sent to Egypt, Jerusalem (two) Bagdad
Aden (two) Beirut (two) London (two) and Constantinople (two).

I have, &c

S R JORDAN

Enclosure in No. 132

Report for the Period March 1 to 31, 1926

(Secret)

DURING the period under report Ibn Saud has been officially recognised as
King of the Hejaz by His Majesty the King of the Netherlands and the Dutch Government. On the 1st March H.M.S. "Emerald" arrived off
Jeddah, and the captain, after paying an official call on the King who was in
Jeddah at the time, invited him to visit the ship. This invitation was accepted, and
the same afternoon the King, accompanied by his eldest son, Mohammed bin
Wahba, Abdullah Bey Dandaji, and Kaimakam of Jeddah and many notables, went
on board and were shown over the ship. The King himself took great interest in all
he saw, and, after taking tea with the captain, was presented with a handsome clock
by the captain and wardroom officers of the ship as a souvenir of his visit.

2 The King, accepting the gift, stated his pleasure at having had the
opportunity of seeing such a wonderful ship, and cordially thanked the captain and
officers for their kindness.

3 The following morning the King's second son, Faisal, visited the ship,
and was accompanied by his eldest son, Mohammed bin Wahba, and his brother,
the Emir Abdullah, was shown over the ship. The "Emerald" sailed
at noon after a most successful visit.

4 In the evening of the second day of the "Emerald's" stay the King gave a
banquet to the British and Dutch consuls and their families.

5 The political situation during the period under report shows no great
change. The Government of the Hejaz has been busy with all its efforts in the
direction of the pilgrimage, and has been successful in securing a
great deal of propaganda, forceful and otherwise, in an attempt to gain converts to
the Wahabi faith.

6 Tveb Hazazi, who I reported in my last despatch as the newly appointed
Rasid of the Hejaz, has been paid by the French Government. It is
suspected that he arrived in the Hejaz on the same ship as Major Ibrahim Depui,
but I have not been able to obtain evidence in confirmation of this report. In fact,
the very obvious difficulties being placed in Major Depui's way would appear to give
these rumours a negative value.

7 The French consul, M. Mourey, who recently proceeded on sick leave,
returned to Jeddah just before the new year, but again has had a complete breakdown

and been obliged to leave the country. Major Depui has been appointed *gerant* of
the French consulate pending the arrival of M. Mourey's successor.

8 Abdullah Bey Dandaji, one time King's representative and Minister for
Foreign Affairs, has now lost both these titles and been recalled to Mecca, where he
remains as one of the King's advisers. I consider this man as thoroughly corrupt
and that he hides under his smiling and most amiable exterior a fanaticism or
stupidity and stubbornness like unto only the much-abused mule of Retiot.

9 The rumour to the effect that there had been a clash in Medina between the
Nawab of Medina and the British Consul, and the various telegrams sent to India in this respect were despatched by the
revenue department, and the British Consul, and the British Consul, and the British Consul,
to Sansa, and so calling at several Hejaz ports en route, where they distributed
pamphlets calculated to create division between the Hejaz, thereby causing trouble
to Ibn Saud. There is little doubt but that they will endeavour to persuade the Imam
of Yemen to attack Ibn Saud and gain possession of the Holy Cities for the Orthodox
Muslims and drive out the Wahabites.

10 The Bolshevik agent in Jeddah recently forwarded a telegram, ostensibly
from the Muslims of Russia, suggesting that the projected conference for the choice
of a Caliph should not be held in Egypt, where the Moslem delegates would be
subjected to British influence, but in Mecca, where such foreign influences would be
absent. My Soviet colleague, who is steadily drinking himself to death, recently
obtained a medical certificate from the Dutch pilgrimage doctor to the effect that his
state of health requires a change to a colder climate. This he has, I understand,
already despatched to Moscow, but states locally that he intends to remain in Jeddah
over the pilgrimage. He also states that as many as 30,000 Russian Moslems will
be making the Haj this year by ship from the Black Sea. This figure I consider is a
gross exaggeration, primarily intended to curry favour with the local authorities.
No doubt suitable excuses will be forthcoming if this number do not turn up.

11 The acting Egyptian consul held a reception on the occasion of King Faisal's
birthday, at which the foreign representatives and notables of Jeddah assisted. The
acting consul, who is a youth from the secondary schools of Egypt, delivered an
eloquent speech, recalling all the past glories of Egypt and her future, and
claiming that King Faisal was the greatest of Moslem Kings and a true friend of the
Hejaz as exemplified by the many charities received from Egypt. I rather suspect that
this oration was prepared in Egypt and sent down to be read on this occasion.

12 Dr Mohammed Saleh, an Egyptian doctor attached to the quarantine at
Suez arrived from Egypt recently and proceeded to Mecca to hand over to the
Sultan the forms used by the quarantine authorities in Egypt.

13 The King of the Hejaz recently received an invitation from the French
Government to attend the International Sanitary Conference to be held in Paris
during the month of May. I have not yet heard whom His Majesty intends to send
as Hejaz delegate.

14 It is rumoured locally that a caravan of 160 camels proceeding from Mecca
to Medina was robbed on the way. Too much credence cannot be placed in these
reports, as many of the anti Wahabi elements in the Hejaz seem to spend their time
in manufacturing and circulating rumours of this nature. The only thing that lends
colour to the rumour is the known dissatisfaction of Sherief Khalid, who, after
quarrelling with the Sherief Abdullah in Transjordan, ran away and joined the
Wahabites, who were at that time besieging the army around Jeddah. It is
currently stated that it was he who persuaded Ibn Saud to attack the Hejaz, and he
no doubt, after his military exploits, expected to receive suitable reward. His
appointment to the Governorship of Turaba hardly fulfilled his expectations, and he
is now supposed, on account of his dissatisfaction, to have instigated the robbery.
The distance of Turaba from the Mecca-Medina route would appear to prevent any
effective organisation of robber bands along that route, and the reported robbery
probably represents but another false rumour.

15 The commercial situation shows signs of improvement, but the abuses in
the customs administration learned under the Turks and perfected under the
Sheriefian régime still continue to a certain extent. There appears to be no
particularly fixed tariff for imported goods, but it is all more or less classed under a
2 per cent ad valorem tax. This gives the customs authorities the opportunity of
adding any sum to the invoice value, such sums representing freight and other
charges, and thus leaves an open road for corruption. But, altogether, even the

merchants in the market admit that there is a distinct improvement in the Customs Administration.

16. The duty on tobacco is fixed at 40 piastres per kilo in Jeddah but tobacco could formerly be landed at Lath or Rabigh at a flat rate of 10 piastres per kilo. Now that the Wahabis have more or less forbidden—or perhaps I should say forcibly discouraged—so high in the Hijaz, the Mecca merchants have been sending their stocks down to Jeddah for disposal. This, of course, was detrimental to the Jeddah merchants, who protested, with the result that the old stocks in Mecca are not allowed to be dumped on the Jeddah market. Considerable losses have been incurred by the Mecca merchants on account of this embargo.

17. The details of the motor car concession for the transportation of pilgrims between Jeddah and Mecca have at last been published in the "I mm al Qura," the Mecca newspaper. The usual pan-Islamism asserts itself in nearly every clause, and until the company takes on a more definite form, British manufacturers would be well advised to stand clear from all advances other than on a strictly cash down basis. Of the eight or nine cars which the company started to use within the last two months, four, no less, were broken down on the Jeddah Mecca road some days back and the others are in various states of repair. The fares have been fixed at £E1 each way, plus a surtax of 20 piastres Egyptian for the Koshan or Government tax. The company recently sent two cars from Rabigh to Medina to reconnoitre a possible motor road between those towns. I understand that this party took some three days to do the distance but report optimistically and state that fifteen hours is all that will be necessary for the journey from Mecca to Medina after regular communication has been established.

18. The situation, in so far as concerns the religious freedom of the pilgrims and residents of the Hejaz, is becoming increasingly difficult. Many petty tyrannies, not the least of which is the fact that all barbers have been instructed not to shave the faces of pilgrims or residents completely, as this is against the orders of the Prophet. At least fifteen hairs must be left on the face. A further cause of dissension is the fact that all pilgrims, male or female, are to be examined by a doctor of the administration before burial. The Wahabi Imam is allowed to lead the evening prayer in the mosque, and where formerly thousands congregated, not more than a thousand may be seen in the mosque of an evening.

19. A further cause of trouble is that the Wahabis are not allowed to wear the turban, which is a mark of distinction for the Meccans. The Wahabis are not allowed to wear the turban, which is a mark of distinction for the Meccans.

20. There is no doubt, as I stated, that Ibn Saud himself is a man with a wider outlook and more modern ideas than his fanatical followers, and though he appears at the moment to be preserving the status quo, he is slowly and with subtle reasoning bringing the Wahabi ulama to a more reasonable point of view as regards the other sects of Islam. To prove this, it is but necessary to compare the actions of the Wahabis when they first captured Mecca some hundred years ago and their actions to-day, when the difference is at once manifest. No appreciation of their actions can be complete until after the pilgrimage, when their behaviour at Ararat and elsewhere will be known. Though pessimists foresee clashes between the various sects about that time, I think that it is as yet too early to judge.

21. The general situation is unchanged. Pilgrims are arriving, but slowly, which is a source of great regret to Hejazi and Wahabi alike. To date, only 10,642 have been recorded officially, but this does not include many North Africans who drift across from Suakin and Massana, but who for the most part are practically penniless and no great source of revenue to the country. My Dutch colleague informs me that the pilgrimage has received a boost in the Dutch East Indies, and more will be arriving than was at first expected. The Indians appear nervous as to their reception, and this can hardly be wondered at in view of the propaganda which has been carried out in that country for months past.

22. A certain Emir-el-Shariat, of Bihar and Orissa, accompanied by one Syed Salih Husain, arrived on the steamship "Jehangir," and the latter particularly was most bitter about the treatment they received at Kamaran and openly stated his intention of encouraging "civil disobedience" of all pilgrims arriving at the quarantine station. Most of the other pilgrims had no complaints to make in respect of their treatment.

23. The victims of the Taif massacre are at last to receive consideration, and Ibn Saud has appointed a committee of Mecca notables to estimate the damages sustained by the victims. This is a step in the right direction, but it is liable to be dropped when but half completed unless the authorities are kept up to it.

24. Mr Philby left for England in the beginning of the month, but stated before his departure that he would probably be returning about the time of the pilgrimage.

S. R. JORDAN

E 2628 366 91

No 133

Vice-Consul Jordan to Sir Austen Chamberlain—(Received April 28)

(No. 36.)

Sir

Jeddah, April 7, 1920

WITH reference to Foreign Office telegram No. 63 addressed to His Britannic Majesty's High Commissioner in Egypt and forwarded to me, relative to the Port Sudan-Jeddah cable, I have the honour to report that I proceeded to Port Sudan in company with the two Hejaz delegates, i.e., Sheikh Suleiman Gabil, for many years Mayor of Jeddah, and Abdullah Effendi Kazim, Director of Hejaz Posts and Telegraphs, on the 14th March, on board the steamship "Mars."

2. I enclose herewith the minutes of the various meetings held during our stay in Port Sudan, which are self-explanatory, together with a copy of the draft agreements that were finally initiated by all the delegates present, under reservation in the case of the Hejaz delegates only, who throughout showed no inclination whatever to take a decision, stating that they must first refer to the King of the Hejaz. Abdullah Effendi Kazim in particular was most obstructive and throughout showed a great disinclination to come to any agreement. This, as was clearly shown by several instances, was more from a desire to keep his own position as Director of Posts and Telegraphs inviolable, rather than from a desire to assist either his Government or a solution of the cable question.

3. Suleiman Gabil was much more helpful, and on several occasions was so annoyed at the stubbornness and stupidity shown by his fellow delegate as to quarrel with him during the course of the sessions.

4. Mr Waterfield, of the Eastern Telegraph Company, was very helpful throughout, and greatly facilitated the work of the conference, firstly by a thorough knowledge of the various telegraphic routes and secondly by his skillful manner in explaining to the Hejaz delegates the details of the proposed new régime.

5. I returned to Jeddah by the steamship "Kutub" on the 21st March.

6. Upon arrival in Jeddah the Hejaz delegates at once proceeded to Mecca to lay the agreements before the Sultan, from whom I have received no intimation of a reply as yet. The Sultan is expected to be absent from the East of Ramadan during which very little work is done by the local people.

7. I would like to use this opportunity of expressing my indebtedness to the Governor, Red Sea Province, Mr Tappett, for placing a room of the Governorate at my disposal and also for his helpfulness and his aid throughout the proceedings.

8. I shall not fail to inform you of His Majesty's reply as soon as I receive a reply from the Hejaz authorities.

9. A copy of this despatch and of its enclosures is being sent to the High Commissioner for Egypt, Cairo.

I have, &c.

S. R. JORDAN

Enclosure 1 in No. 1

Port Sudan-Jeddah Cable Agreement

(Draft Agreement.)

WHEREAS it has this day been agreed between the Sudan Government on the one part and the Hejaz Government on the other part, and His Britannic Majesty's Government as a third and assenting party, as follows

1 That the cable formerly known as the Jeddah-Suakin cable and now known as the Port Sudan-Jeddah cable shall become, as from the 1st day of January, 1926 the joint property of the Sudan and Hejaz Governments.

2 That the unexpended balance standing to the credit of the cable account as at the 31st December, 1925, as shown by the statements prepared and certified by the Sudan Government, shall be divided equally between the Sudan and Hejaz Governments.

3 That the parties to this agreement shall, in order to facilitate the better working of the cable, authorise the Eastern Telegraph Company (Limited) to work and maintain the cable between Port Sudan and Port Jeddah under an agreement to be concluded between that company and the Sudan and Hejaz Governments jointly.

4 That, as from the 1st January, 1926, until such date as the cable is taken over by the Eastern Telegraph Company (Limited) the Hejaz Government undertakes to settle all sums due by that Government in respect of messages transmitted via Port Sudan during this period, or such sums shall be deducted from the half share of the unexpended balance payable to the Hejaz Government under this agreement.

Enclosure 2 in No. 1

(Draft Agreement.)

WHEREAS it has this day been agreed between the Sudan and the Hejaz Governments, hereafter called the Joint Owners on the one part and the Eastern Telegraph Company, hereafter called the Company, on the other part, as follows—

1 That both terminals of the Port Sudan-Jeddah cable hereafter called the cable shall be worked and the cable maintained by the company free of charge to the joint owners for a period of twenty five years.

2 That this agreement shall be subject to two years' notice of termination after the first two years by either of the parties to this agreement.

3 The company undertakes not to charge more than 1 fr. 50 c. gold for each word transmitted over the cable including both terminal charges, and of this charge 1 fr. 25 c. gold shall be retained by the company, who will deal directly with the public in Port Sudan, and the balance of 25 centimes gold shall be paid to the Hejaz Government in respect of services in dealing directly with the public in Jeddah.

4 The Company agrees to accept half the cable rate in respect of all Sudan and Hejaz Government telegrams transmitted over the cable.

5 The charges and or apportionment as set out in article 3 shall be liable to be revised at a period of two years as from the date of this agreement.

6 Should circumstances arise necessitating additional telegraphic facilities wireless or otherwise, in the territories of the Hejaz, the Hejaz Government undertakes to give the company the first refusal for the supply and working for such additional communications.

7 The Sudan Government undertakes not to use wireless between the Sudan and Hejaz in competition with the cable.

8 The Hejaz Government undertakes not to use wireless between the Hejaz and foreign stations in competition with the cable.

9 The Hejaz Government undertakes to accord the company suitable offices in Jeddah free of charge.

10 The Hejaz Government agrees to allow the importation into the Hejaz territories free of duty all material required for the maintenance of the company's offices and staff quarters.

11 The Hejaz Government agrees to exempt from sanitary, harbour or other dues any cable ship of the company entering Hejaz waters and to allow the free importation of all materials landed for the repair or extension of the cable.

12 The Hejaz Government agrees that the company shall have no direct dealing with the public in the Hejaz, this service being performed by the Hejaz Postal and Telegraph Administration.

13 The company agrees to hand back the cable to the joint owners upon the termination of this agreement in good order, having regard to the present condition of the cable.

14 Nothing in this agreement shall absolve the company from paying 25 centimes gold per word for all messages to or from the Hejaz passing over Sudan Government telegraph.

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No. 144

INTER-DEPARTMENTAL PLENUM QUARANTINE COMMITTEE

Minutes of the 29th Meeting, held at the Foreign Office on Thursday, April 29, 1926, at 3 P.M.

Present

Mr. J. MURRAY, C.M.G., Foreign Office (in the chair).

Mr. P. J. PATRICK, India Office.

Major H. W. YOUNG, C.M.G., D.S.O., Colonial Office.

Mr. J. S. HENDERSON, Ministry of Health.

Mr. V. A. L. MALLETT, Foreign Office (Secretary).

Mr. C. L. STOKES, Treasury, Commander F. A. P. WILLIAMS-FREEMAN, D.S.O., R.N., Admiralty, and Flight Lieutenant T. W. ELIHURST, Air Ministry, were also present by invitation.

Minutes of the 28th Meeting

The minutes of the 28th meeting were confirmed.

Kamaran Quarantine Station

A Committee had before them a note from the Netherlands Minister to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, dated the 23rd April, 1926, and India Office letter to the Treasury No. E & O. 2415 26 of the 24th April, 1926.

MR. MURRAY explained that the rejection by the Netherlands Government of the proposals contained in Sir Austen Chamberlain's note of the 25th February, 1926, and the alternative proposals now put forward in M. van Swinderen's note had created a new situation. It was important that a *modus vivendi* should be reached with the Netherlands Government before the meeting of the International Sanitary Conference at Paris on the 10th May. Before considering how far His Majesty's Government might go towards meeting the Dutch proposals, it was necessary to decide to what extent any form of international or Anglo-Dutch control in Kamaran would be compatible with the strategic requirements of the Admiralty and Air Ministry. It had been made clear to the Netherlands Government in Sir Austen Chamberlain's note of the 25th February that the civil administration of the island was to be treated as a thing apart from the actual management of the quarantine station. In his reply, M. van Swinderen had not alluded to this point, but his proposals appeared to refer to the quarantine station only, and not to the whole island.

MR. PATRICK stated that in the year 1917 there were roughly 1,500 native inhabitants of the island. No later figures were available. It was suggested that a small number of British officers appointed from Aden were to be withdrawn, provision would have to be made for the control of the island itself with a view to the administration of the quarantine station itself. The revenues raised in the island apart from quarantine dues would not, however, suffice for the needs of the administration, some subsidy from quarantine dues or elsewhere would be necessary to keep the administration solvent.

Mr. MURRAY said that it seemed clear that His Majesty's Government could not admit the Dutch to any share in the territorial control of the island. This must be kept apart from the management of the quarantine station.

COMMANDER WILLIAMS-FREEMAN explained that Kamaran would, in certain circumstances, be of great importance to the Admiralty, and they desired to retain it. They would, therefore, be opposed to any proposal to hand over the administration of the island to an international body.

FLIGHT LIEUTENANT ELMHIRST explained that there was already an aerodrome on the island, the use of which the Air Ministry would like to retain unless political conditions necessitated its abandonment.

Mr. MURRAY said that the important thing appeared to be to prevent any other Power from obtaining a footing in Kamaran Island.

MAJOR YOUNG enquired whether it was proposed that the administration of Kamaran should continue to be administered by the Admiralty, and mentioned that the Secretary of State for the Colonies was, he believed, in communication with the Secretary of State for India on the subject of the future control of Aden.

Mr. PATRICK thought that the Government of India might be unwilling to continue to be responsible for the administration of Kamaran, through Aden if the island were placed under some other authority, such a situation was not contemplated. The India Office had, however, telegraphed to the Government of India to enquire whether, as a last resort, they would accept the third alternative proposed in M. van Swinderen's note, namely the appointment of an equal number of Dutch and British medical officers to exercise an entire equality of position to each other, in preference to international control of the quarantine station (probably by the Mandatory Power). Mr. PATRICK asked for an answer before the 25th May.

Mr. STOCKS expressed sympathy with the Government of India view that as the administration of the island extends necessarily for the safety of the quarantine station, it should be assisted financially by a contribution from the quarantine receipts.

THE COMMITTEE proceeded to consider various possible alternative ways of meeting the Netherlands Government's claim, and the Secretary and Mr. MURRAY pointed out that it had been agreed to hand over the running of the quarantine station to the Committee. The Committee expressed a strong opinion that the third alternative put forward in M. van Swinderen's note of the 23rd April was the most satisfactory solution. The Committee were of opinion that, in view of the short time available before the opening of the International Sanitary Conference, the negotiations with the Netherlands Government would be best carried on in Paris during the days preceding the meeting of the International Sanitary Conference. They suggested that the British delegation should be authorised to discuss the matter with the Dutch delegation on the following lines:

(1) The administration of Kamaran Island to remain in its present relation to Aden, whatever might be the ultimate decision as to the control of Aden itself.

(2) The quarantine station to be managed on the principles suggested in the third alternative in M. van Swinderen's note of the 23rd April. This would mean practically that Dutch and British or Dutch-Indian and British-Indian medical officers would work the quarantine station on a basis of absolute equality, that the Dutch medical officer would deal with matters affecting Dutch interests, and the British medical officer with matters affecting British interests. The budget would be the joint responsibility of the Governments of India and of the Dutch East Indies.

(3) The Mandatory Power to make loans sinking need to repay eventually to the British and Indian Exchequers the sum of £45,000, representing the deficit on the establishment and running of the quarantine station between 1919 and 1925. In the event of the Netherlands Government agreeing to the establishment of this sinking fund or alternatively advancing a sufficient

sum to meet the claims of both parties, His Majesty's Government and the Government of India would raise no obstacle to the balance at present in hand, amounting to about £47,500, being devoted as far as necessary to the programme of improvements in the quarantine and sanitary arrangements of the station, which were indicated in India Office letter E and O 2415 of the 24th April, and estimated to cost about £48,000.

(4) The administration of the island to receive annually from quarantine station funds the sum of 10,000 Rs. or such lower sum as might be agreed upon in return for the assurance of good order and public security afforded by it. The idea is that the Civil administration shall, as in the past, be self-supporting, out of local taxes and quarantine receipts, so as to impose no burden on India or Great Britain.

Mr. PATRICK explained that the India Office could not commit the Government of India to these proposals without consulting them by telegraph, and that it would therefore be undesirable to send a detailed reply on the above lines to M. van Swinderen before the consent of the Government of India had been obtained. He suggested that in any agreement ultimately reached between the British and Dutch Governments, there should be inserted a stipulation that the working of whatever system was adopted should be reviewed three years hence in the light of experience and if necessary, revised, it being understood that the principle of equality between the British and Dutch medical officers should remain unaffected.

MAJOR YOUNG was unable to state definitely whether if the Colonial Office were to take over the administration of Aden from the Government of India they would also agree to take over Kamaran.

THE COMMITTEE placed on record their opinion that the administration of Kamaran can only be satisfactorily worked from Aden.

Mr. PATRICK explained that a wireless installation was about to be erected on the island by the Government of India out of the balance in hand on the quarantine station.

Mr. STOCKS stated that the Treasury would not object to this expenditure. He pointed out that the existence of the present balance and of the claim of the British and Indian Exchequers to a refund of £44,000 might be used as a lever in bargaining with the Dutch delegation for the establishment of a sinking fund as suggested in (3). He thought it should be made clear to the Dutch that the wireless station, when erected, and the buoys placed at the approaches to the island by the Admiralty will be the property of the administration and not of the quarantine station.

THE COMMITTEE recommended that, pending the receipt of the observations of the Government of India, an interim reply should be addressed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to M. van Swinderen to the effect that His Majesty's Government were consulting the Government of India and hoped shortly to be in possession of their views, but that *prima facie* they were disposed to favour the third solution suggested in M. van Swinderen's note of the 23rd April, and would be glad if the Netherlands Government would authorise their delegation in Paris to discuss the details of the proposed arrangements with the members of the British and Indian delegations, who would be in Paris during the week beginning the 3rd May, attending the meetings of the Office international d'Hygiène publique.

Quarantine Measures on the Hejaz Railway

The Committee had before them telegram No. 122 of the 18th April from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Palestine and Lord Plumer's reply telegram No. 129 of the 26th April, commenting on the draft articles 143, 144 and 145 considered at the 28th meeting of the Committee.

MAJOR YOUNG explained that Lord Plumer had suggested that article 143 should begin "A quarantine station shall be established by the Mandatory Power at Maan." The Colonial Office thought that the words "by the Mandatory Power" should be omitted, as these words might be held to imply that the Maan quarantine station was actually to be set up by His Majesty's Government, whereas the intention

was that it should be administered by the Transjordan Government under British control. The Committee shared this view. Major Young stated that the idea was to make the station self-sufficient and to provide probably with the necessary capital.

Major Young then read the new article 145 which had been drafted by Lord Plumer to run as follows —

"Pending the establishment at Akaba Port of a quarantine station of an adequate capacity, pilgrims travelling from the Hejaz by the sea route to Akaba and thence by land to Mann shall be subject to the prescribed quarantine measures at Tor before disembarkation at Akaba."

THE COMMITTEE expressed its opinion that the proposal would impose a hardship on the pilgrims and that it was not desirable to make any such arrangement. Major Young was asked to suggest to Lord Plumer with the Committee's criticism, and to suggest to him the desirability of dropping the proposal.

MAJOR YOUNG invited the Committee's attention to a letter from the French Colonial Office to the British Colonial Office dated 20th March (Colonial Office letter No. C 7798 26 of the 17th April), in which suggestions were made for the co-ordination as between Syria, Palestine and Iraq of measures for the transporting of pilgrims overland to the Hejaz.

THE COMMITTEE expressed itself in favour of the suggestion that the British Government should enter into negotiations with the French Government in order to arrange for such co-operation. Major Young was asked to recommend this course to the High Commissioners for Iraq and Palestine, and to enquire whether they had already taken any steps in the matter.

[E 2594 80/91]

No. 135

Sir Austen Chamberlain to M. van Sinderen.

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 20, 1920.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 28th April, re: the proposed quarantine station at Akaba.

2. The proposals set forth therein are receiving the sympathetic consideration of His Majesty's Government, who have found it necessary to consult the Government of India on the subject by telegram. Until the views of that Government, which are expected to be received in the course of the next few days, are received, I regret that I cannot reply to your note. Meanwhile it may be of assistance to your Government to learn that *prima facie* His Majesty's Government are disposed to favour the third alternative suggested in your note, namely, the appointment, to manage the quarantine station at Akaba, of a British official, of the rank of Major, to be appointed on an equal footing of equal rank and on an entire equality of position towards one another.

3. His Majesty's Government are anxious to reach an arrangement acceptable to both Governments before the opening of the International Sanitary Conference at Paris on the 10th May. With a view to facilitate this, it appears desirable that the details of a settlement on the above lines should be discussed in Paris by the delegates of the two Governments before that date. If the Netherlands Government share this view I hope that they will authorise their delegates to the International Sanitary Conference to discuss the question with the British and Indian delegations who will be in Paris during the week beginning the 3rd May, in connection with the meeting of the Office international d'Hygiène publique.

I have, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

[E 2735 344 91]

No. 136

Consul-General Satow to Sir Austen Chamberlain. — (Received May 1.)

(No. 75. Confidential.)

Sir,

Beirut, April 19, 1920.

WITH reference to Mr. Mayers's confidential despatch No. 60 of the 23rd March, it was reported the arrival of a party of the Sherif's Hejaz I have the honour to report that it seems likely that this personage intends to leave for the Hejaz in the near future, probably with his son Mohamed Emin.

2. I have not made the acquaintance of Ah Haider, nor, indeed, that of his son Amin. Mr. Mayers, as you know, has been very successful in his mission. He has occasionally expressed to various people his wish to get to know me, but as he has taken no steps to do so, and as I have not been able to find an opportunity on the part of the French, I, for my part, did not think it incumbent upon me to make the first move, and in any case I did not wish to appear to be trespassing on French territory.

However, on the 10th inst. his few days' leave was extended, and on one occasion when, having been inveigled into a photographic group, I found myself regret not been able to get to know me, but that perhaps soon his father and brother would have to apply to me for visas.

4. Last Friday, at a reception given by the Governor of the Lebanon, Sir Ronald Storrs, who has been staying here as the private guest of M. de Jouvenel, found his opportunity to bring the matter before me. Sir Ronald, after bringing the matter to M. de Jouvenel's knowledge and ascertaining that he had no objection and also informing me of his plans, called upon the Sherif the next morning. As Sir Ronald had no official status here, a fact which he was careful to impress upon the Sherif and his sons, he later gave me details of his interview with the family. The gist of what happened is that the Sherif expressed his intention of leaving for Mecca, without, however, consulting his sons, and that once there, he would succeed in persuading the latter to order for him some official position such as he desired. He further stated that it was his earnest wish on his way to call upon His Majesty's High Commissioner for Palestine, which explains why my visa will be required, and also to be received by His Majesty's High Commissioner in Egypt. Sir Ronald Storrs gave non-committal replies and merely said that he would bring the matter to the notice of the proper authorities, meaning me.

5. It is therefore probable that I may shortly receive a request for a visa for the Sherif and his sons. I am sending you a copy of this despatch, which I am sending to whom I am sending a copy of this despatch, will furnish me with an expression of his wishes as to the attitude I should adopt towards such a request. As regards the Sherif's visit to Egypt, my visa is, of course, not required, but if it is desired either to facilitate or to hinder the Sherif's visit to Cairo with the avowed intention of seeking an interview with His Majesty's High Commissioner, the latter will presumably see fit to have the proper instructions sent to the Egyptian consul, who, without such instructions, might be in doubt as to how he should deal with the case.

(Copies of this despatch have been sent to Constantinople, Jeddah, Jerusalem and Cairo.)

I have, &c.

H. E. SATOW

No. 137

Acting Agent, Jeddah, (No. 35 M) to High Commissioner, Bagdad. — (Repeated to Foreign Office, Received May 1.)

(No. 46.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jeddah, May 1, 1920.

YOUR telegram No. 65 S

Ibn Saud requests that, owing to the fact that most of his dependants are assisting him in the Hejaz, constitution of special tribunal may be delayed till the end of August. In the meantime he agrees to instruct Amir of Hail to collaborate

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O 2

with Iraq and Transjordan officials for return of loot and prevention of raids. He informs me that Amir of Hail is responsible for whole of Transjordan and Iraq frontiers and all communications should be direct with him, as all other Amirs, as of Jauk and Tehak, are subsidiary. Question of Persian Gulf may be settled with Amir of Hassa direct.

Instructions to this effect are being sent at once
(Repeated to Jerusalem)

No. 138

Acting Agent, Jeddah, to Sir Austen Chamberlain — (Received May 5.)

(No. 51)
(Telegraphic)

Jeddah, May 4, 1926

YOR telegram No. 35

Ibn Saud urgently requests that revision of treaty to strengthen friendship between His Majesty's Government and himself may be completed before 1st June owing to approaching Moslem conference and pilgrimage and other cogent reasons. These latter undoubtedly refer to situation between Hejaz and the Yemen.

No. 139

Acting Agent, Jeddah, to Sir Austen Chamberlain — (Received May 6.)

(No. 52)
(Telegraphic)

Jeddah, May 4, 1926

MY telegram No. 32

Air Force Officer and I yesterday visited Ibn Saud, who showed great anxiety to have personnel and spares required to make machines serviceable with least possible delay and requested me to order same from United Kingdom.

I informed him that officer had been sent to examine and report on aeroplanes and probable requirements for organising air service. His Majesty wished to operate and that consequently I would refer matter to you.

I gather that he is apprehensive of an attack from Arabs, whom Italians are said to be arming and Ibn Saud is continuing encouraging to attack.

In view of these possibilities it might be to His Majesty's Government's advantage to second Ibn Saud and place a reliable airman such as Noakes at his disposal to organise Hejaz aircraft with aid of civilian British personnel.

My telegram (No. 49) would appear to imply extensive purchases in near future, including war material no doubt.

Foreign countries have been making efforts to secure materials from Hejaz and if materials required by local authorities are not supplied by His Majesty's Government he will have no difficulty in getting them elsewhere. Such an air service would also be advantageous for suppression of raiders and more fanatical tribes who are impatient of Ibn Saud's moderate policy in Hejaz.

See telegraphic report sent to Air Ministry

E 2918 180 91]

No. 140

Vice-Consul Jordan to Sir Austen Chamberlain. — (Received May 11.)

(No. 43.)

Sir

Jeddah, April 12, 1926.

I HAVE the honour to confirm my telegram No. 41 of to-day's date, and to forward herewith a copy of my letter to Ibn Saud in pursuance of your telegram No. 35 of the 6th instant, together with a copy of his reply thereto.

I have, &c

S. R. JORDAN

Enclosure 1 in No. 140

(Copy of Letter from the Acting British Agent and Consul, Jeddah, to His Majesty the King of the Hejaz, and Sultan of Nejd, Mecca, dated April 8, 1926)

(After respects)

I AM directed to inform your Majesty that His Britannic Majesty's Government are at present under consideration Sir Gilbert Clayton's report on the relations between His Majesty's Government and Nejd.

His Majesty's Government are anxious to see the revision of the treaty of 1916, which was the basis of the friendly relations between the two Governments, and they do not desire to raise any objection to your Majesty entering into direct communication with the French authorities in Syria through your Majesty's representative in that country.

With reference to the Nejd delegation which your Majesty proposed to send to London, I have the honour to inform your Majesty that this has been agreed in accordance with your Majesty's wishes, and that there is no objection to the delegation proceeding if and when desired.

Compliments

Enclosure 2 in No. 140.

Translation of Letter from Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman al-Faisal al-Saud, Mecca, to the Acting British Agent and Consul, Jeddah, dated 27th Ramadan, 1344 (April 10, 1926).

(After respects)

I HAVE received your letter of the 8th April, 1926, regarding the readiness of His Britannic Majesty's Government to alter the treaty of 1916, and that the present situation is such as to make it necessary to revise the treaty, and that it will undoubtedly make the friendly relations in future more firm and stronger.

In this connection I have to thank General Sir Gilbert Clayton for his kind efforts and for the attention given by His Britannic Majesty's Government to his opinions, which are based on experience and are of great value. I am sure that you are the capable one who can make the Arab and the British interests common and closely join the two nations.

The request I previously made for a special representative having no connection with the British Government, and who is only interested in the interests of the Arab and the British nations was for such purpose.

My Government is ready at any time to enter into friendly negotiations with whoever the British Government may depute for discussing an agreement to strengthen the relations between my nation and the British nation.

With best greetings.

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No. 141.

Vice-Consul Jordan to Sir Austen Chamberlain. — (Received May 11.)

(No. 44.)

THE acting British agent and consul, Jeddah, presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of despatch No. 247 to His Majesty's High Commissioner, Baghdad, dated the 15th April, 1926, respecting the special tribunal described in the Bahra Agreement.

Jeddah, April 15, 1926.

Enclosure 1 in No. 141

Vice-Consul Jordan to High Commissioner for Iraq.

(No. 297)

Sir,

Jeddah, April 15, 1926.

WITH reference to your telegram of the 7th April, 1926, relative to the early constitution of the special tribunal prescribed in the Bahra Agreement, I have the honour to forward herewith a copy of my letter addressed to Ibn Saud in pursuance thereof together with a copy of his reply thereto.

Copies of these communications are being sent to the Foreign Office

I have, &c.

S. R. JORDAN

Enclosure 2 in No. 141

Copy of Letter from the Acting British Agent and Consul, Jeddah, to His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and Sultan of Nejd, Mecca, dated April 9, 1926.

(After respects.)

I HAVE been requested by His Britannic Majesty's High Commissioner in Iraq to inform your Majesty that the Iraq Government are anxious that the special tribunal referred to in article 2 of the Bahra Agreement should be constituted as soon as possible.

I may further suggest that the tribunal should sit in Kuwait, which is the neutral territory most accessible for both parties, and that the presidency of the tribunal should be entrusted to a British officer.

I shall be glad if your Majesty will inform me if these suggestions are acceptable to your Majesty or if not I shall be glad to be furnished with your Majesty's views in order that I may transmit same to His Britannic Majesty's High Commissioner in Iraq for communication to the Iraq Government.

Enclosure 3 in No. 141

Translation of Letter from Abdul Aziz-bin-Abdul Rahman-al-Faisal-al-Saud, Mecca, to the Acting British Agent and Consul, Jeddah, dated 24th Ramadan, 1344

(After greetings.)

WE have received your letter of the 9th April, 1926, and we have no objection to the constitution of the special tribunal in Iraq as provided for in the Bahra Agreement, and we are holding it in Kuwait. But owing to the fact that our men are now busy in the pilgrim season, and as it is not possible now to get and collect the documents and supporting papers here and in Nejd concerning the losses and the loot we referred to in our previous letters to your Excellency. Therefore we hope that his Excellency the High Commissioner in Iraq will agree to our suggestion that the tribunal should sit in Kuwait, and until careful investigations are made by our representatives deputed to the attacked places in order that correct information and accurate details may be had about the kinds and quantities of such losses which have to be enquired about in order to facilitate the required end, and to limit the cases which will be brought to the said court, and in order to be able to get to the way of solving the entangled difficulties.

Our reply to the presidency of the court being given to a British officer as to refer the application of same to what is mentioned in article 2 of the said Bahra Agreement.

With best greetings and respects.

E 2980 155 91

No. 142

Vice Consul Jordan to Sir Austen Chamberlain—(Received May 13)

(No. 46.)

Sir,

Jeddah, April 17, 1926.

I HAVE the honour to confirm my telegram No. 40 of the 10th instant, relative to the representation of the Hejaz Government at the Sanitary Conference to be held in Paris on the 10th May and in continuation of my despatch No. 38 of the 7th instant, on the same subject, transmit herewith a précis of the report submitted by Munshi Ihsanullah upon his return from Mecca which covers the general situation in Mecca at the present moment.

2. Copies of this despatch and of its enclosure are being sent to India, Egypt, Bagdad, Palestine and Singapore.

I have &c.

S. R. JORDAN

Enclosure in No. 142

Precis of Munshi Ihsanullah's Report

I REACHED Mecca on the evening of the 5th instant and immediately visited Sheikh Hafiz Wahba and Abdulrahman el-Dahlavi, two of His Majesty's chief advisers. Sheikh Hafiz was good enough to arrange for me to see His Majesty the following morning.

On the morning of the 6th instant I presented myself to His Majesty and, in accordance with instructions pointed out to His Majesty the false position caused by the refusal of the Hejaz Government to be represented at the Sanitary Conference, and having explained the desire to be represented thereat and which His Britannic Majesty's Government had been able to arrange, thereby showing a further proof of the friendly relations existing between the two Governments. His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and Sultan of Nejd, who had no axe to grind in this respect, but were desirous only of seeing the Hejaz represented in this conference as some of the questions there to be discussed concerned them closely in relation to the comfort and well-being of the pilgrims, as well as the health of the Hejaz generally.

His Majesty pointed out that there was a shortage of doctors in the Hejaz, and that in view of the approaching pilgrimage he did not feel justified in sending away one of his best men.

Eventually His Majesty agreed to reconsider his decision, and on the morning of the 7th instant sent a telegram to the French consulate cancelling his previous refusal and accepting the French Government's invitation to the conference.

After my interview with His Majesty I made as many enquiries as possible into the local state of affairs, which are taking on a new form, and I have to report that His Majesty the King is coming totally under the influence of the religious fanatics and advisers brought up under the old régime.

Not only the Wahabis of Nejd but also a number of Indians who have converted to the Wahabi faith are persuading Ibn Saud to forcibly convert all who visit Mecca and to destroy tombs and all religious edifices, which they claim amount to idolatry. I learned that it is intended to demolish the four Makams of the four Imams as well as the Makam Ibrahim, and also to demolish the minaret of the holy mosque. Also that the custom of making Umra should be abolished and the mosque of the Umra destroyed.

Needless to say, these rumours and the actions of the Wahabis of only allowing their own ulama to conduct the prayers in the holy mosque, coupled with the forcible manner in which smoking is forbidden, is breeding discontent amongst the people and many of the pilgrims go to the holy mosque but seldom remaining in their houses and conducting their own prayers therein for the most part.

Orders have been issued for the destruction of the Tomb of Eve at Jeddah and also for the demolition of the Dar-el Khazran (the place where Omar the Great was converted). The birthplace of the prophet "Mouhid el Nabi" has been destroyed, and the place is overrun with pie-dogs. Such things as this are causing much heart-burning amongst the pilgrims and all orthodox Moslems, and are not in accordance with the assurances given by His Majesty prior to his advent to the

Throne of the Hejaz. One party of Indians were actually about to leave Mecca and return to India before the pilgrimage, stating that a pilgrimage under such circumstances could not be regarded as a lawful pilgrimage.

The Dutch and Malayan pilgrims, even though the mutawwifs have been ordered to bring them to the holy mosque, refuse to go as there is no Sherik of the Sha'fi, and they consequently remain in their houses and make their devotions there. This was confirmed to me by the Dutch vice-consul.

As clearly shown by the above it is manifest that Ibn Saud has changed greatly and gone back on his many promises, as during the last year's Haj he gave orders for the rebuilding of the destroyed shrines and actually placed the contracts for this purpose.

Apparently also Ibn Saud is losing, temporarily perhaps, the firmness of character which he originally possessed, and now acts in a very undecisive manner, issuing and rescinding orders in almost the same breath.

The situation at Mecca is most unsatisfactory, and even the most fanatical Indians and non-co-operationists are now stating that it is necessary for the British Government to have a representative at Mecca to look after the pilgrims. A certain famous Indian Nationalist, one Maulvi Mohammed Said, the superintendent of the Madrasa Southiah, expressed these sentiments to me personally.

The economical situation in Mecca is also very bad, and the people have no confidence, and although there are perhaps 10,000 pilgrims in the city business is very dull and many of the larger houses which in an average season formerly sold as much as £700 or £800 are now only selling for £100 or £200.

I have also heard that the British Consul at Mecca is now being asked to leave the city, and that the British Government are considering this suggestion.

The British Consul at Mecca is now being asked to leave the city, and that the British Government are considering this suggestion.

"Everyone who comes to me warns me to be careful of the British Government, as it is said that they are working for disunity amongst the Arabs in particular and the world's Muslims in general, and that I am in accordance with the treaty between that Government and myself a slave in their hands. I have sworn on Friday night, and the month the month of Ramadan, and I swear in the name of the Almighty (four times repeated) that I have never received anything from the British Government either in writing or verbally which indicates their desire for disunity amongst the Arabs, and I can prove by the letters that I have in my possession that the British Government have always tried to bring peace and prosperity to the Arabs. They also did their best to settle the dispute between Hussein and myself, but Hussein would never come to any decision, and upon this I wrote to the British Government saying that I was obliged to take the matter into my own hands, and it was the sword that settled the matter. In reply to my letter the British Government said that they would be neutral and they kept their neutrality up to the very end, and I cannot blame them. They kept their neutrality and they respect my religion, honour and independence, and I am bound by my religion to respect the treaty which exists between us by God" (repeated thrice).

During the course of the speech he also referred to the visit of the Persian consul general Am-ul Mulk from Damascus, who came to accord recognition to His Majesty, and in this respect Ibn Saud said: "Only the other day the Persian consul general said to me that the British were like oil on water, and no matter how much you stirred the oil and water the oil would always come to the top." Meaning that British and Arab ideals were very dissimilar and the British always wanted to be on top.

Speaking of the forces he could command, Ibn Saud said: "I am a stranger even in Nejd, and I come from a place near Aleppo, and my present tribe does not number even 5,000 fighting men, and we are the weakest of the Nejd tribes, but we are bound to Nejd by my religion and our religion has strengthened us, and I can easily put 200,000 men into the field in a short period if the necessity arises, and I can sacrifice myself and my whole nation for the cause of our religion."

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No 143

Vice-Consul Jordan to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 13.)

(No. 48.)

THE Acting British agent and consul, Jeddah presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of despatch No. 205, to the High Commissioner, Bagdad, dated the 20th April, respecting Irak-Nejd relations.

Jeddah, April 20, 1926

Enclosure 1 in No. 143

Vice-Consul Jordan to High Commissioner Bagdad

(No. 205.)

Jeddah, April 20, 1926

WITH reference to your telegrams of the 13th instant, I have the honour to confirm my telegram No. 32 of to-day's date and to forward herewith copies of my telegram to the High Commissioner, Bagdad, dated the 20th April, respecting Irak-Nejd relations, together with a copy of his reply thereto.

2. Copies of this despatch and of its enclosures are being sent to the Foreign Office.

I have, &c.
S. R. JORDAN

Enclosure 2 in No. 143

Vice-Consul Jordan to the King of the Hejaz

(After respects.)

Jeddah, April 16, 1926

WITH further reference to your Majesty's letter of the 20th April, 1924 (the 3rd April, 1926) and in continuation of my letter of the 6th April, 1926, I have the honour to state that I have been requested by His Britannic Majesty's High Commissioner in Irak to inform your Majesty that the Government of Irak have issued very strict orders against raiding and is determined to stamp out this evil.

Only one instance of raiding has occurred recently and that when camels were taken from the Nakhusha. These camels have all been recovered and handed over to the messenger of Mussad.

Owing to the lack of details of the raids given in your Majesty's complaints conveyed in your Majesty's letters of the 10th Moharrem, 1344, and of the 27th Safar, 1344, it has not been possible to trace the assailants. With reference to the raids of the 25th March last against the Ibn Ashwan, every effort has been made to trace the assailants, but they have not yet been traced. He was for some time in Kuwait, but has since disappeared.

Your Majesty will, I am sure, realise that in order to trace persons guilty of raiding fairly precise details are necessary, and His Britannic Majesty's High Commissioner in Irak is of the opinion that the best course of combating this evil would be the immediate constitution of the special tribunal as envisaged in the second article of the Bahra Agreement and the submission of all claims to that tribunal for decision.

His Britannic Majesty's High Commissioner has already suggested to your Majesty the immediate constitution of this tribunal, as conveyed in my letter of the 6th April, 1926, and I am sure that your Majesty will be pleased to see that Irak is loyally carrying out their treaty obligations and looks to your Majesty to restrain your Majesty's subjects from acts of aggression on the excuse of the very indefinite details supplied to date.

(Compliments.)

S. R. JORDAN

Enclosure 3 in No. 143

Vice-Consul Jordan to the King of the Hejaz

(After respects)

Jeddah, April 16, 1926.

WITH reference to your Majesty's telegram of the 24th March last, sent direct to me in Port Sudan, relative to the violation of your Majesty's territories by certain tribesmen of Irak, I am now requested by His Britannic Majesty's High Commissioner in Irak to inform your Majesty that the charges set out in your Majesty's telegram under reply have been fully investigated and found to be devoid of fact.

The British officer known as Abu Hunaik has never been beyond the neutral zone, in which area he has on two occasions visited mixed Dhafir and Shammar camps.

Further, His Britannic Majesty's High Commissioner states that no encouragement whatever is given to Nejd tribesmen to migrate to Irak as the policy of Irak is just the contrary.

Ibn Suwait, mentioned in your Majesty's telegram under reply, did not accompany the British officer known as Abu Hunaik on the occasion of his last visit to the neutral zone.

Baryis bin Khairallah, who has for two years past, been in the Irak police, in February last visited the neutral zone accompanied by a party of police to recover stolen property and not for recruiting purposes. On this occasion also they did not cross the Nejd frontier.

His Britannic Majesty's High Commissioner for Irak considers that probably the rumour regarding recruiting may be due to the fact that several men of Shammar origin, three to be exact, who have been living in Zubair for some years past, have recently joined the Irak police.

As pointed out in my letter of to-day's date, His Britannic Majesty's High Commissioner for Irak assures your Majesty that Irak is loyally carrying out her treaty obligations and I sincerely hope that the above explanation will serve further to convince your Majesty of the good intentions of the Irak Government to loyally abide by the Bahra Agreement.

(Compliments.)

S. R. JORDAN

Enclosure 4 in No. 143.

Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman-ul-Fairul-ul-Saud, Mecca, to the Acting British Agent and Consul, Jeddah, dated 5th Shawal, 1344 (April 18, 1926)

(Translation.)

(After respects.)

I copy to you two letters regarding the raids against our frontiers by the Irak tribesmen. I am very sorry to hear that in reading the statement from the High Commissioner in Irak about this matter, I became quite surprised as he did not mention but a single incident or the like which he says that its doer has run away to Koweit and then disappeared.

I have to say that in looking at previous incidents I was not speaking at all without substantiating to it and our subjects have been killed on different occasions and the exact information.

I only presume that the enquiries made by the British authorities in Irak were through people who wish to obliterate the facts or they may have another object for concealing same.

The raiding incidents referred to in my previous letters are actual and I do not think being correct.

But I am sorry that the details I asked for from our Amir at Hail and others concerned at Nejd regarding the explanation of such raids, the dates and places at which they occurred, the names of the raiders and the attached, the quantity of loot, and all such details, have not reached me to date from our said Amir of Hail.

I have at once instructed him to collect such details from the concerned authorities and to forward same in a list direct to the High Commissioner in Irak, together with a letter which I will send to the said High Commissioner through

the mentioned Amir in order to secure the advantage of making the details reach the British authorities at Bagdad by the quickest means.

As to the matter of the British officer named Abu Hunaik and his entering the Nejd frontiers, and the one named Khairallah and his encouraging the tribesmen to emigrate, and recruiting, I beg to refer to my telegram sent to you at Port Sudan in which I only mentioned such news as received from the Amir of Hail as they are I will, however, ascertain the matter from him and will send you the most adequate details about it exactly.

In this connection I refer to my previous letter from which you might have noted that it is difficult before the pilgrim season to have a tribunal constituted in Koweit as mentioned in article 2 of the Bahra Agreement.

I am, in the meantime, glad to say that it is my earnest desire to see that peace and order are prevailing on both sides of the frontier of the two neighbouring countries and that their subjects should live a pleasant and happy life, and that the Bahra Agreements would apply the terms of the agreement quite loyally and carefully.

(With respects.)

E 2961 366 91

N 144

Foreign Office to Eastern Telegraph Company, Limited

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 14, 1926

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Austen Chamberlain to communicate to you the following information, which he has received by telegraph from the acting British agent and consul at Jeddah relative to the Jeddah-Port Sudan cable.

2. On 4th April 1926 the Government of the Hejaz and the Government of the Eastern Telegraph Company, in the form agreed upon at the recent conference at Port Sudan. As regards the draft agreement between the Governments and the Eastern Telegraph Company, he suggests that articles 6 and 8 should be combined in the following manner:

"The Hejaz Government agree not to use their own or other companies' wireless or cables for foreign communications unless the cable is out of order and pending the completion of repairs."

3. You will observe that the effect of this suggested amendment is entirely favorable to your company.

4. As regards articles 9, 10 and 12, Ibn Saud reserves his consent pending the working arrangements and assure himself that those arrangements are not prejudicial to the interests of the Hejaz. Mr. Chamberlain suggests that a representative of your company should be sent to Jeddah for this purpose as soon as possible and the Secretary of State will be glad to learn whether your directors can make arrangements accordingly.

I am, Sir,
LANCLOUT OLIPHANT

E 3032 3068 91]

No. 145

Vice-Consul Jordan to Sir Austen Chamberlain. (Received May 17)

(No. 50.)

Sir,

Jeddah, April 24, 1926

IN continuation of my despatch No. 27 (49) of the 9th March last, relative to the Taif massacres, I have the honour to state that on the 9th instant the local authorities published a notice in the Mecca newspaper to the effect that all claims in respect of losses sustained by Taif during the massacres must be presented to the committee before the 10th Shawal, 1344, i.e., the 23rd April, 1926.

2. As many of the Hejaz subjects who were during the period have since left the country and returned to their homes, I addressed a letter (copy attached) to His Majesty the King of the Hejaz to this effect, and requested a further delay of two

[15026]

months for the reception of claims from abroad. I have had no reply to date, but will not fail to communicate same to you when received.

3. I attach also a list of the claims for compensation* which have been filed at this agency to date, together with a full list of British subjects who suffered at Taif, as far as can at present be ascertained.

4. I also attach such evidence of the guilt of the Wahabi forces as has been collected to date,* and which includes reports from the Indian pilgrimage officer, Mr. Yasin Khan the Indian pilgrim officer lately attached to the agency, Dr. Munir ad Din and a report prepared by Munshi Ihsanullah,* employed at this agency and recently appointed permanent Indian pilgrimage officer, together with an extract from a letter from the British Consul at Mecca dated 12th Shawwal, 1344, which was a list of the massacres.

5. The persons resident in the Hejaz, and who had previously placed their claims with this agency, were instructed to put their claims before the committee appointed by Ibn Saud, and this has in fact been done.

6. Copies of this despatch and of its enclosures have been forwarded to India and Singapore.

I have, &c.
S. R. JORDAN

Enclosure in No. 145.

Copy of Letter from the Acting British Agent and Consul, Jeddah, to His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and Sultan of Nejd, Mecca, No. 268 M (49), dated April 22, 1926.

(After respects.)

I HAVE the honour to inform your Majesty that the article printed in the "Umm-al-Qura," of the 9th April, 1926, relative to the compensation for the losses of the victims of Taif, has been brought to my notice, and I have noted that all claims for compensation must be in the hands of the committee not later than the 10th Shawwal, 1344.

I feel it my duty to inform your Majesty that many of the victims who suffered during that most regrettable incident have now left the Hejaz for India and elsewhere, and the period granted under the above-mentioned notice in the "Umm-al-Qura" is not sufficient for them to do so.

Consequently, I have the honour to request that your Majesty will grant a further extension of the period for the submission of claims by persons who were at Taif and who have since left the Hejaz, in order that these claims also may receive the just consideration which I know is your Majesty's desire.

[E 3034 2068/91]

No. 146

Vice-Consul Jordan to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 17)

N. S. 1

S. R.

Jeddah, April 26, 1926.

IN confirmation of my telegram No. 45 of to-day's date and in continuation of my despatch No. 50 of the 24th April, relative to the atrocities committed at Taif, I have the honour to report that Ibn Saud has agreed to allow a delay of two months for the reception of claims for compensation from abroad.

2. I enclose herewith a copy of his reply to my communication No. 268 M. of the 22nd April, of which was forwarded with my despatch of the 22nd April.

3. Copies of this despatch and of its enclosure are being sent to India and Singapore.

I have, &c.
S. R. JORDAN

* Not printed.

Enclosure in No. 146

Translation of Letter from Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman al-Faisal al-Saud, Mecca, to the Acting British Agent and Consul, Jeddah, dated 12th Shawwal, 1344 April 25, 1926.

(After respects.)

I HAVE read your letter No. 268 (49) of the 22nd April, 1926, and I found that it expresses your high feelings towards us regarding the decision we made to lighten the burden of those who suffered at the massacre of Taif when the ex-Government was withdrawing, and regarding your Excellency's wish to have the period for the submission of claims extended to two months.

To comply with your wishes we have no objection to accept your request in order to act according to justice and equity which we are determined to follow.

I am glad to take this opportunity and present to you my best greetings and respects.

[E 3039 146 99]

No. 147

Acting Consul Vaughan-Russell to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 17.)

(No. 165.)

Sir,

Damascus, May 3, 1926.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 148 of the 27th ultimo, I have the honour to report that His Highness the Aga Khan, who was appointed President of the State of Syria, arrived here from Beirut to take over his duties on the evening of the 29th ultimo. He was accompanied by the French High Commissioner.

2. The proclamation appointing Nami Bey as President having been read by M. de Jouvenel at the Syrian Government offices on arrival here, the next day, the 30th April, Ahmed Nami Bey held a reception there, to which all officials and members in Damascus were invited. Following upon this function, the new President delivered a speech in which he briefly stated the aims which he had in view, and which he hoped his Government and Ministers would assist him to achieve.

3. The speech was a most interesting one, and it was a pleasure to hear the views of the Syrian people which he expressed. It was an address which had a vague promise of future blessings which only could be obtained by close collaboration with France, and such hopes which it did hold out of French concensus to the Syrian people in the cause of a general pacification were, I fear, somewhat disappointing to Damascus in general. It is, of course, obvious that any Syrian Government must collaborate with the French Mandatory Government, but I gather that he emphasised this necessity in his speech, and thereby gave an impression to Syrian Nationalists that his intentions were more pro-mandatory than pro-Syrian. It was, of course, impossible for any speech made on such an occasion to avoid referring to the paramount necessity of Syrian collaboration with the French mandatory authorities.

4. Particularly disappointing was the omission of any reference to the question of amnesty. Syrians are stated to be still firm in their determination to struggle against the French authorities. I am informed from a fairly reliable source that the French authorities are not altogether unprepared to grant an amnesty eventually under certain conditions, and that Nami Bey is aware of this. No doubt he is keeping this trump card up his sleeve and will produce it later when he can make use of it with the greatest effect.

5. However, great hopes were held out by Nami Bey of obtaining a satisfactory solution for the Syrian claims for territorial unity. He foreshadowed territorial adjustments in Syria and the Lebanon which would give Syria an outlet on the sea at Tripoli.

6. He promised that his Government would draw up a treaty with the French Government, which would remain in force for a certain number of years. Syrian national sovereignty would thus be respected.

7. New elections would be carried out as soon as possible, and the newly elected Parliament would vote upon the new Syrian Constitution.

8. M. de Jouvenel having previously publicly declared his agreement upon the foregoing points, there is every reason to anticipate that the new President will find no

great difficulty in forming a Cabinet to assist him in putting his programme into execution. Up to the present no announcement has yet been made here regarding the composition of the new Syrian Cabinet. The disappointment felt by Damascus at the absence of any reference to an amnesty in the new President's speech is somewhat strongly felt in Damascus that the new Syrian Government may find a means of putting an end to the intolerable situation which the revolution has created during the past months.

(Copies of this despatch have been sent to Jerusalem (No. 124), Amman (No. 131), Bagdad (No. 141), Beirut (No. 142) and Cairo (No. 143).)

I am, &c.

J. R. VAUGHAN RUSSELL.

E 2946 306 91)

No. 148

Sir Austen Chamberlain to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris).

No 1472)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, May 18, 1926

WITH reference to Foreign Office letter of the 9th February, enclosing a copy of a despatch instructing His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris to invite the co-operation of the French Government in the matter of the Hejaz Railway, I am directed by Secretary Sir Austen Chamberlain to transmit to you the accompanying copy of a despatch from Lord Crewe, conveying the acceptance of that proposal by the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

2. In view of the acceptance by the French Government of the principle of co-operation with His Majesty's Government in this matter, I consider it desirable to agree with the French Government on a definite course of procedure before approaching Ibn Saud.

3. I am also of opinion that the question of the repair of the line and re-establishment of a train service throughout its length should be kept separate from that of the institution of the Moslem Advisory Council at Medina, which was foreshadowed in M. Bompard's declaration at Lausanne on the 27th January, 1925.

4. I shall, therefore, be glad if you will inform the French Government that I welcome their promise of collaboration and hope that mutual agreement may be reached on the following points, regarding which a settlement is necessary, as a preliminary to the opening of negotiations with Ibn Saud.

5. The problem of reconditioning the sections of the railway which lie in Syrian, Palestinian and Transjordanian territory falls into two parts: (1) Repair of the permanent way, (2) redistribution of locomotives and rolling-stock. As regards (1), I understand that the only section of the line in British mandated territory which is not at present fit for traffic is that between Maan and Mudawarra, on the frontier of the Hejaz. The Administration of Transjordan are prepared to put in hand the necessary repairs as soon as there is a reasonable prospect of the whole railway resuming operations. As regards (2), the present position is set forth in my note of the 3rd December last to M. de Fleuriau, a copy of which was enclosed in my despatch No. 4007 of the 4th December last. This note contained certain proposals for the redistribution of locomotives and rolling-stock, on which I still await the observations of the French Government. I shall be glad if you will urge upon them the early acceptance of these proposals.

6. If agreement is reached on the two points mentioned above, I shall be glad to inform Ibn Saud that the British and French Governments will guarantee an adequate train service on the section of the railway which lies within the Hejaz and is at present unfit for traffic, viz., the section between El Ala and Mudawarra. In return, Ibn Saud could be informed that the French and British Governments will guarantee an adequate train service on the section of the railway which lies within the Hejaz and is at present unfit for traffic, viz., the section between El Ala and Mudawarra. It might further be suggested to Ibn Saud that, if agreement is reached in principle, a meeting should be held either at Maan or at Amman between the local railway experts from Syria, Palestine, Transjordan and the Hejaz to arrange for co-operation in the maintenance of a train service throughout the whole length of the Hejaz Railway.

7. You should lay these proposals before the French Government, and also make clear to them the views of His Majesty's Government on the question of the Moslem Advisory Council, as set forth in paragraph 7 of Foreign Office letter of the 30th April to the Colonial Office.

I am, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

Enclosure 1 in No. 148.

Foreign Office to Colonial Office

Foreign Office, April 30, 1926

WITH reference to Foreign Office letter of the 9th February, enclosing a copy of a despatch instructing His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris to invite the co-operation of the French Government in the matter of the Hejaz Railway, I am directed by Secretary Sir Austen Chamberlain to transmit to you the accompanying copy of a despatch from Lord Crewe, conveying the acceptance of that proposal by the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

2. Mr. Bompard's declaration at Lausanne on the 27th January, 1925, regarding the Hejaz Railway for through traffic to Medina was raised by Ibn Saud in December last (see Foreign Office letter of the 31st December, 1925), and that an interim reply was sent to that ruler through the acting British agent and consul at Jeddah in February (see Sir Austen Chamberlain's telegram No. 15 to Mr. Jordan, a copy of which was enclosed in Foreign Office letter of the 9th February, referred to in paragraph 1 above). Now that the French Government have agreed to co-operate with His Majesty's Government in applying to the Hejaz Railway the principles of the Anglo-French Declaration of Lausanne, it appears to Sir Austen Chamberlain to be desirable to formulate certain definite proposals to the French Government.

3. The question of the effective re-establishment of the Hejaz Railway on a normal basis can be divided into two parts: (1) Joint action by Syria, Palestine, Transjordan and the Hejaz to repair the various sections of railway lying within their respective territories, and to run trains through the whole length of the railway as far as Medina; (2) the establishment of the Moslem Advisory Council at Medina which is foreshadowed in the Anglo-French declaration made at Lausanne by M. Bompard on the 27th January, 1925. These two subjects will be dealt with separately in the following paragraphs.

4. For the establishment of a through connection between Haifa, Damascus and Medina by the Governments of the various territories through which the railway passes, viz., Syria, Palestine, Transjordan and the Hejaz, it will be necessary, in the first place, that certain sections of the permanent way which are now closed to traffic should be repaired. The only sections of the Hejaz Railway which are at present completely out of action are (a) the portion of line within Hejaz territory between El Ala, or (if the line is already repaired as far as Tebuk) Tebuk and Mudawarra; (b) the section lying within Transjordan from Mudawarra to Maan. When these sections shall have been repaired, there will remain the problem of the adequate provision of engines and rolling-stock, the majority of which is still retained by the French authorities on the Syrian section of the line. From the sub-enclosure in your letter of the 17th April, it seems possible that these authorities intend at least to lend engines and rolling-stock in order to run a through train service to Medina during the pilgrimage season. The proposal suggested by the French Government in the sub-enclosure to M. Bourdillon is, however, somewhat obscure: "Les mesures prises sur la section syrienne du [chemin de fer] Hedjaz permettent . . . de fournir le matériel nécessaire aux trains de pèlerins jusqu'au Médine, si les conditions de la voie le permettent au delà des frontières syriennes." Meanwhile, the Secretary of State awaits a reply from the French Government to the note which he addressed to M. de Fleuriau on the 3rd December, 1925 (see Foreign Office letter of the 1th December), in which definite proposals were made for the redistribution between Syria, Palestine and Transjordan of the Hejaz Railway engines and rolling-stock in proportion to the volume of traffic passing over the several sections of the railway on the 1st August, 1914. Acceptance of these proposals by the French Government would materially increase the number of engines and trucks available for use on the Palestine and Transjordan sections of the railway.

5. The Secretary of State, therefore, proposes, if Mr. Amery concurs, to suggest to the French Government that the co-operation, on which they have now agreed in principle, should assume the following form: That the British and French Governments should agree to approach Ibn Saud jointly with the proposal that, if he will put into a thorough state of repair the section of railway from Medina to Mudawarra, and agree to run a regular train service thereon, the Transjordan Administration will repair the section of line from Mudawarra to Maan, and

the Syrian Administration will redistribute the engines and rolling-stock on the lines suggested in Sir Austen Chamberlain's note of the 3rd December 1925. Mr. P. A. V. ... the Hejaz should be held as soon as possible either at Mecca or Amman to arrange for co-operation in maintaining a train service throughout the whole length of the Hejaz Railway.

The Secretary of State is of opinion that, before approaching Ibn Saud, it is essential that some such plan of co-operation should be concerted with the French Government. At the same time, he is of the opinion that the Hejaz Railway is in such a state of ruin that it is unlikely that the necessary repairs can be completed before the 1926 pilgrimage.

7. As regards the second point referred to in paragraph 3 above, namely the establishment of the Modern Advisory Council, I am of the opinion that the object of view is to provide a Modern Council for the Hejaz Railway and to make suggestions to the various authorities concerned. It is not intended to interfere with the existing Council of the Hejaz Railway, but to provide a new Council to deal with the modern requirements of the railway. It is not intended to interfere with the existing Council of the Hejaz Railway, but to provide a new Council to deal with the modern requirements of the railway. It is not intended to interfere with the existing Council of the Hejaz Railway, but to provide a new Council to deal with the modern requirements of the railway.

8. I am to invite the observations of Mr. Amery on the above suggestions and to express the hope that he will concur in the proposed communication to the French Government.

9. A copy of this letter is being sent to the India Office.

I am, &c

LANCELOT OLIPHANT

Enclosure 2 in No. 14x

Colonial Office to Foreign Office

Sir,
I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Amery to inform you that the proposed communication to the French Government with regard to the application to the Hejaz Railway of the principles of the Anglo-French Declaration at Lausanne.

A copy of this letter is being sent to the India Office.

I am, &c

J. E. SHUCKBURN

E 3081 366 91

No. 149

The Eastern Telegraph Company (Limited) to Foreign Office—(Received May 19)

Sir,
WE have to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 14th instant in reference to the Hejaz Railway and I am desired to express my company's thanks to Secretary Sir Austen Chamberlain for communicating to us the information which he has received from the Acting British Agent and Consul at Jeddah.

As suggested by Mr. Jordan, we have instructed our representative at Port Sudan to proceed to Jeddah in due course, after putting himself in touch with the Acting British Agent and Consul at Jeddah. The Secretary of State has to send a copy of the telegram to our superintendent.

I am, &c

Secretary

Enclosure in No. 149

Telegram from the Eastern Telegraph Company (Limited), London, to Representative at Port Sudan

Port Sudan, May 17, 1926

FOREIGN Office, 14th May advises Ibn Saud accepts draft agreement between Sudan and Hejaz Governments in form agreed recent conference Port Sudan. Ibn Saud suggests articles 6 and 8 should be combined in following manner: "The Hejaz Government agree not to use their own or other companies' wireless or cables for foreign communications unless the cable is out of order and pending the completion of repairs." We agree to this, but would like article 6 to stand as well, if you can arrange it giving us first refusal of any additional wireless station but do not let this jeopardise or hinder final agreement. Re articles 9, 10 and 12 Ibn Saud reserves consent pending arrival our representative for discussion details working arrangements. Arrange put yourself in touch with Jordan and proceed Jeddah when he has made necessary arrangements. In your dealings with Hejaz authorities be careful to act in conciliatory tone and meet wishes in any doubt refer to me.

No. 150

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Mr. Jordan (Jeddah,

(No. 42)
Telegraphic

Foreign Office, May 20, 1926

YD (R telegram No. 51 of 4th May. Revision of treaty with Ibn Saud. You should explain to Ibn Saud that, while every endeavour will be made to expedite matters, it is unfortunately most improbable that the revision of the treaty can be completed by 1st June.

No. 151

Acting Agent, Jeddah, to Sir Austen Chamberlain—(Received May 25)

(No. 57)

Foreign Office, May 25, 1926

FROM reliable information it is now certain that tombs of Prophet's family in Medina have been destroyed, including tomb of Hanzala. There are also rumours that dome of Prophet's tomb may be removed. Indian and other pilgrims are very uneasy and incensed against Ali brothers, who they state have again deceived them. Possibility of fanatical outbreaks always present but unlikely for the moment. Ibn Saud justifies action by long article in local paper signed by seventeen ulamas of Medina. (Sent to Bagdad, India, Egypt, Jerusalem and Singapore.)

[E 3158 3158/91]

No 132

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 25.)

(No. 242.)

Sir,

Angora, May 18, 1926.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that according to an announcement in to-day's paper the Turkish Government has appointed a certain Suleiman Sherket Bey to be political representative at Mecca. Suleiman Sherket Bey, who is unknown to me, is stated to be proceeding shortly to his post via Alexandria.

2. The Turkish Government is also sending a delegate to the forthcoming Islamic Congress at Mecca. The delegate, who is a Deputy for Constantinople, Elib Bey is something of a man of the world, speaks good French, plays bridge, and is associated with Europeans in mining and other business. He is also a personal friend of the Ghazi, and that he should be chosen to go against his personal inclination, for he is a Muslim, or religious enough to relish a summer at Mecca—is another indication that the Turkish Government is far from losing interest in the Hejaz.

3. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner in Egypt and to the acting British agent and consul at Jeddah.

I am, Sir,

R. G. LINDSAY

[E 3198 367 91]

No 153

Vice-Consul Jordan to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 26.)

(No. 55 Secret.)

Sir,

Jeddah, May 1 1926

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith my report on the situation in the Hejaz during the period the 1st to 30th April, 1926.

2. Copies of this report are being sent to Egypt, Jerusalem (2), Bagdad, Aden, Delhi, Beirut (for Damascus), Khartum (through Port Sudan) and Singapore.

I have, Sir,

S. R. JORDAN

Enclosure 1 in No. 153

Jeddah Report for the Period April 1 to 30 1926

DURING the period under report no political events of importance seems to have taken place in the Hejaz and the King would appear to have been concentrating his energies on consolidating his Empire and as far as possible pacifying the more unruly tribes. The only event of importance during the period has been the reported outbreak of a number of tribal raids along the frontiers.

Notwithstanding the fact that the Turkish Government has recently issued a decree of tolerance of this troublesome practice was about to take place. Owing to the pressure of the Turkish and British Governments the dispute has now passed and it now appears that a certain amount of the difficulty arose through the violation of Nejd territorial rights. As the treaty as to the frontiers has recently been concluded and the Nejd is not expert in the matter of degree and minutes of longitude and latitude certain errors as to which was the actual boundary appears to have arisen. It is hoped by the early establishment of the boundary that the dispute will go far to stop the present voluminous and sometimes acrimonious correspondence between Ibn Saud and the neighbouring Powers.

3. The Mecca newspaper publishes a statement supposedly made by the Amir Abdullah of Transjordan who declares that an agreement has recently been concluded between the Nejd and Transjordan and he is going to keep to the articles of that agreement. The "Umm al-Kura" adds "Arabs will succeed only if they state the truth."

4. The supposed commercial treaty concluded between Syria and the Nejd was taken back to Beirut by Major Ibrahim Depui recently, who expressed himself well satisfied with the progress made and the accord arrived at between these neighbouring States. On the other hand, local rumour confidently states that no agreement was signed, but that Ibrahim returned to Beirut with a counter-agreement from Ibn Saud roughly approximating to the original agreement submitted by Ibrahim. I have been unable to verify this.

5. A certain Dr. Emin Rihani, a Christian, well known as an Arab historian and writer, recently arrived in Jeddah from Syria, and yesterday morning, upon Ibn Saud's arrival from Mecca, read to him, before a motley assembly of Hejazis and Nejdies, an address of welcome and praising Ibn Saud for his great exploits. Rihani concluded by saying that he had had the honour of visiting the Sultan by two doors, first by the door of the Persian Gulf, secondly by the door of the Red Sea, and he sincerely hoped that soon he would have the honour of visiting His Majesty by the third and more glorious door, that of the Mediterranean Sea and Syria and Palestine.

6. Rihani came rather as a surprise, as I had previously considered him as a decidedly pan-Arab, to be concentrated on the success of Ibn Saud. It may be that recent events in Syria has brought about a change of attitude on his part.

7. Ibn Saud in reply was very moderate in his tone and stated that it was not from foreign Powers that they had to fear, as their country was not a land of gold mines but from the Arabs themselves, who were in the paths of intrigue and falsehood and thereby kept their nation backward.

8. The Persian consul general from Dunsarua, Eyn-el Mulk, has also visited the Sultan in Mecca during the period under report but he stayed but two or three days in the Hejaz and I had but small opportunity of seeing him. He apparently came to convey the Shah of Persia's formal recognition of Ibn Saud as King of the Hejaz. The Persian Government, about the time of his arrival in the Hejaz, officially forbade the Persian pilgrimage.

9. The situation from the Yemen side appears to be quiet. The Meccan newspaper recently published an article to the effect that Sir G. Clayton had been to Sana'a and concluded a treaty between the Imam Yahya and Great Britain, and that he was now about to endeavour to conclude a treaty between the Hejaz and Nejd and the Yemen. As against this the paper publishes an article flatly contradicting the rumour that there has been a clash between the forces of the Nejd and Yemen, and states that the two countries are in most friendly relations.

10. I hear that three aeroplanes and 116 cases of "instruments" were on the Hodeidah by the Italian steamship "Lomedano." My information on this point appears reliable.

11. A Japanese delegation headed by Raden Omar Said Trioktamipolo and Kiyar Hagi Manasur has been very active in Mecca lately holding public meetings and preaching the Malay Archipelago for the Malays and Moslems and the expulsion of the white races and Christian influence. These two were originally proceeding to Cairo but have now left for Medina and will I understand return to Mecca direct in time to attend the conference convened by Ibn Saud on the 20th 21st Kodah 1344 (the 7th June, 1926).

12. I attach hereto a translation* of an article from the Mecca newspaper reporting an interview with this delegation, together with a translation of the telegram sent by Ibn Saud inviting the various nations and committees named therein to send delegates to Mecca. It was hoped I believe, that the delegates who attended the Khilafa Conference in Egypt would then have time to reach Mecca and attend this further conference.

13. Two representatives from the Sind Provincial Khilafa Committee arrived by the steamship "Alavi" recently, and after expressing their pleasure for the kind treatment received in Kamaran, stated that they had brought some 2,000 rupees for distribution among the poor of the Haramain.

14. After receiving an invitation from the French Government to send a delegate to the International Sanitary Conference to be held in Paris, Ibn Saud regretfully refused same. This in view of his previous expressed wish to be represented was a complete volte-face, and although he was later persuaded to cancel his refusal and send a delegate, I have not been able to ascertain why he in the first place refused but I expect the Director for Foreign Affairs, lately reinstated to this rank, was not unconnected with the attitude adopted by His Majesty Abdullah.

* Not printed

Enclosure 2 in No. 1

13. The situation as regards religious freedom in the Sudan is becoming more and more noticeable. The Government has issued a decree forbidding the Mecca newspaper from publishing anything that might offend the religious feelings of the Moslems. The Government has received instructions to take the necessary steps to enforce this decree.

[illegible]

WE heard from the Royal office that the following telegram was sent by His Majesty the King (on 1291344) to His Majesty the King of Egypt, His Majesty the King of Afghanistan, the Turkish Republic, His Highness the Shah of Persia, His Majesty the King of Irak, Amir Abd-el Krim of Rif, Imam Yahya, the Chief of the Muslim Brotherhood at Mecca, the Muslim Brotherhood at Bombay, the Hadith Society at Amritsar, the learned men society at Delhi, his Excellency the Bai of Tunis, the Governor of Tripoli, Sheikh Badr-ed Din-el Hussein, Sheikh Baghat-el Batar at Damascus, the Central Religious Ministry at Orfa, Russia the Kadi Mustafa Shersshah at Tlemcen, Algeria, the Chief of "Sherkit Islam" at Iskikarta, Java and the Mahomedan Society, Java.

¹⁰ We have sent invitations to all those whom it may concern of the Moslems and their Kings.

" Hoping that your representatives will be present at the fixed time
May God guide us all — *ABDUL AZIZ, King of the Hejaz and Sultan of Nejd
and its Dependencies* "

Extract from the Moscow Newspaper "Izvestia"

16. It is strongly rumored that one of the chief of Ibn Saud's Wahabi ulamas has gone to Medina with instructions to destroy the tombs of the Prophet's family. This lacks confirmation to date, but certainly the "Tomb of Eve," in Jeddah, has had the dome destroyed and people are no longer allowed to worship thereat. But there is, as will at once be realized a big difference between the tomb of a very real mythical lady and the tombs of the family of the Prophet.

17. The arrangements for the pilgrimage to Medina has been completed and are as follows. Pilgrims proceeding from Mecca travel the whole way by camel, touching at Rabigh on the coast en route. Pilgrims from Jeddah proceed by dhow from Jeddah to Rabigh and there join the various caravans from Mecca. Camel hire has been fixed at £2 instead of £16 under the late régime.

18. Another example of the Wahabi "Get back to the Prophet" principles occurred in Jeddah a few days ago. A thief who had been caught in the act had his hand cut off and the stump dipped in boiling oil, and was then put on display at the local market place as a warning to others.

19. The one great source of dissatisfaction in the Hejaz at the present is the absolute safety of the roads. Everywhere isolated groups of two or three pilgrims may be met with who go about quite unprotected and in perfect safety.

20. Owing to the scarcity of pilgrims, the financial situation is not brilliant and the Government is rather pressed for money. In order to prevent the corrupt, which exists in the financial departments, Ibn Saud has recently appointed a certain ~~Mr. [Name]~~ ^{Mr. [Name]} ~~to [Position]~~ ^{to [Position]} ~~who~~ ^{who} ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~known~~ ^{known} ~~for~~ ^{for} ~~his~~ ^{his} ~~honesty~~ ^{honesty} ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~his~~ ^{his} ~~zeal~~ ^{zeal} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~discharge~~ ^{discharge} ~~of~~ ^{of} ~~his~~ ^{his} ~~duties~~ ^{duties} ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~who~~ ^{who} ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~known~~ ^{known} ~~for~~ ^{for} ~~his~~ ^{his} ~~honesty~~ ^{honesty} ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~his~~ ^{his} ~~zeal~~ ^{zeal} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~discharge~~ ^{discharge} ~~of~~ ^{of} ~~his~~ ^{his} ~~duties~~ ^{duties} ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~who~~ ^{who} ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~known~~ ^{known} ~~for~~ ^{for} ~~his~~ ^{his} ~~honesty~~ ^{honesty} ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~his~~ ^{his} ~~zeal~~ ^{zeal} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~discharge~~ ^{discharge} ~~of~~ ^{of} ~~his~~ ^{his} ~~duties~~ ^{duties} ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~who~~ ^{who} ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~known~~ ^{known} ~~for~~ ^{for} ~~his~~ ^{his} ~~honesty~~ ^{honesty} ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~his~~ ^{his} ~~zeal~~ ^{zeal} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~discharge~~ ^{discharge} ~~of~~ ^{of} ~~his~~ ^{his} ~~duties~~ ^{duties} ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~who~~ ^{who} ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~known~~ ^{known} ~~for~~ ^{for} ~~his~~ ^{his} ~~honesty~~ ^{honesty} ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~his~~ ^{his} ~~zeal~~ ^{zeal} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~discharge~~ ^{discharge} ~~of~~ ^{of} ~~his~~ ^{his} ~~duties~~ ^{duties} ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~who~~ ^{who} ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~known~~ ^{known} ~~for~~ ^{for} ~~his~~ ^{his} ~~honesty~~ ^{honesty} ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~his~~ ^{his} ~~zeal~~ ^{zeal} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~discharge~~ ^{discharge} ~~of~~ ^{of} ~~his~~ ^{his} ~~duties~~ ^{duties} ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~who~~ ^{who} ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~known~~ ^{known} ~~for~~ ^{for} ~~his~~ ^{his} ~~honesty~~ ^{honesty} ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~his~~ ^{his} ~~zeal~~ ^{zeal} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~discharge~~ ^{discharge} ~~of~~ ^{of} ~~his~~ ^{his} ~~duties~~ ^{duties} ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~who~~ ^{who} ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~known~~ ^{known} ~~for~~ ^{for} ~~his~~ ^{his} ~~honesty~~ ^{honesty} ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~his~~ ^{his} ~~zeal~~ ^{zeal} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~discharge~~ ^{discharge} ~~of~~ ^{of} ~~his~~ ^{his} ~~duties~~ ^{duties} ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~who~~ ^{who} ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~known~~ ^{known} ~~for~~ ^{for} ~~his~~ ^{his} ~~honesty~~ ^{honesty} ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~his~~ ^{his} ~~zeal~~ ^{zeal} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~discharge~~ ^{discharge} ~~of~~ ^{of} ~~his~~ ^{his} ~~duties~~ ^{duties} ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~who~~ ^{who} ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~known~~ ^{known} ~~for~~ ^{for} ~~his~~ ^{his} ~~honesty~~ ^{honesty} ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~his~~ ^{his} ~~zeal~~ ^{zeal} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~discharge~~ ^{discharge} ~~of~~ ^{of} ~~his~~ ^{his} ~~duties~~ ^{duties} ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~who~~ ^{who} ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~known~~ ^{known} ~~for~~ ^{for} ~~his~~ ^{his} ~~honesty~~ ^{honesty} ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~his~~ ^{his} ~~zeal~~ ^{zeal} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~discharge~~ ^{discharge} ~~of~~ ^{of} ~~his~~ ^{his} ~~duties~~ ^{duties} ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~who~~ ^{who} ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~known~~ ^{known} ~~for~~ ^{for} ~~his~~ ^{his} ~~honesty~~ ^{honesty} ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~his~~ ^{his} ~~zeal~~ ^{zeal} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~discharge~~ ^{discharge} ~~of~~ ^{of} ~~his~~ ^{his} ~~duties~~ ^{duties} ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~who~~ ^{who} ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~known~~ ^{known} ~~for~~ ^{for} ~~his~~ ^{his} ~~honesty~~ ^{honesty} ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~his~~ ^{his} ~~zeal~~ ^{zeal} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~discharge~~ ^{discharge} ~~of~~ ^{of} ~~his~~ ^{his} ~~duties~~ ^{duties} ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~who~~ ^{who} ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~known~~ ^{known} ~~for~~ ^{for} ~~his~~ ^{his} ~~honesty~~ ^{honesty} ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~his~~ ^{his} ~~zeal~~ ^{zeal} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~discharge~~ ^{discharge} ~~of~~ ^{of} ~~his~~ ^{his} ~~duties~~ ^{duties} ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~who~~ ^{who} ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~known~~ ^{known} ~~for~~ ^{for} ~~his~~ ^{his} ~~honesty~~ ^{honesty} ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~his~~ ^{his} ~~zeal~~ ^{zeal} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~discharge~~ ^{discharge} ~~of~~ ^{of} ~~his~~ ^{his} ~~duties~~ ^{duties} ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~who~~ ^{who} ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~known~~ ^{known} ~~for~~ ^{for} ~~his~~ ^{his} ~~honesty~~ ^{honesty} ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~his~~ ^{his} ~~zeal~~ ^{zeal} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~discharge~~ ^{discharge} ~~of~~ ^{of} ~~his~~ ^{his} ~~duties~~ ^{duties} ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~who~~ ^{who} ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~known~~ ^{known} ~~for~~ ^{for} ~~his~~ ^{his} ~~honesty~~ ^{honesty} ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~his~~ ^{his} ~~zeal~~ ^{zeal} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~discharge~~ ^{discharge} ~~of~~ ^{of} ~~his~~ ^{his} ~~duties~~ ^{duties} ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~who~~ ^{who} ~~is~~ ^{is}

31 Commendable progress is being made by Messrs. Mirless Watson and Co., with the condenser and it is hoped to be completed by about the 26th May.

22 During the feast of Bairan the usual courtesies were made and returned and two deputations, one of the Tukurais and the other of the Hausa residents of Jeridah took the opportunity of calling at the agency to express their sentiments of loyalty to the British Empire.

23. The number of pilgrims who have arrived in the Hejaz to date may be roughly estimated at 11,500, and over and above there are about 5,000 on their way from India.

24. One slave has been repatriated during the period under report.

S. R. JORDAN

IT reached us from the office of His Majesty's representative that the Royal Order was issued approving the following —

We as the general assembly and being entitled to impose punishments on evil doers and in order to keep the commands of God carried out and not disobeyed, have issued the following orders to purify the holy place of God from sinners :-

- 1 Anybody who intentionally does not pray "jamaah" (with the party) will be imprisoned from twenty four hours to ten days and will be fined a certain amount of money
- 2 Anybody who drinks liquors will be punished according to the Shariatul law in this respect and will be imprisoned from one month to six months and fined a certain amount of money, and in case he continues doing so he will be exiled from the city of God for two years.

Anybody who makes liquors, sells them or prepares a place for drinking will be imprisoned from six months to two years and his place will be confiscated. If he commits this again he will be exiled from the holy city of God from two to three years.

- 4 As tobacco is a bad thing and is harmful for the body, money and mind, and as certain ulamas (learned men) said that it is forbidden, it is necessary to purify the holy places from such evil, and, therefore, anyone smoking openly will be imprisoned from twenty-four hours to three days and will be fined a certain amount of money.

Any meeting held for the purpose of circulating false rumours or conspiring against the policy of the Government its members will be imprisoned, from two years to five years or will be exiled from all the Hejaz.

- ii Anybody who helps to hide such criminals as mentioned in article 5 will be considered as partner and will be punished in the same way

- PS - 01, representative is the one in charge of seeing such rules carried out. These orders are to be put in force from the date of publication.

Acting Agent, Jeddah, to Sir Austin Chamberlain — (Received May 26)

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Jeddah, May 25 1926

and a telegram No 42 of 20th May

As treaty revision cannot take place before 1st June, Ibn Saud states that owing to conference and vulgrimage it is now impossible for him to enter into negotiations before 11th July.

Acting Agent, Jeddah (No 48 M), to Government of India.—(Re-printed to Foreign Office Received May 30)

(Telegraphia)

Sedalia, May 20, 1920

FOR telegram No 6538.

Sheikh Abdullah bin Blahid-a Nejdi and Grand Kadi of Hejaz proceeded to Medina and put question to ulama of that place asking if erection of building over the tomb and using the same as a mosque was not forbidden and prohibited. As a practice of Moslems rubbing themselves against tomb, lighting lamps, making water to ring and all these practices which are against earth as if they were

These are followed by long articles stating that these facts may annoy some people, but that they are in accordance with the Quran, and one should fear God. We are not for what men may say, as we are guided by truth. We wish to satisfy all people, but must first satisfy God.

Full article follows with monthly report

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Acting Agent, Jeddah.

No 43 and No 44)

(1) Ենթադրելով, որ

Foreign Office, May 31, 1926

R) VOIR telegram No. 52 of 4th May Hejaz aersul services

It is undesirable on political grounds that officer on active list of Royal Air Force should be seconded for such service. British civilian personnel, however, might possibly be available if engaged on personal contracts. Air Ministry are making close enquiries regarding suitable volunteers, pending receipt of full report from

His Majesty's Government are prepared to give Ibn Saud such assistance as they can in procuring necessary spare parts and refitting aeroplanes. In order to save time Air Ministry offer to supply spares from Egypt and to arrange for repair of two or three of remaining aircraft at Jeddah. Department of Overseas Trade can also be asked to take up matter with British manufacturers concerned through purchasing agents whom Ibn Saud is appointing. (End of R.)

While anxious to assist Ibn Saud to obtain necessary material for civilian services from British sources, it is not yet certain whether His Majesty's Government will be able to depart from their policy of refusing to grant export licences for war material consigned from United Kingdom to any independent ruler in Arabian Peninsula. You should therefore not broach this question with Ibn Saud at present stage, more especially as no definite request for war material appears yet to have been put forward by him.

155

The Marquess of Crewe to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 5.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Paris presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs respecting the reopening of the Hoja Railway.

Paris, June 4, 1926

Enclosure in No. 187

Note from French Ministry for Foreign Affairs, June 3, 1926

PAR une note en date du 23 mai dernier,* l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté britannique a bien voulu, en accusant réception au Ministère des Affaires étrangères de sa communication du 17 avril 1926, lui faire part des vues du Gouvernement britannique concernant la réorganisation du Chemin de Fer du Hedjaz et l'ouverture éventuelle de pourparlers avec le Sultan Ibn Séoud au sujet de la reprise du traité sur l'ensemble de ce

Le Ministre des Affaires étrangères, le Président du Comité de l'Angleterre qu'il partage entièrement l'avis exposé dans la note dont il s'agit quant à la reprise du service de la ligne de La Meque. Le Gouvernement de la République. Cette entente paraît particulièrement désirable à l'égard de la remise en service des sections de la ligne actuellement inutilisables, ainsi que des conditions auxquelles les deux Puissances mandataires pourraient négocier avec lui l'accord de la reprise du service du pèlerinage de La Meque. Il importe que cette dernière question ne soit abordée que lorsque toutes les dispositions auront été prises d'accord entre les deux Gouvernements, en vue d'assurer dans de bonnes conditions l'expédition de ces affaires situées dans les États sous mandat.

technique du réseau. Son rôle essentiel sera de veiller à la répartition sur l'ensemble de la ligne, dans l'intérêt des pèlerins musulmans, des bénéfices réalisés dans les diverses sections, et qui n'auront pas été absorbés par les dépenses d'exploitation, la majeure partie de ces bénéfices devant provenir, selon toutes prévisions, de la section syrienne, dont le bénéfice net annuel est à l'usage de tout projet de régénération du trafic à destination de l'Arabie. Il semble, d'ailleurs, qu'il n'y ait, pour le moment, aucun intérêt à hâter l'entrée en fonctions d'un organisme qui n'aura sa raison d'être que lorsque la ligne entière sera remise en service.

* See No. 14A.

Quant à la répartition équitable du matériel en vue de la section syrienne du Chemin de Fer du Hejaz, l'attention du Gouvernement de la République, et des autres, est adressée au Haut-Commissaire à Beyrouth en vue de faciliter la répartition équitable des représentants qualifiés des réseaux intéressés.

Le Ministère des Affaires étrangères ne manquera pas de tenir l'Ambassadeur à la hauteur de son rôle et des intérêts de la France.

Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Paris
le 3 juin 1926.

No. 158

Lord Lloyd to Sir Austen Chamberlain. (Received June 5)

(No. 27)

(Cable)

Cairo, June 4, 1926

THE PERSIAN Minister, under instructions, so I gather, from his Government, has approached me with a request that His Majesty's Government should bring pressure on the King of the Hejaz to prevent further destruction of sacred tombs at Medina. He referred to profound irritation which had been aroused in Persia by these acts of vandalism and to general belief in Moslem countries that the Sand was any of Great Britain, whose responsibility apart from consideration of the fact that the Moslems are a people of the East.

I referred to His Majesty's Government's traditional policy of non interference in Moslem religious affairs, and to the propriety of such a request being made to His Majesty's representative at Tehran rather than through me.

Persian Minister was, however, very insistent in view as he affirmed of imminent danger of destruction even of the tomb of the Prophet himself, which was now the only one still left intact.

No. 159

Sir P. Lucas to Sir Austen Chamberlain. (Received June 5)

(No. 137)

(Cable)

Tehran, June 3, 1926

REPORTED destruction of tombs at Medina by Wahabites and likelihood of further acts has aroused considerable indignation here especially as tombs are object of special veneration to Shiites, and religious pressure is being brought to bear on the Persian Government to take action. As you are aware, no Shah or Persian Government can ultimately ignore such pressure.

Circumstances here are now so altered that Shiite and religious hierarchy is without exception anti Bolshevik and pro-British. If therefore, His Majesty's Government felt themselves able to use influence possessed with Ibn Saud as a restraining force as regards these acts of vandalism and without prejudicing their well known policy of non intervention in Moslem religious affairs, and if I were enabled to let it be known that they are so doing, I believe the effect here would be good and beneficial.

(Sent to India)

E 3439 366 91

No. 160

Acting Consul Jordan to Sir Austen Chamberlain. (Received June 8)

(No. 62)

Sir

Jeddah, May 12, 1926

IN reference to the cable of the 1st inst. of my telegram No. 54 of today's date, relative to the Port Sudan-Jeddah cable I have the honour to report that I have discussed the matter with His Majesty the King of the Hejaz at Jeddah. I took the opportunity of discussing with His Majesty the proposed agreement concluded at Port Sudan relative to the disposal of the cable known as the Port Sudan-Jeddah cable.

2. His Majesty accepted the first agreement *en toto*, with the addition of the amount to be divided between the Hejaz and Sudan Governments in the second article of the agreement, which would now read as follows, the addition in no way altering the sense or scope of the article:—

"That the unexpended balance of £E 33 501 140 m/ms. standing to the credit," &c

3. With reference to the second agreement to be concluded between the joint owners and the Eastern Telegraph Company, I have to report that His Majesty agreed to articles 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 after lengthy discussions, but would not agree to article 6, as he seemed incapable of understanding the words "first refusal," and was unwilling to bind himself to buy such new telegraphic facilities as he may require in the future from the Eastern Telegraph Company.

4. His Majesty, after lengthy discussion, suggested that articles 6 and 8 should be deleted and the new article 6 should read:

"The Hejaz Government undertake not to use for foreign communications their own wireless or cables or the wireless or cables of any other company and the Eastern Telegraph Company, on its part, undertake to secure the communications by wireless in case the cable is out of order. Should the company refuse to do so, the Hejaz Government will be free to operate its own communications in any way it may find suitable for its interests during the period the cable is not working."

The above article assures the Eastern Telegraph Company of a monopoly of the Hejaz foreign communications and the company, I think, will accept it to that company.

Article 7 was accepted.

5. While not objecting to articles 9, 10 and 12, His Majesty expressed a desire that any future working arrangements between the Eastern Telegraph Company and the Hejaz Government should be such as to guarantee the full sovereignty of the Hejaz. It would be advisable for a representative of the Eastern Telegraph Company to come to Jeddah and, in collusion with the local authorities, agree to some form of a *modus operandi* agreeable and to the advantage of both parties.

7. I agreed with His Majesty's point of view, and would suggest that, if the Eastern Telegraph Company were to agree to the article 6 as amended, the company should send a representative to Jeddah as soon as possible.

8. His Majesty agreed to the remaining articles 11, 13 and 14.

9. Copies of this despatch are being sent to Cairo and Khartoum.

I have, &c
S. R. JORDAN

[E 3472, 900/91]

No. 161

Vice-Consul Jordan to Sir Austen Chamberlain. (Received June 7.)

(No. 65.)

Sir,

Jeddah, May 17, 1926

WITH reference to your despatch No. 48 of the 22nd April last, relative to the slave trade in the Hejaz, I have the honour to forward herewith a copy of a letter addressed to His Majesty the King of the Hejaz by me in pursuance of the instructions contained in your despatch under reference.

2. I enclose also a translation of his reply wherein he again insists that His Majesty's Government should abandon the right to manumit and repatriate slaves through the intermediary of this agency.

I have, &c
S. R. JORDAN

Enclosure 1 in No. 161

Copy of Letter from the Acting British Agent and Consul, Jeddah, to His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and Sultan of Nejd, Mecca, dated May 10, 1926.

(After respects.)

I HAVE been directed by His Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to inform Your Majesty that the conversations with myself on the subject of slavery in the Hejaz have been reported to Sir Austen Chamberlain, who has read of them with much interest. His Britannic Majesty's Secretary of State is greatly interested in the subject and is at present considering which your Majesty is adopting towards this question.

The Secretary of State recognises that the abolition of slavery in a country where it has been so long established is a matter of great importance and that the abolition of the slave trade and the prohibition of the importation of slaves into the Hejaz and Nejd.

His Britannic Majesty's Secretary of State has fully considered your Majesty's plea that the practice of slavery in the Hejaz should be abandoned, but he regrets that he cannot agree to this.

The practice of manumission is of long standing and is in no way derogatory to the sovereignty of the Kingdom of Hejaz, it is the contrary, and His Majesty's agent at Jeddah to assist your Majesty in your Majesty's declared intention of stamping out the slave trade.

It is quite impossible to exaggerate to your Majesty the great interest taken in the subject by the League of Nations, a committee of which has in the last year been considering this very question. I should also point out to your Majesty that the League was most unfavourably impressed by the conditions existing in the Hejaz in the former

Enclosure 2 in No. 161

Translation of Letter from Abdul Aziz ibn Abdul Rahman al-Faisal al-Saud, Mecca, to the Acting British Agent and Consul, Jeddah, dated Zil Qedah 1, 1344 (May 1, 1926).

(After respects.)

With reference to your letter of the 14th May, 1926, I inform your Excellency that I have been directed by His Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to inform your Excellency that the conversations with myself on the subject of slavery in the Hejaz have been reported to Sir Austen Chamberlain, who has read of them with much interest. His Britannic Majesty's Secretary of State is greatly interested in the subject and is at present considering which your Majesty is adopting towards this question. The Secretary of State recognises that the abolition of slavery in a country where it has been so long established is a matter of great importance and that the abolition of the slave trade and the prohibition of the importation of slaves into the Hejaz and Nejd. His Britannic Majesty's Secretary of State has fully considered your Majesty's plea that the practice of slavery in the Hejaz should be abandoned, but he regrets that he cannot agree to this. The practice of manumission is of long standing and is in no way derogatory to the sovereignty of the Kingdom of Hejaz, it is the contrary, and His Majesty's agent at Jeddah to assist your Majesty in your Majesty's declared intention of stamping out the slave trade. It is quite impossible to exaggerate to your Majesty the great interest taken in the subject by the League of Nations, a committee of which has in the last year been considering this very question. I should also point out to your Majesty that the League was most unfavourably impressed by the conditions existing in the Hejaz in the former

It is regretted that no more sacrifice can be done in this respect. With best greetings.

No. 62

Acting Agent, Jeddah, (No. 52 M) to Government of India (Foreign Department) — (Repeated to Foreign Office, Received June 9)

(No. 63)

(Telegraphic)

Jeddah (via Port Said) 14.5.26

Situation in Mecca is quiet. Practically the whole of the Indian pilgrims are under the protection of the British authorities. The Wahabi persecution from India and Egypt have split with local Wahabis on religious question. Ibn Saud

in opening speech at the conference yesterday, forbade all discussion other than that of a religious nature.

Sanallah of Amri (Tasr) is endeavouring to bring about co-operation of Ali's brothers with (B.)

I understand that a last-minute private conference of Egyptian and Indian Caliphists decided to combine forces at conference.

Anti-of-the-East movement and pan-Arabism is receiving a great deal of attention in private discussions outside.

Ibn Saud appears to be endeavouring to utilise conference to consolidate his position. He is at present endeavouring to secure the construction of a railway scheme, railway from Jeddah to Mecca and erection of accommodation at (Me)na and Arafat. Full report follows as soon as possible.

No. 163

Sir W. Tyrrell (for the Secretary of State) to Sir P. Lornans (Tehran)

(No. 85)

Telegraphic

Foreign Office, June 9, 1926

Subject: Destruction of tomb at Medina

I have been directed by His Majesty's Government to inform you that the Government of India are pursuing a policy of neutrality in the present circumstances. Modern religious affairs is unquestionably wise course to maintain. Moreover, our influence with Ibn Saud is not a consideration on which we can rely. In these circumstances it would be both unwise and unsafe to abandon policy of neutrality, especially as we could not ensure success for our interference.

No. 164

Acting Agent, Jeddah, to Sir Austen Chamberlain. — (Received June 10)

(No. 64)

(Telegraphic)

Jeddah, June 9, 1926

At the conference held under the presidency of Sir Austen Chamberlain, Sultan Nader, president of Indian Caliphists, and Ziauddin, head of Soviet Moslem delegation, were elected vice-presidents.

Governor of Jeddah yesterday called to inform me that Soviet Moslem delegation has no connection whatever with Bolshevik Government, and was concerned with religious questions only. I have no doubt but that he was acting under instructions from Ibn Saud, who for the moment is endeavouring to propitiate all parties.

Pan-Islamism is receiving much attention, but Sulaiman Nader stated confidentially to a friend that, owing to fanaticism of Wahabis, Indians could not co-operate with them at present.

The more fanatical Wahabis are endeavouring to force Ibn Saud to destroy the dome of the Prophet's tomb before the arrival of the pilgrims at Medina after Mecca pilgrimage.

(to India)

E 3638 3472 91]

No. 165

Acting Consul Jordan to Sir Austen Chamberlain. — (Received June 11)

(No. 72)

Sir,

Jeddah, May 28, 1926

WITH reference to my despatch No. 68 of the 17th instant relative to capitulatory rights in the Hejaz, I have the honour to state that my Italian colleague recently requested that a meeting of the foreign representatives, with the exception of the Soviet agent, should be called to discuss the question of foreign capitulatory rights, view of certain difficulties which had arisen between an Egyptian and Italian subject.

[150:6]

R 2

2. It appears that an Italian at present residing in Jeddah in connection with the concession for the railway between Jeddah and Mecca had struck an agreement with the concessionaries by the concessionaries.

3. The Egyptian thereupon complained to his consul, who put the matter before the Sharia courts, and the Italian was arrested and placed in prison.

4. The Italian consul, as soon as he became aware of this, complained to the kaimakam in writing and requested the release of the man on his guarantee. The man was released and the kaimakam forwarded the Italian consul's letter to His Majesty the King of the Hejaz, who wrote a letter to my Italian colleague in which the following passage occurs:—

"You will realize that these places are holy places and the Sharia (religious) laws of all countries are in force here. It is not possible to oppress by another in general dealings, and that the Government do not recognize Capitulations for foreigners in such places. There is no difference between one person and another in the eyes of justice."

5. At the meeting it was decided that, pending instructions from our respective Governments, we would continue to consider capitulatory rights as in existence.

6. Prior to the meeting my Italian colleague had called on the *gérant* of the Egyptian consulate and requested that the matter should be settled between the consulates and withdrawn from the religious courts in order to avoid difficulties. This the *gérant* of the Egyptian consulate refused to do, and the Italian consul then requested me to act as intermediary between them and endeavour to settle the matter.

7. I thereupon requested the *gérant* of the Egyptian consulate to see me in my office and after some explanation he agreed to withdraw the case from the courts. This, in fact, was done and, following a series of reciprocal apologies, the matter was dropped.

8. I shall be glad to be informed what attitude I should adopt towards the Hejaz Government as regards the question of capitulatory rights.

9. A copy of this despatch is being sent to India.

I have, &c.

S. R. JORDAN

(E 3657, 43 91)

No. 166

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—Received June 15.)

Sir,

Dunsmuir Street, June 14, 1926.

I AM directed by Mr Secretary Amery to refer to the letter from this Department of the 30th April, forwarding a copy of a telegram addressed to the High Commissioner for Palestine regarding the establishment of the tribunal provided for in article 1 of the Hadda Agreement, and to inform you that no difficulty will arise in securing suitable persons to represent the Government of Transjordan.

I am to request that, if Sir Austen Chamberlain sees no objection, His Majesty's agent at Jeddah may be requested to ascertain the attitude of Ibn Saud towards the proposal to nominate a British officer as president of the tribunal, since it is not clear from Ibn Saud's letter of the 15th April, a copy of which accompanied your letter of the 17th May, what are his real views on this point.

I am, &c.

J. E. SHUCKBURGH

Enclosure in No. 166.

Lord Plumer to Mr. Amery.

(Confidential. C.)

May 28, 1926

I HAVE the honour to refer to your telegram No. 126 of the 24th April 1926, in the subject of the establishment of the tribunal provided for in article 1 of the Hadda Agreement, and to inform you that no difficulty will arise in securing suitable persons to represent the Government of Transjordan.

2. The selection of a president acceptable to both parties is not, however, so simple a matter if the choice is confined to Arabs. The chief British representative has advocated as a solution the appointment of a British officer in that capacity.

3. In view of the fact that the British representative is a person of high standing who is not likely to be interested in litigation brought before the court, and who will be unobjectionable to both Governments, I suggest for your consideration that His Britannic Majesty's consul and agent, Jeddah, should approach the Sultan of Nejd in order to ascertain his attitude towards the proposal to nominate a British president.

4. A copy of this despatch is being forwarded to His Majesty's consul and agent, Jeddah, for his information.

I have, &c.

PLUMER, F.M.

High Commissioner

No. 67

Mr Phipps to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 17)

(No. 218)

By Bag]

Paris, June 16, 1926

(Telegraphic)

FOLLOWING from British delegation.—

At plenary sitting of conference this morning, Persian delegate, in spite of decision of Second Committee reported in Mr Bullard's letter to Mr Oliphant of 9th June, read declaration claiming that article 82 (which becomes No 90 in final text of convention), should be omitted, as it consecrated a system which was humiliating for Persia and was unjustifiable on technical grounds.

The President pointed out that this was really a political and not a technical question. He called upon British and Persian delegations to agree together upon text which could be adopted on Friday, when final sitting of conference will take place.

Subsequent discussion with Persian delegate made it clear that his instructions, or what he pretended to be his instructions, precluded him from agreeing to anything in the nature of article 82 in a form which would be of any use to us in justifying maintenance of present system.

In these circumstances it was felt that it would be idle to attempt further negotiations with Persian delegate, who had sprung his mine so late as to make it practically impossible to obtain fresh instructions or start negotiations at Tehran before conference breaks up. After consultation with Mr Malkin and Indian delegation we reached conclusion that in last resort we could agree to following article instead of article 82 if conference, including Persian delegate, agreed:—

"La ce qui concerne les modalités de l'application, dans les ports persans du golfe Persique, du régime sanitaire résultant du titre 1^{er} de la présente Convention, les modifications à apporter au régime actuel feront l'objet d'un accord à intervenir entre les Gouvernements persan et britannique."

M. Barrère, to whom situation has been explained, is going to endeavour to persuade Persian delegate to accept above formula. If he refuses, M. Barrère will suggest that he should sign convention containing article 82 with reservation that his Government will withhold ratification pending adjustment of question by diplomatic negotiations with His Majesty's Government. This would leave Persia bound by 1912 Convention until such time as she had reached an agreement with Great Britain.

"We will report further developments."

Acting Consul, Jeddah, to Sir Austen Chamberlain.-(Received June 20)

(No 82)

(Telegraphic)

Jeddah, June 19, 1926

MY telegrams Nos. 63 and 64

Mecca Conference has officially adjourned until three days after completion of Hajj. It is considered probable that no further meetings will take place.

Main objectives were -

1. Secure possession of all Aukaf ul Haramain moneys for improvement of Hejaz
2. Claim Hejaz Railway from French and British authorities, and in case of refusal refer the matter to League of Nations (your telegram No. 15 refers). Resolutions were passed in favour of both motions.

Situation in Mecca is critical, and pilgrims are (group undecipherable) except d... situation may be cited the fact that practically three-quarters of cameldrivers have returned to their homes as they are afraid of trouble during Hajj and not more than 8,000 remain in Mecca to transport pilgrims to and from Arafat. Water is scarce at Mecca, and sickness very prevalent, but no epidemics of a serious nature to date.

(Sent to India)

(E 3790 367 91)

No 169

Vice Consul Jordan to Sir Austen Chamberlain.-(Received June 21)

(No 75. Secret.)

Jeddah, June 1, 1926

1. I HAVE the honour to forward herewith my report on the situation in the Hejaz during the Hajj season of 1926.

2. Copies of this report are being sent to Egypt, Jerusalem (2), Bagdad, Amman, Beirut, for Deir ez Zor, Kh... and... I have &c

S. R. JORDAN

Enclosure 1 in No. 169

Jeddah Report for the Period May 1-31, 1926

(Secret)

OWING to the arrival of many pilgrims in the Hejaz for the approaching pilgrimage, and the necessity of attending to the conference called by Ibn Saud to discuss ways and means of ensuring peace in the Hejaz and the comfort and safety of pilgrims to the Holy Land, the political situation both internal and external during the period under report has been interesting.

2. Internally the situation presents certain difficulties the chief of which is no doubt the dissatisfaction of many of the more fanatical tribes of the Hejaz at the attitude of Ibn Saud towards the questions of wine, gambling, and other such things which are rigorously excluded from the Wahabi faith, as such were not practised by the Prophet.

3. Ibn Saud's brother Mohammed, who is a fanatical Wahabi and married to the daughter of the Emir of the Hejaz, recently left Mecca in great anger and joined his father-in-law.

4. In order to appease these unruly elements which are actually his main power and support, Ibn Saud was obliged to adopt a more drastic policy, and so sent the Grand Kadi of the Hejaz, a certain Sheikh Abdullah Bileibed, to Medina to attend to the destruction of the tombs of the Prophet's family.

The Grand Kadi eventually persuaded seventeen of the ulama of Medina that the tombs were destroyed. I attach hereto a copy of the fetva with the names of the signatories, as published in the Mecca newspaper "Umm-al Kura," together with a long article on the same subject by the editor,* but inspired, if not actually written by Ibn Saud himself.

5. Information from Medina would indicate that a certain amount of dissatisfaction is manifesting itself amongst the population of that town, and many of the ulama are naturally in disgrace, and it is considered possible that they may be prevented from continuing their religious functions.

Smoking has also been forbidden, in public, as has also the playing of music and other pastimes as the time when devout Moslems should be calling upon Allah instead of amusing themselves.

6. The Wahabi contentions in this respect has recently received a great set forward on account of a fetva issued by the religious heads in Cairo in respect of the Mahmal.

Ibn Saud again forced by his fanatics was not prepared to allow the Mahmal to proceed to Mecca, and the Egyptian Government has been obliged to comply with their demands. They were as follows -

- (1) No music to accompany the Mahmal after Jeddah
- (2) No smoking in public
- (3) No circumambulating or worship of tombs

The Egyptian Government referred these matters to their religious heads and a fetva was issued in consequence stating that these conditions were in accordance with the Koran or traditions, and the Mahmal and pilgrims should proceed. I attach hereto a copy of the fetva, together with the comments thereon by the "Umm-al Kura."

This action on the part of the Egyptian authorities has undoubtedly given Wahabism a great boost, and the far reaching effects of the fetva cannot at present be estimated. But certainly it will mean a consolidation of the Wahabi regime in the Hejaz, and will be a great help to Ibn Saud in his present position.

7. The conference which is to be held in Mecca under the auspices of Ibn Saud is to meet on the 1st June, and as far as I have been able to ascertain, and from the tone of the article regarding the Egyptian fetva in the "Umm-al Kura," the work of the conference will be chiefly the dissemination of Wahabi propaganda and a religious discussion on these points.

8. The Egyptian Government has already been asked to by the present Government, and I gather that they are not prepared to enter into any discussion as to any sort of divided control of the Holy Places, though a committee composed of representatives of the various elements of the Moslem world may be elected to advise the Hejaz Government on certain points relating to the pilgrimage.

9. The Ghut Ghut tribe referred to above muster perhaps 5,000 fighting men and are recognised throughout the Hejaz as the most fanatical and savage of the Arabian peninsula. They are closely allied with the Dukhama, another fanatical tribe, and with assistance from the Arabs around Khurma and Tarata are forcing Ibn Saud to put into effect all the Wahabi tenets. Should he fail to do so these tribes are capable of associating with the Imam of Yemen, or anybody else for that matter, and conspiring at the overthrow of Ibn Saud, whom they openly called an infidel. Ibn Saud's recent actions in Medina and Jeddah will undoubtedly have a great effect on the Ghut Ghut, but they are nevertheless clamouring for Ibn Saud to return to Riyadh and attend to the internal matters of Nejd which apparently have not been so flourishing since his departure two years ago.

Just before Ibn Saud took steps to satisfy their incessant demands for a more strict enforcement of their religious principles this tribe looted a camel train of

* Not printed.

900 bags of rice being transported from Haama to Riyadh as, so they said, Ibn Saud had not sent them any food for months.

11. The trouble would now appear to have blown over, and unless some fanatical Indians or Bokharis become annoyed at the destruction of the various tombs the pilgrimage should pass off without any incidents. In order to lessen the possibility of trouble Ibn Saud has as far as possible refused permission for his own people to make the pilgrimage this year.

12. A further incident of some importance recently was the arrest of Sherif Mohsen-el-Munsur, uncle of the late King of the Hejaz, and one of the intriguers who nearly delivered the Hejaz garrison and town into the hands of the Wahabists some months back. Sherif Mohsen is practically the head of the Harb and Bilal tribes in the Hejaz, and as such had a certain amount of influence. Three days after his arrest and departure for Riyadh thirty four other Hejazis were arrested and sent to Taif, where they are to be tried for treason. Prominent amongst these latter is Said Ahmed Saggof once the private secretary and Lord Chamberlain of King Ali. This party had apparently been holding secret conclaves and conspiring for the overthrow of the Wahabi régime. Certain threatening correspondence addressed to persons in Egypt and the Yemen is supposed to have been intercepted and the plot discovered in this manner. I have not been able to ascertain the details of this matter to date but hope to do so later. A list of the arrested persons is attached.

13. It appears from information received from Mecca that certain Indian and Javanese pilgrims are availing themselves of the opportunity of openly expressing to the mass of Moslems gathered in Mecca their ideas of external politics, and it is feared that some of them are offending even their own people by their frankness.

Probably the worst in this respect is an Indian, by name Maulvi Sana Ullah of Amritsar, who loses no opportunity of addressing meetings and expounding his views at the gathered assemblies. He is apparently extremely anti British and continually exhorting the world's Moslems to throw off the Christian oppressors and be free. He has been given a number of the Indian pilgrims, and a certain amount of discontent at his utterances is becoming manifest.

14. Several other persons of various sects of Islam, as have several other persons of minor importance.

15. A Javanese by the name of Tinkorominto, President of the Haramat ul Ikhwan of Netherlands East India has also been very prominent and is most active in the propaganda of the world's Moslems to throw off the Christian oppressors and be free. He has been given a number of the Indian pilgrims, and a certain amount of discontent at his utterances is becoming manifest.

Haji Rasool, editor of the "Al Manar," Padang.

Pakeh Jenan-bun Taib, or Jenan Taib, editor of the "Seman Azhar," and others.

It is confidently stated that these persons are about to make a determined attempt to promote and further their cause in the Federated Malay States.

16. The Ali brothers, Mohammed Ali and Shaukat Ali, recently arrived from India and were met by the Governor and Mayor of Jeddah under instructions from the King. They were taken to the palace and stayed for some days in Mecca. They had no official reception, but they were allowed to see the King and to see the Grand Kaaba. They were also allowed to see the various shrines and tombs in Mecca. They were also allowed to see the various shrines and tombs in Mecca. They were also allowed to see the various shrines and tombs in Mecca.

17. A further incident of some importance recently was the arrest of Sherif Mohsen-el-Munsur, uncle of the late King of the Hejaz, and one of the intriguers who nearly delivered the Hejaz garrison and town into the hands of the Wahabists some months back. Sherif Mohsen is practically the head of the Harb and Bilal tribes in the Hejaz, and as such had a certain amount of influence. Three days after his arrest and departure for Riyadh thirty four other Hejazis were arrested and sent to Taif, where they are to be tried for treason. Prominent amongst these latter is Said Ahmed Saggof once the private secretary and Lord Chamberlain of King Ali. This party had apparently been holding secret conclaves and conspiring for the overthrow of the Wahabi régime. Certain threatening correspondence addressed to persons in Egypt and the Yemen is supposed to have been intercepted and the plot discovered in this manner. I have not been able to ascertain the details of this matter to date but hope to do so later. A list of the arrested persons is attached.

18. Most of the pan-Islam and anti-Christian fanatics who are always cursing the white man's domination are classed as Communists by the local people, but this appellation is entirely erroneous. That they would avail themselves of genuine communistic ideas, teachings or money, is undoubtedly a fact, but only as a furtherance to their own ideas and ambitions.

* Not printed

19. A communistic Moslem delegation from Russia has accepted Ibn Saud's invitation to the Mecca Conference, and is headed by one Dhiseddin bin-Farideddin, chief of the Central Religious Ministry.

20. I now learn that the Mecca Conference has been postponed for five days to allow this Soviet Moslem delegation sufficient time to reach Mecca. It will be after their arrival that the real propaganda may be expected.

21. The local attitude regarding the Yemen is one of constant watchfulness, but I am inclined to consider that the big pilgrimage from Egypt and the letva issued therewith will, besides the effects already mentioned above, react adversely to the Imam in this respect also, and may possibly be the deathblow to the intrigues of the old régime and the orthodox Moslems, who, being dissatisfied with the Wahabists, were endeavouring to persuade the Imam to attack.

22. The attitude of the Moslems towards the existence of the Communists in the Hejaz was one of constant watchfulness, but I am inclined to consider that the big pilgrimage from Egypt and the letva issued therewith will, besides the effects already mentioned above, react adversely to the Imam in this respect also, and may possibly be the deathblow to the intrigues of the old régime and the orthodox Moslems, who, being dissatisfied with the Wahabists, were endeavouring to persuade the Imam to attack.

23. A further advance in the way of administration has been made by Ibn Saud who has caused to be appointed in all the principal towns of the Hejaz an advisory council of Moslems. These councils will be elected by the Moslems of each town. Their duties will be to advise the Imam on all matters of local importance. This name implies, but, further, certain of them are to be elected as representatives to proceed to Mecca to discuss questions of policy when the necessity arises.

24. The pilgrims continue to arrive daily, and with the advent of the Mahmal about 17,000 pilgrims are expected from Egypt. It would appear as if not less than 100,000 pilgrims will arrive in the Hejaz this year. The season which, on account of the short notice, is exceptionally good and will give the Hejaz finances an opportunity to recover from the effects of the war. Approximately 30,500 pilgrims have arrived to date.

25. The Egyptian Government have recently appointed a new Egyptian consul at Jeddah, by name Emin Bey Tewfik, lately at Lyons in France.

26. The motor concession is now in full swing and recently acquired twenty-five Ford cars from Egypt which ply between Mecca and Jeddah. Forty chauffeurs and mechanics were brought from Egypt to work the service, but many of these have found the conditions and climate of Jeddah too severe, and have broken their contracts and returned. Local drivers have been engaged to replace them.

27. The condenser is nearing completion and it is hoped to start supplying water at an early date.

28. Eight slaves have been repatriated during the period under report.

S. R. JORDAN

Enclosure 2 in No. 169.

Extract from the Mecca Newspaper "Ism-al-Aura," No. 69, dated April 30, 1926.

THE FRANK STATEMENT

It reached us from our correspondent at Medina that the Grand Kaaba of the Hejaz Sherif Abdullah bin Baid after his arrival at Medina had an interview with the learned men of the city, discussed with them many matters and asked them some questions to which they answered very distinctly.

The following is the text of the questions and the answers.

In the name of God the Most Merciful the Most Gracious.

What have the learned men of Medina may God enlighten them and increase their knowledge got to say about the building over the tombs and using same as mosques. Is it allowable or not? It was not allowable and prohibited and strictly forbidden. Should it be demolished and praying there prevented or not? And if the building is a place for the burial of the dead where the building prevents using the space built over, is it an unlawful thing and should it be removed because of the

oppression it brings on the deservants or not? And are the actions which the ignorant people do at the tombs, like rubbing themselves against them, and kissing them, and going round them, and other things, approved or prohibited? And this is the question which I have asked you to answer, and I have asked you to answer it in a way which will be of service to the people, and I have asked you to answer it in a way which will be of service to the Government, and I have asked you to answer it in a way which will be of service to the State.

Please give us a ruling in these respects and mention the proofs supporting same.

Answer

We say, and pray God may grant us success, that building on tombs is forbidden as agreed upon by the learned men, and it is a tradition of the Prophet, and this many learned men gave a ruling to the effect that it should be pulled down. This is supported by the tradition of the Prophet, and the tradition of the learned men, and the tradition of the State. And we say, and pray God may grant us success, that building on tombs is forbidden as agreed upon by the learned men, and it is a tradition of the Prophet, and this many learned men gave a ruling to the effect that it should be pulled down. This is supported by the tradition of the Prophet, and the tradition of the learned men, and the tradition of the State.

As to the using of the tombs as mosques and praying in them, it is absolutely forbidden, and it is a tradition of the Prophet, and the tradition of the learned men, and the tradition of the State. And we say, and pray God may grant us success, that building on tombs is forbidden as agreed upon by the learned men, and it is a tradition of the Prophet, and this many learned men gave a ruling to the effect that it should be pulled down. This is supported by the tradition of the Prophet, and the tradition of the learned men, and the tradition of the State.

The things which the ignorant people do at tombs, like rubbing themselves against them, and kissing them, and going round them, and other things, are all forbidden, and it is a tradition of the Prophet, and the tradition of the learned men, and the tradition of the State. And we say, and pray God may grant us success, that building on tombs is forbidden as agreed upon by the learned men, and it is a tradition of the Prophet, and this many learned men gave a ruling to the effect that it should be pulled down. This is supported by the tradition of the Prophet, and the tradition of the learned men, and the tradition of the State.

As to turning towards the tomb of the Prophet, may prayers and peace of God be upon him, it is known from the ancient religious books, and because the best direction is that which is towards the "Kibla". To go round about it or to rub the body against it and to kiss it is absolutely forbidden.

The "Taxkir, tarbeem and tarleem" are something new.

This is what we know as far as we can understand. And every learned man has got a superior to him.

Signatures

MUHAMMAD BIN SA'ID
MUHAMMAD BIN MAHMOUD EL AZHARI
MOHAMMED ZAKI
MAHMOUD SULEIMAN
MUHAMMAD BIN ALI EL TURKI
MAHMOUD EL TAYEB
SADDIK SAID
MUHAMMAD EL HASSEMI
HUSEIN EL BAZI
GHAZI KUTUB
HUSEIN EL GHOTH
KUTUB EL MOHAMMED
HASSEMI EL TURKI
MUHAMMAD EL TURKI
ASSAD KAMAKHI
HAMAD-BIN TAYY
MUHAMMED-BIN SAKI

Dated 25th Ramadan, 1344.

Enclosure 3 in No. 169.

Extract from the Mecca Newspaper "Lum al-Kura," No 73, dated May 28, 1926.

RULING OF THE LEARNED MEN OF EGYPT. VISITING THE TOMBS, TOBACCO AND MUSIC

His Excellency the Sub-Minister of Interior

THE contents of your Excellency's letter of the 10th May, 1926, No. 91 (Administration), are noted as well as the enclosed copy of telegram received from His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and Sultan of Nejd to His Excellency the Minister of the Interior of Egypt, requesting information as to the religious rules regarding the points of the telegram and as to what should be followed this year about the pilgrimage with a view to what His Majesty King Ibn Saud indicated.

On consideration we found that the points about which a decision can be given are those of paragraphs 6 and 7 regarding visiting tombs, music and tobacco.

As regards visiting tombs, we say that it is religiously approved as the Prophet may peace and prayer of God be upon him, said "I had prevented you from visiting the tombs, but now I say visit them."

The Prophet used to visit the tombs of the Moslems at Baken-el Gharkad and say, "Peace be upon you as you have kept patient and blessed is the consequence of that dwelling."

A certain Mahshi Imdad-el Fittah has copied out from the "Kahdani" the following (at El Ehtia). The preferred course of visiting tombs is that one should stand towards the "Kibla" to say salaams and should not rub the grave, neither should he kiss it or touch it.

The learned men explained many things which are disliked when tombs are being visited. They summarized the same by their saying "And also everything that is not known of the Sunna" which is a general rule by which any action not known of the Sunna can be compared. They gave as examples, the touching and kissing. It is known that going round other than the "Kibla" is not of the Sunna.

As regards smoking of tobacco, we say that it is disliked, and it is a tradition of the Prophet, may peace and prayer of God be upon him, neither was it existing in the time of the Prophet, nor was it existing in the late centuries.

The learned men differed very much about it. Some of them said that it is prohibited relying on a tradition of Ahmed related by Om Salma to the effect that the Prophet prohibited using anything which makes one drunk or weak, and said that if it is not intoxicating it causes weakness. They further stated that, according to the religious rules, if the Master prohibited a permitted thing for a religious interest it should be prohibited.

Some of them stated that it is a disliked thing owing to the apparent danger it causes to bodies and loss of money.

Some others did not think that it caused weakness, so they allowed it according to the general rule which is "things are either permitted or forbidden." They replied to those who said that it is prohibited or disliked by saying that such are two religious rulings which cannot be proved without evidence and it did not exist.

It appears that the most reasonable of such sayings is the one which says that it is disliked. So it ought to be left out and not used, as small things turn out great.

As regards playing and hearing of music, it is a play, pleasure and waste of time the thing which is prohibited. For our learned men said that it is a disliked thing to play, dance, clap or to play on musical instruments which are all prohibited. The only thing permitted is the "daff" (drum) in marriages and religious ceremonies.

We think it better that our Government should facilitate pilgrimage for the Moslems.

Salaams and respects.

MUHAMMAD ABU-EL FADHI
Shrikk of El Azhar Mosque
ABDUL RAHMAN KURRA-A
Mufti of Egypt

Dated May 12, 1926 (29 10 1344).

No. 39 fetras, p. 10, book 28

[E 3811/80, 91]

No. 170

British Delegation, International Sanitary Conference, to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 22)

(No. 11.)
Sir,

*British Delegation, International Sanitary Conference,
Paris, June 21, 1926*

WE have the honour to transmit to you herewith the signed and sealed duplicate (British) of the Agreement in regard to Kamaran and the signed duplicate of the same for the Netherlands East Indies. The signature of these instruments took place in His Majesty's Palace at The Hague on June 19, 1926. We were advised that it was necessary to omit the seals on the duplicate of the Agreement in this view, the seals were omitted.

Spare copies of the instruments have been given to the Netherlands and Indian delegations.

The Netherlands signatories were furnished with special full powers, which, as they were not required in connection with the conference they gave to us and which we now transmit for retention in the Foreign Office.

We have, &c
G. S. BUCHANAN
JOHN MURRAY

Enclosure I in No. 170

Anglo-Dutch Agreement regarding Kamaran

The Governments of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of India of the one part and the Government of the Netherlands for the Netherlands and for the Netherlands East Indies of the other part recognizing that the treatment of pilgrims from the South Arabian Islands is a matter of common concern and desiring to secure the health of pilgrims and to prevent the spread of infectious diseases.

Have agreed upon the following provisions:

Measures to be applied on Pilgrim Ships and at the Quarantine Station

1. The British and Indian Governments of the one part and the Netherlands Government for the Netherlands and for the Netherlands East Indies of the other part agree that the measures prescribed in the Schedule to this Agreement shall be applied with effect from the date on which this Agreement enters into force, pending the ratification of the revised International Sanitary Convention on behalf of India and the Netherlands East Indies.

Internal Organization

2. The Civil Administrator of the Island of Kamaran appointed by the Government of India shall be the Director of the Quarantine Station, and in that capacity shall exercise general supervision and control over the whole staff of the station. He shall be assisted by two medical officers, one of whom shall be appointed by the Government of India, and the other by the Government of the Netherlands East Indies. It is agreed that the medical officers shall be on a full-time basis in order, however, to ensure necessary co-ordination in matters of common concern in regard to the internal administration of the

* Not printed

Quarantine Station it is agreed that the relative seniority of the two officers shall be determined as follows:—

Each medical officer shall be appointed in the first instance for a period of two years, during the first of which he shall be described as Deputy Medical Superintendent and during the second as Medical Superintendent. For the first year from the date on which this Agreement enters into force the medical officer appointed by the Government of India shall be Medical Superintendent. If at the end of the period of two years from first appointment the Medical Superintendent continues to be employed on the staff of the Quarantine Station, he shall revert to the position of Deputy Medical Superintendent for the first year of his second term of office or of any further term. Should the Medical Superintendent for any cause vacate his appointment before the end of his term of office, he will be succeeded by the Deputy Medical Superintendent, who will act as Medical Superintendent for the remainder of the term without loss of his right to be Medical Superintendent for the next year.

The Medical Superintendent shall be the chief technical officer of the Station. He shall be responsible for the management of the Station and for the execution of the measures prescribed in the Schedule to this Agreement. He shall be assisted by a staff of medical and nursing personnel. The Medical Superintendent shall be appointed in the case of ships not registered in the Netherlands East Indies shall be appointed by the Government of India. The Medical Superintendent shall be responsible for the health of pilgrims and for the prevention of infectious diseases. He shall be responsible for the management of the Station and for the execution of the measures prescribed in the Schedule to this Agreement. He shall be assisted by a staff of medical and nursing personnel. The Medical Superintendent shall be appointed in the case of ships not registered in the Netherlands East Indies shall be appointed by the Government of India. The Medical Superintendent shall be responsible for the health of pilgrims and for the prevention of infectious diseases. He shall be responsible for the management of the Station and for the execution of the measures prescribed in the Schedule to this Agreement. He shall be assisted by a staff of medical and nursing personnel.

Epidemiological Intelligence

3. The Government of India undertake to communicate to the Government of the Netherlands East Indies any information received from pilgrims or from the medical staff of the Station on board pilgrim ships calling at Kamaran or at the Quarantine Station.

4. The Government of India shall be responsible for the payment of each pilgrim carried on all ships required to call at Kamaran shall remain fixed at Rs. 10 until the Governments of India and the Netherlands East Indies determine otherwise by agreement.

5. The British and Indian Governments of the one part and the Government of the Netherlands for the Netherlands and for the Netherlands East Indies of the other part agree in principle—

(a) that the Governments of India and the Netherlands East Indies shall be responsible for the payment of the deficits which were incurred in the administration of the Quarantine Station up to the 31st March, 1922, shall be repaid to these Governments out of the revenue of the Quarantine Station.

(b) that responsibility for any further deficit incurred after the date on which this agreement enters into force shall be shared in proportion to the number of pilgrims by whom dues are paid to the Quarantine Station, this proportion to be determined in accordance with the number of pilgrims carried on board pilgrim ships calling at Kamaran or at the Quarantine Station.

9. For the purpose of repayment of the advances already made by the British and Indian Governments and of creating a reserve for future contingencies, provision shall be made for the maintenance in India of a fund to be called "the Kamaron Quarantine Station Fund" with effect from the date on which the agreement is made. To this fund shall be paid:-

- a. 5 per cent of the amount collected annually from pilgrim dues, which shall forthwith be paid in equal amounts to the British and Indian Governments, as an instalment of the amount due to those Governments in respect of the advances referred to in article 8 (1) until the whole of that amount is liquidated.
- b. any surplus available in respect of the previous financial year after provision has been made for the expenditures required during the forthcoming year which surplus shall bear compound interest at 5 per cent.

Annual Report and Budget

10. The annual budget estimates of the Quarantine Station shall be prepared by the director, together with an annual report. These shall be submitted, with the observations of the Medical Superintendent and Deputy Medical Superintendent, to the Government of India six months before the commencement of the forthcoming financial year. Copies of the annual report the actual figures for the preceding year and the budget estimates for the forthcoming year together with the balance sheet of the Kamaron Quarantine Station Fund, and the observations of the Medical Superintendent and the Deputy Medical Superintendent thereon shall be communicated forthwith by the Government of India to the Government of the Netherlands East Indies. The observations of the Government of India shall be communicated to the Government of the Netherlands East Indies not later than three months before the commencement of the running financial year. If any such amendments have been made as are accepted by the Governments of India and of the Netherlands East Indies.

Capital Expenditure

The Governments of India and of the Netherlands East Indies shall jointly determine the improvements and alterations of the Quarantine Station involving capital expenditure in which such improvements shall be executed by the Government of India for their execution to be made in the annual budget of the Quarantine Station.

Contribution to Civil Administration of Island of Kamaron

11. A sum of Rs. 10,000 shall be paid annually from the revenues of the Quarantine Station to the Government of India towards the maintenance of the civil administration of the island of Kamaron.

Adjustment of Disputes arising out of the Interpretation of the Agreement

12. Any dispute between the British or Indian Governments of India and the Governments of the Netherlands or the Government of the Netherlands East Indies arising out of the interpretation of this Agreement shall be adjusted as follows:-

If the Director of the Quarantine Station is unable to agree with the medical officer appointed by the Government of the Netherlands East Indies, when the latter is acting either as Medical Superintendent or as Deputy Medical Superintendent, as to the interpretation of any article of this Agreement, he shall report the circumstances to the Government of India, who shall forthwith communicate his report to the Government of the Netherlands East Indies. The respective Governments shall thereupon endeavour to reach a settlement of the dispute by agreement. If after full consideration, the Government of India and the Government of the Netherlands East Indies are unable to reach a

settlement of the dispute by agreement, or if as between themselves

the dispute is not settled, the dispute shall be referred to the British and Netherlands Governments, who shall endeavour to reach a settlement through the diplomatic channel. If a settlement is still not reached by this procedure, the British and Netherlands Governments shall appoint a representative in each Government and these representatives may endeavour in conference to reach a settlement of the dispute by agreement. If the two representatives fail to reach an agreement they shall jointly appoint a third representative, who shall be appointed by the British and Netherlands Governments. The agreement shall be in force for a period of six months.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF
I, the Director of the Quarantine Station,
have hereunto set my hand and seal
this 1st day of January 1938.

SCHEDULE

General Provisions

I. When there are cases of plague, cholera or yellow fever in the place of departure of a pilgrim ship, quarantine shall not take place unless the Government of the country to which the port belongs has taken measures by immunisation, segregation or observation after the pilgrims have been collected in groups, with or without bacteriological examination intended to ensure that none of the pilgrims embarked.

II. A ship which in addition to ordinary passengers carries pilgrims of the upper classes may be included. Carries pilgrims in proportion shall not exceed one pilgrim per 100 tons gross, shall not be considered a pilgrim ship.

III. As far as it is practicable, pilgrims who disembark, and pilgrims who embark at sanitary stations must have no contact with one another at the landing places. Pilgrims who have been disembarked must be distributed in camp in as small groups as possible.

It is necessary that they be supplied with wholesome drinking water, obtained either from local sources, or by distillation.

Provisions Applicable to Pilgrim Ships

IV. Pilgrim ships must be capable of accommodating pilgrims in the between-decks.

Over and above the space required for the crew, the ship must provide for each person, irrespective of age, an area of 1.50 square metres, equivalent to 16 English square feet, and a height between decks of at least 1.80 metres, equivalent to about 6 English feet.

No pilgrim shall be accommodated below the first between-deck below the waterline. Satisfactory ventilation must be ensured, and, in the case of any deck below the upper between-deck, it shall be well ventilated.

In addition to the spaces reserved as above for pilgrims, the ship must provide on the upper deck for each person, irrespective of age, a free space of at least 0.56 square metre, equivalent to

about 6 English square feet, not reckoning the space which is reserved on the upper deck for temporary hospitals, crew, shower baths, latrines and for the working of the ship.

V—Adequately screened washing places must be provided on deck. A certain number of them being reserved exclusively for women. The washing places must be supplied with pipes fitted with taps or nozzles able to yield a continuous supply of sea water under pressure even when the ship is at anchor, these taps or nozzles to be in the proportion of 1 per 100 pilgrims or fraction of 100.

VI—The ship must be provided, in addition to closets for the crew, with latrines fitted with a flushing apparatus, or with a water closet. One of these latrines shall be reserved exclusively for women. The proportion of 2 per 100 pilgrims or fraction of 100.

There must be no latrines in the hold.

VII—The ship must have two places for cooking set apart for the use of the pilgrims.

VIII—Properly fitted hospital quarters, constructed with due attention to safety and health must be reserved for the accommodation of the sick. These quarters must be situated on the upper deck above, in the opinion of the competent sanitary authority, arrangements fully as hygienic can be made elsewhere. They must be isolated from the rest of the ship.

IX—A temporary hospital, must be capable of accommodating at the rate of 8 sq. metres per patient equivalent to 82 English sq. ft., 4 per 100 or fraction of 100 of the pilgrims on board. The hospitals must be provided with separate latrines.

X—Every pilgrim ship must carry such medical remedies, disinfectants, and appliances as are necessary for the treatment of the sick. It must be provided with anti-measles and anti-cholera vaccines. It is desirable that it should also be provided with other specific immunising agents (typhoid and sera) in the necessary quantities. The regulations framed for this class of ship by each Government must specify the nature and the quantity of these agents. Medicine and attendance shall be provided for the pilgrims free of charge.

XI—Every pilgrim ship must carry a medical officer qualified in accordance with the regulations of the Government from which the pilgrims were shipped to the Hajj, or to which they are to return. A local officer, with similar qualifications, shall be provided for the pilgrims on board.

XII—The heavy baggage of pilgrims shall be registered and numbered. Pilgrims may keep with them only such articles as are absolutely necessary. The nature, amount, and dimensions of these articles shall be decided by regulations framed by each Government for its own ships.

XIII—The competent authority shall not permit the departure of a pilgrim ship until satisfied—

a) that the ship has been thoroughly cleaned, and, if necessary, disinfected.

b) that the ship is in a condition to undertake the voyage and that she is provided with the necessary gear and apparatus for use in case of shipwreck, accident, fire, with wireless equipment for sending and receiving which can function independently of the engine room and with sufficient life saving apparatus that the ship is properly manned, equipped, and ventilated, with awnings of sufficient size to cover the decks and that there is nothing on board that is, or may become, injurious to the health and safety of passengers.

c) that there is on board, over and above the rations for the crew, sufficient food and fuel of good quality for all the pilgrims during the whole voyage, and that there are places suitable for the storage of such food and fuel.

d) that the drinking water is of good quality and from a source free from risk of contamination, that it is in sufficient quantity, that the tanks for drinking water are safe from

all contamination and supplied only by means of taps or pumps supply fittings known as "surgers" are absolutely

- a) that the ship carries a condenser capable of distilling a minimum quantity of 3 litres of water per day for each person on board, including the crew.
- b) that the ship possesses a disinfecting chamber, constructed by the sanitary authority of the port where the pilgrims embark to be safe and efficacious.
- c) that the provisions of Clause X have been complied with.
- d) that the deck is free from all merchandise and from

XIII—The captain may not start without having in his possession—

- 1 a list countersigned by the competent authority showing the name and sex of each of the pilgrims embarked, and the total number of pilgrims he is authorised to carry.
- 2 a list of health, giving the name, nationality and domicile of each, the name of the captain and of the doctor.
- 3 the nature of the cargo and the place

of origin. The authority shall note on the bill of health whether the pilgrims are permitted to disembark under the regulations in force in the latter case, the additional number of pilgrims authorised to embark at subsequent ports of call.

During the voyage the deck intended for the use of pilgrims must be kept free from encumbrances. It must be removed night and day for the passengers and placed at their disposal without

being fully cleaned and rubbed down every day while the pilgrims are on deck.

XVI—The latrines allotted to the passengers as well as the crew must be kept clean and must be cleaned and disinfected three times daily and more often if necessary.

XVII—The captain and doctor of persons showing symptoms of plague, cholera, dysentery or other diseases preventing them from leaving hospital latrines must be received in vessels containing a disinfecting solution. These vessels shall be emptied into the hospital latrine, which must be thoroughly disinfected every time this is

XVIII—All bedding, carpets and clothing that have been in contact with the sick persons referred to in the preceding clause must be immediately disinfected. The observance of this rule is especially important in respect of the clothes of persons who have been in contact with the sick.

Such of the above-mentioned articles as are of no value must be thrown overboard. If the ship is not in harbour or in a canal, the articles must be disinfected.

Quarters occupied by the sick, referred to in Clause XIII must be thoroughly and regularly cleaned and

disinfected. The drinking water must each day be disinfected and the water must be free of

in particular

- 1 satisfy himself that the rations issued to the pilgrims are of good quality, that their quantity is in accordance with the contract and that they are properly prepared.

provisions of Clauses XVI, XVIII, XX and XXI of this Schedule have been carried out
 8 keep a diary of all occurrences relating to health during the voyage, and submit this diary, on request, to the competent authority of the ports of call or the port of final destination.

XXIII.—In the event of a death occurring during the voyage, the captain must enter the fact opposite the name of the deceased on the list countersigned by the authority of the port of departure, and must also enter in the log the name of the deceased, his age, the place from which he came, the certified cause of death, and the date of death.

In the event of a death from infectious disease, the corpse, wrapped in a shroud impregnated with a disinfecting solution must be committed to the deep.

XXIV.—The captain must see that all preventive measures taken during the voyage are entered in the log. The log shall be submitted by him on request to the competent authority of the port of call or the port of final destination.

At each port of call the captain must cause the list drawn up in accordance with Clause XIII to be countersigned by the competent authority.

At the port of call of a pilgrim disembarking during the voyage, the captain must enter in the log the name of the pilgrim.

on the list in accordance with the above-said Clause XIII. This must be done before the competent authority, as its duty bound,

Measures at Kamaran

XXV.—Pilgrim ships from the South bound for the Hejaz, must put in at the Kamaran Quarantine Station and shall be dealt with as provided in the following clauses.

XXVI.—Ships found on medical inspection to be "healthy" shall be given free pratique on completion of the following operations:

1. Pilgrims shall be disembarked, they shall take a shower in the sea, their soiled linen and any portion of their baggage shall be destroyed or disinfected as the officer indicates.

2. The duration of these operations, including disembarkation and embarkation must not exceed forty-eight hours. Provided this period is not exceeded, such bacteriological examination as may be considered necessary by the above-mentioned officer may be made.

If no recognized or suspected case of plague or of cholera be discovered during these operations, the pilgrims shall immediately be re-embarked and the ship shall proceed to the Hejaz.

Notwithstanding the above, the officer indicated in article 4 of the Agreement may authorize ships recognized after medical inspection to be "healthy" to proceed to the Hejaz without being subjected to the measures prescribed, provided that all the pilgrims on board have been immunized against cholera and smallpox, exception being made in the case of smallpox for those pilgrims who show marks of having had the disease, and that the provisions of this Schedule have been strictly adhered to.

XXVII.—Suspected ships, that is to say ships which have had cases of plague or of cholera on board but no fresh case of plague within seven days or of cholera within five days of the date of arrival, or on board of which an unusual mortality among rats has been discovered shall be dealt with as follows:—

The pilgrims shall be disembarked, they shall take a shower bath or baths in the sea, their soiled linen and any portion of their baggage or personal effects considered by the officer indicated in article 4 of the Agreement to be suspect shall be disinfected.

The parts of the ship occupied by the sick shall be disinfected. The duration of these operations, including disembarkation and embarkation, must not exceed forty-eight hours, provided this

period is not exceeded such bacteriological examination may be made as indicated in article 4 of the Agreement may consider necessary and at his option measures may be taken to effect the disinfection of all rats on board. These measures shall be carried out in such a manner as to avoid, as far as possible, damage to the ship's plating, engines and cargo, and must not last more than twenty-four hours.

If no case or suspected case of plague or of cholera be discovered during these operations, the pilgrims shall immediately be re-embarked and the ship shall proceed to the Hejaz.

XXVIII.—Infected ships, that is to say ships which have cases of plague, rat plague, or cholera on board, or which have had on board cases of plague within seven days, or of cholera within five days, of the date of their arrival, shall be dealt with as follows:—

Persons found suffering from plague or from cholera shall be disembarked and isolated in hospital. The other passengers shall be disembarked and isolated in as many small groups as possible, in order that if plague or cholera break out in one group the whole party may not be affected by the outbreak.

The soiled linen, clothing, and personal effects of the crew and the passengers shall be disinfected thoroughly, as well as the whole or such parts of the ship, and of the baggage, as the officer indicated in article 4 of the Agreement shall decide.

The passengers shall remain at the Quarantine Station five days in the case of cholera, or seven days in the case of plague. If the officer indicated in article 4 of the Agreement, the period of observation is extended by five days for cholera and seven days for plague to date from the cessation of the last case.

In the case of plague, or of the discovery of rats infected with plague, adequate measures shall be taken by the sanitary authority to effect the destruction of all rats on board, subject to the provisions of Clause XXVII. Pilgrims shall not be permitted to proceed to the Hejaz until after

XXVIII shall be applied.

XXX.—If the pilgrims are infected a pilgrim ship may be ordered to put in at Kamaran on its return voyage to the South or to the North.

In the case of a ship returning to the South or to the North, the officer indicated in article 4 of the Agreement shall decide what quarantine measures shall be taken at the station. These measures may include isolation, vaccination and bacteriological examination. If no case of plague or cholera has manifested itself during the voyage nor at Kamaran the duration of these measures shall not exceed five days from the date of departure from the Hejaz. If a case of plague or cholera has manifested itself on board or at the Quarantine Station the measures prescribed in Clause XXVIII shall be applied. However, deratisation of the ship shall be effected only if deemed necessary by the above-mentioned officer.

Enclosure 2 in No. 170.

Protocol

On the occasion of the signature of the Agreement between the Governments of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of India of the one part and the Government of the Netherlands for the Netherlands and the Netherlands East Indies of the other part concerning the administration of the Quarantine Station at Kamaran the undersigned plenipotentiaries have considered it appropriate with a view to the removal of doubt and to the smooth working of the

Agreement to place on record the manner in which they interpret the Agreement in regard to the following matters arising out of articles 7 to 12 —

(1. For the purpose of this protocol it has been assumed that the financial year for the Quarantine Station at Hamaran will coincide with the calendar year.

2. It is understood that the Government of India will credit to the fund the sum of Rs. 100,000 on the 1st January, 1927, derived from pilgrim dues estimated to be available on 31st March 1927. Thereafter the sums to be credited to the fund will be those specified in article 9 of the Agreement. These sums shall be distributed as follows —

a. sums dependent on the gross receipts from pilgrim dues only preceding year.

b. sums dependent on the results of the working of the immediately preceding year and on the prospects of the forthcoming year.

3. In the year 1928, 5 per cent of the gross receipts from pilgrim dues in 1927 will be credited to the fund and will be available for payment out for disposal in the manner prescribed in article 9 (a) of the Agreement. This sum will be paid through the accounts of the fund and will continue to do so each year until the advances referred to in article 8 (1) of the Agreement have been fully repaid. The surplus, if any, available for credit to the fund in respect of the financial year 1927 will not be available until the accounts of the financial year 1928 are closed, since any balance which may exist at the 31st December, 1927, on the result of the working of the year 1927 is reserved in the fund.

4. The same procedure will apply to each subsequent year with appropriate changes of dates.

5. It is understood that the order of priority of payments from the fund will be as follows —

a. The first charge on the fund is the sum of Rs. 100,000 referred to in article 2.

payment will be due of the sum of Rs. 100,000 from the fund.

b. The next charge on the fund is the repayment of such further instalments as may be agreed upon between the Government of India and of the Netherlands East Indies of the balance of the advances referred to in article 8 (1) of the Agreement, the object being to secure the repayment of these advances as early as is consistent with the prompt execution of the improvements and alterations referred to in article 11.

c. The next charge on the fund is the payment of any advances arising out of the application of article 8 (2) of the Agreement.

d. Thereafter the fund will be available as a reserve to meet further unanticipated expenditure.

6. It is understood that as the British and Indian Governments are not charging interest on the advances referred to in

article 8 (1) of the Agreement, interest is only due on the difference between the amount at the credit of the fund and the outstanding amount of these advances.

Signed in duplicate at Paris, the 19th June, 1926.

G. S. BUCHANAN
JOHN MURRAY
D. T. CHADWICK
W. DOUDE VAN TROON-WAAR
DE VOGEL
VAN DER PLAS

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No. 171

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Mr. Philippe (Paris)

(No. 1852.)
Sir,

Foreign Office, June 25, 1926.

HIS Majesty's Government have recently had under consideration the question of the prevention of the export of arms and ammunition to the rulers of the Arabian peninsula, to which reference was made in my despatch No. 1446 of the 27th April 1925.

2. Political conditions in Arabia no longer warrant the continuation of this policy, which has in practice proved susceptible of evasion. I shall therefore be glad if you will address to the Government to which you are accredited a note in the following terms.

3. In view of the re-establishment of peace in the Hejaz and of the friendly relations existing between Ibn Saud and the Governments of Iraq and Transjordan, HIS Majesty's Government have come to the conclusion that there is no longer any objection to the admission of arms and ammunition to Arabia, provided that the trade is conducted within the limitations laid down in the Arms Traffic Convention of 1925. In these circumstances I propose to inform Ibn Saud that there is no objection to his placing orders for war material in the United Kingdom subject to the above limitations, and that HIS Majesty's Government will no longer refuse to grant export licences from this country in respect of such consignments. HIS Majesty's Government further propose to take similar action in the case of other established rulers in Arabia if they make similar requests, except in the case of the Imam of the Yemen, to whom arms will not be allowed in this country so long as he remains in occupation of part of the Aden Protectorate.

4. A similar despatch is being addressed to HIS Majesty's representatives at Rome and Brussels.*

I am &c
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

No. 172

Acting Agent, Jeddah, to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 26)

No. 70)
(Telegraphic) R

Jeddah June 24, 1926

CLASH occurred between Egyptian Mahmal escort and Akhwat between Mecca and Arafat on evening of 19th June. There were losses on both sides, and only arrival of Ibn Saud saved general disaster. Details follow by despatch when available. (Sent to India and Egypt)

* Rome, No. 997 and Brussels, No. 496, October 1925.

[E 3976/710/91]

No. 173

The Marquess of Crewe to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 30.)

(No. 1201)

HIS Majesty's representative at Paris presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note sent to M. Briand, dated the 29th June, 1926, respecting the export of arms and ammunition to the rulers of the Arabian peninsula.

Paris, June 29, 1926

Enclosure in No. 173.

The Marquess of Crewe to M. Briand.

M. le Président du Conseil.

Paris, June 29, 1926

I HAVE the honour under instructions from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to inform you, Monsieur le Ministre, that

His Majesty's Government have come to the conclusion that there is no longer any objection to the admission of arms and ammunition to Arabia, provided that the export is conducted within the limitations laid down in the Arms Trade Convention, No. 322 of the 28th April, 1923.

2. In view of the re-establishment of peace in the Hijaz and of the friendly relations between the two Governments, His Majesty's Government have no objection to the admission of arms and ammunition to Arabia, provided that the export is conducted within the limitations laid down in the Arms Trade Convention, No. 322 of the 28th April, 1923.

In the circumstances, Sir Austen Chamberlain proposes to inform His Majesty's Government that there is no objection to his placing orders for war material in the United Kingdom to the above limitations, and that His Majesty's Government will no longer grant export licences from Great Britain in respect of such consignments. His Majesty's Government further propose to take similar action in respect of other established routes of export.

3. His Majesty's Government have no objection to his placing orders for war material in the United Kingdom to the above limitations, and that His Majesty's Government will no longer grant export licences from Great Britain in respect of such consignments. His Majesty's Government further propose to take similar action in respect of other established routes of export.

4. His Majesty's Government have no objection to his placing orders for war material in the United Kingdom to the above limitations, and that His Majesty's Government will no longer grant export licences from Great Britain in respect of such consignments. His Majesty's Government further propose to take similar action in respect of other established routes of export.

5. His Majesty's Government have no objection to his placing orders for war material in the United Kingdom to the above limitations, and that His Majesty's Government will no longer grant export licences from Great Britain in respect of such consignments. His Majesty's Government further propose to take similar action in respect of other established routes of export.

6. I have the honour to add that His Majesty's representatives at Rome and Madrid have been instructed to address a similar communication to the Governments to which they are accredited.

I have, &c.
CREWE.

CHAPTER III SYRIA.

No. 174

Consul Damascus to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 5.)

R
ANTINOPLE despatch No. 206 of 13th April
Abdul Majid has arrived here and is reported to have declared publicly that he is charged by the French High Commissioner with mission of pacification. Natives think that he is French candidate for throne of Syria.

E 147 146 89

(Received January 6, 1926)

(No. 384.)

Damascus, December 27, 1925.

Sir,
WITH reference to my telegram No. 42 of the 23rd instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of the letter of Souhbi Bey Berakat tendering his resignation from the post of President of the State of Syria, and the text of M. de Jouvenel's letter accepting this resignation.

2. The comments below the second letter are from the newspaper, the "Syria" of the 23rd instant, and are much to the point. Apparently Souhbi Bey, when at last he was forced to resign and realised that he could hope for no further effective support from the French, determined to safeguard his electoral future by adopting the Nationalist programme.

3. This resignation was inevitable and has been unduly delayed. It was humorously remarked that the French perhaps hesitated so long to bring about the departure because they feared that, when out of office, he might return to his old occupation of a leader of bands in the neighbourhood of Antioch.

4. Souhbi Bey was obviously not the man for the Presidency of the State of Syria. He is deficient in intelligence and speaks Arabic with difficulty. As President of an Arabic-speaking State he had to have his public speeches read by a secretary. He surrounded himself with collaborators having the same linguistic qualifications. The very general complaint was that the Syrian Government was Turkish, not Arab.

5. Hassan Ismet Pasha, the Minister of Public Works, and the most Turkish member of the Cabinet, has also tendered his resignation.

6. Sheikh Taj-ud-Din, Director of Aukaf (Religious Endowments), and son of the most respected of the ulama, Sheikh Badr-ud-Din, has been asked to act as head of the Syrian State. It seems doubtful whether he will finally accept such an ungrateful task. Colonel André, who has just been promoted to the rank of general, is the effective ruler of Southern Syria, and the native Latakian Government at Damascus has no power whatever.

I have, &c.
W. A. SMART.

E 148 12 89

Consul Smart to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 6, 1926.)

(No. 265)

Damascus, December 28, 1925

Sir,
WITH reference to paragraph 21 of my despatch No. 278 of the 18th instant I have the honour to report that the Damascus delegation, after an interview with M. de Jouvenel, has returned here, leaving three of its members at Beirut to continue the discussions with the French High Commissioner.

* Not printed

2. The following were the demands presented by the delegation as essential for the restoration of peace —

- (1) A general amnesty
- (2) Unification of the country so as to include the whole of the present State of Syria, the territory of the Alawites and the districts added to the pre-war Lebanon to form the "Grand Liban," including Beirut and the other coastal towns. The pre-war Lebanon would be excluded from this
- (3) National supremacy, by which is meant that the native Government should have real authority and no longer be a figure-head, that the French advisers should be confined to an advisory rôle, and should not, as now, constitute virtually the Executive
- (4) The election of a Constituent Assembly to frame the Constitution of the new Syrian State
- (5) A limitation of the period of the French mandate, on the analogy of Iraq

3. Considerable vagueness characterised the formal reply of the French High Commissioner, M. de Jouvenel, to the delegation. He evaded the constitutional demands by referring them to the future representative councils of the present State of Syria and of the Alawites—councils which are to issue from elections decreed in conditions objectionable to the Nationalists (see my despatch No. 2-3 of the 27th instant). He was only specific on the question of the amnesty, subsequently embodied in the *arrêté* enclosed in Mr. Mayers's despatch No. 175 of the 25th instant and regarded as inadequate by the delegation.

4. The delegates returned to Damascus dissatisfied with the results of their mission. They were trying to get the best of them by political manoeuvres. In his conversations with them he apparently refused to include in the Syrian State the districts added to the old

5. The amnesty is only complete for the rank and file of the rebels laying down arms. The French precipitation is reminiscent of General Gaiduch's action in giving Damascus after the bombardment less than four days to pay £T 100,000 gold and surrender 3,000 rifles, a task also physically impossible, and, of course, not completed.

6. Moreover, as the delegates pointed out, the inhabitants of the Jebel Druse who were the mainstay of the French, were not included in the amnesty, as well as by the French who, indeed, confirmed this right in article 7 of the famous Druse Charter of Independence (see my despatch No. 107 of the 23rd June inst). It is argued that this right is based on the peculiar necessities of the Jebel Druse exposed on all sides to armed Bedouin against whom it can only defend itself by arms. It would therefore, it is maintained, be unfair to disarm the Jebel Druse before disarming its predatory Bedouin neighbours.

7. Incidentally, I would observe that only European officials, quite ignorant of realities, could imagine that there is any chance of the Druses even considering the

8. But an even graver defect of the amnesty is its limited application to the rank and file of the rebels. The delegates argued that they can only bring about peace by negotiating with the rebel chiefs, who will certainly refuse to negotiate on such a basis. The feudal loyalty of the Druses to their chiefs precludes any likelihood that the rank and file would, to secure their own lives, be prepared to sacrifice their leaders.

9. Apparently verbal assurances were given to the delegates by the High Commissioner that the rebel chiefs surrendering would be treated without severity and with due regard to their social position.

10. The delegation also objected to the electoral *arrêté* enclosed in my despatch No. 2-3 of the 27th instant. It was a mere device for further division of Syria. Apparently the delegates received a verbal assurance that the French would not use force against the Nationalists, but this was a dangerous

11. Objection was also raised by the delegates to the grant of semi-constituent powers to a Syrian Representative Assembly elected according to the old electoral law, devised they think to reduce Nationalist representation to a minimum.

12. M. de Jouvenel apparently evaded expressing any opinion regarding the demands for "national supremacy" and for a limitation of the period of the mandate.

13. The French High Commissioner, residing in the Christian atmosphere of Beirut, remote from the realities of the situation now requiring a settlement, seems to be handling the problem without adequate knowledge. There does not also appear to be consistency in the different French agencies at work. While M. de Jouvenel at Beirut is decreeing the release of the Nationalist prisoners at Ruad Island, General Andrea at Damascus is multiplying the arrests of Damascus notables. Moreover, while proclaiming a desire to meet the wishes of the Nationalists, M. de Jouvenel's manifest attempts to accentuate divisions in Syria have unfortunately inspired the people here with a distrust of his sincerity. The Oriental is very quick to form an opinion of the personal character and sincerity of an individual, and this first impression is often definitive. It is, anyhow, unfortunate that the French should have embarrassed the progress of negotiations by such definite and precipitate measures as the above-mentioned electoral and amnesty *arrêtes*, as well as by manifestations tending to promote separatism in Northern Syria.

14. I fear that M. de Jouvenel is inclined to examine the Syrian problem much as a French politician examines the possibilities of combinations to constitute a parliamentary majority among numerous and unstable French political parties. The Syrian people, no doubt, makes such methods tempting. It is, however, a dangerous game. M. de Jouvenel has asserted that the whole country is united in its purpose. The numerous particularist tendencies of the Alawites and of Aleppo hardly inspire them with enthusiasm for any administrative centralisation at Damascus. If it is a question of gaining time, of bringing more troops from France or of crushing the rebellion later and of maintaining France's old strategy in Syria, there is no doubt much to be said for a French policy. But if France is ready eventually to pay the price in

15. Hitherto under General Gouraud and M. de Jouvenel, the policy in Syria has been based on strategic interests of France. By this policy the "Grand Liban" and the Alawites, isolated from the rest of Syria, constituted a rampart which France could dominate the hostile interior and behind which she could wait for a good chance of safety in the hour of need. This policy, however advantageous to France, is administratively and economically harmful to the whole country, which cannot prosper amidst such unnatural divisions. The Nationalists are persistent in their desire to reunite the country, and they are getting unexpected support in this matter from the Jebel Druse. The Druse leaders are evincing a strong interest in the detachment from the "Grand Liban" of its recent additions. These annexed districts contain a considerable Druse population, which has suffered greatly during and after the hostilities in Hasbeya and Rasheya. The imprudent vociferations of the Lebanese Christians have aroused much bitterness among the Druses, whose irritation is increased by the knowledge that the hostile eloquence of the Lebanese is only equaled by their personal animosity. The Druse leaders seem to feel that their brethren in the Greater Lebanon should not be abandoned to their Christian enemies backed by the French. The Druse movement is, of course, invaluable to the Nationalists. The movement for unity to-day is far more difficult to oppose than before the rebellion and the maintenance of France's old policy will require a more considerable army than that

16. The French policy in Syria has been based on strategic interests of France. By this policy the "Grand Liban" and the Alawites, isolated from the rest of Syria, constituted a rampart which France could dominate the hostile interior and behind which she could wait for a good chance of safety in the hour of need. This policy, however advantageous to France, is administratively and economically harmful to the whole country, which cannot prosper amidst such unnatural divisions. The Nationalists are persistent in their desire to reunite the country, and they are getting unexpected support in this matter from the Jebel Druse. The Druse leaders are evincing a strong interest in the detachment from the "Grand Liban" of its recent additions. These annexed districts contain a considerable Druse population, which has suffered greatly during and after the hostilities in Hasbeya and Rasheya. The imprudent vociferations of the Lebanese Christians have aroused much bitterness among the Druses, whose irritation is increased by the knowledge that the hostile eloquence of the Lebanese is only equaled by their personal animosity. The Druse leaders seem to feel that their brethren in the Greater Lebanon should not be abandoned to their Christian enemies backed by the French. The Druse movement is, of course, invaluable to the Nationalists. The movement for unity to-day is far more difficult to oppose than before the rebellion and the maintenance of France's old policy will require a more considerable army than that

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17 No doubt the French have not said their last word and perhaps they are not getting any nearer to the point at which they would doubtless accept less than they are now asking for. Perhaps Amir Amin Arslan and his fellow-delegates to the Jubel Druse (see paragraph 20 of my despatch No. 27th of the 18th instant) will now that they have returned to Beirut be able to bring home to the French some of the realities of the situation. Other deputations, Druse, Moslem and Christian, are at work. Altogether, there is ground for the hope that the negotiations will not be abruptly interrupted on the fatal 4th January.

145

157

248

2. In Beirut the Constitution makers have little program yet to record. The procedure is not exactly as stated in paragraph 3 of my despatch No. 171 of the 14th December, 1929. The function of the Committee of Twelve is to elaborate the constitutional law only. They will consult representatives of the different creeds, leading professional men and heads of departments and members from the districts of the Lebanon. However, although the opinion of these witnesses will be taken into account, they will have no voice in voting the Constitution in its final shape. That privilege is reserved to the Representative Council, who will proceed to the vote after they have debated the draft presented to them by the sub-committee.

4. Elections in the State of the Alouton have been ordered for early in January 1926. Thereafter that territory will also proceed to elaborate its constitutional demands.

I have, &c
NORMAN MAYERS

175

(No. 255.)

January 31 1921

the powerful concentration of force in the immediate neighbourhood of the town after there has been a recrudescence of this activity. The tanks have again been on the French military posts at the edge of the city, and the French air force on occasions, have remained their cannonading across the town. They have again been active in the Shaghour (eastern) and M. (northern) quarters. The French and their hands are composed almost exclusively of Moroccan troops. They are well trained and no difficulty in concealing themselves in friendly neighbourhoods. In March, the north-western suburb of

1. Nasir-ud-Din and Hameed-al-Kharrat, with not inconsiderable bands, have reappeared in the neighbourhood of the town, but they cannot now make any prolonged sojourn in one place.

at yesterday at 4 p.m. a mounted band, about 30 strong, rode into the town up to the entrance of the bazaar, almost within a stone's throw of the French barracks, and there they were met by a large number of the French troops, who were on duty at the time. The band then rode back to the barracks, and the French troops followed them by the way they had come.

Two more tracks have been made by hand on the station of 'Ain Fiqh, on the Beirut Railway, 21 kilom. from Damascus, where is the source of the water for the city.

11 For the moment the French appear to be making no serious attempt to deal with Wadi al-Ajaw, still overrun by Druses. Its turn was to come after the clearance of the Darnaseus oasis.

19. In short, the military operations in the neighbourhood of Damascus, although they have not been successful, have not prevented the city from being attacked or being taken, and the operations have not been successful in preventing the city from being taken.

I have, &c.
W. A. SMART

1004

(No. 290. Confidential.)

Дополнени. December 30, 1995

2. During the recent expeditions into the eastern oasis (see my despatches No. 276 of the 18th instant and No. 288 of to-day's date) much plundering of villages and killing of villagers, not always guilty, have taken place. Natives state that the

command, who consist mainly of Circassians, with Armenian and Kurdish elements. These irregulars have become a byword for every kind of rapine and cruelty. The presence, in these irregular formations, of Christians who, to add to native resentment, are Armenians, refugees dependent on Arab hospitality, has aroused dangerous passions

3. No doubt the Moslems exaggerate both the numbers of the Armenians enrolled in these irregular formations and the extent of their massacres. Yet the fact remains that some Armenians are in them. — Armenians came here as well.

4 So strong is the feeling now that a Moslem in
warned Mr Teoh, my dragonman, of the danger he was run-
Armenians to take refuge
periodical alarms caused
were determined to kill any Armenians they could
directly his Armenian guests to leave for the Lebanon

6. I fear, too, that local Moslem feeling is not so friendly as it was towards Great Britain. There can be no doubt that Christians generally at Damascus have hitherto

7. At present, the French troops at Latakia are not in any danger of being driven out of the city by the native or foreign, run little danger from this Moslem feeling, except from accidents encounters with bands hastily raiding and escaping from the city. If, however, trouble elsewhere should cause any serious reduction of the present French garrison, I doubt whether Christians would be so comfortable at Damascus and whether the desire to humiliate us would constitute so powerful a restraint on the rebels as in the past.

I would mention that the Nationalists, having lost hope of help from the West, have turned to Turkey and Russia. Much mystery surrounds the movements of Mustafa Kemal. In paragraph 16 of my despatch No. 285 of the 25th inst., I stated that he has paid a visit to Ankara and has had interviews with Mustafa Kemal and the Russian Ambassador there. I do not know what degree of truth there is in those stories. But I am sure that the Nationalists, little as they like and need outside aid, are turning to Turkey and Russia for help in their desperation, headed by Mustafa Kemal.

Hama (280), Beirut (285) and Aleppo (178).

W. A. SMITH

Alamo, January 11 1920

YESTERDAY mob made a demonstration against a school of Nationalism and tried to rush the prison. Dispersed by machine-gun fire, six killed, a score wounded. The town now quiet, but panic stricken.
(Sent by post to Beirut, Damascus and Bagdad)

Letter (Comand-General) Meyers to Sir Austin Chamberlain.—(Received January 14.)

Heard, January 3, 1926.

I HAVE the honor to transmit to you herewith copy of a communication from the Druse which has appeared in the press to-day. An official communiqué published simultaneously, and with which the above should perhaps be read, states that the Druse chiefs met at Shama on the 27th December and decided on a course of submission. Sultaneh Attash is said to have declared for a continuous struggle, while others expressed a wish to submit. According to the same communiqué, the Jabel Druse is uneasy over its fate and dissensions.

(Copies of this despatch have been sent to Baghdad, Jerusalem, and Aleppo.)

I have de.
NORMAN MAYERS

Enclosure in No. 181

Manifesto to the Druses.

Pourquoi vous battez-vous?

Il vous apporter le droit de faire vous-mêmes votre Constitution, de choisir votre Gouvernement et ses chefs.

En continuant la lutte, c'est donc contre vos espérances et contre votre liberté que vous combattez?

Pourquoi?... Pour qui?

Il y a quelques jours, des notables druses désespérés de vous voir mourir sont allés trouver vos chefs, pour leur démontrer que les combats n'avaient plus de raison d'être, et qu'il fallait cesser la lutte.

L'armée française avait laissé passer ces notables, car je n'ai pas voulu que la responsabilité des malheurs qui vous menacent,

Cette responsabilité, Sultan Attrash l'a prise, car c'est lui qui a refusé de négocier.

Seule la France peut vous donner le bien-être, la sécurité, la liberté. Elle veut voir toutes les parties de la Syrie unies.

Avant l'heure décisive qui sera celle de vos derniers combats, j'ai voulu faire un devoir en vous avertissant que, si votre sang continue à couler et si vos femmes et vos enfants meurent de faim, de froid, de maladie, et si vous êtes obligés de vous rendre à des combats où vous perdrez tout sans qu'ils en profitent.

Entre eux et moi, vos enfants jugeront. Druses, votre seul moyen de vaincre est de déposer les armes!

Rappelez-vous que vous ne pouvez rien contre la France et qu'elle peut tout pour vous!

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République française,
JUVENEL.

E 426 12 89]

No. 182

Consul Smart to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 19.)

(No. 2.)

Sir,

Damascus, January 4, 1926.

WITH reference to the copy of the French High Commissioner's letter to transmit herewith a copy of a proclamation of the French High Commissioner to the Druses,* inviting them to submit and to repudiate their chief, Sultan Attrash, who, it is asserted, is being held by the rebels.

The French High Commissioner's letter is dated January 4, 1926, and is addressed to the Druses, who are invited to submit and to repudiate their chief, Sultan Attrash, who, it is asserted, is being held by the rebels.

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* See No. 181.

proclamation would seem to mean that the French are now resolved to suppress the rebellion by force of arms and that these vague peace suggestions are only made with a view to conveying the impression to the world that France has done all she can to make peace and that the ultimate repression has been forced on her by the rebels' uncompromising attitude.

4. Captain Georges Picot, General André's chief of the staff, mentioned to me that he was not troubling about a house at Damascus because he expected to have to go to the Jebel Druse in April next with the French column.

5. Reinforcements would, of course, be required for such a policy, which would necessitate considerable sacrifices of French blood and treasure. Syria, after it had thus been reconquered, would be completely ruined.

6. Nevertheless, French incoherence precludes any confidence in logical deductions from their own actions. There are indications of compromises being evolved from the negotiations now proceeding between the French High Commissioner on the one hand and Sheikh Taj-ud-Dine (see paragraph 6 of my despatch No. 284 of the 27th ultimo) and the candidates for the new Syrian Government on the other. I have been informed confidentially that the nationalist leaders are not at all easy about the rebel powers of resistance. My nationalist informant, who was thoroughly acquainted with the subject, told me that the Druses were much as usual and anxious for peace. Sultan Pasha Attrash, he said, had so far refused to disassociate himself from the nationalists and was sure of the fidelity of the Druses, but he was despondent of the future. He said that the French were working offensively in the spring (when such, I think, is the best time to attack) and that the nationalists were, therefore, anxious to make peace as soon as elements in Syria. The nationalists were, therefore, anxious to make peace as soon as elements in Syria. The nationalists were, therefore, anxious to make peace as soon as elements in Syria. The nationalists were, therefore, anxious to make peace as soon as elements in Syria.

7. If the French were prepared to offer a general amnesty there would be a good chance of peace now. I gathered from my informant that M. de Jouvenel is anxious to do so, if the situation is taken in such a way as to soften the blow to French prestige. The idea has been mooted that the new Syrian Government should receive assurances from the French High Commissioner that it would be authorized if the rank and file submit, to extend subsequently the pardon to the chiefs. The difficulty in the way of this solution is the general lack of confidence in French promises. However, the fact that M. Pierre Atype, the new delegate, came to Damascus the day before yesterday, and that M. Aubouard, who was so hopeless as they would appear from French promises, came to Damascus some time ago that he would not take any notice of the French High Commissioner's letter, which the Syrian Government had been deceived.

(Copies of this despatch have been sent to Jerusalem, Amman, Bagdad, Beirut and Aleppo.)

I have, Sir,

W. A. SMITH.

[E 460 12 89]

No. 183

Acting Consul-General Myers to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 20.)

No. 7.)

Sir,

Beirut, January 19, 1926.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that Sheikh Taj-ud-Din, accompanied by a small party of Damascus notables, has, as reported by Mr. Smart in paragraph 6 of his despatch No. 2 of the 4th instant, been in Beirut for some days now negotiating with the French High Commissioner over the new Syrian Government to be formed after the resignation of Souhbi Bey Barakat.

The French High Commissioner treats the sheikh with respect, but points out that while, on the one hand, the sheikh represents the Druses, which he represents are not theoretically supposed to have any political aims, on the other, he could hardly make more extreme

demands if he were the duly accredited spokesman of the rebel forces. He is said to have asked —

- (a) The proclamation of Syrian unity, the districts added to the Lebanon in 1920.
- (b) The convocation of citizens to elect a Constituent Assembly
- (c) A general amnesty
- (d) A general amnesty
- (e) A general amnesty
- (f) Duration of the mandate to be fixed by charter

It is not, no thought of a...
It has certainly never...
g y agie and distant prospect, to the Christian sects

into an to envisage the Lebanon as other than it is at present, as

4. The adherence of the Lebanese Christians to the mandate is only rivalled by their abhorrence of any conception of the independence of their country with Syria.

It is not, no thought of a...
It has certainly never...
g y agie and distant prospect, to the Christian sects

wonder that the morosity of the Lebanon and all the sons of the hybrid

distinction which has grown up along the Syrian littoral should be firm in the

a French mandate and in independence from a radically alien interior.

The fact appears to be that the Christian Syrian of the Lebanon has generally

reception of his nationality. If he travels in Europe, he most likely tries

but that he is a French protégé. The Moslem of Beirut would not

except a political ideal, by Syrian unity. He is definitely European in his aspirations

rather than Asiatic.

6. Nevertheless, there are important Moslem enclaves in the Great Lebanon. The

they refuse to be satisfied with the Great Lebanon, which they regard as a

of any voice in the direction of their country. Fanaticism, as much as dispassionate

conviction, is at the base of this idea. Still, Beirut, Sidon and Tripoli were all outside

the former small Lebanon.

activity has been considerable. A de

days ago on M. de Jouvenel and laid before

the last few months have all gone to inflame, remains to be solved. General

to keep himself politically above the sects and creeds. His failure was

due to personal insufficiency to carry out his extremely difficult ideal.

8. M. de Jouvenel has obtained the favour of the Christians, but his success with

the Moslems has yet to be made. They can be counted on for the present as taking

their stand with their Nationalist co-religionaries in the Syrian State, but, when the

time comes for them to show their strength, I do not think they will be found so

obedient as their friends in Damascus, for they have not so much to gain materially by

a political triumph. A larger share in political and administrative offices might do

something to alleviate their sense of grievance. In any case, the French will in all

such as the Alawites, the Melwais and even the Lebanon Druses, to lend support to

their resistance of the orthodox Moslem demand for unity, as expressed in paragraph (a)

9. Although yesterday was the 8th January, date which was to terminate the offer of a limited amnesty, there is no news of the insurgents coming in in any numbers, and no general hope of pacification.

(Copies of this despatch have been sent to Bagdad, Jerusalem, Damascus and Aleppo.)

I have, &c
NORMAN MAYERS.

[E 459 12 89]

No. 184

Consul Smart to Sir Austen Chamberlain — (Received January 20)

(No. 16.)

Damascus, January 11, 1926

Sir,

1 HAVE the honour to invite a reference to despatch No. 7 of the 9th instant from the British acting consul-general at Beirut regarding the negotiations of Sheikh Taj ud Din and his Nationalist collaborators with the French High Commissioner at Beirut.

2. As this account is given from the Lebanese angle, it would seem only fair to present the Syrian version of the failure of these negotiations.

3. When M. de Jouvenel arrived at Beirut he let it be known to various Syrian notables that he was anxious for peace. It was represented to him that the only possible way of placating the rebels was to get rid of Subhi Bey, with his Turkish colleagues, and to form a popular Government with a programme which would command sufficient Nationalist support. At Damascus it was understood that M. de Jouvenel was prepared to follow this course, and deputations proceeded to Beirut. In the meanwhile M. de Jouvenel went to Aleppo and gave to this journey the appearance of a separatist demonstration against Damascus, i.e., against the Nationalists, with whom he was negotiating. At the same moment, his electoral decree (see my despatch No. 285 of the 27th ultimo) was issued, manifestly against the people with whom he was supposed to be seeking peace. A partial amnesty, which was supposed to be a concession to the rebels, was also issued, as to prejudice the negotiations. Syrian alarm was still further increased by the extraordinary statements made in the French Chamber of Deputies by Ministers during the Syrian debates in the Chamber of Deputies just before Christmas. Two Nationalist negotiators therefore had some ground for being uneasy.

4. The demands they submitted were the five enumerated in paragraph 2 of my despatch No. 285 of the 28th ultimo. Three of these—Syrian Unity, a Constituent Assembly, national supremacy—have figured in every Nationalist programme since I have been in Syria. The general amnesty was obviously necessary if the rebels were to submit peacefully. The only new feature was the limitation of the mandate. This hardly seemed to the Syrians a revolutionary suggestion, in view of the fact that a readiness to accept such a limitation in the far more backward country

Subsequently a demand was made for an adjournment of the elections until the return of peace—a perfectly reasonable demand.

6. Obviously the Nationalists were prepared to accept less than they were asking for. As a matter of fact, they were prepared not to press for the inclusion of the Alawites in the Syrian Unity. They were even prepared to accept the return to Syria of only the Kazas of Hasbeya, Rasheya, Baalbec and Tripoli, leaving for the present Beirut and the Kazas of Tyre and Sidon in the Greater Lebanon. In reply to the Nationalist demands, M. de Jouvenel has, as far as my information goes, made no offer whatever. A search through all his pronouncements and decrees will reveal no concrete and practical concession to the cause of peace, excepting, perhaps, the mission to the Jebel Druse. These direct overtures to the Druses, which might easily have been successful a couple of months ago, came too late for the Druses now refuse to dissociate themselves from their Nationalist allies. As regards the negotiations with the Nationalists, it is difficult to avoid the impression that there was no real intention of compromise on the French side. It looks as though an impracticable amnesty and vague peace professions were intended to justify, before

12 I do not think that the French would be well advised to surrender to the Nationalists. At the same time I am repeatedly pointed out that Nationalists represent a serious danger to the French occupation and that it would be a serious mistake to surrender to them. But if France is to stay in Syria without a guarantee of opposition to the French, it is better to give some material prosperity to the Nationalists. The French mandate has been far from successful and a policy of material prosperity to the Nationalists is a policy of material prosperity to the French. At present, the Nationalists are a serious danger to the French occupation and it is better to give some material prosperity to the Nationalists.

I have &c
W A SMITH

* Not printed.

Tous les confiscations des biens ne deviendra définitive à l'égard des individus condamnés que si ceux-ci ne se présentent pas pour faire opposition à l'arrêt dans un délai de trente jours.

La condamnation et la confiscation seront prononcées par le même arrêt.

Art. 2. Les biens confisqués par la mesure de l'Etat seront affectés à la satisfaction des besoins publics dont le produit figurera à un compte spécial hors budget.

Art. 3. Une Commission de Répartition, dont la composition sera réglée par un arrêté ultérieur, procédera à l'affectation des biens confisqués ou de leur produit à l'un des objets suivants :

1. Indemnités des dommages de brigandage.
2. Cession de terres aux paysans.
3. Subventions à la Banque agricole et Institution de Crédit mobilier.
4. Construction ou aménagements de logements à bon marché.

Art. 4. Le secrétaire général est chargé de l'exécution du présent arrêté, qui entrera en vigueur le jour de sa publication au Journal Officiel de l'Etat.

Le Haut-Commissaire,
DR JOUVENEL

Reynouth, le 12 janvier 1926

E 602 12 89

No 188

Consul Hough to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 27.)

(No. 5.)

Sir,

Aleppo, January 13, 1926.

IN continuation of my immediately preceding despatch, I have the honour to report the following additional details which have come to my knowledge regarding the demonstration of the 9th instant.

2. It is said that the demonstration was formed at the Great Mosque, or Mosque of Zakaria, at noon on Sunday. Only about 500 volunteers presented themselves, so the leaders adjourned the proceedings until 3 p.m., telling the crowd to add to their number and return then. At 3 p.m. about 1,500 turned up at the mosque. The procession, attracting many idlers on the way, may have swelled to 3,000 or 4,000 by the time it reached the Serai. Up to the present I am totally unable to say whether the demonstration was organized, and no one can even give unsupported conjectures. If I may give one, entirely my own, I may hint that the mufti is a member of the Kayali family, five of whom were among the arrested Nationalists. This, however, is pure surmise.

3. It seems certain that the mob were not all unarmed. It is said that the policeman whose death was reported in my former despatch was killed by a revolver shot. A somewhat comic touch was given to the proceedings when Saadallah Jabri, an arrested Nationalist, succeeded in haranguing the mob from a window of the prison. It seems clear that the use of force was amply justified in the circumstances.

4. I have heard and read that Mr. Vali, the President of the Court of Appeal, was injured in the riot. He finally escaped in his motor, not without injury. It must be said that the injury was not directly due to the mob. A spahi, clearing the path for his car, accidentally smashed its window with his sabre, and the Vali was badly cut about the face by broken glass. His own son, Nash-el-Meliah, was among those arrested, and, finding his position quite untenable, he resigned the same evening. The president of the Court of Appeal, Mahmoud Bey El Hakim, was named Vali in his stead. A namesake of his signed the boycott manifesto, but is not of the same family. The new Vali had been offered the presidency of the Extraordinary Tribunal at Damascus, but declined it, so his sympathies may be said to be mildly Nationalist. He is not, however, anti-mandate. His general reputation is good.

5. This is written in the evening of the 12th. Up to the time of writing the shops have only made a feeble and partial attempt at reopening. I hear, from what I believe to be an absolutely sure source, that the shops were given private hints to remain shut by the rank and file of the police, many of whom are in covert sympathy

with the rebels. This, if true, is the most disturbing factor in the situation. The chief of police is, however, thought to be loyal.

6. The total of arrests is now forty-three. This includes one or two secret emissaries from Damascus, who were caught with seditious propaganda matter on them. Of local families, the Jabris head the "roll of honour" with eight members arrested. The activities of Ihsan of that ilk in Geneva and elsewhere are doubtless known to you. The other great Moslem family of landowners, the Mudaress, are taking no part in the proceedings. It is understood they regard them as part of a pan-Arab movement, while their own secret sympathies are said to be pro-Turk. The Kayali family have five members behind bars, including the notorious Dr Abdul Rahman Kayali, an incorrigible malcontent, but an intelligent and rather likeable man. The recital of the rest of the names is not necessary. The arrested persons have been removed to the military barracks for safer custody, and it is now thought likely that they will be deported to France for a spell.

7. In the person of Ibrahim Hanano, who escaped in time to avoid arrest, the French let a big fish slip through their net. He was the first signatory of the boycott manifesto and was in former times a celebrated "chetch" leader. Reports on his previous exploits by my predecessors will be found in your archives. It is by some thought that he will not be able to do so much mischief now, as the Turks have decided not to co-operate in band movements (see my despatch No. 1 of the 5th January). I personally am not so sure. He may yet prove a considerable source of trouble.

8. I had information this morning that a pacific demonstration was intended to the British consulate, with the aim of expressing a general desire for a change of mandate and of invoking the intervention of Great Britain for the release of prisoners. I telephoned M. Reclus and said that such a demonstration would be as embarrassing to me as to him. It has not so far materialized.

(Copies to Bagdad (No. 5), Beirut (No. 6) and Damascus (No. 5).)

I have, Sir,

W. HOUGH

E 631 12 89

Acting Consul-General Mayers to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 5.)

Sir,

Beirut, January 17, 1926.

WITH reference to despatch No. 16 of the 11th instant from His Majesty's Consul at Damascus, and in continuation of my despatch No. 7 of the 9th instant, I have the honour to inform you that the manifold difficulties in which the French have involved themselves since the 9th instant are now being met by the French Government. The Government are now beginning to be realized to the full by responsible persons here. Officials who in the days of the 9th instant were in a state of panic are now expressing quite freely their discouragement, and frankly discuss the situation and its consequences.

2. These difficulties, now that there are reinforcements in the country (although even they, to all appearances, are not sufficient), are for the present more political than military. The revolt against the French Government from Beirut and from Damascus is an impression of solidarity which a month or two ago was not so obvious. The mainstay of the resistance is now clearly seen to be the hostility of the Orthodox Moslems, which, centred in Damascus, active and intelligent, focusing on the French mandate animosities gathered from every corner of the Moslem world, including perhaps Nejd and the Rif, has now lifted the quarrel from the sphere of the revolt of a small group of fanatics to the sphere of the old antagonism of East and West.

3. The question whether the Lebanon is to be great or small is, to my mind, only a symptom of more menacing difficulties. The Lebanese newspapers say that the French Government are now in a position to extend the struggle. If so, the manoeuvre has succeeded. The agitation about its boundaries has brought the Lebanon at last into the general maelstrom. The Municipal Council of Baalbek has just been dissolved for taking part in it, and all officials have simultaneously been warned by the Governor of the State that if they take the latter's bread and salt,

Enclosure in No. 189.

Extract from the Beirut Press of January 17, 1926.

NOUS demandons à M. de Jouvencel de faire paraître un communiqué qui met fin à la campagne des Séparatistes. Voici "la déclaration nécessaire"

" Le Haut-Commissaire reçoit depuis quelque temps un certain nombre de mandataires ~~étrangers~~ ~~des~~ ~~zones~~ ~~touchant~~ ~~à~~ ~~définir~~ ~~tel~~ ~~ou~~ ~~telles~~ parties du Grand-Liban, les autres réclamant le maintien des frontières actuelles.

" Ces margates sont sordides.

" Le régime des élections qui permet aux populations de faire entendre leur voix à des intervalles réguliers est infiniment préférable à celui des pérorations. Le premier est un appel au peuple, le second n'est qu'un appel au maître.

"C'est pourquoi le Haut-Commissaire a décidé que partout les élections suivraient la paix.

"Ceux qui prolongent les hostilités ou s'abstiennent de participer, soit aux élections, soit aux Constitutions, risquent d'eux-mêmes à l'exercice de leurs droits.

" Le Haut-Commissaire considère comme un devoir de les en avertir

"Quant à ceux qui attingent les frontières, ils exaspèrent les races."

n'opposent-ils à la véritable unité, qui consiste à rompre les rapports d'amitié et d'intérêt qui doivent unir le Liban et la Syrie.

* Venant du dehors, les attaques contre les frontières existantes apparaissent comme des menaces de guerre. Venant du dedans, elles attentent à la sécurité de l'Etat.

" A l'heure où la guerre n'est pas encore terminée, et où l'armée française vient à peine de sauver le Liban de l'invasion, chacun doit éviter soigneusement

toute attitude qui pourrait le faire suspecter de connivences avec les bandes qui s'efforcent de mettre en péril la sécurité de l'armée et de l'Etat."

E 641/146,891

No. 190

Consul Hough to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 28.)

7. An opinion commonly expressed here is that the offer of a partial amnesty by the M. L. Government was a move towards reconciliation. A French official himself described it to me as a gesture destined to justify the mandatory Power in the eyes of the world and to put an end to the war. He said that the proposal before the United Nations was a definite extension of the amnesty brought down an official declaration that the offer was made for a definite purpose.

[illegible]

9. I append a communiqué from the talented pen of the High Commissioner which, by its very nature, is free of all party considerations and in which no party is avoided, and the pronouncement is simply a trumpet call to the ballot-box.

(1) Ba^{+2} + H_2O → BaOH^+ + H^+ (aq) Ba^{+2} + H_2O → Ba(OH)_2 (aq)

Aleppo.)

I have, &c.
NORMAN MAYERS.

I HAVE the honor to submit a report on the progress of the commission. I am, Sir, Sir,

2. The possibility that the extremists might make trouble in Aleppo was foreseen when the heads of the Christian communities could not be induced to call their communities to the poll en masse. The spiritual chiefs are generally very well informed about political feeling, and the inference made by the French was that they were "eating candy" so as to avoid setting themselves too openly in opposition to the Moslem extremists, keeping on terms with whom is a constant factor in their policy. The deduction drawn was that the extremists were out for trouble, which proved to be correct, as you know. In consequence of these manoeuvres, the percentage of voters in Aleppo itself was low. The French do not assert it to be higher than 15 per cent. of the electorate, and this may be exaggerated.

3. On the other hand, in the outlying districts the proportion was extremely high, in some places up to 90 per cent. of the electorate. It is thought that this unusual interest is due to the conviction in the minds of all electors that a separation from Damascus would be good for them economically. This is possibly true, but it would be interesting to know what methods were used to propagate this conviction. The autonomy of Aleppo was certainly important to the Arabs and Kurds, and the convenience of this can hardly have escaped the attention of the mandatory and the free.

1. The recent elections have been declared valid, and the elections of the second degree are fixed for the 22nd instant. It will then be possible to estimate their ultimate significance better than at present.

As regards the elections in other sanjaks of this district, all I have learnt of Dair-es-Zor is from a brief paragraph in the press saying that it has been impossible to conduct them among the tribes, as they are all inaccessible in their winter quarters. It is true that a good many of them are in Irak, but there may be more in this paragraph than meets the eye.

2. Reports from Alexandretta show that a very high percentage of voters took part in the election. This may lead to interesting developments in the political complexion of the district.

(Copies of this dispatch have been sent to Bagdad, No. 7; Beirut, No. 9; and Damascus, No. 8.)

I have, &c.
W. HUGH

E 628 12 89]

No 101

Consul Smart to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 20.)
Sir,

Damascus, January 19, 1920.

I HAVE the honour to report that railway communication between Damascus and Rayak has been interrupted for a week.

2. On the night of the 12th-13th instant the band of Akkashah, swollen by Kurdish recruits, under Abu Diab, a recent addition to the band leaders, pulled up, at different spots, some 5 kilom. of rails between the stations of Elhameh (10 kilom. south of Damascus) and At Takiyyeh (30 kilom. north of Damascus) and threw a considerable quantity of the rails into the River Barada below the embankment. A goods train coming from Rayak was derailed between Judeidah (14 kilom. north of Damascus) and Elhameh and plundered by the band. A relief train coming from Rayak with workmen to repair the damage was derailed at Kafar, between Sook Wadi Barada (10 kilom. north of Damascus) and Fijeh (21 miles north of Damascus), the rails there having been pulled up after the passage of the goods train. An armoured train which came out to the relief from Damascus was derailed just north of Elhameh and about a kilometre south of the spot at which the goods train had been derailed.

3. From a conversation with Commandant de Vaux, of the Services de Renseignements, and from other sources, I gather that the military authorities displayed then usual negligence. They apparently knew on the morning of the 12th instant that this band was moving towards the railway line, but they took no steps to obviate the danger. After the derailment of the goods train they were informed that the line had been cut and spread. The goods train from Rayak was derailed and the goods from Damascus were allowed to proceed incautiously into the damaged area, with the result that they were both derailed.

4. On the following morning, the 12th instant, workmen, without any military protection, were sent out from Damascus to repair the line. They found the band across the line near Judeidah and naturally returned to Damascus. On the next day, the 13th instant, a goods train from Damascus was derailed by the band between Judeidah and Elhameh and had to retreat to Damascus.

5. On the next day, the 14th instant, the French did at last what they should have done on the 12th instant, when they got the news of the rebel movement and before the damage had been done, that is to say, they sent out a strong column, under Colonel Verger, which has been reported to have swept the rebels from the neighbourhood of Damascus. This column drove the band away and burnt the villages of Judeidah and Ashrafiyyeh, which is a little north-east of Judeidah. The inhabitants fled to the mountains, and the males among them will doubtless become recruits for the bands. The column is apparently threatening Fijeh and Basimeh, a neighbouring village, with a similar fate.

6. A British Indian subject, named Haj Mohamed Kumal-el-Hindi, who was a worker in a flour mill at Judeidah and did not fly with the villagers, appears to have had a narrow escape. According to his own story, the soldiers pushed him into the mill, to which, after closing the door, they set fire with the intention of burning him

alive. He says that he jumped out of a remote window and managed to reach the station, where the station master, who knew him well, intervened for him and saved his life.

7. Incidentally it seems rather extraordinary that the mandatory authorities have not at a moment when the fear of Syrians has not yet been removed burnt a large mill which provides the town of Damascus with some of its flour.

8. The interruption of railway communication with Beirut has raised the prices of bread, tea and sugar. Communication by road has, of course, long been interrupted. As Damascus is now depending largely on flour imported through Beirut, any frequent and prolonged interruptions of communications with the coast must have serious effects on the town. Scarcity is already being felt among the population, which is so poor that it cannot afford to pay the high prices for the necessities of life.

9. However, General André announced yesterday that the line has now been repaired. A trial train left Damascus for Beirut this morning.

10. It must be admitted, however, that the rebels have shown some real enterprise. It is said that they have been working in the night to blow up the rails of the railway. If this destructive skill were to make further progress and the rebels, for instance, were to learn how to blow up one of the numerous tunnels, the interruption of railway communication would be still more prolonged and more serious. If we are to judge by their past record, the military authorities cannot be counted on to do anything to protect the tunnels until one of them has been blown up.

11. In view of this new development, the railway company has announced that it is suspending its night services for the present. There will thus be only one train to Beirut each day, and passengers for Aleppo, who used to leave Damascus by the night train to catch the connection at Rayak, will presumably have to spend the night at Rayak or Baalbec and get their connection for Aleppo next day. Travellers from Aleppo to Damascus will likewise have to spend the night at Baalbec or Rayak.

I have, &c.
W. A. SMART

[E 566/12/89]

No 102

Acting Consul-General Mayers to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 8.)

(No. 20.)
Sir,

Beirut, January 25, 1920.

I HAVE the honour to report that there is still no improvement in the general Syrian situation as seen from Beirut. The Maronite Patriarch has written to the Governor of the Anti-Lebanon asking that a militia should be sent to the aid of those who have defended it against aggression. Nevertheless, there are no trains running to Aleppo, the rail having again been cut south of Hama. The whole of the country lying between the Lebanon and the Anti-Lebanon lives in a state of perpetual apprehension. A band of 600 insurgents was in the Bekaa last week, holding up to ransom half a dozen Lebanese villages within an hour's journey of Zahle. At Sofar, 15 miles from Beirut on the Damascus road, a scuffle took place a few nights ago between gendarmes and armed Druses, which resulted in five deaths.

In conversation with the French one gets away from the talk of war and peace and the peace-loving apostle of civilisation. There is mention of war and mention of peace. It is a curious situation. The High Commissioner and General Gamelin do not see eye to eye in the situation and the result is that we are in a state of confusion. It is the fact that conversations are still going on with the Moslems. A representative of M. de Jouvenel has met several times in the last few days with local Moslem spokesmen who have several schemes to offer, one of them being that Beirut should become a free port. This French representative is M. Joseph, a French representative of the anti-dilemma, who has been "chef de cabinet" to the Governor-General of Algeria. His official task in Syria is to help prepare the Organic Law, but he is supposed to be something of an expert on Eastern affairs, although he says he does not speak Arabic. He works personally with the High Commissioner, and is rather proud of being, like the latter, a man of letters, having published a number of books.

[15026]

- (a.) Admission of Syria into the League of Nations.
- (b.) A Constitution based on "national supremacy."
- (c.) A treaty between France and Syria.
- (d.) A general amnesty.

4. If these proposals are really what the sheikh has put forward, they are much more likely to be the result of a desire to fix the frontier between France and the State of Syria on the lines of that which has recently been renewed between Great Britain and Irak would perhaps not be altogether an impossible solution. It is now the general international subject of Mr. de Laroche, not to mention the law department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and I am sure that at least the latter will be very glad to see what exists and bring it up to some Frenchmen. The question of the Great Lebanon and its boundaries is still there in a modified form, but I am afraid to talk of it, also, from the Beirut point of view, at this very moment, when we are talking about Syria, the ending Moudons of Sidon, for example, have signed their desire to be with the fact that they should be attached to Syria. It is true that Tripoli has been sulking behind closed shop doors for several days, but the Lebanese Moudons are not for the Lebanese and the Moslems of the Lebanon were divided and a treaty with France was never given to the Arabs of a piece in the center of the affairs that they have at present to be doing, and so I do not want to put their position very much weakened. It is, however, rather anticipating matters to speak of such a treaty.

Copies of this despatch have been sent to Bagdad, Jerusalem, Damascus and Aleppo.

E 927.12.69]

No. 143

Consul Smart to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 9.)

(No. 44)

215

Damascus, January 28, 1926

I HAVE the honour to invite a reference to the French High Commissioner's decision N° 49 of the 17th instant enclosed in despatch No 12 of the 15th instant from the British acting consul-general at Beirut, regarding the confiscation of the properties of rebel notables.

2. The preamble would convey the impression that the rebellion is the work of a few notables, who are leading the working people into the struggle, since a preamble of this case is, in fact, lacking. At Damascus is, at any rate, no atmosphere of the least sort of the kind, and I would suggest, as a good representative of the masses for their lack of co-operation. The failure of the notables to co-operate more actively, due to pusillanimity rather than to any lack of anti French sentiment. Many of them have fled to Beirut or Egypt to keep out of danger and complications.

3. If the French are misled and are not merely trying to mislead public opinion outside of Syria, it is to be feared that they will be at a considerable disadvantage in handling the situation. What constitutes the difficulties at Damascus is the universal presence of a great number of Druses who are excited and are without neutral divisions. A strong military expedition against the Druse Drags in April is not able to crush the resistance in the mountain. But the problem of this general guerrilla

[illegible]

4 (Of course this popular complexity may diminish gradually as the exactions of the hands, which are naturally composed largely of loose-minded and irresponsible leaders. But even if it were to diminish, it would be a long time before it could be reduced to the point where the more organized rebel forces, must, it would seem, be able to give a minimum of satisfaction to the popular element. The situation, too, for the more organized rebel forces, must, it would seem, be such that they would give more satisfaction to the popular element than that of the notables.)

(Copies of this despatch have been addressed to Jerusalem (No. 37), Amman (No. 34), Bagdad (No. 32), Beirut (No. 34) and Aleppo (No. 24)).

I have, &c

W. A. SMART

[R 978/12/89

114

Consul Smart to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 11)

(No. 32)

215

London, January 31, 1920

I HAVE the honour to submit a summary review of the general situation in Southern Syria during the first month of the New Year.

Southern Syria during the first month of the New Year.
The situation generally remains quiet. The French troops at Damascus have been ordered to move back to their original positions. The British troops have also moved back to their original positions. The official communiques on the subject were so vague as to leave much to be desired. The mobile column under Colonel Verne has had during the latter part of January some minor operations in the northern railway, but it has just begun again its periodical sweeping movements in the eastern oasis.

3. In Damascus itself governmental authority is even more circumscribed than it was. That we are far from the kind of Damascus which emerges from their houses and relate to them with it may already disappear. In another part of the city. When their action becomes too aggressive French troops move against them.

and use is sometimes made of tanks, which shall right and left the streets through which they pass. Casualties among non-combatants, Circassian or Armenian irregulars and Syrian gendarmes are not infrequent. The Meydan and Shaghour (eastern) quarters are almost permanently in the possession of bands, which even affect to have a police organisation of their own. Considering the lawlessness of their component elements, the amount of pillaging by the bands has hitherto been remarkably small. They still distinguish between the French and other Europeans in favour of the latter. The rebels, for instance, recently attacked a train coming up from the Meydan, and caught a Polish passenger. They asked him his nationality. He said first that he was a Pole, and then, as they did not understand this term, that he was a German. They at once let him go with demonstrations of friendliness.

4. Recently the bands in the city have begun to carry off persons for ransom. The rebels appear to have selected preferably persons connected with the French, such as the son-in-law of the Francophile president of the municipality and the notary public of Damascus who, for instance, was carried off from his home in the commercial quarter. But this is not always the case. The bands are evidently getting out of hand, and robbery pure and simple without any direct anti-French intention, is beginning to become the motive of their activities. This relaxation of organisation on the part of the bands was inevitable, and is a disquieting development.

5. Firing night and day continues to be customary in the city. Indeed, as a result has everyone grown to these fusillades, mostly in the air, that little attention is paid to them. The French still indulge occasionally in artillery fire across the town.

6. The bands, on finding their movements circumscribed in the eastern oasis, have turned to the north, and have been seen to destroy a railway and telegraph line in the immediate neighbourhood of Damascus and as far north as Hama. It was a long time before the line was repaired. During this month, I fear that the Damascus garrison has again been reduced to provide the forces which appear to have operated with some success against the rebels in Central Syria. Hama, where there has been considerable unrest, is now more heavily garrisoned.

7. The French are only holding the important urban centres and the railways. The rebels have been left in undisturbed possession of Wad-al-Ajam, and thus the country both east and west of the southern railway is at rebel discretion. The road to Kunetra is closed, and the Kunetra garrison has to be kept supplied by convoys. The southern railway has been occasionally cut. The rebels have been in possession of the Nebk region for three months, but a French force recently moved out in that direction from Hama. I do not yet know what has been the result of this movement. Generally the rainy season makes any extensive military operations impracticable for the present.

8. The Druses appear to be very exhausted, and there is now some opposition among them to Sultan Atrash. A reliable informant tells me that Sultan Atrash commands about 70 per cent. of the Druses of the Southern Mountain, but on very few in the northern parts, where the rival families of the Halabiyeh and 'Awamereh have considerable influence. It would, however, be unwise to exaggerate the importance of these divisions, which are often simulated by the Druses for purposes of political tactics. Nevertheless, my information goes to show that the Druses are not at present in a position materially or morally to resist successfully a strong offensive in the spring, unless diversions in their favour occur elsewhere and encourage their resistance.

9. A French officer recently remarked to me that the rebellion would be ended by terrorisation and exhaustion. Burning and plundering of villages no doubt form part of the terrorisation, which, however, has, to a certain extent, an effect contrary to that sought, for it creates the desperation which swells the numbers of the insurgents. But exhaustion is already operating to weaken the organised forces of the rebellion. If there are no developments in the north favourable to the rebel cause, the French troops, mightily reinforced, should in the spring be able to overcome organised rebel resistance, provided they are prepared to attack vigorously and suffer considerable casualties.

10. But guerrilla and banditry cannot be overcome by purely military methods. I have seen that some Syrian administrators are willing to cooperate with the French troops in the work of pacification. At present there is virtually no native Government and it is almost impossible for a foreign army to handle such a situation by direct and unaided action. The negotiations of M. Pierre Alype, the new Envoyé extraordinaire, with various Damascene personalities have not yet resulted in the formation of a Syrian Government. He has recently proceeded to Beirut to discuss matters with M. de Jouvenel, and perhaps on his return he may make some announcement of French policy. Without considerable concessions to Nationalist opinion, it

would be impossible to find a Syrian Government having the necessary authority to assist the French in the work of pacification. It is such a case as which I believe that I would not be prepared to have the responsibility of the active Government of the Levant. The situation is serious, and the growth of the anarchic forces in the country is a matter of great concern.

11. Moral: The situation of France has deteriorated since the outbreak of the present month. Her military and naval power is now at the disposal of the present Government, which has not been able to cooperate with the growing power of the independent forces in the Levant. The situation is serious, and the growth of the anarchic forces in the country is a matter of great concern.

I have, &c.
W. A. SMARK

E 1159 12 89

N 133

Consul Smart to Sir Austen Chamberlain — (Received February 17)

(No. 56. Confidential.)

Damascus, February 3, 1926

Sir,

WITH reference to paragraphs 8 and 9 of my despatch No. 52 of the 31st ultimo, I have received information that the situation in the Levant is becoming more serious. The rebels are now in possession of the southern railway and telegraph line, and are threatening the city of Damascus. The situation is serious, and the growth of the anarchic forces in the country is a matter of great concern.

The situation in the Levant is becoming more serious. The rebels are now in possession of the southern railway and telegraph line, and are threatening the city of Damascus. The situation is serious, and the growth of the anarchic forces in the country is a matter of great concern.

5. The submission of the rebels without their obtaining any fundamental concessions would leave behind rancours and bitterness which would render precarious any political settlement of the country. It is to be hoped that France, once the rebellion is at an end, will seize the opportunity to adopt a liberal Moslem policy and grant in peace all the people's moderate demands to which she has felt unable to yield under threat of war. It is to be hoped that the rebellion can gradually be effaced and its future renewal be obviated. There is, unfortunately, little hope that the men France sends to Syria would be able to give effect to such a statesmanlike policy.

I have, &c.
W. A. SMARK

No 196

Consul Smart to Sir Austen Chamberlain. — (Received February 17)

(No 4)

(Telegraphic) R.

Damascus, February 18, 1926

YOUR telegram No 33 and my despatch No 57 of 8th February

Situation is again very bad at Damascus, but reinforcements are arriving, to-morrow and immediate French military reaction against sudden strengthening of rebel offensive is promised.

From experience of the past, it seems likely that new military reaction will have a temporarily calming effect. I propose, therefore, in the absence of contrary instructions from you, to leave for Jerusalem and Amman 22nd February, and get back over the desert situation, and become perhaps worse with the approach of winter weather, which will facilitate band circulation, and of tribes migrating past the town.

E 1209 146 89]

No 197

Acting Consul-General Mayers to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 20)

(No. 30.)

Sir,

Beirut, February 7, 1926.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that no very clear decision has yet been evolved from the general public debate on the future Constitution of the Great Lebanon reported in my despatch No. 14 of the 18th January last. The time limit set for answers to the questionnaires was at first the 15th January. It was then extended to the 31st January. Even now, with the Moslems refusing to co-operate and the learned professions still resentful of their exclusion from the Representative Council charged with the elaboration of the Constitution, there has not yet been a complete expression of opinion on the subject.

2. Apart from the general utility of such a discussion as a healthy occupation for the controversially inclined in times of political excitement, and from the desirability of rewarding the Lebanon for its docility, one is inclined to think that M. de Jouvenel himself is honestly animated by the democratic ideals to which he holds political allegiance. His main mission is, of course, to save French prestige in Syria. It would, however, be unfair to call the High Commissioner a mere opportunist, he gives the impression of a man who is a sincere believer in his remedy for the country's ills, not of one who has adopted a liberal solution because he has been forced to it. His constant theme is to exhort not only the friends of France, but also those who are indifferent or hostile to the mandatory Power, to get together and decide on democratic lines themselves. From other high officials, past and present, in Syria the appeal would be suspect; from M. de Jouvenel it carries at least the conviction of sincerity.

3. The general impression is that it will be very difficult for France ever again to enjoy the prestige which, through years of patient work since the middle of the 19th century especially, she has built up in the Lebanon. Even now there are constant complaints that nothing is being done to protect or save the Christian communities on the fringe of the Lebanon who are exposed to the devastating visits of the insurgent bands, so that it is hard to see how the present generation can ever again place its full confidence in the protection and the wisdom of the mandatory Power. However, something has been saved. M. de Jouvenel has made many friends; he keeps open table for all who wish to dine and discuss with him. The somewhat equivocal M. Melis (see paragraph 2 of my despatch No. 20 of the 25th ultimo) works to and fro like a shuttle, gathering opinions and picking up hints. Indeed, the latter ruse in such oddly assorted company that the High Commission have been forced to state that its activities are purely informal and personal. Thus, the future rather than the present is the subject of the attention of many of the Lebanese.

4. The attitude with which the question of a future Constitution is being treated by the Constituent Assembly should prepare the Constitution is fought indicates the degree of interest successfully aroused. Further, the hostility of the Moslems to a State against which they have political rather than material grievances might perhaps weaken if conditions changed in Damascus.

5. In a word, the Lebanon ought not to be now a cause of any grave anxiety to the French, despite the Moslem movement, in view of the fact that the majority of its inhabitants ask nothing better than the presence in the country of a foreign Power. The discussion of the Constitution is therefore developing, although slowly. The Greek Orthodox community have now decided what line they will take in the debate. They consider that there ought to be two Chambers, the Senate to serve as a court of appeal and to check the activities of the Chamber of Deputies. The head of the State should only be responsible to the Constitution and to the law. Cabinet responsibility should be collective or individual according to the authorship of the measures which have occasioned censure. Representation of the people should be by direct, universal and single vote, and on a confessional basis. Every voter should be allowed to vote for any candidate, but no candidate should be successful who polls less than 75 votes. Government appointments and portfolios in the Cabinet should be distributed on a confessional basis, thus ensuring that no one confession—the Maronites, for example—should monopolize the Government.

6. The Greek Orthodox community, in harmony with most other bodies who have expressed an opinion, are for a republican régime. The idea of a constitutional monarchy has, however, its supporters, generally on the sound principle that in a

country such as this a monarchical system would make for discipline and public service. The preponderance of opinion in favour of a republic is to be accounted for by the influence and example of France, and by the absence of any suitable candidate for the throne. No doubt, if the French wished to mould this issue they could secure a candidate for a principality. The notion was mentioned to M. de Jouvenel, it is said, that perhaps a Prince of the House of Bourbon might accept. M. de Jouvenel laughed and asked what figure he would cut if he wrote to his Radical friends in France to report that he had not made much material progress beyond securing an offer of a crown for a Prince de Bourbon.

7. The Greek Orthodox community as a matter of fact want the head of the State to be French, and so acute are local jealousies, even among the Christians, that this opinion is shared by many Lebanese. It will be interesting to see how French diplomacy will be able to combine whatever self-governing constitutional apparatus is produced at Beirut with the ordinary and natural desire of the French Administration who will remain when M. de Jouvenel has departed, to keep for itself all the actual reins of government.

(Copies of this despatch have been sent to Bagdad, Jerusalem, Damascus and Aleppo.)

I have, &c.
NORMAN MAYERS.

E 1240 1192 89]

No 198

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 20)

(No. 72.)

Sir,

Constantinople, February 17, 1926.

I HAVE the honour to report that M. de Jouvenel reached Angora overland on the 12th instant. He is still there with M. Albert Sarraut negotiating the main lines of an agreement which, it is said, M. Sarraut hopes to conclude in detail after his departure. M. de Jouvenel has stated that his object in getting into personal touch with the Turkish Government is to settle all questions connected with the Turco-Syrian frontier which have been outstanding so long. He has made a point of adding that such a settlement could but be of advantage to Anglo-Turkish relations.

2. I know little of what has passed at Angora beyond such reports as appear in the press. From these it is clear that M. de Jouvenel has been very busy. He has then engaged in frequent discussions. These discussions are said to have been set up at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Turkish Government suggests that Turkey desires, firstly, such a rectification south of Kilis as would restore to the people of that place valuable lands which they are alleged to own south of the present frontier, and, secondly—though this is mentioned less confidently—Alexandretta and Antioch. I suspect that the Turks' chief objective is yet another, viz., the railway junction at Muslmuch, the return to Turkey of which would give her a direct line in her own territory as far east as Nussebin. The Turkish minority at Alexandretta is not much more important than at Mosul. It seems that the return of these two places has been kept a secret. To obtain it was a very important step. The Turkish Government has been very anxious to see M. de Jouvenel. For him to go to Angora at all seemed a doubtful step. As soon as he arrived, I think, he was met by a French official and delivered himself, in an interview, of a flowing tribute to the genius of

[15026]

Mustafa Kemal. He certainly had some reward, for the President of the Republic received him yesterday. One imagines that each party hopes to obtain more by his personal charm than he could by ordinary discussion and that the result will perhaps be a drawn match.

I have, &c
R. C. LINDSAY

No. 199

Consul Smart to Sir Austen Chamberlain. (Received February 22)

(No. 4)

(Telegraphic.) R

My telegram No. 4

Damascus, February 18, 1926

Situation has been rendered more serious by French sending Circassian and Armenian irregulars to clear up Meidan (southern) quarter of town. In so doing to-house fighting some pillaging and killing of innocent persons are inevitable. Irregulars appears to have indulged in excess.

Feeling of Moslems is intense and they are angry at the loss of their houses killed and despoiled by Armenians. There is much loose talk of reprisals against Christians generally.

I have urged leading Moslems to exercise restraining influence and they have promised to do so.

I venture to suggest desirability of pointing out to French Government the danger of the use of Christian irregulars within a metropolis of Islam and even in Moslem interior generally. French do not protect us, and we are dependent upon Moslem protection. Moreover, continued use of Christian irregulars against Moslems

under the mandate of League of Nations may create great future difficulties for all Europeans in these parts.

I will postpone visit to Jerusalem unless situation improves.

E 1256 146 89]

No. 200

Consul Smart to Sir Austen Chamberlain. (Received February 23)

(No. 59)

Sir,

Damascus, February 10, 1926

I HAVE the honour to report that the French High Commissioner arrived at Damascus by special train in the afternoon of the 5th instant. As in view of the danger of rebel attacks his coming could not be announced beforehand, there was hardly any crowd along the well-guarded road from the station to the house of M. Alype, his envoyé extraordinaire, where M. de Jouvenel stayed during the three nights he was here.

2. On the 8th instant, after the usual official reception at the Grand Serail, M. de Jouvenel, in the hall of the Representative Council, made a speech, the text of which I have the honour to enclose herewith.*

3. This declaration, like its predecessors, repeats general offers of constitutional recognition and of the independence of the Syrian people and of the United States of Syria and the Lebanon, and of the consecration by treaty of the constitutional arrangements peacefully agreed upon. M. de Jouvenel intimates that his report to the League of Nations contains suggestions on these lines.

4. Native opinion generally seems to be that such speeches have no effect one way or the other.

5. Extraordinary military precautions were taken to protect the High Commissioner during his sojourn at Damascus.

6. M. de Jouvenel, on his arrival at Beirut, stated that he would not come to Damascus until Damascus was ready to receive him. It is not, therefore, clear why he came at this moment, unless it was considered advisable that he should put

* Not printed

in an appearance at the Syrian capital before proceeding to Angora. No political considerations seem to have been of importance in his visit. Apparently the French police continues to be mainly military, and to count on the reduction of the rebels by force of arms by the end of the year, if necessary, against the Druzes in April.

7. Damascus showed itself very quiet. For several days the rebels had been unusually quiet, and the news of M. de Jouvenel's arrival had spread. Rebel demonstrations began to take place in the evening of the 10th instant. On the night of the 8th-9th instant, the rebels attacked the northern suburbs just above the old Residence, which is the house of M. Alype. They broke into the house of Reza Pasha Said, the Minister of Education, who fortunately was not there. They shattered his mirrors with rifle shots and carried off some property. They then entered the house of M. de Jouvenel's secretary dragoman of the United States, who had a large sum of money he had in his safe. The rebels, who were not in a fight, had two of their number killed.

8. French post was quite close, no soldiers intervened.

9. With reference to M. de Jouvenel's statement in his speech, the French Government apparently decided to make official the regime of direct government which has been practically in force since M. Alype's arrival (see the last paragraph of my despatch No. 32 of the 25th ultimo). The efforts to form a native Government have failed largely owing to the inability of the French to assist the native Government in co-operating with them. The bands are carrying off property and are not indiscriminate, but they have a purpose. Until the mandatory Power can regain control of the town, it is hardly to be expected that its citizens will expose themselves and their houses to hostile band action by too emphatic identification with the French.

10. M. de Jouvenel left Damascus for Angora via Beirut on the morning of the 8th instant.

(Copies of this despatch have been sent to Jerusalem (No. 47), Amman (No. 44), Bagdad (No. 42), Beirut (No. 50), and Aleppo (No. 33).)

I have, &c
W. A. SMART

(E 1257/77/89)

No. 201

Consul Smart to Sir Austen Chamberlain. (Received February 23)

(No. 60)

Sir,

WITH reference to paragraphs 2 and 4 of my despatch No. 52 of the 31st ultimo, I have the honour to transmit herewith a French note addressed by the Consular Corps here to the Envoy Extraordinary of the French High Commissioner regarding the situation created by recent developments of band activities in the town of Damascus.

1. The meeting of the Consular Corps was called at the instance of my Lord Ambassador. The meeting was held on the night of the 7th-8th instant.

2. The situation at Damascus must be almost unique. In spite of a French garrison of about 10,000 men, the rebels are able to move freely in the town and carry off for ransom persons living in diverse quarters. On the night of the 8th-9th instant a band occupied the whole of a central quarter of the town and carried off the property of the inhabitants. One of the victims was a member of the municipality (see paragraph 4 of my despatch above referred to). The band was the high in the morning of the 9th instant. The band entered the alleged tomb of St. John the Baptist. No one interfered with either their devotions or their less peaceful operations.

3. Apparently the French are reluctant to risk the lives of their soldiers by occupying the interior of the town. The Christian quarter is now occupied by a few French posts, adequate to prevent successful attacks on the parts thus held, if the bands remain as inconsiderable as at present. About half the northern suburbs are occupied

[15026]

22

I have, &c
W. A. SMART

* Not printed

W A SMART

No. 214

215,

3. The rebels have been cutting and even carrying away the barbed wire entanglement which the military authorities have been patiently erecting along the circular boulevard which is to surround and protect the town. Recourse has been had, not very successfully, to electric currents, mines and other devices to prevent the passage of rebels through this circular entanglement, large stretches of which are undefended by French posts.

15. All telegraphic and telephonic communication with Damascus is again interrupted.

I have, &c.,
W. A. SMART

(Copies of this despatch have been sent to Jerusalem (No. 54), Amman (No. 50), Bagdad (No. 49), Beirut (No. 57) and Aleppo (No. 37).)

I have, &c.,
W. A. SMART

[E 1301 77 89]

No. 205

Consul Smart to Sir Austen Chamberlain Received February 24

(No. 81.)

Sir,

Damascus, February 16, 1926

WITH reference to my despatch No. 66 of yesterday's date and my telegram No. 4 of to-day, I have the honour to report that I have just had very interesting conversations with M. Pierre Alype, the French High Commissioner's Envoyé extraordinaire at Damascus, and with General André, the general commanding the troops in Damascus at the present time. Both of them are obviously very badly informed of the situation at Damascus, regarding which they are obviously very badly informed. I was, however, unable to diminish their invincible optimism.

I told them frankly that British subjects and the consulate at Damascus were at the mercy of the rebels, who were masters of the city. Hitherto, I said, the rebels had respected the British colony generally, but it was impossible to say how long this forbearance could be counted upon.

3. General André, with his usual charm, endeavoured to allay my apprehensions by saying that the revolution proper was at an end.

4. General André also told me that he was withdrawing the French troops from the city, and that the British troops were to take their place.

5. French complacency now strangely resembles that displayed in October last (No. 141). October last, when I had secured the conviction that the bands were going to enter the town, I addressed a strong note to M. Aubouard, then French delegate, giving him exact geographical details of my colony and asking for military assistance. M. Aubouard's answer suggested that Damascus was as safe as any similar urban conglomeration in France or England (see enclosure in my despatch No. 214 of the 17th October last). The result was that, when on the 17th October last the attack took place on the points I had indicated, the French had taken no measures whatever to protect our people. To-day I have indicated, with similar geographical precision, to M. Aubouard the points at which the rebels are likely to enter the city, and the slightest difficulty I feel sure that again nothing will be done to protect our people.

6. The French garrison was numerically inadequate. To-day the French have a large garrison here and should be able to protect the town if they are prepared to run some risks with their soldiers' lives. But to-day the bands are less controlled by responsible leaders, the passions of the rebels more inflamed, the general misery and despair greater, than last October. We cannot be so sure to-day that these bands, operating in irregular house-to-house searches in the Meydan (see paragraph 12 of my despatch No. 214 of the 17th October last), will be so easily controlled. The situation is highly incensed by Lebanese provocations. The Christians in Damascus are perhaps more alarmed by the Christian imprudences and the French military and political use of Christian

7. The French must, in justice to us, either occupy the city effectively or allow the rebels to enter the city. If neither of these courses is practicable, we must

seriously consider whether we can, especially in view of the diverse menaces of the spring, continue to leave our countrymen in a position so unassured at Damascus.

(Copies of this despatch have been sent to Jerusalem (No. 57), Amman (No. 52), Bagdad (No. 53), Beirut (No. 60) and Aleppo (No. 39).)

I have, &c.,
W. A. SMART

No. 206

Acting Consul-General, Beirut, to Sir Austen Chamberlain — (Received February 24)

(No. 10)

(Telegraphic)

Beirut, February 24, 1926

FRENCH High Commissioner has now returned from Angora and proposes similar visit to Jerusalem in a fortnight. Purpose (1) to establish personal contact, (2) to deal with any outstanding questions you may wish to discuss. Despatch asking for your instructions follows immediately.

(Sent to Jerusalem, No. 2)

E 1310 1199 89

No. 207

The Marquis of Curzon to Sir Austen Chamberlain. — (Received February 25)

(No. 360)

Sir,

Paris, February 24, 1926

WITH reference to your despatch No. 579 on the Turco-Syrian frontier, I have the honour to state that I saw M. Berthelot on this subject to-day, leaving with him an *aide mémoire* containing the request for information contained in your despatch, and also a reminder of the note addressed to me on the subject by M. Briand on the 11th July, 1925. M. Berthelot promised to send a written reply in due course, but he would at once give me such information as he had. Two telegrams had arrived from M. Sarraut with a general outline of the agreement, but the actual text would not reach Paris for some days, probably early next week. It was important to remember that nothing is actually concluded, everything being *ad referendum*.

As to the frontier, it had been divided into three sections for purposes of discussion. Starting from west to east, the first section ended at the point at which the railway is continuous with the frontier, and in this section some minor modifications are suggested, and will probably be agreed to. On the second section, where the railway runs along the frontier, no question arises.

3. On the third section, that in which we are interested, from Nisibin to Djazirah-ibn-Omar, the new agreement provided for the retention of the line laid down by article 8 of the Agreement of Angora, whereby the frontier follows "the old road between the two places," but unfortunately this did not take the French into account. The Turkish Government, however, the Turkish Government continued to maintain that the "old road" meant a line drawn some way further south, which lost itself in the sands of the desert. The Turks had spoken of arbitration about this line, but the French considered there was nothing to arbitrate on, the old Roman road being visible and generally recognised.

4. The Turks, as I knew, had created several military posts on the wrong side of their proper frontier. To expel these by force would open up a large question, but it was astonishing that their retirement had not been made a condition of the agreement. A treaty engineered in such fashion could not be called a treaty at all, and M. Berthelot had said that he was coming round to the secretary general's favourite thesis that Senators and people of that sort ought not to be sent on diplomatic missions. After the text of the proposed agreement arrived he would keep you fully informed, quite understanding your anxiety about this section of the frontier, which the French Foreign Office also regards as of capital importance.

M. Berthelot gave me the distinct impression of thinking that the business was very muddled, but I was not clear whether he thought that M. de Jouvenel or M. Sarraut ought to have managed it better.

I have, &c.,
CRWE

(No 919)

Foreign Office, February 25, 1926

He referred in the first instance to the conversation in which Sir William Tyrrell had had with him a few days ago at my request. He told me that he was leaving for Paris to-morrow and that in the meantime he had communicated to his Government my offer to place the vacant British judgeship at Tangier in the hands of an Italian, if in that way and by such concessions as France might be ready to make, the Franco-Italian alliance could be strengthened. He went on to repeat the broad outline of the statement which Sir William Tyrrell had made to him, and inquired whether he himself had rightly understood my position. I replied that my motive was to maintain the very cordial and friendly relations now established between the French and British Governments, to cultivate similar friendship and cordiality with the Italian Government, and to see the triangle completed by a like cordial relationship between Paris and Rome. I could not help feeling that at present the Cabinets of Paris and Rome were not altogether at one. He would remember that he had spoken to me about a proposal made by M. Briand to Rome for a defensive treaty embracing France, Italy and Yugoslavia, and I had gathered from what M. de Fleurbaey had said that the French Government thought that their proposal was likely to prove acceptable.

reached me from Rome. I gathered that it was rather of the latter kind, and I was led to doubt whether M. Brund had rightly gauged the probable attitude of the Italian Government towards it. Then again the exchanged between the British and Italian Governments in London on the 10th inst. I had just been reading the telegram from your Lordship of the 11th inst. of your conversation with M. Ponsot. I told M. de Fle that the French and Italian Governments were each warning for the other, and that for want of a frank explanation they were drifting apart rather than coming together. All this caused me a certain anxiety and it was this which had led me to ask Sir William Tyrrell to make his communication.

M. de Fleury referred to the controversy about the composition of the Council. He told me that he had reported to M. Briand what I had previously said to him on the subject but had received no further instructions, though he knew that conversations had been taking place in Berlin between the French Ambassador and the German Government. He added that after my speech to the Foreign Press Association he had written to M. Briand that my object appeared to be to reserve the right of discussion on the subject until the meeting of the Council. He said that they met at Geneva, and he added that I should have observed that M. Briand had taken a similar line before the Senate's Foreign Affairs Committee.

I am, &c

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

[No. 370]

(No. 370)
HIS Majesty's representative at Paris presents his compliments to the Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of an
French Government regarding the
Syrian frontier

Paris, February 24, 1925

Enclosure in No. 209

In his note (Direction politique) of the 11th July dealing with the question of the frontier between Syria and Turkey, M. Triaud was good enough to state that while, on the one hand, certain small rectifications might be made in that section of the frontier between the sea and Nisibin, this was not the case as regards the section between Nisibin and Dj-esirah, i.e., which would follow the old road of ancient communications to the effect

between Nisibin and Djesreh-Omar, which would follow the old road from Nisibin to Djesreh-Omar, and thus constitute a formal recognition of the line in question. The Government of the Republic of Turkey has been requested to inform him whether they have agreed or not to such a proposal.

The Ministry's Government are apprised of recent announcements to the effect that an agreement has now been signed between the Turkish Government and the British Government at Ankara whereby it was agreed that the British Government will undertake to protect the interests of the Assyrian population in the settlement of the disputed frontier between the two countries. It is also stated that the British Government has undertaken to guarantee the safety of the Assyrian population in the district of Djesreh-Omar, which has always formed a constituting in this district the frontier between the two countries.

The French-Syrian frontier, as laid down by the Franco-Turkish Agreement of the 20th October 1921, and confirmed by the Treaty of Lausanne.

Hannah Kimberly, Par.

February 24, 1926

His Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of an order of the Emperor of the Netherlands, signed by the King of the Netherlands, in relation to the Treaty of Commerce between the Netherlands and the United States of America.

Paris, February 26, 1926

Enclosure in No. 210

Aide-memoire.

L'AMBASSADEUR d'Angleterre a bien voulu, par un aide-mémoire du 24 février courant, marquer l'importance que le Gouvernement britannique attache à ce que la partie de la frontière entre la Turquie et la Syrie, qui avait été fixée par le Traité d'Angora à la vieille route entre Nisibin et Djezireh-ibn-Omar, ne soit pas modifiée comme l'assurance lui en avait été donnée par le Gouvernement de la République.

Le Ministre des Affaires étrangères a l'honneur d'informer Lord Crows qu'aucune fixation à cet égard n'a été faite par l'accord que M. Sarrant et M. de Jouvenal ont récemment paraphé à Angora *ad referendum*. La ligne frontière entre les deux villes précitées est restée fixée dans les mêmes termes que précédemment.

Paris, le 25 février 1926.

E 1395/146 89)

No. 211

Sir R. Graham to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 1.)

(N. 20)

Sir,

Rome, February 20, 1926.

I HAVE the honour to report that an extraordinary session of the Council of the League of Nations opened at Rome on the 15th instant, under the presidency of Marchese Alberto Theodoli, to consider the French report on the administration of the mandate over Syria and Lebanon, with a view to the commission to furnish the Council of the League with their views on all the questions relating thereto.

2. In addition to the president, the commission was composed of M. H. van Rens (Holland), who acted as vice-president, M. Freire d'Andrade (Portugal), M. Leopoldo Palacios (Spain), M. Roume (France), Sir Frederick Lugard (Great Britain), M. Pierre Orts (Belgium), Mrs. Bugge Wickeell (Sweden), Mr. Chiyoaki Yamaguchi (Japan), M. Rappard (Switzerland), and Mr. Grimshaw (representative of the International Labour Bureau). M. Robert de Caix, ex-secretary-general of the French High Commissionership in Syria and Lebanon, assisted by Comte Chancel, Ambassador Plenipotentiary, attended the meeting as representatives of the mandatory Power.

3. On the following day the commission began their examination of the French reports on the administration of the mandates in Syria-Lebanon during the year 1925. At their request, M. de Caix furnished them with additional explanations in regard to (1) the situation of the inhabitants of the mandated territories, (2) the economic equality.

The examination of the 1924 reports was continued on the morning of the 18th instant, when additional information was given by M. de Caix to the commission, especially with regard to the question of education and the position of Armenian refugees.

4. During the afternoon of the 18th instant, the commission proceeded to consider the French report for 1925. M. de Caix pointed out that it was only provisional and that the mandatory Power would be ready to present its final report to the session of the commission. In the course of the following sittings, which were given up to the examination of the situation in Syria in 1925, M. de Caix furnished the commission with various details respecting the maintenance of order in the country, frontier questions, and the feelings of the population. He emphasized the fact that the French had made great sacrifices on behalf of Syrian independence, but that the population had contributed little to the liberation of their territory or to the defence of their frontiers. The French Government had arranged for representatives of the population to be present at the negotiations for the distribution of the Ottoman debt, and had appointed, in countries such as Egypt, United States of America, and Brazil, assistant consular officials to deal especially with Syrian emigration.

After the discussion of various questions connected with the appointment of French judges in Syria, the commission, at their meeting of the 19th instant, decided to draw up a report for presentation to the Council of the League of Nations.

I have the

R. GRAHAM

23

E 1477 12 89]

No. 212

Consul Smart to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 3)

(N. 42)

Sir,

Damascus, February 18, 1926.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 6 of to-day's date, I have the honour to inform you that the French High Commissioner regarding the present serious situation at Damascus. (Copies of this despatch have been sent to Jerusalem (61), Amman (57), Beirut (56), Beirut (64) and Aleppo (44).)

I have the

Enclosure in No. 212

Consul Smart to French Representative.

M. l'Envoyé extraordinaire,

Damascus, le 17 février 1926.

J'ai l'honneur de vous faire savoir que des rapports inquiétants me parviennent de la surexcitation parmi la population musulmane à Damas. Des rumeurs de tout genre se répandent parmi elle au sujet de musulmans tués et pillés par les partisans arméniens au quartier Meidan. Dans les milieux populaires on parlait couramment de représailles contre les chrétiens. Il est à craindre que cette surexcitation à l'intérieur de la ville ne trouve un appui de la part des bandes à l'extérieur.

Je prie que M. le Général Andrieu et vous, à qui j'ai déjà fait part oralement de ces inquiétudes, puissiez vous en occuper.

Je me suis permis de signaler à M. Aubouard dans ma lettre du 14 octobre passé, que je n'ai pas alors réussi à lui faire partager mes craintes d'incursions, ainsi que le montre ma lettre du 16 du même mois, c'est-à-dire deux jours avant l'entrée des rebelles à Damas. Aujourd'hui, je suis persuadé que les dangers peuvent être écartés, à condition que toutes les précautions soient prises de suite.

Je vous prie de vouloir bien en tenir compte et par les lourdes responsabilités que leur position leur impose.

Yvon

E 1569 146 89

No. 213

Acting Consul-General Mayers to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 8.)

(No. 40.)

Sir,

Beirut, February 21, 1926.

HIS Majesty's consul at Damascus, in paragraph 3 of his despatch to you No. 40 of the 17th instant, reports the fact that M. de Jouvenal, French High Commissioner, has expressed his hope for the "United States of Syria and the Lebanon" in a peaceful and prosperous future.

2. This phrase, which is not an isolated presentation of the same idea, has aroused astonishment and dismay in the hearts of the Christian Lebanese. Apprehension was first awakened by the activities of M. Meha, to whom I have alluded in paragraph 3 of my despatch No. 30 of the 7th February last. He called on the Maronite Patriarch in his palace of Bkerké and sounded his views on the feasibility of accommodating some at least of the Moslem demands with regard to the frontiers and territorial organization of the Great Lebanon. The aged prelate is said to have answered with heat that, if there was any talk of destroying the Great Lebanon, he would himself go to Europe, in spite of his advanced age, and wait on the Powers who had acquiesced in its formation.

3. The suggestion that the territory of the Great Lebanon is not intangible, and that it may be subject to change, has been a source of great anxiety to the French High Commissioner. Before it had been given publicity here, M. de Jouvenal had, fortunately or unfortunately, been informed of the fact that the French High Commissioner had given explanations, made with an insistence which was almost unknown before the present

troubles. A number of local Deputies put a direct question as to the purport of the phrase to the High Commissioner's delegate in the Lebanon. This junior official, who in Beirut does no more than effect liaison between the High Commission and the local representative council, would have been in an uncomfortable quandary if his questioners had not been told that M. de Jouvenel had not meant the phrase in the sense in which M. Briand used it when he spoke of the United States of Europe after Locarno. After a few days' cogitation, the phrase was quite correct. M. de Jouvenel had only meant that his mission was to develop between Syria and the Lebanon, under the guardianship of France, the pacific principles of friendship which had triumphed at Locarno.

4. But lately there came to Beirut a forecast from Paris of new phrases in M. de Jouvenel's report to the Mandates Commission of the League of Nations. The High Commissioner is said to speak of a federal system for the territory under French mandate which would introduce into inter-State affairs the harmonious relations which exist between the Swiss cantons.

This announcement, whether correctly reported or not, has brought matters to a head. When M. de Jouvenel came to Syria, the Lebanese Christians have taken the alarm against him. Many of them are saying that the honour of France was engaged in 1920 when General Gouraud proclaimed the Great Lebanon, and that if France now proposes to hand over word, then the Christians of Syria are at liberty to turn their backs on her. Loyalty to the mandatory Power, on which, this French influence here is fundamentally based.

(Copies of this despatch have been sent to Bagdad, Jerusalem, Damascus and Aleppo.)

I have, &c.
NORMAN MAYERS.

[E 1595 1199 89]

No. 214

Acting Consul-General Mayers to Sir Austen Chamberlain—(Received March 9.)

(No. 42.)
Sir,

Beirut, February 23, 1926.

I HAVE the honour to report that in a conversation to-day M. de Jouvenel described to me the results of his journey to Angora.

2. He had been pleased with his reception by the Turks. He had gone there at the urgent request of the French Ambassador and had expected to sign a general and, perhaps, rather vague understanding about friendly relations. He had been surprised to find a number of sub-commissions promptly formed to debate accurately and energetically with him the questions under consideration.

The convention finally arrived at was based on two principles: That of friendship, which was the keynote of the preamble, and that of arbitration, note on which the agreement closed. In harmony with these two principles, the two parties had been in accordance on a number of questions added as protocols, of which the most important were—

- (a.) Delimitation of the frontier, on which agreement had been reached.
- (b.) An arrangement whereby, within 50 kilom. on either side of the frontier special police measures would effectively deal with bands troubling the peace of territory across the neighbouring border.
- (c.) Facilities for Syrians now in Turkey to opt for Syrian nationality, should they so desire.
- (d.) Customs. The agreement signed in September last to be submitted at once for ratification to the Angora Parliament.
- (e.) Regularisation of procedure between the two countries regarding the ordinary use of the Bagdad Railway.

(Official information given to the newspapers adds that the other points settled included extradition, protection, contraband, frontier formalities for travellers, measures and the distribution of the waters of the Euphrates.)

M. de Jouvenel emphasised that there were no private or secret collaterals to add to the above.

5. With regard to the delimitation of the frontier, I gained the impression that the agreement mentioned refers to the common frontier in the Aleppo district, where the frontier between Hama and Jeziret ibn-Onar, where, as is known, there is no disagreement as to the exact position. My impression is that this matter is not settled, and that consequently the difficulties raised by the presence of Turkish bands in the area have not been satisfactorily solved. M. de Jouvenel seemed to be satisfied that his arrangements for arbitration would be able to settle that question when the moment came.

Bagdad Railway, so important for Iraq, had been discussed. He replied that in that matter he was confronted with a fait accompli in the shape of the Accord of Angora, to which, whether he liked it or not, he had to conform. It had been in some degree a view to the question of troops and munitions on the Bagdad Railway that he had added to the word "amitié" in the preamble the word "neutralité." If the Turks ever tried to bully Syria with regard to the passage of troops, he could always fall back on that word. He had a second line of defence in the same matter—the recourse to arbitration.

7. This arbitration is to cover all the ordinary ground of possible dispute between the two States, apart from disputes involving the question of sovereignty. For example, if the Turks had claim to Alexandretta that difference would have to be settled by private arbitrators, not by commissioners appointed by both sides, who could give a neutral opinion if necessary.

8. He submitted to the examination of the respective Governments. M. de Jouvenel supposed that "Paris would communicate it to London." The press announced that the final signatures will be exchanged in Beirut.

M. de Jouvenel made a number of observations on the new Turkish Republic. He pictured the Turks as aspiring to be the Europeans of Asia. They were fundamentally hostile to either Great Britain or to France. These he thought, had interest in befriending and strengthening the Turkish Republic, stretching up from Smyrna to Chinese Turkestan, might be considered the spinal column of continental Asia. They showed no great enthusiasm about their convention with Russia, although they hoped that some possible good might come of it in the future. As for their feelings with regard to Mosul, he had not found them very excited. In his opinion, the idea of making war over Mosul had not entered into their calculations. If Great Britain could find some means of satisfying their injured dignity on this matter, nothing more would be heard about it.

10. M. de Jouvenel added that Angora was an uncomfortable spot where men drink heavily. Mustafa Kemal's chief interest in life appeared to be his new farm.

11. An official who accompanied the High Commissioner and with whom spoke before I saw M. de Jouvenel gave as his opinion of the Turks that they had really effected their revolution not in their legislation about monogamy and hats, but in their recent adoption of the Swiss Penal Code.

(Copies of this despatch have been sent to Bagdad, Jerusalem, Constantinople, Damascus and Aleppo.)

I have, &c.
NORMAN MAYERS.

[E 1587 77 89]

No. 215

Consul Smart to Sir Austen Chamberlain—(Received March 9.)

(No. 74.)
Sir,

Damascus, February 22, 1926.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 60 of the 10th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a reply received from the French High Commissioner to the note of the consular corps of the 9th instant regarding the situation at Damascus.

2. Reinforcements have arrived, and at last the French have sent some soldiers into the town for patrol purposes.

3. However, the situation, which allowed possibilities of improvement, has been complicated by the unpleasant incident at the Meidan quarter, reported in my telegrams Nos. 6 and 8 of the 18th and 20th instant respectively. I am reporting the details of this affair in a separate despatch.

Copies of this despatch have been sent to Jerusalem (No. 65), Amman (No. 67), Bagdad (No. 65), Beirut (No. 75) and Aleppo (No. 51).

I have, &c.
W. A. SMART

Enclosure 1 in No. 215.

M. Alype to Consul Smart.

M le Doyen,
Le 19 février 1920.
Damas, le 19 février 1920.
J'ajoute que le sort des colonies étrangères fait l'objet de toute la sollicitude de

PIERRE ALY.

Enclosure 2 in No. 215.

General Andria to M. Alype.

Damas, le 13 février 1920.
LES enrôlements de personnes auxquelles fait allusion M le Doyen du Corps
Les travaux de défense en cours permettront d'interdire aux bandes d'ici quinze jours l'accès des quartiers intérieurs qui représentent d'ailleurs la partie la plus importante de la ville.
Seuls les quartiers Meidan-Akrad et Mohajrin resteront à l'extérieur des réseaux de fil de fer. Leur défense sera confiée à trois groupes de cinquante partisans chacun.
J'estime que, dans ces conditions, la sécurité des ressortissants étrangers sera assurée dans de bonnes conditions et je ne saurais en conséquence revenir sur l'avis précédemment émis par le Général Soule.

Le Général Commandant les Troupes de la
Region de Damas et du Jebel-Druse,
ANDRIA

E 1589 12 '89]

No. 216

Consul Smart to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 9.)

Damascus, February 23, 1920.
I HAVE the honour to report that the French have discovered about 200 inmates for a month, north-west of Hama, where there is an important Ismaili colony. These inmates are apparently to be used in the eastern oasis. They are physically distinguishable from the local population.

2. The romantic mind will no doubt find delight in this reassociation of French and Ismaili. But those who are more particularly concerned with the fate of Syria of to-day can only regard this with indifference.

3. Armenians, Lebanese, Circassians, Kurds, Ismailis, all small minorities, have been drawn by the French into the struggle against Arabian Islam. It is certain that the French occupation of Syria would like to stake their all on the permanency of the French occupation. If she leaves, the minorities will pay the penalty for having attacked the majority, which, until provoked, had generally respected them.

4. The Ismailis of to-day have the reputation for courage enjoyed by their dreaded forefathers of the Middle Ages. It is to be hoped that they have lost some of their ancestral ferocity. It will be interesting to watch their exploits at Damascus.

I need hardly say that these irregulars, of whatever sect, are not enlisting out of hostility to Islam, but on account of their poverty. I entirely share the opinion of Mr. Hough, as expressed in section 2 of his despatch No. 21 of the 26th ultimo, as to the heavy responsibility of the Power which has, with the Cilician experience fresh in its memory, upheld these minorities in hostility against the majority for a national

(Copies of this despatch have been sent to Jerusalem (No. 68), Amman (No. 65), Bagdad (No. 65), Beirut (No. 75) and Aleppo (No. 51).)

I have, &c.
W. A. SMART

E 1593 12 '89]

No. 217

Consul Smart to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 9.)

(No. 51.)
Sir,

Damascus, February 24, 1920.

I HAVE the honour to report that the French have recently begun again aerial operations against the Jebel Druse, and that Suaida has been heavily bombarded. No warning is ever given by the French on such occasions to afford the women and children a chance of withdrawing. The Druses have vainly protested against these methods of French "frightfulness."

2. It would appear that the new heavy bombing machines brought into action by the French have been very destructive, and produced a considerable moral and material effect in the mountain.

3. I gather from officers here that the French columns in April do not intend to penetrate into the interior of the mountain. The idea apparently is to recapture and hold Suaida. Some anxiety has been expressed by Frenchmen as to the security of the post at Suaida will be easy. It is thought, however, that once the French are permanently installed at Suaida, the Druses, exhausted and duly harassed by the French, will abandon Sultan Atrash and make their submission to the French. This calculation is not unreasonable, provided the accompanying political action is less amateurish than is usual with the French in Syria. The Druses have suffered so much that it is difficult to see how even this heroic little people can go on fighting indefinitely.

(Copies of this despatch have been sent to Jerusalem (No. 71), Amman (No. 68), Bagdad (No. 68), Beirut (No. 81) and Aleppo (No. 54).)

I have, &c.
W. A. SMART

E 1638 12 '89

No. 218

Consul Smart to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 10)

(No. 84.)
Sir,

Damascus, February 25, 1920.

WITH reference to my telegrams Nos. 6 and 8 of the 18th and 20th instant respectively, I have the honour to submit a brief report on the regrettable incident of the Meidan quarter of Damascus.

2. The Meidan quarter is the long, narrow southern arm of the city, flanked by the oasis gardens on either side. This peculiar configuration greatly facilitates the infiltration of bands into this quarter.

3. The Meidan is the quarter occupied by grain merchants and contains important granaries. Many of its inhabitants are in business relations with the Hauran and the Jebel Druse. It has also a camel market, and consequently contains many Bedouin and Nejdian elements. It has also a not inconsiderable Christian colony.

4. The Meidan from the beginning was not accommodating to the rebels. It was as anti-French as any other Meidan quarter of Damascus, but its granaries and its commercial interests inspired the inhabitants with a keen desire to avoid making

[15026]

2

the whole of which remains in rebel possession. All this bloodshed and pillaging and stirring up of religious passion have served no practical purpose whatever.

22. It is hardly an edifying coincidence that these irregulars should have been let loose in the Syrian capital at a moment when France's mandate is under examination by the League of Nations.

23. If the French do not wish to risk the lives of their soldiers, and therefore find it necessary to use irregulars, they ought, in justice to Europe, to keep these irregulars under control, whether they be Moslem or Christian. After all they are under French command, and their French officers should be made responsible for at least a minimum of discipline. If the irregulars cannot be kept under control, they should be disbanded as unfit instruments of a Power selected by the League of Nations to inspire Syria with European ideas of civilization.

(Copies of this despatch have been sent to Jerusalem (No. 74), Amman (No. 70), Bagdad (No. 70), Beirut (No. 88) and Aleppo (No. 56).)

I have, &c.
W A SMART

Enclosure in No. 218

Translation of Article from "Alif Ba" of February 20, 1926

The Deputation and the Delegate

WE mentioned in yesterday's issue of this paper that the meeting which took place in the Municipal Hall resulted in the election of two deputations, one of which was entrusted with the task of enquiring into everything connected with the looted property.

In the afternoon of the day before yesterday, Wednesday, this deputation called at the office of his Excellency the Delegate Extraordinary to the High Commissioner, M. Pierre Aloye, and discussed with him, in the presence of his Excellency General Andréa, the recent events that have resulted in the looting of property and the developments.

After the deputation had submitted their evidence and their demands, General Andréa, commander of the armies of Damascus, proceeded to explain the actual position, passing on to the recent events which were the cause of the deputation's visit. The following is a summary of what he said:—

I am extremely sorry for what has happened—matters that I cannot in any way approve. At the same time I must point out the causes which led to such happenings. While the troops were marching through the town in pursuit of their avocations, a constant rain of bullets were poured on them, not from the streets and thoroughfares, but from the windows of houses. Such illegal acts as these led to regrettable consequences. It is incumbent on law-abiding citizens not to open the doors of their houses to rebels in order that the latter may use them as breastworks from which to fire upon the soldiers.

Nevertheless, when I learned what had happened, I issued the strictest orders against any sort of aggression and for the arrest of any person whatever who had been prompted to commit acts of robbery or personal violence. I have dismissed already thirty-seven volunteers against whom it has been proved on enquiry, that they committed these acts which I condemn, by whomsoever committed, spontaneously or under orders. As to the looted property, we have begun by demanding its restoration, and I am quite confident that, after a short lapse of time, I shall get it back in its entirety. Then we shall hand it over to the special committee which, after completing its investigations as to its owners, will make a full and complete restoration to them.

This is the gist of what happened at this meeting, after which the members of the deputation withdrew, thanking General Andréa and M. Pierre Aloye for their consideration and for the steps taken to restore the looted property. We hope that the rights of the victims will not be lost sight of.

[E 1642, 12 89]

Consul Smart to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 10.)

(No. 84.)

Damascus, March 1, 1926.

I have the honour to inform you that the notables of Damascus have endeavoured to arrange a negotiated peace, but have been unsuccessful. A deputation of last December, headed by the notable of the Lebanon who headed the unsuccessful deputation of last December, has been sent to the mountain, but he expressed himself as sceptical of any practical results.

The idea of the notables was that they should first ask the French authorities to state the maximum terms they were prepared to grant and then go to the Jebel Druze and ascertain the minimum terms of the rebels. An attempt would then be made to reconcile any difference between the attitudes of the two parties.

3. On the 27th ultimo the notables visited the Envoy Extraordinary, M. Aloye, from stating concrete and practical proposals, but he expressed himself as sceptical of the deputation to the mountain, but he expressed himself as sceptical of any practical results.

A deputation went out to the band leaders south of the town and city, especially in the Jebel Druze area, to explain the French policy and to refrain from attacks until the deputation to the Jebel Druze had returned. It is not known yet exactly what answer the rebels have made, but apparently their attitude was not unfavourable to the idea of a truce.

5. A negotiated peace is impossible as long as the French will not offer any concession of coming to terms with the rebels. It seems to show that there was French policy it is difficult to see what any peace deputation can achieve. It is hoped that the French have carefully calculated the means and cost of settlement by war.

(Copies of this despatch have been sent to Jerusalem (No. 77), Amman (No. 74), Bagdad (No. 70), Beirut (No. 88) and Aleppo (No. 56).)

I have, &c.
W A SMART

[E 1779 145 89]

Acting Consul-General Meyers to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 16.)

(No. 51.)

Beirut, March 4, 1926.

Sir, WITH reference to my despatch No. 40 of the 21st February last, I have the honour to inform you that the French authorities have repeated, with some modifications, the same attitude.

la Syrie et du Liban. No country has ever been so divided as Syria and Lebanon. Why should he not use the same language of the United States of Europe, he said. Why should he not use the same language of the United States of Europe, he said. Why should he not use the same language of the United States of Europe, he said.

contradictory. The French authorities are created by the French Government, and the French authorities are created by the French Government, and the French authorities are created by the French Government. The French authorities are created by the French Government, and the French authorities are created by the French Government, and the French authorities are created by the French Government.

3. A frightened brood of prelates gathered at the Maronite Patriarch's palace at the Lebanon a week ago. In the last sentence of paragraph 2 of my despatch above mentioned it would have been more correct to say that the Patriarch spoke of appealing to the six Powers who in 1860 guaranteed the Lebanon as it remained from that date until 1918, should there be any question of lessening its present confines. To the local Christian chiefs the integrity of the Lebanon had really appeared menaced. They reaffirmed their confidence in France, but stated that they required reassurances from the High Commissioner and, failing him, from Paris. The concave was still sitting when M. de Rellie, the secretary-general, arrived hot-foot with a copy of M. de Jouvenel's report to the Mandates Commission. He was able in some degree to dissipate their apprehensions. The question for them of course is one of political predominance or, as others would say, political freedom. If the Great Lebanon were divided into two cantons—one consisting of the old Lebanon, the other of the districts added to form the new Lebanon in 1920—the non-Christians would predominate in the second and more important canton.

4. During the early days of the rebellion there was a certain amount of facile satisfaction in the Lebanon that the main trouble was outside the gates. To-day less Lebanese are happy over their own security, less indifferent to the course of events. The censorship has been re-established and two newspapers suppressed. Moslem "Baathes," expressing an antagonism which would now seem to be general throughout Syria, is said to resent the presence of two newly recruited companies of volunteers mostly Armenians. Operations against the bands in the district between Hama and Latakia have recently taken the form of three columns backed by aeroplanes, converging on the village of Yunta, and there is not much left of Yunta. The Moslem agitation for unity with Syria continues. The debate over the organic law, which until quite recently was a great comfort to many seems to have been forgotten. A state of uneasiness characterises the general situation. We look eastward and wait for the first rays of peace from Damascus.

(Copies of this despatch have been sent to Bagdad, Jerusalem, Damascus and Aleppo.)

I have, &c.
NORMAN MAYE

[E 1839 12 89]

No. 221

Acting Consul Vaughan Russell to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 18.)

Sir,
Damascus, March 6, 1926.
I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 2nd inst. from the French High Commissioner regarding the present situation in Damascus.

The French authorities undoubtedly have taken measures to render the city of Damascus more difficult of attack from without by placing outside it, at intervals, strong posts armed with machine guns and connected up with barbed-wire entanglements. Such defences would very probably make bands unwilling to risk attacking the town, but the danger of insurrection within the city, though remote, exists, as indicated in the sixth paragraph of General Andree's letter.

3. Military patrols have, it is true, begun recently to scour the town, and the French thereby will come closer into contact with the main elements of the population. The French authorities will thus soon realise, if they have hitherto been really unaware of, the depth and bitterness of Moslem feeling against them. These patrols will no doubt keep order in the city, but it is to be hoped that they will bear themselves with restraint and not provoke any dangerous incidents such as that which occurred in the Meidan quarter of Damascus on the 15th to 17th ultimo (see Damascus despatch No. 84 of the 25th ultimo).

4. Should the French authorities persist in their use of irregular troops for the purpose of maintaining order, such measures may well result. The Meidan incident was only with comparative difficulty smoothed over, but repetitions of the irregulars' savage misbehaviour in Damascus might lead to an outbreak of feeling among the Moslem population in the city which

would be stronger than the French authorities are prepared to reckon with. This point is being unofficially represented to the French authorities.
(Copies of this despatch have been sent to Jerusalem (No. 82), Bagdad (No. 77), Amman (No. 79), Beirut (No. 93) and Aleppo (No. 65).)

I have, &c.

J. R. VAUGHAN-RUSSELL

Enclosure to No. 22.

U. Aleppo to Acting Consul Vaughan-Russell

M. le Consul,

Damas, le 5 mars 1926.

VOUS avez bien voulu, par lettre en date du 17 février, me manifester vos inquiétudes au sujet de la sécurité de la ville de Damas, qui vous semblait à nouveau menacée par une recrudescence d'activité des bandits.

M. le Général Andree, auquel j'ai fait part, verbalement d'abord, puis par écrit, de votre communication, m'a, en réponse, communiqué la lettre dont vous voudrez bien trouver ci-joint copie.

Vous pouvez, M. le Consul, constater que les autorités françaises, qui ont la charge de maintenir de l'ordre à Damas, apportent l'attention la plus grande. Je puis vous donner l'assurance, à donner aide et protection, en toutes circonstances, à tous ressortissants étrangers.

Veuillez, &c.

General Andree to M. Aleppo

Damas, le 25 février 1926

En réponse à votre lettre du 22 février, j'ai l'honneur de vous faire savoir que les renseignements que vous m'avez communiqués dans votre lettre du 17 février ne correspondent nullement à la situation actuelle.

A la suite des opérations de nettoyage de Meidan, une manifestation s'est produite en effet manifestée chez les musulmans contre les Arméniens et les chrétiens. Les foules furent formées pendant trois jours en signe de protestation.

Les conseils de calme que vous avez donnés ont été suivis. Une députation de notables, les esprits ne sont manifestement détendus.

Le sérieux de la situation actuelle ne m'a pourtant pas échappé. Je fais pousser très activement les travaux de défense de la périphérie de la ville. Je compte que le travail de fer sera entièrement terminé à la fin de la semaine.

Un poste de mitrailleuses sera installé en tous points par les deux des mitrailleuses de postes de barrage, est déjà une garantie très sérieuse contre les incursions de bandes à l'intérieur de la ville.

Pour prévenir tout mouvement insurrectionnel dans la ville même, de fortes patrouilles armées composées de gendarmes, de policiers et de partisans parcourent de nuit et de jour les différents quartiers.

Je suis donc exactement tenu au courant de l'état d'esprit de la population et, en cas de nécessité, des mesures énergiques et immédiates me permettront de rétablir l'ordre et la paix.

Je ne perds pas de vue la sécurité des ressortissants britanniques, qui trouveront toujours aide et protection auprès de l'autorité militaire.

E. ANDRÉE

[E 1840 12 89]

No. 222

Acting Consul Vaughan Russell to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 18.)

(No. 96.)

Damascus, March 6, 1926.

Sir,

WITH reference to Mr Smart's despatch No. 89 of the 1st instant, I have the honour to report that the project of sending a further despatch to the French High Commissioner has so far failed to materialise.

1. Amir Amin Arslan has not yet arrived here from Beirut, and the other members of the proposed deputation in Damascus cannot proceed on their mission without him. I have had several conversations with the French High Commissioner in Syria, but without out sufficient hopes of arranging a meeting between him and the French High Commissioner here unless he has the authority of the French Government to offer concrete and practicable terms to the Druse leaders.

2. A negotiated peace, therefore, seems as far off as ever, though there are few signs here that the French are preparing for the alternative—a settlement of the rebellion by military operations.

3. The present strength of the French army here is hardly sufficient to maintain order and keep the rebels and their bandit associates out of Damascus and to do more than hold the various small posts outside and around the city. The whole of Southern Syria still remains practically at rebel discretion, and rail and telegraph communications are cut more often than not, so it is difficult to see how any punitive expedition could successfully do much more than reach, let alone subdue and hold the Jebel Druse.

4. The despatch No. 89 of the 1st instant has not materialized. On the contrary, daily and nightly exchanges of rifle fire between the rebels and the French on the outskirts of Damascus continue with unabated intensity. A column of between 2,000 and 3,000 troops which went out to effect the routine relief and re-equipping of the French post of Duma (about 7 miles north-east of Damascus) was heavily attacked by rebels and quite a battle ensued. The French claim to have killed 150 rebels, and state that their own losses were very slight, but even though this be true, the above incident is another clear indication of the state of insecurity on the very threshold of the city and of the lack of French control outside the range of their artillery.

5. The general situation remains, then, in a state of deadlock. No progress is being sought by the French neither by peaceful nor by military means. Mr. Smart has in numerous reports dealt fully with the foregoing situation. Further comment on my part is superfluous.

(Copies of this despatch have been sent to Jerusalem (No. 70), Beirut (No. 93), and Aleppo (No. 60).)

Yours, &c.

J. R. VALOCHAN-RUSSELL.

E 1910 844 91]

No. 223

Acting Consul Jordan to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 1926.)

Jeddah, February 27, 1926.

WITH reference to the second paragraph of Mr. Acting Consul-General Mayers' despatch No. 24 of the 31st January last, relative to the mission of M. Ibrahim Depui to the Hejaz to conclude a commercial treaty between Syria and the Nejd, I have the honour to state that I have been informed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs that M. Depui is making but small progress in Mecca, and that what few discussions have taken place on the proposed treaty to date have resulted in practically the whole thing being covered.

2. The first fence M. Depui had to face on his arrival in the Hejaz was the fact that his only credentials were from M. de Jouvenot, the French High Commissioner in Syria, consequently his position as an envoy of a High Commissioner and not of a French Government was unenviable.

3. The French consul in Jeddah was informed neither by his Government nor by the High Commissioner in Syria of Depui's mission, and consequently the Minister for Foreign Affairs, acting on instructions from His Highness the Sultan, requested my advice in the matter of recognition of the validity of M. Depui's credentials. I informed him that the attitude adopted seemed somewhat irregular, and that they would appear to be justified in asking for further credentials as to his standing as they had not been officially informed of his mission by the representative of the French Republic accredited to the Hejaz.

4. Depui after remaining in Jeddah for some three days left for Mecca and presented his draft agreement to Ibn Saud, who requested to be informed as to with which Government the proposed agreement was to be concluded. Depui informed

the Sultan that he was sent by M. de Jouvenot, to which Ibn Saud replied courteously that he was not in a position to make an answer. M. Depui then left for Mecca.

5. I conclude that Depui thereupon communicated the above to the French High Commissioner in Syria, as it has now been decided that the treaty shall be between the Government of Syria and the Government of the Nejd.

6. I believe that the French mandate of Syria has never been recognised by the Hejaz and that the advisers now consider that the treaty thus presented (which is a commercial treaty) is a purely commercial treaty and was a purely commercial treaty. It is Ibn Saud's recognition of the French mandate, as thus they would be a treaty of friendship and alliance, but he has been sending reinforcements to the insurgents in Syria.

7. Consequently the local Government are treating the whole matter in a very distrustful manner, and are now sending out some of the exiles of the Syrian Government with whom the treaty is to be concluded.

8. Depui as a result of this, the French High Commissioner has submitted for the approval of the French Government certain proposals which will put Syria in a position to deal with the situation with the Government of the Nejd. The treaty will be in force.

9. Discussions are still in progress, and I shall not fail to notify you of any further details that may come to my notice.

I have, &c.

S. R. JORDAN

[E 1924/12/89]

No. 224

Acting Consul-General Mayers to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 22.)

(No. 52.)

Beirut, March 8, 1926.

Sir, WITH reference to Damascus despatch to you No. 89 of the 1st March last, I have the honour to state that the exchange of views between the French and the Druses have for some days been carried on.

A communiqué has now, however, been published in the press which appears to be based on these hopes. It is signed "The Druse People." It demands:—

- (a.) Recognition of the complete independence of the Syrian territory, with foreign representation. Admission of Syria into the League of Nations.
- (b.) Proclamation of the unity of all Syria, the Lebanon to be reduced to its pre-war frontiers.
- (c.) Conclusion of a treaty with France guaranteeing French interests without prejudicing Syrian independence. This treaty to be deposited with the League of Nations, who would be responsible for its execution.
- (d.) Election of a free Constituent Assembly; on the formation of this body French troops to retire to the coast.
- (e.) General amnesty.

3. These conditions are similar to those put forward on several previous occasions by the rebels. The reply of the High Commissioner, dated the 6th March, is a short one.

"Le Haut-Commissaire fait savoir que la lettre du 28 février signée 'Le Peuple druse' rend impossible toute négociation sérieuse et directe avec les rebelles. Il n'acceptera désormais que leur commission pure et simple."

(Copies of this despatch have been sent to Bagdad, Jerusalem, Damascus and Aleppo.)

I have, &c.

NORMAN MAYERS.

Consul Smart to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 24)

(N. 99)
Sir

Damascus, March 11, 1926

WITH reference to despatch No. 52 of the 8th instant from the British acting consul-general at Beirut, I have the honour to point out an error of detail in the Druse peace conditions as given by Mr. Mayers under the heading (d).

2. The Druses, in their letter to the French High Commissioner, posed the condition that the French troops should be withdrawn to the coast, and that a free Constituent Assembly representing all regions of Syria should subsequently be elected to form a free, united, and independent Syria. The withdrawal of French troops from Syria should be completed after the meeting of the Constituent Assembly.

Copies of this despatch have been sent to Jerusalem (No. 86), Bagdad (No. 80), Beirut (No. 96) and Aleppo (No. 88).

I have, &c.
W A SMART

Acting Consul-General Mayers to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 7.)

(N. 7)
Sir

Beirut, March 18, 1926.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 53 of the 8th instant, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of my despatch No. 20 to His Majesty's Acting High Commissioner for Iraq. As the matter is one of general interest to the territories under British mandate, I have forwarded copies of the despatch to His Majesty's representatives in Palestine and Transjordan.

I have, &c.
NORMAN MAYERS

Enclosure 1 in No. 225.

Acting Consul-General Mayers to Acting High Commissioner for Iraq.

No. 2 (Secret)

Sir

Beirut, March 18, 1926.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 11 of to-day's date regarding Colonel Vincent, the French High Commissioner's chief de cabinet, to Bagdad, I have the honour to inform you that I called on M. de Jouvenel this morning and had a short conversation with him on the subject of Colonel Vincent's errand.

2. The High Commissioner informed me that he had prepared with the help of his staff a project of convention, which he handed to me and copy of which is enclosed. These proposals have been mentioned to me on one or two recent occasions by Colonel Vincent, and have now taken definite form. They are at present merely suggestions for a friendly understanding between the different territories under British and French mandate. I do not gather that the project has been formulated by other than local initiative, i.e., the scheme appears to me to be the personal policy of M. de Jouvenel, who, however, is confident that it would be acceptable to the French Government.

Speaking in general terms, the High Commissioner repeated his belief in Anglo-French co-operation. He ridiculed the newspaper reports that he had given away Alexandretta to the Syrians or that the Bagdad Railway to the Turks, and insisted that, as he had represented to Sir Austen Chamberlain and to Mr. Amery he intended to work in harmony with the British, this part of the world. Both France and Great Britain, he added, would be in his opinion wise to draw Turkey out of the Russian orbit into their own.

4. Here, he went on, was a scheme which would be a public demonstration of Anglo-French solidarity in the Near East. He was personally ready to put his signature to such an agreement. Why should points in dispute not be settled quickly and amicably here on the spot by the three-monthly conference he proposed? There was no sense in the League of Nations as the mandates provided, but why go so far as the League of Nations? It was necessary for England and France to go to law to settle their disputes! He had been very much surprised at the League of Nations, and unsettled since 1924. Between Syria and Iraq, he said, there was no standing order and no understanding. He had no objection to the League of Nations Agreement, but he considered as the point of departure of the present proposals.

5. In reply, I said that a meeting of the two or three days Colonel Vincent would have at Bagdad would give him the time to do much more than to lay these proposals before you, and that in any case they would evidently be only the basis of important negotiations to come. M. de Jouvenel agreed.

6. I did not attempt to comment on these proposals, which the High Commissioner read out aloud to me, beyond giving a general assent to the utility of his suggestions. Some of the clauses will undoubtedly appear one-sided, but it will be remembered that they are only a beginning.

7. The suggested Protocol No. 1, mentioned in article 6 of my telegram, according to M. de Jouvenel, follow the lines of the present arrangement between Najd and Iraq.

I have, &c.
NORMAN MAYERS

Enclosure 2 in No. 225

Draft Convention

1. Le Gouvernement britannique et le Gouvernement français, dans le but de garantir la paix et la stabilité dans les territoires sous mandat, et de faciliter la mission commune qu'ils ont reçue de la Société des Nations

À cet effet, ils ont désigné pour leurs plénipotentiaires

qui se sont mis d'accord sur les stipulations suivantes

ARTICLE 1^{er}.

Les Hauts-Commissaires britannique et français délégueront deux fonctionnaires par territoire sous mandat, qui se réuniront à Bagdad, en vue de la tenue d'une conférence périodique d'autre à améliorer l'administration et à augmenter le bien-être des pays sous mandat. Les fonctionnaires tiendront une conférence régulière tous les trois mois.

ARTICLE 2.

Toute contestation existant à l'heure actuelle ou susceptible de s'élever entre les Hauts-Commissaires britannique et français sera portée devant cette conférence.

ARTICLE 3.

En cas où l'entente ne se serait pas établie au sein de la conférence, les Hauts-Commissaires britannique et français lui adjoindront un tiers arbitre choisi d'un commun accord.

Si ils ne parviennent pas à se mettre d'accord sur l'arbitre, ou ne croient pas pouvoir s'entendre sur le tiers arbitre, sera porté devant le Conseil permanent de Justice internationale.

ARTICLE 4.

Les Hauts-Commissaires britannique et français remettront à cette conférence le projet de convention ci-dessus, les fixations en prenant pour base l'accord déjà intervenu le 33 décembre 1920.

ARTICLE 5.

Les frontières communes étant déterminées, les Hauts-Commissaires britannique et français contractent l'engagement réciproque de les garantir contre toute agression ou toute incursion.

ARTICLE 6.

Les Hauts-Commissaires britannique et français veilleront à ce que les territoires sous mandat soient administrés conformément aux principes de la Convention de Mandats de 1922, et en particulier à ce que les populations indigènes soient traitées avec équité et que leur développement matériel et moral soit encouragé.

ARTICLE 7.

Les Hauts-Commissaires britannique et français s'engagent en commun la coopération nécessaire pour la surveillance du commerce des armes, des munitions, des poudres et explosifs et la répression de la contrebande de ces mêmes articles.

Ils communiqueront dans le plus bref délai les mesures prises sur leurs territoires respectifs à la conférence, qui aura, par ailleurs, charge de veiller à l'application du Protocole No. 2^e annexé à la présente convention et à l'observation des accords douaniers intervenus entre les hautes parties contractantes.

ARTICLE 8.

Les ressortissants syro-libanais en territoires sous mandat britannique et les ressortissants irakiens, palestiniens ou transjordanais en territoires sous mandat français jouiront, en ce qui concerne les droits et les conditions d'établissement, du traitement de la nation la plus favorisée.

ARTICLE 9.

La protection des ressortissants syro-libanais sera assurée dans les pays sous mandat britannique par les représentants diplomatiques et consulaires français régulièrement accrédités auprès du Gouvernement ou des autorités locales irakiennes, palestiniennes ou transjordanaises.

Réciproquement, la protection des ressortissants irakiens, palestiniens ou transjordanais dans les États sous mandat français sera assurée par les représentants diplomatiques ou consulaires britanniques régulièrement accrédités auprès du Gouvernement français.

ARTICLE 10.

Les hautes parties contractantes sont d'accord, en ce qui concerne l'extradition, sur la procédure établie dans la convention passée entre la Palestine et les États sous mandat français.

ARTICLE 11.

En vue de faciliter les relations commerciales entre les pays sous mandats britannique et français et d'appliquer, dans les conditions les meilleures, la Convention de 1922, les Hauts-Commissaires britannique et français s'engagent à conférer le soin d'organiser la circulation automobile suivant les principes qui ont été adoptés par la Commission internationale de la circulation automobile, et à faciliter la circulation automobile entre les territoires sous mandat français et la Palestine.

ARTICLE 12.

Le régime sanitaire entre les États sous mandat britannique et les États sous mandat français sera soumis aux dispositions des conventions sanitaires internationales en vigueur, auxquelles les parties ont adhéré, en particulier, à celles de la Convention de Paris du 17 janvier 1922.

Les deux parties contractantes s'engagent à rendre les mesures nécessaires pour enrayer l'extension et la contagion de toutes les maladies épidémiques et éphémères et les communiqueront à cet effet tous les renseignements utiles par l'intermédiaire des autorités sanitaires compétentes.

En dehors des mesures générales ci-dessus indiquées, les autorités des territoires sous mandat britannique et français s'engagent à prendre toutes les mesures nécessaires pour assurer la sécurité et le bien-être des populations indigènes.

* Not printed.

respectives. Les autres autorités se sont chargées de surveiller l'état sanitaire des tribus nomades. Elles proposeront à la conférence toutes mesures sanitaires qui leur paraîtraient opportunes.

ARTICLE 13.

La conférence pourra avoir recours à des experts, qui devront toujours être en nombre égal du côté britannique et du côté français.

ARTICLE 14.

Les Hauts-Commissaires britannique et français désigneront leurs représentants à la conférence dans le mois qui suivra la ratification de la présente convention.

[E 2213 146 89]

No. 227

Acting Consul-General Mayers to Sir Austen Chamberlain — (Received April 7)

(No. 39. Confidential.)

Beirut, March 21, 1920

Sir, ON the approaching return of His Majesty's consul general it may not perhaps be inappropriate to offer a few observations on the general march of affairs in Syria as seen from Beirut.

2. All things considered it must be confessed that, in spite of a good deal of earnest work and a use of various expedients, there is still no very real improvement in the situation. The removal of General Sarrail undoubtedly put the French in a much better position with regard to the revolt. It was, in a way, a fresh start. Certain of the old disadvantages remained — it was true, and those disadvantages were unfortunately fundamental — the special historical relationship between France and the Christian sects and the corresponding tendency of the Moslems to view that relation with distrust and apprehension.

3. However apart from this permanent disability, a fresh start was undoubtedly made when M. de Jouvenel landed in Syria. It is not yet peace, nevertheless. It is not yet peace even in the Lebanon. Only last week an officer newly arrived in the country was ordered to conduct a detachment of some fifty men, partly French, partly Lebanese, to the village of Hama. He went to the village, on the Beirut-Damascus road, until measures of protection for the onward journey of the party should be completed. Instead of waiting he pushed on independently towards Hama, with the result that the detachment was attacked by a strong band of rebels and practically wiped out. The whole of the Lebanon border area, in fact, between the Damascus road and the Palestine frontier is still refractory.

4. In Beirut itself the Moslem leaders are no nearer conciliation. A meeting was recently made by a local notable to bring the different political leaders together and search for common ground. The meeting ended in confusion and no real progress.

5. A Lebanese paper has asked that, before the promised military offensive starts, all prominent men in the Lebanon who are for the French mandate should stand up and say so. I have not heard yet of any such declarations of faith. Most people believe in a foreign mandate, many believe in a French mandate; but all are waiting to see what will happen next. There is no clear conviction one way or the other, unless it is in the minds of the few who want complete independence. In ordinary intercourse one hardly has the opportunity of seeing or hearing a representative of the last category. Probably of all sections of the population they are the only ones who know their own minds. The predominant tone of public opinion is confused and hesitating. Self interest is largely there, as everywhere in the world. I doubt if ever in the Lebanon there will emerge a real sense of patriotism. The country seems too small and divided, too far committed to European influences of various sorts, educational, social, political, for that. At least, one never hears the sterling ring of disinterested conviction in public utterances.

6. M. de Jouvenel, therefore, in the four months that he has been here, has not effected as much as was hoped of him. He is generally credited with intentions which appear generous and liberal after the administrations of General Wevgand and General Sarrail. He is himself a little disillusioned about his task and his mandatory charges. The forces of rebellion have not yet melted away before his

earnestness. He is the kind of man who, unlike the parrots of the press, can still convince that France has a civilizing work to do in Syria. Yet the obstinate situation continues to elude him.

7 On the other hand, it is open to discussion whether he did not strike the wrong note when he first landed at Beirut, and whether in the first few weeks of his administration he did not say too much. He offered peace to those who desired peace, and war to those who chose war. It is thought by some that it would have been wiser to maintain a discreet silence, while beginning, at once, to work quietly for peace everywhere even in the hostile camps. Such negotiations would necessarily have had to start from the assumption that General Sarrail's conception of the mandate and administrative methods had been a mistake and a failure. I cannot see for enough that such an admission would be, but it is at least possible that even if a temporary confession of fault had momentarily resulted in loss of prestige, it would not have taken long to build up again the old position of European influence on the foundations on which throughout the world it is permanently based.

8 M. de Jouvenel has done much but, so far, accomplished little. I suppose that he is nearer peace than he was when he first came to Syria, but only in the military sense. The question of Franco-Syrian harmony seems as far off solution as ever. The next word has been given to General Gamelin, operating in the Damascus region. To a man of M. de Jouvenel's temperament that is in itself a disappointment.

9 The Christians greeted the arrival of the new High Commissioner with undisguised joy. They imagined they were returning to the good old days when the mandatory Power could do no wrong. M. Meha (see my despatch No. 49 paragraph 2) soon proved that it was possible to be French and a friend of M. de Lamoncel and yet to remain the friend of the people. M. Meha first proved his new good faith by ordering the evacuation of the Christians from the Lebanon. M. Meha said that the Christians had been too long in the Lebanon and that they were now to be sent to the Syrian Arab Republic. They are still asking what they fear to lose by inclusion in the Great Lebanon, and they still reply rather aptly by asking what the Christians fear to lose by inclusion in a unified Syria.

It is open to supposition that France's inability to make progress with the nationalist forces is the result of her not having any policy in sympathy with the Arabs in this part of the Near East. In conversation the other day, M. de Jouvenel remarked that he thought the "Lawrence" war was not between the Arabs and the Turks, but the Turks and the Arabs. He did not of course mean this in connection with the Great War, nor, in view of the fact that at the time he was talking over it, of Anglo-French co-operation in connection with his recent visit to Angora. His meaning was, I think, that he felt some indignation over Arab pretensions, and thought the Turk more of a man to merit them. It is possible that a more serious consideration of the interests of the Arab world in Great Britain, the French have never sufficiently taken into their calculations, when they have framed their Syrian policy, the growing insistence of the Arab world.

11 M de Jomvelli's plan at present is obviously to ring round the city by a series of friendly conversations with his neighbours. That with Angora is completed; those with Jerusalem and Bagdad are imminent. The results of these conversations, even should they effect no fundamental change, will be announced with a fanfare of publicity intended to force on the imagination of the rebels the sense of a wall closed round them.

12 M. de Jouvenel's neighbourly friendliness thus fits in with the impression that his repeatedly expressed desire for co-operation with Russia was merely an expedient forced upon him by the necessities of the situation. His astonishingly large schemes for Anglo-Russian co-operation in the Near East after the present rebellion is liquidated. He may have been right in his estimates of the future to the Far East as he has been in the past. It would exploit the Europe of the future as Britain exploits Asia at the moment. Beirut to Smyrna, Constantinople to Bagdad, Persia to India, China to Japan, is what he had in mind.

through Persia, where she is already working, or about to work, in one disguise or

13. As far as one can judge the High Commissioner does not consider that
 it has to choose between Great Britain and Turkey. He thinks that he can be friends
 with both. X 47

Angora. he is not bound hand and foot to the French Ambassador in Constantinople. In the dealings over a variety of matters which I have had with M. de Jouvenot I have found him friendly, desirous to help and free from all ground suspicion.

Copies of this despatch have been sent to Jerusalem, Bagdad, Damascus and Aleppo.

I have, &c
NORMAN MAYER-

E 2215 52 89

No. 22.

Acting Consul Smart to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 7)

 $(\sim 10^6)$

Damascus, March 31, 1920

DAVID, who happened to report that he had met a Jew in the East since my return from Transjordan and Palestine to have a long conversation with M. Pierre Akpe, who had been absent at Beirut and temporarily indisposed

2. I endeavored to remove the apprehensions entertained by him regarding Transjordan. I felt sure I said, that M. de Jouvenel would return from Jerusalem not to me, but to the British High Commissioner in Palestine. I told him that I had seen during the war a Syrian woman who was the sister of the man who had been killed in the case which, though not so evident to me at Damascus, had been brought home to me during my journey, namely, that, after all, it was for Syria to close her own frontiers against the Turkish army, and that it was not a British duty. The fact that I have lost possession of a great part of the northern Syrian frontier leaves Transjordan the burden of what was really Syria's business. Nevertheless, I have seen and that there was great exaggeration in the reports given to the French by the British High Commissioner in Palestine. I told him that I had seen a great number of British soldiers, and that he was not to be deceived by the reports of the mountain. I mentioned that I had seen him in Palestine that had of the British waterband had been effected on the coast between Nakoura and Beirut and was M. de Jouvenel. A British report at Transjordan seemed to show that the rebels were short of ammunition and that was a great part of the British High Commissioner's authorities to check this traffic.

3. M. Alype said that French information was that the rebels had a large stock of munitions but that the entry of new supplies had recently become more difficult because of the blockade of the port of Haifa. He said that the rebels had been unable to establish a contact between Nablus and Beirut but that they had been able to smuggle in the munitions by coastal quays and at sea. The main traffic had been through Transjordania.

6. M. Alope said that at a dinner I had got during my journey in the communities of Druse resistance to the French occupation. I reported that my impression was that the Druses would fight. M. Alope said that he had been told that he got the reports to the effect that the French would not be able to move into a Druse village as they did not find too much importance to these prognostics. He, indeed, thought that it would be better if the Druses were to resist, and this would give the French an opportunity of showing their power. A French victory, which was expected, would greatly facilitate the peace and general settlement.

The ~~business~~ and general ~~substance~~ of the ~~the~~ M. A. I. was ~~the~~ a view of Sir Gilbert Clark's negotiations with John Yahan and others which they were directed towards some form of Amendment to the Bill. He also glared that any such Amendment would be bound to result in the ~~the~~ of a system where the people were at present only doing as well as they could get away at strong measures to support the Academy.

6. I said that I had no information about Sir Gilbert Clayton's mission in the Yunnan, but I imagined that his negotiations were of purely local consequence. I suggested that any form of Arabian unification was a very distant fatality and that the W. seemed to menace our mandated territories before those of France.

8. M. Aylpe and General Andréa maintain their apparently invincible optimism as regards the rebellion in Syria. Neither they or any other French authorities appear to realise that the problem in Syria is political rather than military.

I DON'T
WANT A SMART

No. 223

212

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the question of the situation in Syria was raised in the Chamber of Deputies on the 29th March during the debate on the provisional credits to be accorded to the Government for the month of April. The credit asked for by the Government to meet expenses which were expected to be incurred in Syria amounted to the sum of 23,485,236 fr., whereas the figures for January, February and March were respectively 37 millions, 37 millions and 23.5 millions.

3. Following upon M. Desjardins, M. Baron, a member of the Socialist party, moved an amendment proposing that the credit which had been drafted intended solely for operations both in Syria and Morocco, be reduced by 10 million francs. Later in the debate, M. Baron agreed to alter his amendment and to move that that part of the credit relating to Syria be reduced by 1 million francs. M. Baron declared the object of his amendment was to show the objection which his party felt to the position which France had acquired in Syria, and to demonstrate their desire that she should abandon this position as soon as possible. In his eyes the Syrian mandate would never be an economically sound proposition and far from France gaining in material profit thereby there would be a steady drain on her resources caused by the necessity of maintaining the mandate in Syria. It was essential, he felt, especially in the present state of French finances, that this unsatisfactory situation be brought to an end. Apart, however, from the economic aspect of the question, the Socialist party was deeply concerned by the continuance of active military operations in Syria and by the fact that so many French lives were being lost. It insisted that an end should be put to this state of affairs, and, indeed, to all such colonial expeditions which were entirely contrary to the party's political ideals.

evacuated without delay and an independent State set up, enquired whether the Government was prepared to take steps to come to terms with the Druze.

redesigned to be a wide, shallow, flat-bottomed boat, 265 feet long, 26 feet wide, and 10 feet deep, with a large number of compartments. The boat was built by the Government, together with the Centre and the Right, who declared that in view of the national interests involved they were prepared to support the Government, voted against the amendment.

I have, &c
CREWE

250

(No. 119.)

\$17.

[illegible]

4. The return of this column to Damascus does not appear to have ended the ardour of the rebels in the Ghouta (east of Damascus) and in the whole region surrounding the city. Exchanges of rifle fire take place every night, and by day the French artillery in and around Damascus (on an average of three or four days during the week) is engaged in the fighting, with a range of the guns most

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of the villages surrounding Damascus have either been bombed by aircraft or destroyed by artillery or by the incendiarism of the forces operating around the city. Irregulars, whose savagery and predatory proclivities the French authorities seem unable or find too irksome to check.

Thus does the work of attrition ruthlessly proceed: the French policy is evidently to let the rebels do their worst, and then to crush them. The French authorities are not afraid to employ irregulars (i.e., Circassians, Armenians, Kurds or other irregulars) can be employed. The French have no objection to the employment of irregulars in the Syrian desert, but they are not prepared to let them operate in the vicinity of Damascus.

The French authorities are not yet ready to consider the possibility of a general amnesty for the rebels. Opinions vary as to exactly what amnesty should be accepted, but all agree that a general amnesty is the one essential condition of peace in Syria.

The French authorities are not yet ready to consider the possibility of a general amnesty for the rebels. Opinions vary as to exactly what amnesty should be accepted, but all agree that a general amnesty is the one essential condition of peace in Syria. The French authorities are not yet ready to consider the possibility of a general amnesty for the rebels. Opinions vary as to exactly what amnesty should be accepted, but all agree that a general amnesty is the one essential condition of peace in Syria.

This despatch has also been sent to Jerusalem (No. 10), Amman (No. 11), Baghdad (No. 12), Beirut (No. 13) and Aleppo (No. 14).

J. R. VAUGHAN-RUSSELL.

No. 231

Acting Consul, Damascus to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 26.)

N. 231
Damascus, April 26, 1926.
I have the honour to inform you that, during the afternoon of 25th April, Druses and other irregulars, who have been operating in the Syrian desert, have been seen in the vicinity of Damascus. (Repeated to Jerusalem No. 6, Baghdad, No. 3, and Cairo.)

[E 2709 146 89]

No. 232

The Marquis of Crewe to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 20.)

(No. 792.)

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inform you that, during the afternoon of 25th April, Druses and other irregulars, who have been operating in the Syrian desert, have been seen in the vicinity of Damascus. (Repeated to Jerusalem No. 6, Baghdad, No. 3, and Cairo.)

The Marquis of Crewe to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 20.)

Senate to agree to this postponement and not to cause any embarrassment to the Government at the present time. M. Bérard stated that he was prepared to accept M. Poincaré's undertaking, and in consequence withdrew the amendment which he had previously tabled reducing the credit for the Ministry of War by 100 fr.

I have, &c
CREWE

E 2932/146/89]

No. 233

Consul Vaughan-Russell to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 11.)

(No. 146.)

Sir,

Damascus, April 27, 1926.

WITH reference to Mr. Smart's despatch No. 65 of the 12th February last, I have the honour to inform you that the appointment of Naimi Bey to the Presidency of Syria has been confirmed by the High Commissioner. Naimi Bey is a well-known and respected figure in the Syrian community, and his appointment is a matter of great importance to the Syrian people.

The above appointment has been anticipated for a long time and the High Commissioner's decision has been met with much warmth and persistence in the Syrian community. Naimi Bey is a well-known and respected figure in the Syrian community, and his appointment is a matter of great importance to the Syrian people. The High Commissioner's decision has been met with much warmth and persistence in the Syrian community. Naimi Bey is a well-known and respected figure in the Syrian community, and his appointment is a matter of great importance to the Syrian people.

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It is too early yet to foresee what effects this new appointment will have upon the Syrian situation. Naimi Bey has not yet arrived here to take up his post. I shall not fail to acquaint you with further developments in due course. (Copies of this despatch have been sent to Jerusalem (No. 117), Amman (No. 124), Baghdad (No. 111), Beirut (No. 140) and Aleppo (No. 94).)

I have, &c
J. R. VAUGHAN-RUSSELL.

Consul Vaughan-Russell to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 11.)

(No. 149)

Sir,

Damascus, Syria, April 27, 1926.

I HAVE been informed by the British Air Ministry that the capture of Sueida, the capital of the Jebel Druse on the afternoon of the 21st, instant by the French military forces of General Andréa.

2. No doubt you will obtain through the Air Ministry or War Office a full report on the matter, prepared by the British liaison officer at Beirut, who was present during the operations which resulted in the capture of Sueida. I will therefore, not venture to describe the military operations in any detail, but confine my remarks to the events leading up to the above operations, and to the results which may be expected to follow the above military event.

3. Preparations for the attack on the Jebel Druse—so long threatened by the French authorities—had been held until the last possible moment. I am inclined to think that the French authorities had hoped that the threats of a campaign which they held over the heads of the Druses, would induce the latter to surrender before the spring, and thus obviate the destruction of their villages and crops—a disaster which a campaign would assuredly bring upon them.

4. For a long time, every effort had been made to undermine the moral of the Druses and their allies, the Syrian revolutionaries, by spreading news and reports likely to discourage them. The most important reports spread alleged that there were serious defections within the ranks of the leaders of the rebellion, that there were numerous surrenders of leaders of the rebel movement, that large numbers of villages were capitulating, and that the losses suffered by the rebels in every engagement or skirmish where French columns came into contact with them were exceedingly heavy. Whether the foregoing reports were really true is open to some doubt, but even so, they were evidently exaggerations of the truth.

5. In any case, if these reports were multiplied and broadcasted with a view to inducing the Druses to surrender, the result has been a failure. The Druses knew all along that the French reports concerning their moral, their casualties and their resisting powers were inaccurate, and that the French army as well as French public opinion in France would not relish a punitive expedition into their mountainous country.

6. I am inclined to think that in the same way as the French hoped that the Druses would surrender before they should be crushed, the Druses also hoped that the French would not put into execution their threats against them.

7. As the Druses had not surrendered, the French have been forced to go forward with their expedition. The result of the operations has been that a large stretch of country still remains out of French control. The result which, I think, the French military authorities hoped to (and to a certain extent did) achieve was to drive the rebel elements scattered in various parts of Syria into a corner and there to round them up. Many rebels were killed in these operations, but also large numbers escaped and found their way to the main body of the rebel forces in the Jebel.

8. Reinforcements and stores were sent down by rail to the French centres on the railway in the Hauran plain, west of the Jebel, notably Ezra Derna, Chazaleh and also Bokra Eski Sham. While the troops which had participated in the operations near Nebk and Mount Hermon were resting, and the reinforcements were being sent down, preliminary aerial bombardments of Druse centres were carried out. I am informed that these bombardments were on a very large scale and that they must have wrought great havoc among the Druses.

9. It may conceivably have been hoped by the French authorities that the foretaste of ruthless war thus administered by them to the Druses would have

brought them to their knees. It did not have that effect, if it was hoped that it would.

10. By mid April both sides realised that their enemy would not surrender. The French planned to execute their move on Sueida, advancing in two columns simultaneously from Bokra Eski Sham and from Ezra. Their forces in these two columns totalled roughly 12,000 men, and the capture of Sueida appears to have been effected without serious difficulty and according to the pre-conceived French plan.

11. The Druses, realising that their failure to surrender would bring upon them and their mountain the severest punitive measures which a modern mechanically equipped army could inflict, and the heroism to what they must have expected, inspired them with a new determination. In spite of the fact that the French and themselves, the Druses prepared to put up a fight. The move on Sueida should not be a triumphal progress through their country. Estimates put the number of Druses which engaged the two columns at 1,000 to 5,000 men. Their casualties appear to have been heavy, but only approximate figures can be hazarded.

12. The operations in the Jebel Druse are generally admitted to be somewhat exaggerated. The French have been successful in capturing Sueida, but the Druses have not been crushed. The French have been forced to go forward with their expedition. The result of the operations has been that a large stretch of country still remains out of French control.

13. The French have been forced to go forward with their expedition. The result of the operations has been that a large stretch of country still remains out of French control. The French have been forced to go forward with their expedition. The result of the operations has been that a large stretch of country still remains out of French control.

14. General Andréa, having been appointed Governor for several months past, is expected to establish himself there and to endeavour to set up again a Government administration. Perhaps the situation in the Jebel Druse, which is now in the grip of war, will be a serious one. The French have been forced to go forward with their expedition. The result of the operations has been that a large stretch of country still remains out of French control.

15. The French have been forced to go forward with their expedition. The result of the operations has been that a large stretch of country still remains out of French control. The French have been forced to go forward with their expedition. The result of the operations has been that a large stretch of country still remains out of French control.

16. The French have been forced to go forward with their expedition. The result of the operations has been that a large stretch of country still remains out of French control. The French have been forced to go forward with their expedition. The result of the operations has been that a large stretch of country still remains out of French control.

(Copies of this despatch have been sent to the following: Amman (No. 123), Bagdad (No. 112), Beirut (No. 141), and Aleppo (No. 95).)

I have, &c.

J. R. VAUGHAN RUSSELL

Consul-General Satow to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 11.)

No. 67.)

Beirut, April 28, 1926.

Sir,

THE local press announced the day before yesterday both that the French troops had captured the town of Hama and that the Hama Ahmed Nami Bey had been appointed Chief of State. The latter news is a very important one, and it could itself choose a permanent Chief of State. The fact that the French success a definite turning-point has been reached and that from henceforth a

new era is beginning in Syria is a very important one. Ahmed Nami Bey, who is a very important figure in the Syrian movement, has been appointed Chief of State. The fact that the French success a definite turning-point has been reached and that from henceforth a new era is beginning in Syria is a very important one.

3. His first appearance in public was on the 15th of June, 1920, on the arrival of General Sarrail, who was then High Commissioner. From the prominence which Ahmed Nami then gained it was at the time thought that some public appointment was in store for him. There was even a talk that he might be appointed Governor of the Great Lebanon, as there was then some question of appointing a native Governor. However, this did not materialize.

As already stated, he has taken but little part in public life here, and it is in his favour that he has not been one of the crowd of office-seeking sycophants who have been so prominent since the arrival of the French. According to the local papers, he has demanded and obtained from M. de Sournel more or less a free hand and has been authorized to choose freely his Ministers and collaborators. I happened recently to mention Ahmed Nami to a local Moslem notable and asked what he thought of him. He replied that, while he had perhaps no very outstanding qualities, he was at any rate honest. I understand that he has left to-day for Damascus with the High Commissioner, who, on the occasion of his installation of head of the Provisional Government of Syria, is to make an important speech.

I have, &c

H. E. SATOW

2. 44

(No. 181.)

348

Domodroma, April 29, 1926

2. The notice, it will be seen, is couched in the vaguest possible terms. Most probably it would seem to have been issued with the intention of providing justification or excuse later for the French military authorities for damage to life and property resulting from their present measures of coercion.

4. For the last six months indiscriminate bombing and bombardment of villages and quarters of Damascus have been carried on without, to the best of my knowledge, any warning to enable women, children and old men to withdraw ever having been given. It is almost incomprehensible that, after the lapse of over six months, it should now even be thought necessary that warning should be given for any repressive or coercive measures to be taken.

bombarding. As bombing and bombardment without the giving of prior notice has been the rule from the outset, it is difficult to understand what the motives of the French are. It is true that the loss of life and property, for, if genuine consideration had been the keynote of war, the use of gas and fire would not have been introduced into it.

6. A further point worthy of consideration is the reasons given which may render necessary measures of coercion, namely the failure of certain persons to pay a fine. I do not know whether the failure of inhabitants to pay a fine (whatever its nature) constitutes a sufficient reason to justify the use of coercive measures such as are contemplated. By stretching international law a point it might, perhaps, be arguable that the refusal to pay a war indemnity constitutes a menace to the public security, and that when national law is insufficient such measures may be dealt with by such "measures of coercion" as may be considered most effective by the competent authority.

7. At a meeting of the consular corps yesterday, my colleagues and myself discussed the above notice, and a note has to-day been addressed to the French delegation copy of which I have the honour to enclose. The note requests that full explanations may be given to the consular corps as to the nature of the measures of coercion envisaged and requests information as to what villages or quarters may be affected by the measures contemplated. It also requests that the consuls may be given sufficient time to remove their subjects living in the threatened zones into places of safety, and it also expresses the agreement of the consular corps with the attitude of the French Military Government in its declaration that he can accept no responsibility for accidents which may

Major of the 1st Infantry Division, told me a few days ago that the troops have been taken to destroy the rebels and that the protests are being met with a show of force. I am inclined to believe that the situation is serious and that the government is determined to suppress the rebellion. It is also possible that the rebels are being encouraged by foreign powers. The situation is very serious and the government is taking all necessary steps to maintain order.

inhibition of the plan
for the refusal by the Prun
to come back in the future

(Copies of this despatch have been sent to Jerusalem (No. 121), Amman (No. 128), Haifa (No. 115), Beirut (No. 144) and Aleppo (No. 97).

I have, etc.

J. R. VAUGHAN-RUSSELL

Enclosure 1 in No. 236.

Continuées par la Presse,

Un certain nombre de villages de la Ghouta ou de quartiers de la ville, se trouvent
à l'extérieur de la zone de sécurité. Le général commandant les troupes
a fait de la non-exécution des clauses entendues, le général commandant les troupes
de la région militaire, les femmes, les vieillards et les enfants, car le
Gouverneur militaire, après cet avis, n'entend avoir aucune responsabilité, même morale,
quant aux accidents qui pourraient survenir

Λάρισα, 1ε 27 απριλ 1926

Mr Keeley to M Allyn

M E x c u s e

[illegible]

Ku ora que les autorités romandes déclarent que certains
la ville doivent être l'objet de mesures de coopération.

measures, ainsi que celles
se connecter avec l'

lieux indiqués ci-dessus. En outre, les autorités locales ont bien voulu lui faire connaître qu'elles sont les seules à avoir l'intention d'adopter pour mettre les conseils à même d'assurer la protection efficace de leurs ressortissants dans les villages ou quartiers exposés aux mesures de coercition.

Le corps consulaire ne partage pas l'avis de M. le Gouverneur militaire, qui pourrait, par la simple publication de ce communiqué, décliner toute responsabilité quant aux incidents qui pourraient survenir à la suite des mesures de coopération envisagées et tient toujours la Puissance mandataire responsable de la sauvegarde de la vie et des biens des étrangers.

Le corps consulaire, ayant à cœur de faciliter autant que possible la tâche des autorités mandataires et tout en reconnaissant la sollicitude bienveillante montrée dans le passé par les autorités françaises à l'égard des étrangers, renouvelle ses assurances de n'être inspiré que par le désir de vouloir collaborer avec la Puissance mandataire dans ses efforts pour assurer la protection des étrangers.

Vouille, &c.

J. H. KEENEY, JR.

Consul des États-Unis à Damas.
Docteur du Corps consulaire.

No. 237

Council Vaughan-Murray to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 17.)

(No. 161)

1997

Дмитровск, Май 6, 1926

WITH reference to my despatch No. 155 of the 3rd instant, I have the honour to report that the new President of the State of Syria yesterday announced that he had formed a Cabinet, and the following are the names of the new Ministers. —

| | | | |
|----------------------------|-----|-----|----------------------------|
| Minister of the Interior | ... | ... | Husny Bey El Barazy |
| Minister of Finance | ... | ... | Shakir Nimat Bey Shaabany. |
| Minister of Education | ... | ... | Faruq Bey El Khoury |
| Acting Minister of Justice | ... | ... | Yusef Bey El Hakim. |
| Minister of Agriculture | ... | ... | Wahik Bey El Muayad. |
| Minister of Public Works | ... | ... | Lutfi Bey El Haffar. |

2. Three out of the six Ministers mentioned above, namely, the Ministers of the Interior, Education and Public Works, are members of the "Party of the People," which has been identified with the present rebellion.

5. Hassan Bey El Harazi is a Moslem notable of Hama, of Kurdiah extraction (a fact of which he is reputed to be very proud). He has little claim to fame in Syria, where he is chiefly known as a rich landowner, with little administrative experience. The portfolio of the Interior is considered by many persons here to be almost the most important of all, as the Minister of the Interior will be expected to arrange the vital electoral machinery, to organise the all-important new elections and above all to frame the new Constitution of the State of Syria. The fact that he is little versed in administrative matters may well throw the organisation of the elections upon the shoulders of the French authorities, who, no doubt (whatever the outward appearances may be), will continue to a large extent, if not to the degree of virtually controlling them to influence the course of the elections. Hassan Bey El Harazi's appointment is, therefore, likely to find little disfavour among all parties interested, whether French or Syrian—at least until the elections actually commence.

4. As regards Shakir Nisat Bey Shabnam, I would invite a reference to Aleppo despatch No. 20 of the 26th January last (paragraph 4). He is not known to be a member of the Party of the People, but his past record is such as to credit him with no particular Francophil feelings.

5 Faru-el Khoury is one of the leading lights of the Party of the People. He is a Christian, a lawyer and the chief of the "Ordre des Avocats." He is, moreover, popular with all sections of the Syrian nation and is known to be Francophile.

6 Youssef el-Hakim is of Lattakin origin and a judge of the Court of Cassation. He is popular, but has had little previous experience of service in a Syrian Ministry.

7. Wathuk-el Muayad was formerly in the Turkish diplomatic service, and is fairly polished if not a clever person. He has an English wife and is popular among all sections of Damascus, among whom the Muayad family has been well known and respected for generations. Until recently he was the director of the Syrian Department of Land Registry.

8 Lath of-Huffar, the new Minister of Public Works, has been for the past three or four years vice-president of the Damascus Chamber of Commerce. He is a member of the Party of the People and president of the Moslem Refugee Relief Committee here. He is popular and a fairly capable official.

2. None of these persons can be identified as puppets of the French authorities. They are members of the Cabinet shown signs of

Damascus is now much more optimistic than it has been for the past few months, that is, since the peace negotiations in the Jebel Druze, undertaken by Amin and Arian, raised Syria's hopes only for them to be dashed to the ground. It is too early yet to prognosticate and to foresee what course events here will take. Unquestionably we are on the eve of events of great importance, the future of the country will to a great extent be decided as the result of the deliberations and negotiations of the next few weeks.

... of this dispatch have been sent to Jerusalem (No. 128), Amman (No. 134), Beirut (No. 131) and Aleppo (No. 102).

I have, &c.

J. R. VAUGHAN-RUSSELL,

[E 2243 12 89]

No. 235

Acting Consul Vaughan Russell to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 27)

No 165)

215

Damascus, Syria, May 15, 1928

Sir, WITH reference to my despatch No 151 of the 29th ultimo, I have the honour to report that the French authorities have not yet replied to the consular corps note of the 24th ultimo. The only reply, if it can thus be described, has been a bombard-

[15036]

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near the Meydan quarter (a large area, about 300 yards long and 100 yards wide, from shells, having been dropped on this quarter). The area newly laid waste is vaster than that destroyed during the historic bombardment of the 16th to 20th October last, but I am given to understand that the value of the property damaged on this occasion is not so great as before.

2. As anticipated by me in paragraph 8 of my despatch under reference, the consular note of the 29th April last does not appear to have influenced in the least the policy of the French authorities. On the contrary, the above bombardment shows that the measures of coercion are being carried out with redoubled vigour and with little, if any, increased consideration for the lives and property of foreigners or of Syrian women and children.

3. I have been asked to collect information concerning the above bombardment of the Meydan quarter of Damascus.

4. In the first place, I have the honour to transmit herewith the French official version of this bombardment*. It is contained in two official communiqués published in the Syrian press on the 9th and 11th instant respectively, and explains that the bombardment was carried out to save Damascus from the menace of an attack by brigands who had concentrated in the Meydan quarter. This concentration of rebels (a few hundred at the most) is quite likely, but opinions must differ as to whether their presence constituted a menace to the safety of Damascus so grave as to justify a bombardment such as that which took place on the 7th instant.

5. The version given by the Damascus public and by persons who escaped from the Meydan quarter is somewhat different. It is to the effect that on the 6th instant a column, composed of about 500 irregular and French native troops, was sent to the Meydan quarter, and from there continued its march to the villages of Yalda and Babla, situated 3 or 4 miles to the east of the Meydan quarter outside the city. While on its way through the Meydan and beyond it, the column was fired upon by rebels who, it is said, eventually obliged the column to return to Damascus. Of course, it is possible that the object of the column was to effect a reconnaissance, and that it was intended to return to Damascus in any case, but even so, it suffered some casualties, and in retaliation the troops are said to have set fire to some houses in the Meydan and to others between Meydan and Yalda. The same day, in the afternoon, a number of rebels surrounded the military post manned by Circassian irregulars near the Ziftiyeh Camel Market at Meydan, killed seven and captured the rest who, it is said, were subsequently killed.

6. Damascenes state that in revenge the Meydan quarter was heavily bombed and shelled between 4.45 a.m. and 5.15 a.m. on the 7th instant and immediately afterwards tanks and armoured cars, accompanied by a body of irregulars and French native troops, were sent to the Meydan to follow up the attack upon the inhabitants of that quarter. The soldiers set fire to several houses. I have confirmation from an absolutely reliable source of the fact that the troops deliberately set on fire many buildings in the Meydan, after having sprinkled them with kerosene. The fire brigade was forbidden by the French authorities to go to the Meydan to attempt to extinguish the fires which, at least six in number, raged from Bab Musallah to Bawabullah, that is, the whole length of the Meydan, a distance of over three-quarters of a mile. It was only on the 10th instant that the Damascus fire brigade was allowed to attempt to subdue the fires, which by this time had almost burnt themselves out, not before they had, however, laid waste practically half the Meydan quarter. It is estimated that at least 500 or 600 houses and two mosques were destroyed either during the bombardment or as a result of incendiarism. Many estimates place the number of destroyed houses and shops at well over 1,000.

7. At least 200, in which figure are included a large percentage of women and children. They claim that the troops killed indiscriminately anybody whom they saw in the Meydan during their sortie, and that the majority of victims were not persons actively engaged in fighting against the French, but people who quietly stayed in the quarter. It is further stated that, moreover, that prior notice for women and children to leave the Meydan was not given. It is also stated that women and children should be evacuated. After the attack on the Meydan, the French troops carried their spoils through the streets of Damascus with an effrontery which it is impossible to describe.

* Not printed.

7. I learn from a reliable source that the newly-formed Syrian Cabinet met on the evening of the 7th instant, and made strong representations to the French authorities on the subject of this Meydan bombardment. M. Pierre Aylpe is stated to have replied that, as the French military authorities had learnt that 500 rebels had gathered in the Meydan and were planning to attack Damascus, the measures had been taken to save the Damascenes themselves, as well as the French colony, from the atrocities which the rebels would certainly have committed if they had been given a chance of attacking the city.

8. After the bombardment the survivors of the Meydan quarter, in a stream of cowed and wretched humanity, moved into other parts of Damascus (where they could find temporary shelter), bearing the few objects which they had been able to save from the destruction of the bombardment and the flames and the rapacity and cruelty of the irregulars. The refugees gathered on the 7th and 8th instant in front of the police headquarters and demanded the return of the things which had been taken from them.

9. A crowd of women and children gathered on the 8th instant in front of the Serail (Government Buildings), asking the Government to put an end to this cruel state of affairs. About fifty wailing women gathered in front of this consulate on the 8th, and again on the 12th instant, demanding the intervention of this consulate. Similar demonstrations took place outside the other consulates in Damascus.

10. Owing to the fact that the area destroyed lies outside the barbed wire defences of the city and is still, as it was before, virtually a battle-zone, it has been difficult to visit it and to form by personal inspection an estimate of the extent of the havoc wrought and of the value of the property destroyed. In any case, it would appear that, fortunately, little, if any, damage has been done to the property of British subjects.

11. A tour of inspection of the ruined Meydan seems to me hardly necessary. The area destroyed contained chiefly Arab residential property of no outstanding value. If one assumes that the loss amounts to 500 houses of an average value of £300, the total destruction of property alone would aggregate £150,000. If merchandise, valuables, carpets and furniture be added to this total, I would estimate the loss at £200,000. This is, of course, a very rough estimate, but I think conservative.

12. The losses suffered by foreign nationals are, I think, not likely to be very great. As for some time past the majority of inhabitants of the Meydan, both foreigners as well as Syrians, have been abandoning their homes in that quarter, which has long enjoyed the deserved reputation of being an unhealthy place to live in. There are, however, many Iraqis and Transjordanians in the Meydan and also a considerable number of Nejdians. I have already received claims from three British protected persons whose houses (with the contents) were destroyed or damaged. I have also received information of the loss of life among British nationals as a result of the Meydan bombardment.

13. I am very loath to express any opinion upon the bombardment of the Meydan or upon the reasons or events which provoked it. That there were rebels in the Meydan is undisputable, for this quarter has unquestionably been in rebel possession since last November. The French authorities might argue, therefore, that the quarter could well have been subjected to coercive measures at the outset, and that the bombardment of the 7th instant was a punishment delayed only until it became necessary to avoid the danger of a menace to the city of Damascus itself. I am personally of opinion that the menace from rebels in the Meydan has never been really dangerous to the city, nor was there any real danger of Damascus being attacked on the 6th or 7th instant. The French military authorities, no doubt, had their own reasons for supposing otherwise, and, in the state of war and martial law existing here, had ample justification for putting into execution strong coercive measures against the Meydan, where the rebels have undoubtedly been sheltering owing to the destruction of their villages in the Ghouta.

14. One cannot help feeling that the measures taken were unnecessarily severe and that little serious effort was made to exercise discrimination when the killing of inhabitants of the Meydan was carried out. It is open to doubt whether the wanton incendiarism and destruction wrought in the Meydan will succeed in breaking the resistance of the rebels as soon as the French expect. The French evidently hope that by the wholesale destruction of life and property a feeling of hopelessness in continuing the struggle will be engendered in the minds of the population. I hope will probably be realized.

eventually, but, in view of the bitterness of feeling provoked by the present French policy of "frightfulness," it is to be feared that after the country has been subdued the mandatory authorities will be confronted with new problems directly arising out of the present short sighted policy of terrorism.

Copies of this despatch have been sent to Jerusalem (No. 134), Amman (No. 137) Bagdad (No. 124) Beirut (No. 156) and Aleppo (No. 105).

I have, &c

J R VAUGHAN RUSSELL

E 3305 148 89

No. 230

Consul-General Satow to Sir Austen Chamberlain—(Received May 31)

(No. 168)

Damascus, May 18, 1926

TWO local papers, the "Orient" and the "Syrie," have to-day published reports to be the programme, consisting of ten points, of the policy of the Syrian Ministry. It is for the acting British consul at Damascus to comment on this programme.

The programme is as follows:—

"Donner au mandat les formes d'un traité qui sera passé entre la France et la Syrie pour une période de trente ans, traité qui fixera les droits, les obligations et les relations réciproques des deux nations. Il s'inspirera de celui conclu entre la France et l'Irak."

"Le mandat sera révisé à la fin de la période de trente ans, et la France s'engage à ne pas le renouveler."

"The 'Syrie,' which has for years, and not without success, attempted to create the impression that it is a semi-official organ, and which certainly is in the receipt of a regular subvention, in consequence of which it is able to publish such reports."

"Nous sommes fort touchés de la priorité qu'il nous a accordée. Nous ne pouvons cependant entendre réserver à la France: priorité économique seulement, spéciale à la Syrie. Qu'est-ce à dire? Voilà qui devra être strictement défini par des traités de bonne et due forme."

4. It seems not unreasonable to assume that the Syrian Ministry, in drawing up its programme, has in touch with the French authorities. If this is so, the programme is not so much a surprise as it seems to be. The idea is, however, so patently contrary to the spirit of the mandate that I think it well at once to call attention to this matter.

I have, &c

H E SATOW

E 3349 77 89

No. 240

Acting Consul Vaughan-Russell to Sir Austen Chamberlain—(Received June 2)

(No. 168)

Sir,

Damascus, May 18, 1926

WITH reference to my despatch No. 165 of the 15th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith the copy of the reply from the French Envoy Extraordinary at Damascus to the consular corps' note of the 28th ultimo, copy of which I forwarded under cover of my despatch No. 151 of the 29th ultimo.

2. I have the honour also to forward herewith copy of the reply of the consular corps to the above note from the French delegation here.

3. General Vallier's reply to the consular corps' note is, I venture to think, as satisfactory as can be expected in the present difficult situation. The last paragraph of his letter, in particular, holds out hopes that the lives and property of foreigners will

be safeguarded in the future. If General Vallier will indeed furnish to the consular corps a copy of all notices sent to villages near Damascus or to the quarters of the city upon which fines are imposed, and if these notices can be circulated to consuls in sufficient time to permit them to withdraw their nationals from the possible danger of coercive measures in the event of the non-payment of these fines, there should be a reasonable chance of safeguarding the lives and property of foreign nationals.

4. A further satisfactory feature of General Vallier's letter is the general helpful tone of its expression. Hitherto offers to collaborate with the mandatory authorities in the event of the non-payment of these fines, there should be a reasonable chance of safeguarding the lives and property of foreign nationals.

(Copies of this despatch have been sent to Jerusalem (No. 134), Amman (No. 137) Bagdad (No. 126), Beirut (No. 157) and Aleppo (No. 105).)

I have, &c

J R VAUGHAN RUSSELL

Enclosure 1 in No. 240

M. Pierre-Allypé to Mr. Keeley.

Damas, le 14 mai 1926

M. le Doyen,

ME référant à votre lettre du 28 avril, j'ai l'honneur de vous adresser, en réponse, la réponse que m'a fait parvenir M. le Général Vallier, chargé du maintien de l'ordre et de la sécurité dans la région de Damas.

Je suis persuadé que les indications données par cet officier général apaiseront les inquiétudes manifestées par le corps consulaire de cette ville.

Je vous prie,

PIERRE-ALYPÉ

Enclosure 2 in No. 240

General Vallier to M. Pierre-Allypé.

Damas, le 8 mai 1926

M. l'envoyé extraordinaire

EN vous faisant retour, en joint de la lettre, en date du 28 avril, de M. l'envoyé du corps consulaire de Damas que vous avez bien voulu me faire parvenir pour que je puisse lui adresser mon honneur de porter à votre connaissance.

1. Quoique inséré dans la presse du 28 avril ne vise que les villages de la région de Damas, les amendes en nature et numéraire sont infligées en représailles de faits déterminés, tels que complicité ouverte et répétée avec les bandes ou attaque de nos troupes ou de représentants des autorités françaises ou syriennes.

2. Quo, loin de constituer une nouvelle menace contre les villages, il ne vise qu'à épargner la vie des femmes, des vieillards et des enfants en avertissant les populations intéressées que la non-exécution des conditions qui leur sont imposées les expose à des actions de contrainte susceptibles d'amener la perte de vies humaines.

3. Que ces actions de contrainte peuvent consister soit en des humiliations, soit en des travaux à l'usage des débris imposés, soit en opérations offensives suivies éventuellement de saisie de biens destinés à être vendus au profit du budget syrien et en rétribution des services rendus.

Je vous serais reconnaissant de bien vouloir intervenir auprès de M. le Doyen du corps consulaire pour lui faire connaître.

1. Que le fait de donner un délai pour l'exécution des conditions imposées à un village déterminé constitue en lui-même un préavis permettant aux populations coupables de prendre toutes mesures pour échapper à des sanctions éventuelles.

2. Que je ne puis me dispenser de vous signaler au contraire des opérations de répression que je me verrais dans l'obligation de monter et pour la répression desquelles le secret est absolument nécessaire.

M. le Général Vallier, qui demeure entièrement disposé à favoriser sa mission de protection des ressortissants étrangers en lui faisant tenir un exemplaire des avis envoyés aux villages ou quartiers auxquels des amendes sont imposées, afin de permettre aux consuls intéressés d'aviser en temps voulu lesdits ressortissants des dangers qu'ils peuvent courir en cas de non-exécution.

Veuillez, &c.
VALLIER

Enclosure 3 in No. 240

Mr. Keeley to M. Pierre-Alype

Decanat du Corps consulaire, Damas,
le 18 mai 1926

M. l'Envoyé extraordinaire,

Je vous prie de bien vouloir transmettre à M. le Général Vallier par laquelle vous avez bien voulu me transmettre la réponse de M. le Général Vallier à la note du corps consulaire en date du 28 avril 1926, au sujet de la protection des étrangers, surtout les mesures à être prises pour éviter aux étrangers les périls auxquels ils pourraient être exposés par les mesures de coercition dont un certain nombre de villages de la Ghouta ou de quartiers de la ville pourraient être l'objet.

Le corps consulaire vous prie de bien vouloir transmettre à M. le Général Vallier ses remerciements pour les indications qu'il a bien voulu lui donner et qui sont très utiles aux consuls vis-à-vis de leurs ressortissants respectifs.

Le corps consulaire est particulièrement heureux de noter que M. le Général Vallier est disposé à accepter sa collaboration afin d'assurer la protection des étrangers en lui faisant tenir un exemplaire des avis envoyés aux villages ou quartiers qui peuvent être l'objet de mesures de coercition, afin de permettre aux consuls d'aviser leurs ressortissants des dangers qu'ils courraient en temps suffisant pour leur permettre de se retirer hors du danger. Il croit que cette collaboration n'aurait pour résultat que de mieux sauvegarder la vie et les biens des étrangers sans porter aucun préjudice aux opérations que les autorités mandataires trouveraient nécessaire de mener.

Tout en réservant le droit de leurs Gouvernements respectifs à tenir responsables les autorités mandataires pour tout dommage causé aux personnes et aux biens des étrangers, le corps consulaire voudrait vous rassurer, M. l'Envoyé extraordinaire, qu'il ne désire point et n'a jamais voulu entraver l'exécution de la tâche de la Puissance mandataire en Syrie. Étant intéressés seulement de la protection adéquate de leurs ressortissants et voulant autant que possible faciliter l'œuvre des autorités françaises à cet égard, les consuls à Damas espèrent que dorénavant ils pourront se concerter avec elles pour sa réalisation.

Veuillez, &c.

J. H. KEELEY, Jr.,

Consul des États-Unis à Damas.

Depuis le Corps consulaire.

[E 3350,146 89]

No. 241

Acting Consul Vaughan-Russell to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 2)

(No. 63)

Sir

Damascus, May 19, 1926.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 161 of the 6th instant, I have the honour to report that, after much delay, the President of the Syrian Government, Ahmed Nami Bey, has announced the programme of his Government and Cabinet. I enclose herewith the text of the "declaration ministérielle" published in the Syrian press of yesterday's date.

The aims of the new Syrian Government are many and their scope is very wide. While this programme will rejoice the hearts of all Syrians by the fact that it holds out hopes that the carrying out of so many reforms and popular demands is envisaged, it is equally certain that the vagueness of the working of the programme has created an unfavourable impression in many circles here.

The French High Commissioner has approved "in principle" of the programme, as it is now being put forward. M. de Jouvenel, who arrived here yesterday and whose arrival here was the signal for an ovation by crowds of Damascenes, who were in a most expectant mood, is expected to make important pronouncements during the course of the next day or two regarding the new Syrian Government's programme.

It will, of course, be impossible for the Syrian Cabinet to carry out this programme, or even a part of it, unless the mandatory authorities agree to make large concessions on numerous and fundamental questions. I am inclined to believe that many concessions will be made in order to avoid the further loss of French lives in the guerilla warfare which has been going on and with a view to the re-establishment of order in the country.

The French authorities would seem to have still avoided making a definite decision on the programme. It seems probable that the Government empowered to carry it out. It seems probable that the Government, however much it may strive to carry out the ten points of the programme, will be forced to make a single move or to realise the programme in its programme unless the course is agreed in its programme. After the Syrian Constituent Assembly has been elected and the question of the relations between France and the State of Syria has been decided, it may perhaps be possible to estimate what the chances are that the Syrian Government programme will be carried out. Until then speculation on the matter will be idle and futile, although it is possible that the speech which M. de Jouvenel is expected to make to-day or to-morrow may throw some light upon the views of the mandatory Government as regards the programme of the new Syrian Cabinet.

Copies of this despatch have been sent to Jerusalem (No. 187), Amman (No. 189), Beirut (No. 188), and Aleppo (No. 187).

I have, &c.

R. VAUGHAN RUSSELL.

Enclosure in No. 241

Extrait from the "Syrie" of May 18, 1926

LA DECLARATION MINISTÉRIELLE

Le Gouvernement syrien a communiqué à la presse le programme suivant

Le Gouvernement s'efforcera de réaliser le programme suivant qu'il a adopté comme son action :

1. Réviser une Assemblée constituante qui se chargera de l'élaboration de la Constitution du pays sur la base de la souveraineté nationale.

2. Donner au mandat les formes d'un traité qui sera passé entre la France et la Syrie pour une période de trente ans, traité qui fixera les droits, les obligations et les responsabilités de la France et de la Syrie.

3. Réviser le traité de commerce conclu entre la Grande-Bretagne et l'Irak et ne deviendra exécutoire qu'après avoir été approuvé par l'Assemblée nationale syrienne. Il réservera à la France le droit de veto sur les traités de commerce conclus sans porter atteinte à la souveraineté nationale.

4. Réaliser l'unité syrienne par des moyens déjà entrepris et qui, nous l'espérons, ne tarderont pas à donner à la nation des résultats fructueux.

5. Unifier le régime judiciaire sur la base de la souveraineté nationale, de façon à sauvegarder les droits des nationaux aussi bien que ceux des étrangers.

6. Créer une armée nationale de façon à permettre aux troupes françaises de quitter le pays.

7. Demander l'admission de la Syrie à la Société des Nations ainsi que la reconnaissance extérieure analogue à celle accordée à l'Irak.

8. Réviser la réforme du système monétaire actuel et rétablir progressivement la base ou pour la monnaie officielle du pays.

- No. 242

(No. 152. Certificate.)

I have ventured to forward the enclosed letter from Mr McFarland as it characterizes the feeling which has been going on around and in Dunsmuir for the past few months.

4. I do not propose to comment upon the other questions regarding the French policy of brutality and "frightfulness" raised in the letter addressed to me by Mr. M. F. ...

I have, &c.

J. R. VAUGHAN-RUSSELL

Enclosure in No. 242.

Rep. W. J. McFarland to Acting Consul Vaughan-Russell.

Dear Mr Russell,

Irish Migration, Danganema, April 29, 1904.

a feeling that they at the most can be only supposed to entertain, if there is no overt act
 a very many, very many soldiers' families, for whom politics is but a mere
 enough food for themselves and their families, for whom politics is but a mere
 of game for chiefs and leaders to play at, with unfortunately the lives and lives of
 these humble people as a consequence of the game.

As I said, the Christian quarter was not isolated, as the village is outside of our quarter. I spent the winter of 1904-5 at the mission, and during that time I saw many of the Christians and passing through such times as you know. I have been here for the last six months owing to the fact that the mission is now in a very bad state. When I first saw these Christians, even though they were poor and in a very bad state, I thought, "My fellow-Moslems, is it any wonder there is growing up a new generation of them—not dangerous now, perhaps, but very dangerous under the present conditions? In any case, a very undesirable state of things."

Of course I know very well that the above incident was not an isolated one. It is but one of many similar ones that took place during the winter and early autumn. And it would seem, too, as if many more such are in store for us. As I write, reports and rumours are being circulated as to what took place at Kasr Buz this morning—of wholesale looting, burning the houses, &c. It is bad enough to hear about these things *maase*, but sometimes I think we are really more impressed by a simple event that comes under one's own notice. Here is one regarding Jobar—no often abused and bombed. An old man from there has supplied us with butter for a long while. Meeting him on the street one day, I enquired about his affairs. He told me he had to leave the village ~~the week before last~~ killed all the cattle, the ploughs and some of his children also, his cows also were killed or smashed up. Now there remained of the family just himself and one girl.

I know all the difficulties of the situation, and I trust you do not think I am wishing to say a word which would trench on politics—even mandatory politics. Still, one must wonder if this policy of "frightfulness," which we used to speak so harshly about when put into remorseless practice by its modern inventors, is just the policy contemplated by the liberators of those lands from "the tyranny of the Turk," and one cannot believe that it is in accord with the ideas, or ideals, of the best elements in French political thought. It is certainly not the policy which statement I read in a recent copy of the *New East* from M. de Castelnau, made, I think, at the League of Nations, setting forth his views as to the duties of a mandatory Power.

Can anything be done? I know, of course, your hands are tied as a British official; I am no expert well known in Syria, but as being under a mandatory Power, a British agent under your charge, to express my feelings openly—I am afraid my comments will be regarded as unbecomingly indiscreet if I could not do myself justice if I said that there may be maintained in the country at least of those exhibitions—and deeds—which do not prevent European civilization in a very favourable way to the people of Syria.

Yours faithfully,

W. J. McFARLAND

E 3555 12 89

No. 243

Acting Consul Vaughan-Russell to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 9.)

(No. 178.)

Damascus, Syria, May 29, 1926

Sir IN my despatch No. 177 of the 26th instant I had the honour to refer to a speech delivered by the French High Commissioner at Damascus on the 20th instant in the course of which he announced among other things that the fine of £T 100,000 gold imposed on Damascus would be annulled and that he agreed that the new Syrian Government should proclaim a general amnesty to all persons who laid down their arms by the 15th June next.

[15026]

2 The French High Commissioner during his speech congratulated the new Syrian Government upon the fact that they had shown confidence in France and her power in Syria, and said that he would return confidence for confidence. As a reward, he would agree to the carrying out of certain points in the Syrian Government's programme.

3. M. de Jouvenel may be right when he gives expression to the feelings of confidence felt by the French authorities towards the Syrian Government. He may also be right when he asserts that the new Syrian Government have placed their confidence in the mandatory Power, but I fear that he is quite wrong if he believes that he has now won over the feelings of the Syrian nation and gained for France their confidence. After the events of the past nine months, such few concessions and such vague flimsy promises as M. de Jouvenel has made to the Syrian nation can hardly be expected to have won it over.

4. Most of the programme put forward by the Syrian Cabinet cannot be realised until elections have been held and the Constituent Assembly has been elected. These measures of reform are being deferred until the country is in a state of sufficient calm to carry out free elections. In turn, the restoration of order and calm, which is still to be realised, depends upon the amnesty, unless it is intended that a military solution to the problem should be found.

M. de Jouvenel's announcement on the subject of the amnesty has been considered too vague by Syrian Nationalists to enable them to acclaim it. To endeavour to persuade the extreme Nationalists and the rebels that an amnesty on more general and comprehensive lines would shortly be proclaimed, the President Ahmed Namy Bey, issued a proclamation on the 25th instant, urging all Syrians to have patience and confidence in his Government and they would obtain an amnesty based on acceptable grounds. In the meantime, discussions and negotiations on the subject are being pursued between the Syrian Government and the mandatory authorities. Pacifism prevails in Damascus, however, as a result of the lack of confidence felt in the new Syrian Government, which Syrians appear to think is not representing to the Mandatory Power sufficiently strongly their feelings on this matter.

5. Since M. de Jouvenel's speech there has been a slight falling off in the military activity, but the rebels are still holding villages in the Ghouta and in the mountains. The rebels are still clinging to the idea that the French authorities are not serious. A section of the population of Damascus undoubtedly still holds the view that the French are who are refusing to surrender but there is the possibility that the number of sympathisers will gradually decrease when they begin to realise that the action of a small minority of rebels are impeding the re-establishment of peace.

6. The situation is therefore a rather difficult one for everybody at the present moment. M. de Jouvenel has left Damascus and Syria with a report upon his stewardship which will, no doubt, create an excellent impression in French and European circles, and probably also at Geneva. There is little doubt that he will force the pace during the next few weeks. I fear that the measures taken to bring about the re-establishment of peace here have not been planned out very carefully and with due regard to their effects in the future. I am inclined to think that due consideration has not been given to each individual phase of the pacification plan, if such a plan exists. The result is that there seems to be a lurch in the proceedings, and nobody seems to know quite what the next move for the best should be. Meanwhile M. de Jouvenel will no doubt exploit the successes which he has achieved here though they can be only partial.

7. The Syrian Government are faced with an extremely difficult task as their programme contains so many points which are bound to place them in an embarrassing position vis-à-vis the Syrian nation and the mandatory authorities. Ahmed Namy Bey will require much courage and tact to be able to overcome the exaggerated demands of the Nationalist elements. So far he has had little scope to show his capabilities in this respect, or to show to what extent he and his Cabinet can negotiate with the mandatory authorities on matters where Syrian interests seem opposed to those of the French authorities or of their Lebanese protégés. If the French authorities will live up to the words pronounced by M. de Jouvenel and treat the Syrian problem in a generous spirit, if they will bear in mind that many of the points in the Syrian Cabinet's programme represent legitimate and reasonable aspirations of the Syrian people and that by agreeing to the carrying out of the reasonable points in the programme they will not necessarily suffer loss of prestige,

the mandatory authorities will succeed in solving the Syrian problem without having recourse to force of arms.

Copies to Jerusalem (No. 142), Amman (No. 145), Bagdad (No. 131), Beirut (No. 165), and Aleppo (No. 110).

I have &
J. R. VAUGHAN RUSSELL.

No. 244

Consul-General, Beirut, to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 9.)

(No. 24)

(Telegraphic)

Beirut, June 8, 1926

FOLLOWING from liaison officer for Air Ministry:—

Your telegram of 31st May

"French propose to organise gendarmerie to occupy post [between] Nisibin and Euphrates. This has not yet been done (Sent to Bagdad)"

No. 245

Acting Consul, Damascus, to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 11)

(No. 20)

R.

Damascus, June 11, 1926

L. L. NCH General Officer Commanding by proclamation declares Ghouta a "no-go" zone, and requests that people there unconnected with rebels should evacuate their homes in view of imminence of military cleaning operations.

A. L. L. inhabit one of the villages in Ghouta. Propose informing them that they remain at their own risk, although their homes, if abandoned, risk being pillaged.

Please telegraph instructions as to what action, if any, can be taken to alleviate the situation and to safeguard British interests against probable losses from rebellion and French measures.

E 3806 146 89]

No. 246

The Marquess of Crewe to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 12.)

(No. 1096)

Sir,

Paris, June 11, 1926

I HAVE the honour to inform you that M. de Jouvenel the High Commissioner in Syria, who recently returned to France on leave, attended a meeting of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Chamber on the 9th June and made a statement regarding the present situation in Syria.

At the meeting of the Commission, M. Berthoin, a Chamberlain, having refused to agree to the proceedings of the meeting being kept secret, M. de Jouvenel was obliged to explain to the Commission the steps which he had taken to deal with the difficulties with which he had met on his arrival and to restore the situation to the normal. The High Commissioner went on to explain the measures which he intended to take with a view to preparing the future political organisation of the country. The statement was warmly received and M. de Jouvenel was warmly congratulated on his work.

In this connection it may be of interest to report that M. Painlevé, on leaving a meeting of the Commission, stated to certain newspaper correspondents that, in his opinion, the resistance of the Druse tribes in revolt might be considered as having been finally broken down. There only remained, according to the Ministry for War, a few minor centres of dissension to be dealt with.

I have, &c.
CREWE.

[15026]

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in the Jubel Drive into a sense of false security. Later, when peace has supposedly

(Copies of this despatch have been sent to Jerusalem (No. 145), Amman, (No. 149), **Bagdad** (No. 184), Beirut (No. 171), and Aleppo (No. 119).)

I have, &c.

J. R. VAUGHAN-HUSSELL

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159. 160. 161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 169. 170. 171. 172. 173. 174. 175. 176. 177. 178. 179. 180. 181. 182. 183. 184. 185. 186. 187. 188. 189. 190. 191. 192. 193. 194. 195. 196. 197. 198. 199. 200. 201. 202. 203. 204. 205. 206. 207. 208. 209. 210. 211. 212. 213. 214. 215. 216. 217. 218. 219. 220. 221. 222. 223. 224. 225. 226. 227. 228. 229. 230. 231. 232. 233. 234. 235. 236. 237. 238. 239. 240. 241. 242. 243. 244. 245. 246. 247. 248. 249. 250. 251. 252. 253. 254. 255. 256. 257. 258. 259. 260. 261. 262. 263. 264. 265. 266. 267. 268. 269. 270. 271. 272. 273. 274. 275. 276. 277. 278. 279. 280. 281. 282. 283. 284. 285. 286. 287. 288. 289. 290. 291. 292. 293. 294. 295. 296. 297. 298. 299. 300. 301. 302. 303. 304. 305. 306. 307. 308. 309. 310. 311. 312. 313. 314. 315. 316. 317. 318. 319. 320. 321. 322. 323. 324. 325. 326. 327. 328. 329. 330. 331. 332. 333. 334. 335. 336. 337. 338. 339. 340. 341. 342. 343. 344. 345. 346. 347. 348. 349. 350. 351. 352. 353. 354. 355. 356. 357. 358. 359. 360. 361. 362. 363. 364. 365. 366. 367. 368. 369. 370. 371. 372. 373. 374. 375. 376. 377. 378. 379. 380. 381. 382. 383. 384. 385. 386. 387. 388. 389. 390. 391. 392. 393. 394. 395. 396. 397. 398. 399. 400. 401. 402. 403. 404. 405. 406. 407. 408. 409. 410. 411. 412. 413. 414. 415. 416. 417. 418. 419. 420. 421. 422. 423. 424. 425. 426. 427. 428. 429. 430. 431. 432. 433. 434. 435. 436. 437. 438. 439. 440. 441. 442. 443. 444. 445. 446. 447. 448. 449. 450. 451. 452. 453. 454. 455. 456. 457. 458. 459. 460. 461. 462. 463. 464. 465. 466. 467. 468. 469. 470. 471. 472. 473. 474. 475. 476. 477. 478. 479. 480. 481. 482. 483. 484. 485. 486. 487. 488. 489. 490. 491. 492. 493. 494. 495. 496. 497. 498. 499. 500. 501. 502. 503. 504. 505. 506. 507. 508. 509. 510. 511. 512. 513. 514. 515. 516. 517. 518. 519. 520. 521. 522. 523. 524. 525. 526. 527. 528. 529. 530. 531. 532. 533. 534. 535. 536. 537. 538. 539. 540. 541. 542. 543. 544. 545. 546. 547. 548. 549. 550. 551. 552. 553. 554. 555. 556. 557. 558. 559. 560. 561. 562. 563. 564. 565. 566. 567. 568. 569. 570. 571. 572. 573. 574. 575. 576. 577. 578. 579. 580. 581. 582. 583. 584. 585. 586. 587. 588. 589. 590. 591. 592. 593. 594. 595. 596. 597. 598. 599. 600. 601. 602. 603. 604. 605. 606. 607. 608. 609. 610. 611. 612. 613. 614. 615. 616. 617. 618. 619. 620. 621. 622. 623. 624. 625. 626. 627. 628. 629. 630. 631. 632. 633. 634. 635. 636. 637. 638. 639. 640. 641. 642. 643. 644. 645. 646. 647. 648. 649. 650. 651. 652. 653. 654. 655. 656. 657. 658. 659. 660. 661. 662. 663. 664. 665. 666. 667. 668. 669. 670. 671. 672. 673. 674. 675. 676. 677. 678. 679. 680. 681. 682. 683. 684. 685. 686. 687. 688. 689. 690. 691. 692. 693. 694. 695. 696. 697. 698. 699. 700. 701. 702. 703. 704. 705. 706. 707. 708. 709. 710. 711. 712. 713. 714. 715. 716. 717. 718. 719. 720. 721. 722. 723. 724. 725. 726. 727. 728. 729. 730. 731. 732. 733. 734. 735. 736. 737. 738. 739. 740. 741. 742. 743. 744. 745. 746. 747. 748. 749. 750. 751. 752. 753. 754. 755. 756. 757. 758. 759. 760. 761. 762. 763. 764. 765. 766. 767. 768. 769. 770. 771. 772. 773. 774. 775. 776. 777. 778. 779. 780. 781. 782. 783. 784. 785. 786. 787. 788. 789. 790. 791. 792. 793. 794. 795. 796. 797. 798. 799. 800. 801. 802. 803. 804. 805. 806. 807. 808. 809. 810. 811. 812. 813. 814. 815. 816. 817. 818. 819. 820. 821. 822. 823. 824. 825. 826. 827. 828. 829. 830. 831. 832. 833. 834. 835. 836. 837. 838. 839. 840. 84

Consul General Sutow to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 14.)

1. 122

Reinst. June 4, 1926

I HAVE the honour to report that on the 8th May Abdallah Medawar, a well known merchant of Beirut, was stabbed outside his house by a young man and that he died the next day. The assassin is believed to be a certain Nadim Abdallah, who has fled the country.

2 On the 16th May M. Georges Hadad, the honorary Roumanian consul, was arrested as having been the instigator of the crime. He too, is well known in Beirut, and is a member of the firm Ibrahim Hadad et Fils. He was the brother in law of the deceased. The main reasons which led the French judicial authorities to order M. Hadad's arrest appear to have been (1) that there was a long standing commercial dispute between the parties, involving a large sum, which had reached a critical point, and (2) that a *cawass* discharged by M. Hadad had, with two other *cawasses* of the inner work, made a sworn declaration that they had been charged by M. Hadad to murder M. Medwar. The deceased appears to have informed the High Commission some months ago that his life was threatened, and on his death bed to have accused M. Hadad of having caused his death, but the deceased's belief that M. Hadad was plotting against him and his telling different people so seem in the end to repose on the story told to him by the discharged *cawass*, who, when M. Hadad refused to take him back, had threatened to take his revenge.

M. Hadad on his arrest appeared to the United States Consul General, as Secretary General of the High Commission in the matter. Mr. Knabenshue took the line that although under the procedure indicated in General Weygand's circular No. 1433 of the 11th July, 1924 (see Beirut despatch No. 99 of the 16th July, 1924), the event of a crime, immune from arrest, the position of the interests which he represents render it necessary that an arrest should be made except on very convincing proof, and that in the case of M. Hadad such proof was to people who had lived some time in the East non-existent. He therefore urged that in these circumstances, and in view of M. Hadad's well known position, it should be found possible to release him on heavy bail which would be forthcoming. His matter was discussed at great length but Mr. Knabenshue did not succeed in making any impression upon M. de Ruffe. He did however surprise the latter by telling him that the accused was being kept in solitary confinement, and that his lawyers were refused access to him. This M. de Ruffe found on enquiry to be the case, but I understand that permission was then given to the accused to prepare his defence. It was also pointed out to M. de Ruffe that all consuls were in the ordinary course of their duties, liable to make enemies who might wish to take their revenge. M. de Ruffe stated that no line must be drawn between honorary and career consuls, and that any among the latter would be naturally examined with greater care. He stated that he had meant that the personalities of the representatives of the Great Powers gave such a guarantee that in the event of one of them being involved in a criminal affair he would naturally only be arrested if caught in the very act.

4. As this was the first case of the arrest of a foreign consul since the suspension of the Capitulations a meeting of the consular body was called. It approved its clean intervention with M. de Ruffe and, after discussing the whole question, decided to express its views in a resolution of a general character. The resolution adopted for which I was mainly responsible, was as follows:—

"The Herent consular body, at its meeting of the 12th May, taking into consideration the terms of the High Commissioner's circular No. 1933 of the

11th July, 1924 recognises that a consul can be arrested in the case of a crime, but it is of the opinion that the arrest of a consul, whether career or honorary, is only justified in the case of a 'flagrant délit' or where proof of guilt exists, and that an arrest based on suspicions or mere presumptions is not justified.

A copy of this resolution was later handed unofficially to the Secretary-General by the United States consul general.

5. Shortly after I saw M. de Reffye and, without going into details, urged upon him the vital importance, not only from the French, but also from the European, point of view, that there should be no miscarriage of justice in a case which had been so publicly and so flagrantly brought before the French magistrature. He seemed considerably perturbed about the matter, and confided to me that, if he had had to deal with the case, he would not have ordered the arrest of M. Hadad. At the same time, there had in the past been too much outside interference with justice, and the French High Commission wished to set a good example and to leave the case entirely in charge of the magistrates who were dealing with it.

6. A most unpleasant feature of the business has been the scandalous campaign which the almost semi-official paper, the "Syrie," which is owned by an undesirable named Vaysse and edited by another undesirable named Chevalier, has been conducting against M. Hadad. Starting from the assumption that he was guilty of the charge laid against him, it proceeded for four days after his arrest to occupy the best part of its front page, under glaring headlines, with articles urging his guilt and marshalling what it alleged to be the proofs against him. Elsewhere the paper would have been charged with grave contempt of court, but the French judicial authorities took no notice of the matter. On the face of it, it looks like an attempt at blackmail, and a rival paper, the "Orient," has just said so quite frankly. It will be interesting to see now whether, as it threatens to do, the "Syrie" will dare to take the "Orient" into court.

7. The moral of this sad affair is, I fear, that foreigners in Beirut are not yet likely to be protected by the presence of French judges against possible miscarriages of justice. I have, however, been able to call in just one or two of the French judges, but they are new to the East and its devious ways, and they are ignorant of the Arabic language, and for these reasons they are likely in all good faith to be misled by the intrigues which thrive in a place like Beirut.

I have, &c.
H. E. SATOW

No. 249

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Acting Consul, Damascus.

(No. 20)

(Telegraphic) R

Foreign Office, June 15, 1926

YOUR telegram No. 20 of 11th June. Possible evacuation of Ghouta.

In case of absolute need you may expend up to £50 on destitute Indians, but while this sum should in no circumstances be exceeded, you should keep total expenditure as low as possible.

1. Ministry cannot dispute right of French to take all military measures necessary to put down the rebellion, and French alone can judge when such necessity exists. Since they have warned you that Ghouta is dangerous zone and recommended evacuation, we have no objection to your withdrawing. His Majesty's Government would not wish to incur any responsibility for persons or property on behalf of British Indian subjects who ignore the warning and remain in Ghouta.

On the other hand, I am advised that French warning by proclamation will not exempt them from claims for damages, directly caused by military operations, to property which these British Indian subjects may have been compelled to leave behind in response to French warning.

250

E 3690 12 891

No. 250

Acting Consul Vaughan-Russell to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 16.)

(No. 189.)

Damascus, June 7, 1926.

Sir,
WITH reference to the first paragraph of my despatch No. 96 of the 6th March, I have to report that the delegation has been despatched to the rebel Druses to urge them to consent to surrender and to negotiate peace, several unofficial messengers have been sent to the Ghouta and to the Jebel Druse by Damascus notables and by the more influential Syrian Government officials. No results have hitherto been achieved.

2. A serious effort at inducing the Druses to surrender and thus to avoid useless bloodshed would appear to be imminent. A certain Osman El Charabati, well-known extreme Nationalist, is reported to be leaving for the Jebel Druse in the next few days, probably accompanied by other Nationalists, at the tacit consent of the French authorities and with the approval of the Syrian Government.

3. Osman El Charabati, although only a modest merchant of Damascus, is reported to possess some influence among the Druses. He has been twice detained and released, once to Hassakeh and once to the Island of Round, by the French authorities. As a result of the sufferings and sacrifices resulting from the above deportations, he is said to be popular among the rebels, and it is possible that he may succeed in influencing the Druses to surrender.

4. Sultan Pasha Attrash, although he has lost the support of a large percentage of the Druses, is still a powerful figure among them. He has been reported to be by large body of the most patriotic Druses. Having burned their boats, the latter seem determined to fight to the death, and it is probable that they will be able to do so. Osman El Charabati can in any way influence the continuation of Sultan Pasha Attrash and his followers.

Copies of this despatch have been sent to Jerusalem (No. 146), Amman (No. 150), Baghdad (No. 135), Beirut (No. 176) and Aleppo (No. 114).

I have, &c.
J. R. VAUGHAN-RUSSELL.

E 3678 12 89

No. 251

Acting Consul Vaughan-Russell to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 16.)

(No. 190.)

Sir,

Damascus, June 7, 1926.

WITH reference to paragraph 2 of my despatch No. 163 of the 15th ultimo, reporting the bombardment of the Meydan, I have the honour to report that on the 27th ultimo I visited this quarter and spent over an hour examining the ruins there.

2. My estimate of the extent and of the value of the damage done appears to have been accurate. The number of houses destroyed can be estimated at between 400 and 500, and the number of small shops destroyed at between 300 and 400. The value of the damage done may, in my opinion, be conservatively estimated at about £300,000. I have not been able to obtain information from any reliable source to confirm the above figure; I believe that it is slightly exaggerated, and that perhaps the number of killed might be more accurately estimated at between 100 and 150.

3. The Meydan quarter now presents a very sorry spectacle. The area destroyed being so large and consisting as it does of several separate and scattered areas in ruins, it appears vaster than it is in reality. The fact that so much of the damage has been done to shops and houses of the Meydan is due to the fact that the property generally carried here that shops were deliberately set on fire by the troops which attacked the quarter. If all the shops and houses in the Meydan had caught fire as a result of the indiscriminate throwing of bombs or shells, the property fronting on the main road would presumably have suffered in the same proportion as the property situated off the main road.

4. During my visit I noticed that a military post manned by irregulars and formerly situated at the junction of the main road with the road to the Meydan

was no longer established there. This, in my opinion, is the only point that the above post was overlooked (see the last sentence of paragraph 5 in my despatch under reference).

5. One striking feature was the absence of human life there. This large and formerly busy and prosperous quarter of Damascus formerly contained about 20,000 persons. During the hour I spent there, I saw only a few persons during the hour I spent there.

6. In addition to the above refugees, there was seen an influx into Damascus of the population from the ruined villages in the Ghouta and around the city, and also from the destroyed or abandoned Christian villages in the Hauran. It is certain that about 55,000 persons from the Hauran are living in a state of acute misery and hardship.

7. The French seem to have made no efforts or appear unwilling to alleviate the suffering of the population. Their calculations in this respect are entirely wrong. In my opinion, the French are doing nothing to help the population which suffers all for the future. There is abundant proof of this feeling the most noticeable evidence being the open and general sympathy and sympathy of the population of the city with the bands operating around it.

8. In conclusion, it is difficult to estimate the practical or tangible results which the French have achieved by their destruction of the Hauran. They have certainly succeeded in "clearing up" the quarter, but the value of this result is very small. The French authorities have not succeeded in breaking the morale of the Syrian rebels if they supposed that they would achieve this result by the destruction of the Hauran. The French authorities have not succeeded in breaking the morale of the Syrian rebels if they supposed that they would achieve this result by the destruction of the Hauran.

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to the French headquarters and asked for official confirmation of the notice which had appeared in the Arabic press. I was assured by the Chief of the Staff that the notice was official and that General Vallier had issued it through the French delegation, which had been requested to transmit the notice to all consuls. I said that neither the doyen nor myself had received any official notice, and that I considered that it was unsatisfactory from my point of view that I should find myself obliged to obtain news on such a matter through the native press. I pointed out that the translation of the Arabic notice made by this consulate might differ in some detail from the official French text and that misunderstanding could conceivably arise therefrom. He agreed, but maintained that the French delegation had been informed on the 7th instant, and that the notice must certainly be on the way. I informed him that I was then proposing to warn British subjects to leave Jibar in case of a possible bombardment, and he agreed that this course was advisable.

3. I accordingly drew up a notice warning British subjects of possible danger and posted it in the waiting room of the consulate. I have the honour to enclose herewith copy of the notice in question. At the same time a message was sent to some of the British subjects from Jibar who had taken refuge in Damascus, asking them to send word at once to the other British subjects still remaining in and near Jibar of the possible danger that might befall them if they remained there after 6 p.m. on the following day (the 10th instant).

4. As I have received no news that any harm has befallen any British subjects, I am fairly certain that the six or seven British Indians who lived in the neighbourhood of Jibar received warning of danger in good time, whether through the local authorities and the Arabic press or through my message.

5. The required conditions not having been fulfilled by the Jibar villagers at 6 p.m. on the 10th instant the bombardment took place. It lasted, with short intermissions, for about twenty minutes, but well over 100 shells were fired into the village or its surroundings. At the time of this bombardment I was in the Christian (north-eastern) quarter of Damascus in a part of the city facing Jibar and I can testify to the heaviness of the bombardment while it lasted. There is no doubt that the bombardment of Jibar, a notorious centre of rebel activity in the outskirts of Damascus, after due warning, was entirely justified.

6. I think at the same time that mention should be made of the fact that during the bombardment, and actually while it was in progress, a French military plane was flying over the city of Damascus at a distance of little more than a mile from the area where the shells were exploding. This quarter of the city is a very densely populated area. I myself heard the explosion of the shell which fell in the Christian quarter of the city. I myself heard the explosion of the shell which fell in the Christian quarter of the city. I myself heard the explosion of the shell which fell in the Christian quarter of the city.

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No 252

Acting Consul Vaughan Russell to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 23.)

(No 105)

Sir,

Damascus June 11 1920

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 10th instant, and to inform you that the same has been forwarded to the French authorities. I have also the honour to inform you that the French authorities have not succeeded in breaking the morale of the Syrian rebels if they supposed that they would achieve this result by the destruction of the Hauran. The French authorities have not succeeded in breaking the morale of the Syrian rebels if they supposed that they would achieve this result by the destruction of the Hauran.

I have, Sir, the honour to be, Sir, your obedient servant, J. R. VAUGHAN RUSSELL

Enclosure 1 in No 252

Notice

THE French Military Governor of Damascus published in the local press on 7th June 1926 certain conditions were fulfilled by them, before 8 p.m. to-morrow, the 10th instant, the village and its surroundings would be liable to be bombarded.

British nationals are hereby warned that they may run great danger if they remain in Jobar and its surroundings after 8 p.m. to-morrow, Thursday. If British nationals do not leave the area by that time, the French military punitive measures may be put into execution, they will do so at their own risk and peril.

J. R. VAUGHAN RUSSELL

Damascus, June 9 1926

Enclosure 2 in No 252

M. Pierre Aloye to the Doyen of the Diplomatic Corps (Damascus)

(Confidential)

M. le Doyen,

Damas, le 10 juin 1926

DES informations recueillies tout récemment et de plusieurs sources indiquent que les rebelles se préparent à une opération offensive contre la ville de Damas.

Il est à craindre que cette opération ne soit menée à bien, ce qui entraînerait de graves conséquences pour la ville de Damas.

Dans ce cas, il est probable que les rebelles tenteront d'attaquer la ville de Damas, ce qui entraînerait de graves conséquences pour la ville de Damas.

Je me tiens à la disposition du corps consulaire pour lui fournir, s'il le désire, toutes autres indications qui pourraient éventuellement l'intéresser.

Veuillez, &c.

PIERRE ALOYE

E 3842 12 89

No 253

Acting Consul Vaughan Russell to Sir Austin Chamberlain.—(Received Jan

No. 196.)

WITH reference to the letter No. 12115, dated 12th June 1926, from the British Legation, Damascus, to the French Legation, Damascus, dated 12th June 1926, regarding the situation in the Ghouta.

As the French military command had been patient, and had not hitherto made full use of the means at its disposal to crush the rebels. Now, in view of the offensive operations which are being carried out by the rebels in the Ghouta, and the danger to Damascus, swift and sudden attacks on and bombardment of villages in which rebels were known to collect would be carried out. No warning could or would be given.

5. The French military command had been patient, and had not hitherto made full use of the means at its disposal to crush the rebels. Now, in view of the offensive operations which are being carried out by the rebels in the Ghouta, and the danger to Damascus, swift and sudden attacks on and bombardment of villages in which rebels were known to collect would be carried out. No warning could or would be given.

6. I pointed out to M. Pierre Aloye that, by the mere fact of their presence in the Ghouta, British subjects might be considered as guilty, according to the French military command. I should have been more explicit in saying that the French military command considered that the mere presence of British subjects in the Ghouta was a sufficient reason for considering them as guilty, and that they would be liable to be treated as such.

4. I remarked that digging trenches and mining roads were not signs indicating an offensive against Damascus, but that they were rather of a defensive nature. He replied that rebels had no status, and had no right to be on the offensive or the defensive. As there was no official state of war, the rebels could not be treated as belligerents.

5. After careful study of the question, the French authorities had decided that, as the zone of the Ghouta was a war zone, no warnings of impending bombardments were necessary. I asked M. Pierre Aloye to be good enough to let me have this decision of the French authorities in writing. He said he could not, and turned the conversation upon the impossibility of giving warning of bombardments, as, in that case, the guilty would leave the locality and escape punishment.

6. I pointed out to M. Pierre Aloye that, by the mere fact of their presence in the Ghouta, British subjects might be considered as guilty, according to the French military command. I should have been more explicit in saying that the French military command considered that the mere presence of British subjects in the Ghouta was a sufficient reason for considering them as guilty, and that they would be liable to be treated as such.

7. I explained to M. Pierre Aloye that the French military command considered that the mere presence of British subjects in the Ghouta was a sufficient reason for considering them as guilty, and that they would be liable to be treated as such. I should have been more explicit in saying that the French military command considered that the mere presence of British subjects in the Ghouta was a sufficient reason for considering them as guilty, and that they would be liable to be treated as such.

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[13026]

202

1. Protests from the consular corps have been consistently ignored and it would seem inadvisable further to invite humiliation by making another protest which, if ignored (as it probably would be), would emphasize still further the negative results of consular representations.

I have &c
I R VAUGHAN-RUSSELL.

Enclosure 1 in No. 253

II *Pierre-Alype to the Dagen of the Consular Corps (Damascus)*

M le Dagen
Valher adresse aux habitants de la Ghouta pour les inviter à cesser toute complicité avec les bandes sous peine de sanctions militaires.

Veuillez, &c
PIERRE-ALYPE

Enclosure 2 in No. 253

Acte aux Habitants de la Ghouta.

LE Général Valher, Gouverneur militaire de Damas, a fait à travers la région de Damas et du Hauran, porte à la connaissance des habitants de la Ghouta et du Mery, que les bandes sous peine de sanctions militaires.

Il est à regretter que les habitants de la Ghouta et du Mery, au lieu de se joindre à nos troupes victorieuses, aient encouragé les bandes à poursuivre leurs méfaits.

Les attaques incessantes menées contre les postes de la route de Damas à Hama ont été rendues possibles par la complicité des habitants de la Ghouta et du Mery.

Le général, Gouverneur militaire, nous ne, en conséquence, les habitants de la zone menacée à livrer ou à éloigner immédiatement les monnaies du mouvement révolutionnaire et leurs bandes que leur complicité simplement leur punition ont se les encouragés à poursuivre leurs méfaits.

Sourida, Chaaba, Mulhad sont tombées successivement aux mains de nos troupes victorieuses. La paix est en voie de naître au Djebel-Druze.

Il faut qu'à son tour la banlieue de Damas retrouve sa sécurité.

Le Général Valher, reprenant son rôle de commandant des troupes de la Ghouta et du Mery qu'il est prêt à employer les moyens nécessaires pour y ramener rapidement l'ordre et invite les populations innocentes à cesser une région qu'il déclare être dangereuse pour leur sécurité.

LE GÉNÉRAL VALHER,
Commandant les Troupes de la Région
de Damas et du Hauran

le 10 juin 1920

E 3850 148 89

No 254

Lettering Consul Vaughan Russell to Sir Austen Chamberlain - (Received June 23)

(No 188)

Sir

Damascus, June 14, 1920

WITH reference to the report of the press in London, dated June 14, 1920, in which it is stated that the French authorities have decided to send a large force to the Ghouta and Mery, and to the President of the State of Syria a 'Moderate' Ministers on the other hand the President dissolved the Cabinet on the

12th instant. Immediately afterwards, the French authorities arrested the above three Nationalist Ministers, namely, Lutf Bey, el Khouri, Husni Bey-el Barazi and Lutf Bey Haffar, and sent them under military escort to the Lebanon, where they are imprisoned, it is understood, at Beit-ed-Dine.

2. From the very day it came into existence, the Syrian Cabinet has been created against the wishes of the French authorities, and has been a constant source of trouble to them. It is understood that the French authorities have decided to send a large force to the Ghouta and Mery, and to the President of the State of Syria a 'Moderate' Ministers on the other hand the President dissolved the Cabinet on the 12th instant. Immediately afterwards, the French authorities arrested the above three Nationalist Ministers, namely, Lutf Bey, el Khouri, Husni Bey-el Barazi and Lutf Bey Haffar, and sent them under military escort to the Lebanon, where they are imprisoned, it is understood, at Beit-ed-Dine.

3. The three arrested Ministers have from the outset shown independence of character and a desire to obtain relief for the Syrian nation from the severe military repressive methods employed by the mandatory authorities. At the time of the bombardment of the Merydan on the 7th ultimo, the Cabinet nearly fell, owing to the fact that the above three Ministers threatened to resign as a protest against these French military tactics. It was only after the French military authorities had warned these Ministers that if they persisted in opposing the efforts of the mandatory Power they would be considered as rebels themselves and dealt with accordingly.

4. When General Valher announced, on the 11th instant, that in future all villages in the Ghouta and elsewhere where rebels were reported to resort would be bombarded without further notice or warning they again urged that the Syrian Government should protest against this decision of the French authorities, and suggested that as the Cabinet was now dissolved the President Nami Bey should form a Cabinet entirely of Ministers from the Party of the People, and then the Government should deal with this matter and all other matters of importance.

5. It is at this stage that the three Extremist Ministers were arrested on the night of the 12th. At the same time, four other members of the Party of the People were arrested and imprisoned and many other arrests are reported to be imminent. On the 13th the President, Ahmed Nami Bey, announced the composition of his new Cabinet which is as follows:

Minister of the Interior - Wassak Bey el Moayad
Minister of Justice - Joseph Bey-el Hakim
Minister of Public Works and Commerce - Chakib Bey Moyassar
Minister of Finance - Abdel Kader Bey-el Azm
Minister of Agriculture and Economic Services - Wassak Bey-el-Moaynd
Minister of Education - Chaker Bey Hanbali

The new Ministers are all Moderates of average qualifications and known to be Francophile, so that the Syrian Cabinet is now entirely subservient to the policy and control of the mandatory authorities.

6. It would seem useless to follow the fate and fortunes of this new National Syrian Government in the future as it has no independent character, except in its name, and its future course of action is already determined beforehand. The Syrian rebels have now no mediators between them and the mandatory authorities, and the French military authorities have decided to continue the present policy of wholesale destruction to property and to impose upon it their will and peace.

7. It is appalling to contemplate what carnage and wholesale destruction to property will result from a continuation of the struggle. The French seem determined now to ride rough-shod over the country and to impose upon it their will and peace. The causes which produced the rebellion have long since been forgotten and the blame for the existence of the rebellion and for its prolongation is continually attributed to the rebels, who are usually described as

bandits, murderers and such like. The existence of any national and patriotic feeling among the rebels seems to be studiously ignored by the French, though it always has been present and is every day growing in intensity, while at the same time its character is becoming increasingly Francophobe.

Since the Mandates Commission of the League of Nations approved last February the action of France in Syria, the French authorities seem to have assumed that the military methods employed by them are justifiable and above criticism. I cannot help feeling that some of the coercive measures now enforced by the French authorities, would scarcely be considered by an international military tribunal as justifiable in the circumstances of their application. Bombardments are the order of the day nowadays, and scarcely a day or night passes but Damascus reverberates with the crack and roar of artillery and with the explosions of bombs and shells in the vicinity or outside the city. The rebels, however, show no signs of capitulating at present.

Copies to Jerusalem (No. 152), Amman (No. 157), Bagdad (No. 142), Beirut (No. 145), and Aleppo (No. 120).

I have, &c.

J. R. VAUGHAN RUSSELL

E 3949 12 89]

No. 255

Acting Consul Vaughan Russell to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 20)

(No. 200)

Sir,

Damascus, June 10, 1926

I HAVE the honour to invite a reference to paragraph 4 and 5 of my despatch No. 198 of the 12th instant, and to forward herewith for your information a copy of a letter which I have addressed to General Vallier, through the French Envoy Extraordinary, relative to the British Indians living in the village of Beit Sawa.

2. Apart from giving to the French military authorities as precise details as possible concerning the location of the houses of the British Indians in the above village, I have deemed it advisable to point out to them the danger which now attends the withdrawal of British subjects from the Ghouta. It was on very well known the French military authorities to proclaim on the 10th instant that all persons who remained in the Ghouta would be considered, as from that date, as rebels. Since the above proclamation, it has become very dangerous to move about in the Ghouta, as persons so doing are more than ever before regarded with suspicion and liable to be shot at from a distance by the irregulars.

3. It should, I think, be remembered that only a few weeks ago the French were urging and coercing the villagers to leave Damascus and to return to their homes.

4. The British Indian subjects of Beit Sawa have risked their lives and property by remaining in the Ghouta for the past nine months, owing to the repeated assurances of the French military authorities that they would be safe if they remained there provided that they did not help the rebels. The French military authorities have admitted to me on several occasions that they have never had occasion to complain that the village of Beit Sawa has fired upon their troops, and that they have received no reports to show that the British Indian subjects have been aiding the rebels. The proclamation of the 10th instant rendered at once British Indians in the Ghouta liable to be considered as rebels and to be treated accordingly. No chance was given them of leaving their homes beforehand while a withdrawal was possible with a reasonable chance of safety. As they have been encouraged by the French authorities to remain in the Ghouta, I trust that my letter to General Vallier will be considered as justifiable and that my action meets with your approval.

I have, &c.

J. R. VAUGHAN RUSSELL

Enclosure 1 in No. 255

Acting Consul Vaughan-Russell to French High Commissioner

M. l'Envoyé extraordinaire,

Damas, le 15 juin 1926

ME référant à votre lettre du 11 courant à l'adresse de M. le Doyen du corps consulaire, j'ai l'honneur de vous transmettre, sous ce couvert, une lettre que je viens d'adresser à M. le Général Vallier au sujet des ressortissants britanniques qui habitent le village de Beit Sawa dans la Ghouta.

Je vous prie de bien vouloir la faire parvenir à son destinataire.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

J. R. VAUGHAN RUSSELL

Consul de Sa Majesté britannique par intérim

Enclosure 2 in No. 255.

Acting Consul Vaughan Russell to General Vallier, Military Governor of Damascus

M. le Général,

Damas, le 15 juin 1926

ME référant à votre lettre du 11 courant à l'adresse de M. le Doyen du corps consulaire, j'ai l'honneur de vous préciser la situation des maisons des sujets indiens britanniques dans le village de Beit Sawa.

La plupart de ces maisons se trouvent groupées tout autour de la mosquée de ce village. Il m'est impossible de vous fournir une carte qui démontrerait clairement la topographie du village. Des renseignements qui me sont parvenus, il est certain que les maisons des indiens britanniques sont situées sur la rue principale qui traverse le milieu du village à un tiers de la distance entre sa limite occidentale et son extrémité orientale.

Les maisons de mes ressortissants, étant tout à fait contiguës à la mosquée, il semblerait assez facile de les identifier, surtout vu que leurs habitants y ont installé des magasins de provisions. Cependant, il est à craindre que les indiens britanniques ne soient exposés à de graves dangers de leur séjour dans la Ghouta. Je tiens à vous en faire part, car les renseignements que j'ai reçus sur la situation de la Ghouta sont très alarmants. La circulation dans la Ghouta est devenue extrêmement dangereuse dernièrement, surtout depuis votre proclamation du 10 courant.

Les femmes et des enfants, craignent de se hasarder hors du village de Beit Sawa pour effectuer le trajet dangereux entre Beit Sawa et Damas, je vous saurais gré de bien vouloir me faire savoir s'il y aurait des moyens de les soustraire de danger.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

J. R. VAUGHAN RUSSELL

Consul de Sa Majesté britannique par intérim

CHAPTER IV. GENERAL.

E 952 37 44

No 256

M. de Fleury to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 2.)

LE Président du Conseil d'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane vient d'appeler l'attention du Gouvernement français sur le fait que les États du Hedjaz, du Yémen et du Nedj, constitués par des territoires détachés de la Turquie à la suite de la guerre, n'ont pas exécuté les obligations financières mises à leur charge par le Traité de Lausanne.

D'autre part, l'État de l'Asyr, qui figure parmi les États appelés à exécuter les obligations financières mises à leur charge par l'article 47 du Traité de Lausanne.

Cette situation à laquelle le Conseil de la Dette se trouve hors d'état de porter remède n'est pas sans causer un préjudice aux porteurs de la dette publique ottomane. La part de ces quatre États dans les annuités est, en effet, évaluée à environ 2215,000 et, le traité ayant exclu toute solidarité entre les États débiteurs, cette perte serait

En signalant cette situation au Gouvernement français, le Conseil de la Dette a fait appel à son intervention afin que les droits des porteurs consacrés par le Traité de Lausanne soient reconnus par les États arabes précités.

Une démarche semblable aurait été faite auprès du Gouvernement britannique.

Le Gouvernement français estime, en ce qui le concerne, que la situation actuelle de la Dette publique ottomane porte préjudice aux intérêts français et qu'elle est de nature à aggraver les mécontentements qui leur sont déjà

M. de Fleury a été chargé de demander à Sir Austen Chamberlain, Secrétaire d'Etat des Affaires Etrangères, de vouloir bien faire connaître le point de vue du Gouvernement britannique à cet égard.

L'Ambassadeur de France, Paris, le 15 février 1926.

Ambassade de France, Londres, le 15 février 1926.

E 998 37 44

No 257

Marquis della Torretta to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 11.)

(Translation.)

THE Italian Ambassador presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, with reference to the identical communication which the President of the Council for the Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt addressed on the 15th ultimo to the British, French and Italian Governments on the subject of the alleged failure of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes to fulfil the financial obligations imposed upon them by the Treaty of Lausanne of the 24th July, 1923, has the honour to present His Excellency's belated protest with the request that he will be so good as to state what action the British Government have taken or propose to take with regard to the request of the President of the Council for the Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt.

Italian Embassy, London, February 3, 1926.

265

E 999 37 44

No 258

Marquis della Torretta to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 11.)

(Translation.)

THE Italian Ambassador presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, with reference to the identical communication which the President of the Council for the Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt addressed on the 15th ultimo to the British, French and Italian Governments on the subject of the alleged failure of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes to fulfil the financial obligations imposed upon them by the Treaty of Lausanne of the 24th July, 1923, has the honour to present His Excellency's belated protest with the request that he will be so good as to state what action the British Government have taken or propose to take with regard to the request of the President of the Council for the Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt.

Italian Embassy, February 3, 1926.

E 1081 37 44

No 259

M. de Fleury to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 15.)

LE Président du Conseil d'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane vient d'appeler l'attention du Gouvernement français sur le refus de l'État serbe-croate-slovene d'exécuter les obligations financières mises à sa charge par le Traité de Lausanne.

Le Gouvernement de Belgrade a été informé de cette situation le fait qu'il n'est pas signataire du Traité de Lausanne. Le Conseil de la Dette se trouve hors d'état de porter remède à cette situation. La part de cet État dans les annuités est évaluée à environ 2405,000 et le traité excluant toute solidarité entre les États débiteurs, cette perte serait

Le refus de l'État serbe-croate-slovene d'exécuter les obligations financières mises à sa charge par le Traité de Lausanne porte préjudice aux intérêts français et qu'elle est de nature à aggraver les mécontentements qui leur sont déjà

En signalant cette situation au Gouvernement français, le Conseil de la Dette a fait appel à son intervention afin que les droits des porteurs consacrés par le Traité de Lausanne soient reconnus par le Gouvernement de Belgrade.

Une démarche semblable aurait été faite auprès du Gouvernement britannique et du Gouvernement italien.

Le Gouvernement français est d'avis qu'en raison du motif invoqué par l'État serbe-croate-slovene, la question soulevée par le Conseil de la Dette ne pourra être réglée, le moment venu, que par une intervention diplomatique. Il estime qu'il y aurait lieu de subordonner l'ouverture de négociations dans ce sens au développement des pourparlers actuellement engagés avec la Turquie et les autres États successeurs. L'éventualité d'un règlement d'ensemble dont il demeurerait volontairement exclu pourrait en effet inciter le Gouvernement de Belgrade à modifier son attitude.

M. de Fleury a été chargé de demander à Sir Austen Chamberlain, Secrétaire d'Etat des Affaires Etrangères, de vouloir bien faire connaître le point de vue du Gouvernement britannique à cet égard.

L'Ambassadeur de France, Paris, le 15 février 1926.

Ambassade de France, Londres, le 15 février 1926.

* *I.e., non-signature of the treaty.*

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 19)

(No. 1.)

(Telegraphic)

Angora, April 18, 1926

I SAW Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday and Prime Minister to-day. To the former I gave general sketch of draft treaty and proposal of a cession of territory comprising all of area No. 1 and northern half of area No. 3. This he was unable to understand without technical advice, and his remarks were entirely non-committal. As regards treaty, he had criticisms to make of some details as to which I will refer to you as and when necessary. He appeared to accept in principle especially association with Irak as co-signatory.

Prime Minister said he had not yet completely realized what proposed cession amounted to, but he said that to transfer territory "was the whole thing," and that cession proposed was "nothing at all." He talked a good deal about security and was disposed to attribute all Turkey's troubles in the East to activities of British agents in Irak.

I prefer not to draw any deductions from these two conversations, but I think Prime Minister's demeanour was that of a man worried and grieved rather than in lament.

(Sent to Bagdad. Figures by post to Constantinople.)

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 22)

(No. 2.)

(Telegraphic)

Angora, April 21, 1926

I SAW Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday, and frontier negotiations took a surprising turn.

Minister stated that what Turkey desired was not territory in itself, but security. He then said that the Government had decided to refuse the offer made to cede territory to it, while expressing appreciation of friendly sentiments which had actuated that offer.

As substitute Turkish Government had three proposals to make by which it might receive satisfaction. He put them forward unofficially, not as coming from the Government, but said he had consulted his most influential friend. It is inconceivable to me that he can have formulated them without approval of the Prime Minister and the President of the Republic. I take them in order.

1. He proposed an undertaking of mutual neutrality on model of recent French and Russian treaties. I replied that this had been carefully considered in London and discarded for three reasons. Firstly, it really meant nothing, but aimed at creating in the public mind impression of a condition of affairs that did not exist. As such we should dislike it. Minister agreed that mutual neutrality agreement was really only "propaganda." Secondly, it would necessitate our inserting so many stipulations and reserves as to our duties under pact that document would be complicated and difficult to understand. I had seen a draft and felt sure it would be most distasteful to Turkish Parliament. The Minister agreed that National Assembly would only accept simple and easily comprehensible engagements. Thirdly, I said that such a pact would involve widespread ramifications, and His Majesty's Government could now only contemplate agreement dealing with frontier under discussion. I then restated what was contained in article 3 of draft treaty, adding that if he wished terms might be drafted in even more solemn form. He considered that this was just as good as mutual neutrality proposal, which he then dropped.

2. Minister's second idea changed its form in course of discussion. As first put forward, he proposed that Turkey should formally cede the whole territory south of Brussels line to Irak, but that sovereignty should only pass when special relations were established between the two States. After discussion, however, he proposed a proposal that both territory and sovereignty should finally and definitely pass to Irak on ratification of treaty. This cession could be made to Irak as to a fully

self-governing State," in words of article 1, paragraph 2, of pact (see especially French text passage). There was a certain amount of objection on his part to relations between Great Britain and Irak, nor was there objection on his part to arrangement being embodied in tripartite treaty formed as contemplated in our draft. Object of our curious proposal, however, was not to propose that Turkish Government shall be in its present difficult position. He intends saying to it in substance: "You are in a very difficult position. He intends saying to it in substance: 'Here is Irak, a recognised self governing State, young and revolutionary in character like ourselves. By our Constitution we are debarsed from hampering the development of such a State, and we are therefore only wish it well, and with such arguments he believes Assembly will easily be convinced.'

He would gladly consider one. 3. Last proposal of Minister for Foreign Affairs was that Turkey should be given a participation in Irak. A Turkish empire would be no good, and he would want an allotment of shares. He had no idea how many shares he would want. Object of this was not to give Irak a share in the profits, but to foster the feeling of security all round, for he maintained that if Turkey were materially interested in Irak oil industry she would clearly be indisposed to disturb the tranquillity of the country. It required, he would have no objection to engagement by the Turkish Government not to alienate its interests in the company. I strongly expressed my view that this was impractical. The company consisted of various groups of different nationality who quarrelled freely and would never be able to agree as to where a Turkish participation was to come from. He expressed some doubt as to this, and hinted that as a *quid pro quo* Turkish Government would be able to provide him with a share in the profits. I said I had heard that removing last doubts as to the possibility of a Turkish participation in the Irak oil industry, that such a thing was highly speculative, and that it would be better to wait in the same position as he realised. He answered that Turkey could afford to wait in the same position as other participants. Discussion was entirely on the basis of allotment of shares. There was no mention of participation in royalties.

I said that I could not see how it was possible for Turkey to have a share in the profits of the Irak oil industry, and that it would be better to wait in the same position as he realised. He answered that Turkey could afford to wait in the same position as other participants. Discussion was entirely on the basis of allotment of shares. There was no mention of participation in royalties.

As regards other articles of our draft, I said I had heard that removing last doubts as to the possibility of a Turkish participation in the Irak oil industry, that such a thing was highly speculative, and that it would be better to wait in the same position as he realised. He answered that Turkey could afford to wait in the same position as other participants. Discussion was entirely on the basis of allotment of shares. There was no mention of participation in royalties.

Replied to Bagdad, figures by post to Constantinople.)

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 23.)

(No. 3.)

(Telegraphic)

Angora (old Constantinople), April 21, 1926

MY telegram No. 2

It is most remarkable that Turkish Government should have abandoned claim of territorial concessions in such a manner that it will be difficult to revive it. I said that they should have done so without first making sure that there was no chance of their obtaining a *quid pro quo*. The turn negotiations have now taken are almost absolute surrender by Turks, which is somewhat confirmed by the desperate terms which a State now finds itself and by the extraordinary amount of money which is being raised at this time by everyone from the President of the Republic to the lowest official. There is only one opinion here, namely, that the Government is in a very difficult position.

A Turkish Minister of Finance, whose second proposal, the danger is in the order of ideas that Turkey is in a very difficult position, should be kept in mind. It is true that Minister abandoned claim of territorial concessions in such a manner that it will be difficult to revive it. I said that they should have done so without first making sure that there was no chance of their obtaining a *quid pro quo*. The turn negotiations have now taken are almost absolute surrender by Turks, which is somewhat confirmed by the desperate terms which a State now finds itself and by the extraordinary amount of money which is being raised at this time by everyone from the President of the Republic to the lowest official. There is only one opinion here, namely, that the Government is in a very difficult position.

As to oil proposal I do not know what is or is not possible with company Minister for Foreign Affairs gave me impression that he knew in detail but I do not know what he said. It is possible that in this case it is better to have some vague recognition of oil rights of Turkish Government though I cannot now see how and if so it might be easier for them to do so if participation in royalties were accorded instead of in shares. I do not think share in oil can have same face-saving advantages in Turkey as cession of territory we were prepared to offer but it is quite possible that Turkish Government really believe in oil being them large accession of wealth in short time. Possibly it is not so.

I am much vexed that Turkish Government should now have introduced in discussions a topic which I presume must arise, at the best, several weeks delay because time is of more value here than in London in this negotiation. Atmosphere here is at present extraordinarily favourable and has been created by Turkish Government as I think with a view to the purpose of being able to give me very soon some sort of interim reply about it and at the same time something may possibly be done in this line, and how much time must elapse before any concrete proposal is to be expected.

(Sent to Bagdad)

No. 270

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 23.)

(No. 4)

(Telegraphic)

My telegram No. 2.

Angora, April 22, 1926

I (group omitted) Minister for Foreign Affairs last night and referred again to his proposal about the oil question and said I did not know whether His Majesty's Government would find it practicable at all but if they did, the time I thought it too more sure I was that it would be many weeks before an agreement on the subject could be entered into. I thought it might be a good idea to have especially an atmosphere for negotiation is it this direction seems to be a particularly favourable one.

Minister's name is I think I was asked a most at the time whether there was any other way of reaching a settlement and he said he would like to see a Turkish oil law in force and a peace and a working of Iraq. I said that I knew of none.

I have yet to see that something may be possible in the direction of oil and that something on the point may be come to quickly. The situation for reaching a settlement could not be more favourable than it is now, but there is a feeling that it may be three weeks hence.

(Part 2)

It seems to me there are very great advantages in meeting Turkish wishes over oil —

- (a.) We should reach settlement on terms suggested by Turkish Government themselves and against which they could not afterwards avail
- (b.) It would save Iraq all the trouble involved by continuing present territorial settlement
- (c.) If we could first get Turkish Government to accept satisfactory formula for cession of oil rights and then a Turkish oil law would be no danger of giving them any peace of mind of Iraq Government's mind
- (d.) I am would associate Turkish Government closely with Iraq Government in oil interests in the manner Minister for Foreign Affairs objects to and it would be objected to by Iraq without discouraging the constitution of Turkish Petroleum Company
- (e.) It is worth while to remember that idea of paying Turkey off in oil was first hinted at by Sir P. Cox at Constantinople in 1924, so that it is rather difficult now to reject their suggestion of it

If you agree with above it becomes urgent for me to send me a firm answer at least forming a strategy and strategy

(Sent to Bagdad Figures by post to Constantinople)

No. 271

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir R. Lindsay (Angora)

(No. 6.)

(Telegraphic)

Foreign Office April 24 1926

REFERENCE your telegrams Nos. 2, 3 and 4 of 21st and 22nd April

You may be sure that His Majesty's Government will do their utmost to respond to new spirit of conciliation shown by Turkish Government, which coincides entirely with our own desire for restoration of really friendly relations

As regards their first proposal, we are already preparing a text, which when completed and approved by Cabinet I will telegraph to you

As regards oil, we are similarly engaged in endeavour to frame practicable scheme which would meet Turkish wishes. I incline to securing for Turkey participation in royalties, since this involves consent only of the three Governments immediately concerned, whilst any attempt to redistribute share interest must involve prolonged and most difficult negotiations with private interests, French and American as well as British, which we have only just succeeded in reconciling and might well provoke objection from French and American Governments

You may be certain and assure the Turkish Government that we will not be responsible for a moment's unnecessary delay, but you will be able to explain convincingly that a little time is necessary for communication with Iraq in addition to that required for working out practical schemes and their embodiment in appropriate texts

You are of course right in holding that we cannot directly or indirectly recognise continued Turkish sovereignty or suzerainty, but subject to this condition and to observance of our obligations as a mandatory under the treaty, I am now very hopeful of reaching an early and mutually satisfactory solution, but it will be obvious to you that in matters of such consequence I must have time to consult Cabinet

In my conversation on Friday with Turkish Ambassador he showed liveliest anxiety about Italian intentions and supposed Italian-Greek Pact. I did not seek to play upon these fears, though most Governments would have done so. I do not suppose that Signor Mussolini would be likely to follow the policy of adventure. I have, however, no doubt that if peace were once broken he would seize the opportunity to further Italian ambitions and to secure the outlet for its surplus population which Italy will eventually need. Turkey's best security against unprovoked aggression by another Power lies in securing good relations with her present neighbours in Iraq and Syria, and thus preventing any incident which would invite or encourage intervention by another State. You should bear these considerations in mind. A sudden change in the Turkish attitude may be due to fear of Italian action, and that their attitude may change again if that fear is removed by assurances which Signor Mussolini has volunteered

Not repeated to Constantinople

No. 272

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 28)

(No. 5)

(Telegraphic)

Angora, April 27, 1926

I SAW Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday, who was very satisfied at the conversation between you and Turkish Ambassador

He asked me about Russo-German Treaty, and I stated the view of His Majesty's Government as I have indicated in my telegram sessions. He said that he was very glad at its conclusion. He had been attacked for concluding December agreement with Russians. It opened a gulf between Turkey and the League of Nations

This had not been his intention and the fact that Germany, who is about to enter the League of Nations, is signing a precisely similar treaty proves that this would not be its effect. I asked for information about resumption of payments of bridge tolls to National Bank. He said that he had heard and knew nothing about it. Surprising as it may seem, this may be true. If so it is a good sign, as showing

Ministry of Finance, independently of Ministry for Foreign Affairs, is anxious to conciliate His Majesty's Government.

Minister said that if and when our frontier negotiations reached a favourable point he intended to ask His Majesty's Government to use their good offices to bring about a settlement between Turkey and her bondholders. I explained how much the British and French Governments.

His tone was very friendly and intended to suggest he desired rapprochement with Great Britain all along the line. There was no hint of any reversion to territorial concessions.

No 273

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir R. Lindsay (Angora)

(No. 8)

(Telegraphic)

Foreign Office, April 20, 1926

BAGDAD telegram of 25th April to you - Presence of an Irak plenipotentiary at Angora

It seems to me that turn which negotiations have taken not merely justifies but requires for early success immediate attendance of an Irak plenipotentiary, more particularly in view of (a) Turks' apparent desire to emphasise the independence of Irak and to give the new treaty a Turco-Irak character, and (b) satisfactory settlement of oil participation.

Please telegraph your views

(Not repeated to Constantinople)

No 274

Sir R. Lindsay (No. 8) to High Commissioner, Bagdad. (Repeated to Foreign Office, Received April 20.)

(No. 9)

(Telegraphic)

Angora, April 20, 1926

BAGDAD telegram No. 178 to Colonial Office

I fear there is still great danger that Turkish Government may reverse their attitude and revive demand for some territorial cession, and I think it undesirable that Irak plenipotentiary should be here while negotiations are in progress, from which Turks would pointedly exclude him. I will telegraph as soon as I think this danger may be ignored. Moment may come very soon after Anglo-Irak ideas about oil have been formulated to Turkish Government.

E 2560 37 44]

No. 275

Sir Austen Chamberlain to M. de Fleurbaey.

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, April 29, 1926

FROM my note of to-day's date in regard to the refusal of certain States signatory of the Treaty of Lausanne to recognise liability for their share of the Ottoman Public Debt your Excellency is aware that His Majesty's Government are in agreement with the suggestion put forward in your note of the 13th February that diplomatic representations should eventually be addressed to the Serb-Croat-Slovene State.

2. You suggest that until the outcome of the negotiations actually in course between the bondholders and Turkey and the succession States is known, representations should not be made to the Serb-Croat-Slovene State.

3. As the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government refused to sign both the Treaty of Sevres and the Treaty of Lausanne owing to their unwillingness to assume responsibility for a share of the Ottoman Public Debt, it will no doubt be a matter of difficulty to induce them to reconsider their attitude, and it may be possible to connect representations in regard to this matter with negotiations on other matters on which some concessions are being made to the Serb-Croat-Slovene State. In this connection

it will be remembered that in the course of the recent unofficial exchange of views with your Government on the subject of the Ottoman Public Debt, the Treasury of Saint Germain and Trion and to the Ottoman debt it was agreed that the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government should assume responsibility for their share of the Ottoman Public Debt in return for their release from liability of ceded properties and liberation debts.

I have, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

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N 276

Sir Austen Chamberlain to the Marquess della Torretta.

Foreign Office, April 20, 1926

Your Excellency,

With reference to my note of the 17th January and previous correspondence regarding the assurances to be given to Italy in connection with the Palestine Mandate, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that His Majesty's Government are now in a position to give the Italian Government the assurances and undertakings relating to the mandate for Palestine, contained in the memorandum of the 17th January present note.

2. His Majesty's Government have taken note of the intention of the Italian Government, as expressed in your note of the 17th January, to take the necessary steps for the simultaneous registration with the League of Nations of the assurances which have already been given to the Italian Government in regard to Irak and of the present assurances in regard to Palestine.

3. I shall be glad if you will be so good as to acknowledge the receipt of this memorandum.

I have, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

Enclosure in No. 276

Memorandum respecting the Mandate for Palestine

HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT assure the Italian Government that nothing will be done to disturb the religious rights of the Jewish people in Palestine who are not to be regarded as a national group for the purpose of the League of Nations. The rights of the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine are also to be maintained.

2. Article 11 of the mandate for Palestine is not intended to preclude the participation of Italian enterprises in public works, services and utilities and in the development of the agricultural resources of the country so far as these matters are not dealt with by the League of Nations. It is not intended to preclude the Italian Government from making any arrangements for the development of the country, such arrangements being negotiated with the League of Nations and being subsequently admitted into Palestine.

3. His Majesty's Government inform the Italian Government that they have no objection to the Italian Government's proposal that the Italian Government should have the right to appoint Italian judges in the courts of Palestine, subject to the approval of the League of Nations. It is not intended to restrict the right of such schools to admit pupils of any other community.

4. His Majesty's Government assure the Italian Government that the use of the word "maintain" in article 15 of the mandate was not intended to restrict the opening of new Italian schools or to restrict the right of such schools to admit pupils of any other community.

5. His Majesty's Government assure the Italian Government that the second clause of article 11 of the mandate is not intended to restrict the right of the Italian Government to maintain law and order and good government. They add that there is no intention of permitting arbitrary interference in the internal affairs of any religious community.

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6. His Britannic Majesty's Government assure the Italian Government that in the event of the Italian economic zone in Asia Minor materialising, and in the event of any customs arrangement being concluded with the F. A. C. Government, the Government of the United Kingdom will be prepared to consider the possibility of a similar arrangement being concluded with the Italian Government in respect of sea-borne trade between Palestine on the one hand and the Italian economic zone and Rhodes on the other.

7. His Britannic Majesty's Government assure the Italian Government that consignments imported for the use of Italian schools, hospitals, dispensaries and other institutions such as hospitals, printing presses, bookshops, etc., will be admitted free of duty. It is understood that the Italian Government will be prepared to consider the possibility of a similar arrangement being concluded with the British Government in respect of sea-borne trade between Palestine on the one hand and the Italian economic zone and Rhodes on the other.

8. His Britannic Majesty's Government agree that article 18 of the Palestine mandate shall be regarded as applying to Italy.

(E 2560/37/44)

No 277

Sir Austen Chamberlain to M. de Fleurbaey

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, April 29, 1920.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that I have given careful consideration to your notes of 25th and 26th April, and to the proposals contained therein. I am glad to hear that the President of the Council of the Administration of the Ottoman Empire has agreed to the terms of the proposed arrangement for the disposal of the Ottoman Public Debt, and of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, and of the Turkish Government's obligations in connection with the Ottoman Public Debt.

2. His Majesty's Government consider that it is a matter of the highest importance that the interests of the bondholders should be safeguarded, and that every effort should be made to support the inviolability of the debt as recognised by treaty and by international law. At the same time they are prepared to consider the possibility of a similar arrangement being concluded with the Italian Government in respect of sea-borne trade between Palestine on the one hand and the Italian economic zone and Rhodes on the other.

3. The position of these latter States (i.e., the Arab States, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, and the Turkish Government) is a matter of the highest importance, and it is essential that the interests of the bondholders should be safeguarded, and that every effort should be made to support the inviolability of the debt as recognised by treaty and by international law. At the same time they are prepared to consider the possibility of a similar arrangement being concluded with the Italian Government in respect of sea-borne trade between Palestine on the one hand and the Italian economic zone and Rhodes on the other.

4. The position of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State and of Albania differs from that of the other States mentioned in the Treaty of Lausanne in that they accepted

* Also to Italian Ambassador, under the mandate.

in principle responsibility for a proportionate share of the Ottoman Public Debt at the commission which met in Paris in 1913 to distribute the Ottoman Public Debt after the Balkan wars, but never completed its work owing to the outbreak of the European war in 1914. Serbia also accepted the obligation to assume a share of the Ottoman Public Debt by the Treaty of Berlin of 1878, but never took any steps to carry out this obligation, while Albania accepted the principle at the Lausanne Conference, though she stipulated for unacceptable conditions.

5. The position of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State is also one of special importance to the bondholders, as the share of the Ottoman Public Debt which will fall upon it is more considerable than the amounts attributed to other States non-signatory of the Treaty of Lausanne and as its financial position is comparatively stable.

6. I shall be grateful if your Excellency will communicate the foregoing to the French Government and inform me in due course of their views. A similar communication is being addressed to the Italian Ambassador in reply to similar enquiries.

I have, &c.
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

No 278

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 30)

(No. 10.)

(Telegraphic.)

Angora, April 29, 1920

MY telegram No. 9 addressed to Bagdad, and your telegram No. 8. I have since named Minister for Foreign Affairs, and he said he would leave to me to decide when Irak plenipotentiary should arrive. Yesterday a press article appeared, stating that no territorial concession was to be expected and that solution would be found in other ways.

Danger referred to in my telegram referred to above is therefore diminished. Nevertheless, I am still very anxious to see plenipotentiary arrive yet and to see His presence cannot help and may be a drawback. It will make it more difficult for us to break off negotiations in case of Turkish recalcitrance, and will have the effect of putting up Turkish Government's terms. He will be to some extent hostage in their hands. Moreover, when he arrives the personal operations I have had with Minister for Foreign Affairs, and in which we have got on well, may turn into conferences, in which business may be far more difficult.

I cannot yet feel sure that principle of [treaties of agreement etc] are yet securely laid, and I should have greatly preferred that arrival be postponed, at any rate till I had seen how Turkish Government took the proposals about sovereignty and oil.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 9.)

No 279

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir R. Lindsay (Angora)

(No. 13.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, May 1, 1920

YOUR telegram No. 10 of 29th April. Irak plenipotentiary at Angora. I am content to be guided by your advice.

No 280

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir R. Lindsay (Angora)

(No. 14.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, May 4, 1920.

MY telegram No. 8 of 24th April. Negotiations for Turco-Anglo-Irak Treaty. As regards the oil question, redistribution of the share capital in the Turkish Petroleum Company would raise well-nigh insurmountable difficulties and the

(E 3026)

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Present Turkish proposal has great advantage of making for a settlement of the whole problem. If His Majesty's Government agreed in principle nothing remains to be decided except the sum.

On reading your telegram No. 14 I personally came to the conclusion that we ought forthwith to be able to reach terms on basis at the utmost of 20 per cent participation for period of twenty five years.

Thinking to-day in terms of lump sum I should surmise that Turkish consent might be purchasable for not less than £900,000 and not more than £500,000.

Both above estimates are of course pure guesswork.

I need hardly say that though delay of settlement is entirely due to mind of Turkish Government the importance of rapid progress remains undiminished (Addressed to Foreign Office No. 19, repeated to Bagdad, No. 15.)

No 284

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 8)

(No 21)

(Telegraphic)

YOUR YEDEN Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ankara, May 8, 1926.
I have been enquiring here about financial position of Turkish Treasury. It is undoubtedly very bad. They have abolished tithes and are only just getting new compensation taxes into working order. Latter will produce some immediate revenue, but are really more calculated to ruin trade than to restore the finances of the State. Financially, Turkish Treasury is just now at a very low point, but it should be in an easier position a month or six weeks hence, temporarily at any rate, though probably not permanently. Taken all together, I think they should reach a point where we should endeavour to bring negotiations to a rapid conclusion.

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(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 17.)

No 285

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir R. Lindsay (Constantinople)

(No 50)

(Telegraphic)

YOUR telegrams Nos. 18 and 19 of 7th May. Turkish request for allotment of shares in Turkish Petroleum Company.

Data here are inadequate to form even rough estimate of possible output or value of oil.

On what, then, do you base your figures of £300,000 and £500,000?

They appear too high for annual payments, and too low for capitalised total payment.

Pending receipt of reply to this telegram, detailed answers to points in your telegram No. 18 of 6th May appear unnecessary.

No 286

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 12)

(No 77)

(Telegraphic)

YOUR telegram No. 50

Both estimates in my telegram No. 19 were purely guesses and represent my estimate of Turkish feeling. I think they would regard 20 per cent participation for twenty five years or alternatively a capital payment of from £500,000 to £1,000,000 as satisfactory. These two estimates were put forward by me independently of each other. I have never had any idea how they compare with each other. The truth is that 20 per cent is a good percentage and half a million sterling is a good figure and I have nothing of which to use estimates of what I can expect except conjecture.

I spoke seriously to Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 8th May about Turkish changes of mind, and said that they would give you the impression of frivolous

behaviour. I hoped Turkish Government had now come to end of this and that their last suggestion was to be taken seriously. He assured me most positively that he would not go back on his last proposals.

I have been enquiring here about financial position of Turkish Treasury. It is undoubtedly very bad. They have abolished tithes and are only just getting new compensation taxes into working order. Latter will produce some immediate revenue, but are really more calculated to ruin trade than to restore the finances of the State. Financially, Turkish Treasury is just now at a very low point, but it should be in an easier position a month or six weeks hence, temporarily at any rate, though probably not permanently. Taken all together, I think they should reach a point where we should endeavour to bring negotiations to a rapid conclusion.

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(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 21)

No 287

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir R. Lindsay (Constantinople)

(No 51)

(Telegraphic)

YOUR telegram No. 77 of 11th May. Ankara negotiations.

If on return to Ankara you find your surmise about Turkish attitude correct and see that a deal is feasible it is essential that no favourable opportunity be not missed. His Majesty's Government agree to the payment by Iraq of a sum of £300,000 or if necessary any sum up to maximum of £500,000, and you are authorised to negotiate with Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs with a view to settlement on this basis.

You will understand that this financial proposal is in lieu of and cannot be additional to territorial concession, and can only be admitted if it creates a complete settlement.

If Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs prefers participation in oil royalties up to maximum of 20 per cent for twenty five years or as Iraq would prefer up to a maximum of 15 per cent for the whole period of the concession, your Excellency is at liberty to accept. You are already aware that in this event there would be no royalties for first few years and that even later amount is entirely problematical.

Settlement on a lump sum basis would be in effect compensation for final extinction of Turkey's interest in Iraq oil. Had Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs not objected to mention of lump sum in treaty, no difficulty would have arisen in drafting formula. In present circumstances formula in treaty might be that His Majesty's Government and Iraq Government, recognising Turkey's desire to participate in development of Iraq oil, are prepared to agree to Turkey having an annual charge of £ over a term of years in lieu of active participation or royalties.

This would be followed by clause making provision for commutation of annuity by lump sum payment. The amount of annuity would of course depend on the exact lump sum for which you settle. In any case payment will not be made until treaty enters into force.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 3)

No. 258

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 18.)

(No. 22)

(Telegraphic) R

Angora, May 18, 1926

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs tells me that Assembly will finish off budget debates in two or three days and then adjourn till November, and that ratification of any treaty will therefore be impossible till then. This is a considerable disappointment to me. I had hoped that budget which has only just begun, would have lasted till end of the month.

Bagdad informed

No. 259

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir R. Lindsay (Angora)

(No. 22)

(Telegraphic)

Foreign Office, May 20, 1926

YOUR telegram No. 16 of 6th May. Turkish participation in Irak Government's oil royalties.

The royalties mentioned in my telegram No. 55 of 17th May, paragraph 3, in which the Turkish Government may be offered participation are those which will accrue to the Irak Government from exploitation of the area of the Turkish Petroleum Company's concession as defined in article 3 thereof.

Basra Vilayet and the "transferred territories" are therefore excluded from the scope of the offer.

The Turkish percentage will be on all royalties which may from time to time be received by the Irak Government under article 10 of the concession, either from the Turkish Petroleum Company, or from any of the lessees referred to in article 6, or from the subsidiary companies which company may form under article 33.

If future amendments to royalties are introduced into the present concession by agreement between the company and the Irak Government, the Turkish Government will nevertheless receive the percentage of the royalties now agreed on between the company and the Irak Government or its equivalent.

Furthermore, in the event of the termination of concession before its normal term, i.e. under articles 4, 5, 13, 36 and 38 of the convention, Turkey is to continue to receive the equivalent of the percentage of royalties now agreed on.

You should not volunteer information in immediately preceding paragraph but may so reply should Turkish Government raise the point.

(Repeated to Bagdad No. 5.)

No. 290

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 21.)

(No. 25)

(Telegraphic) R

Angora, May 20, 1926

MY telegram No. 77

Last night I officially offered Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs maximum sum named by you for complete settlement. I will explain reasons for my procedure by despatch, but I feel confident that it was wisest course. He quite understood that offer will not be increased. He expressed great disappointment, but said he must refer matter to the Head of Government. No question of any alternative offer arose. He will give me an answer to-morrow or Saturday.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 21.)

No. 291

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 21.)

(No. 27)

(Telegraphic) R

Angora, May 21, 1926

BAGDAD telegram No. 221

I have strongly urged Minister for Foreign Affairs to arrange for immediate ratification and if necessary keep Assembly for the purpose. I used all the obvious arguments.

He expressed his own desire for immediate ratification, but doubted possibility of keeping Assembly sitting but promised to try.

He suggested that ratification should be completed within a certain time after signature, say six weeks. Could Irak and His Majesty's Government agree to this if necessary?

(Repeated to Bagdad No. 23.)

No. 292

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 21.)

(No. 30)

(Telegraphic) R

Angora, May 21, 1926

YOUR telegram No. 55 paragraph 1

I find that Minister for Foreign Affairs has no objection to formula you suggest. His idea is that just as Turkey cedes territory and sovereignty for nothing, so she cedes interest in Irak oil for a sum of money which may be expressed in the treaty.

Could you telegraph a draft?

(Repeated to Bagdad.)

No. 293

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 22.)

(No. 31 Part 1)

(Telegraphic) R

Angora, May 21, 1926

MY telegram No. 25

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that he had no objection to my proposal. He said that he had discussed his proposal with the Minister of Finance. A sum of £1,000,000 was suggested as a maximum and he said that he would refer the matter to the Assembly and the Council of Ministers. Turkey had no alternative proposal to make, viz. that she should have a settlement with her bondholders, the first three years' interests due on the loan under eventual arrangement, whatever they might amount to, should be paid for her by Great Britain and Irak.

I said, in view of offer already made to bondholders by Turkish Government which had been rejected this meant a payment to Turkey of about £1,400 million gold. He said that, what with delay which would supervene before agreement could be reached and having regard to moratorium which bondholders would have to grant, he calculated present value of this commission at 2½ millions.

(Part 2)

I refused absolutely to admit that there was any comparison whatever between Austrian case and present question, and I reminded him of strong protests which His Majesty's Government had addressed at the time to the Austrian Government on its illegal action. As to his new proposal, His Majesty's Government would not look at it for a moment.

Why should Irak question be mixed up with that of Turkish debt? This was merely a way of confusing issues and would postpone any settlement of frontiers indefinitely. If he wanted more money he should say so openly, but I would repeat what I had said before, viz. that His Majesty's Government would not give more

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than maximum figure I had offered. He must have no illusions on these points. Only possible alternative was royalties, which was still open to Turkish Government, but I must warn him that Turkish public opinion would get no stronger satisfaction out of percentage which could be offered than out of lump sum which had been offered.

I must beg him to consult his colleagues again.

Above is short summary of very long conversation, but it includes all essential points.

(Part 3. Confidential.)

This is another of Minister for Foreign Affairs' brilliant improvisations, but I am not yet convinced he means indefinite postponement or breakdown of negotiations. He let out real object of his manoeuvre when he said to me that in his most pessimistic moments he had never expected His Majesty's Government to offer less than £1 million. This is clearly sum he is aiming at.

I recommend that you send me a telegram in due course bluntly refusing present proposal, and that you leave me to carry on awhile on basis of sum and royalties within limits already laid down.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 27.)

No. 204.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 23.)

(No. 82.)

(Telegraphic.)

Angora, May 23, 1926.

I HAVE seen Prime Minister to-day. Neither of us yielded anything in discussion of capital sum, but I am convinced that he is desirous of early settlement and immediate ratification by Turkey. He said he would keep Assembly sitting if in two or three days' time it became evident that settlement could be reached.

Difference between real Turkish demand and our offer is now half a million (see penultimate paragraph of my telegram No. 31). In order to get immediate settlement could I have authority to go to £775,000?

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 29.)

No. 205.

Sir P. Lorraine to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 23.)

(No. 124.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, May 23, 1926.

MY telegram No. 120, last paragraph.

Reuter's telegram of 22nd May contained undated message from Geneva to the effect that, according to semi-official information, Mosul agreement is imminent and will be supplemented by non-aggressive pact between Turkey, Iraq and Great Britain "in which Persia will participate." I assume this message to be unauthorised by His Majesty's Government, and, in view of bad impression which would be created here if it were felt that Persia's attitude in an important question of foreign policy was being taken for granted, I have withheld message from publication.

Please acquaint me with true position. If any such non-aggressive pact is actually contemplated, my impression is that Persian Government, if properly approached, might be willing to participate.

(Sent to India. Repeated to Bagdad, No. 67.)

[E 3178/1511/65]

No. 206.

Lord Lloyd to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 25.)

(No. 314.)

Sir,

Cairo, May 15, 1926.

THE Cairo newspapers of the 9th November, 1922, quoted the Aga Khan as foreshadowing a pan-Moslem Conference in Egypt, convoked to discuss the implications of the decision, taken by the Grand National Assembly of Angora on the 1st November, 1922, to suppress the temporal authority of the Sultan-Caliph.

2. Sultan Mohammed VI had fled from Constantinople; his successor, Abdul Majid, had followed him into ignominious exile; the Grand National Assembly had, by the law of the 3rd March, 1924, abolished the office of Caliph; and King Hussein had been proclaimed Caliph in Mecca, before steps were taken in Egypt to make the Aga Khan's prophecy effective. In his despatch No. 211 of the 20th March, 1924, Lord Allenby reported the resolution of the Grand Ulama of Al Azhar to summon a congress of representatives of the Moslem world, which should discuss in Cairo, in March 1925, the general question of the Caliphate, and should proceed to the election of a successor to this high office.

3. Opposition to the terms of this resolution, which, it will be recalled, acquiesced in the collapse of Abdul Majid, soon declared itself and inspired the formation of a rival Committee of Ulama known as the "Supreme Caliphate Committee," under the presidency of a certain Sheikh Mohammed Madi Abu'l Azaleem, who possesses not even the qualifications of an Alim. This committee declined to accept the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate, and worked for the recognition of Abdul Majid as Caliph pending the decision of a Caliphate Congress, preferably sitting outside Egypt, which it endeavoured to organise. It enjoyed the patronage of Prince Omar Tousseun, who announced to the press on the 21st April, 1925, that the decisions taken by the Azhar Committee were premature, and the sympathies of leading members of the Watanist party; also of Sheikh Mohammed Bekhit, ex-Grand Mufti of Egypt. An energetic member of this committee was the Emir Khalid Abdul Kader-el-Hassani, now in Damascus, who established friendly contact with the Indian Caliphate Committee and with other Moslem organisations abroad.

4. In early May 1924 the Azhar Caliphate Committee announced the formation of its Administrative Council, under the presidency of the Sheikh of Al Azhar. At the same time Prince Omar Tousseun opened with a donation of £1,000 a fund for the financial support of "the Caliph, Abdul Majid."

5. It soon became apparent that the Committee of Al Azhar alone enjoyed official approval and the benefit of recognition by the authorities. Public meetings of Sheikh Abu'l Azaleem's Committee in Cairo and of the Alexandria Branch Committee were prohibited by order of the Public Security Department.

6. The month of March 1925 found Egypt in the throes of parliamentary elections, while Mecca and Medina lay in the hands of rival potentates, and the Holy Country was a theatre of war. Pleading these considerations and the difficulty of collecting delegates from distant corners of the Moslem world, the Azhar Committee postponed its Cairo Caliphate Congress until March 1926.

7. During the past twelve months the attitude of the rival Caliphate committees and of the general public towards the Caliphate has been affected by various factors which were not present in March 1924.

8. The influence exercised by Hassan Nashat Pasha over leading dignitaries of Al Azhar, and the alleged dependence of the ulama upon palace favour, have led to a belief that King Fuad is working through the Azhar Committee to secure his own election to the Caliphate. His ambitions in this respect were hinted at in the "Temps" so long ago as the 7th January, 1924. The "Liberté" of Cairo, a palace organ, called for the return of the Caliphate to Egypt in a special number of the 10th October, 1925, commemorating His Majesty's accession. In the present state of Egyptian politics such a candidature could not but arouse keen opposition, even though it existed in the malice of imagination only. This animosity has embittered the hostile criticism of the Azhar Committee's purpose, while criticism of Cairo as the meeting-place of the congress—already based on such different grounds as the British quasi-protectorate over Egypt and the existence in Egypt of bars, banks, brothels and other material infringements of Sharia law—took therefrom a sharper edge. (In this context it is interesting that Sheikh Abu'l Azaleem, at a meeting of his committee on the 28th February last, made the announcement that Egypt, "as being a constitutional Power," was not fitted to be the scene of a Caliphate Congress.)

9. On the other hand, the fundamentalist doctrines and military success of Wahabism have won many sympathies for Ibn Saud. Sheikh Mohammed Madi Abu'l Azaleem and his friends appear to have definitely forsaken the cause of Abdul Majid and to incline strongly to the proposal of a Caliphate Council, which, sitting in Mecca to support and advise a titular Caliph, is designed, in fact, to be an application of democratic methods within Islam and the nucleus of a Moslem League of Nations.

10. The comments and assurances of various Indian leaders (see, for example, your despatch No. 1004 of the 19th September last and my despatch No. 735 of the

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25th October last) and the reactions of the Indian Caliphate Committee to the ebb and flow of Ibn Saud's orthodoxy, have also not been without effect in Egypt.

11. Of particular importance to the Cairo Congress has been the circumstance that Ibn Saud has summoned a pan-Moslem Conference to meet on the 28th June next at Mecca. It is by no means improbable that the mandates of many of the delegates to the Cairo Congress are for Mecca primarily, and that events in Cairo are of incidental interest only to them.

12. The congress summoned by the Azhar Committee opened on the 13th May under the presidency of Sheikh Mohammed Abu'l Fadl-el-Guizawy, Grand Sheikh of Al Azhar. It sits behind closed doors. Discussions are in Arabic, interpreters from among the Azhar students being available for foreign delegates.

13. The programme laid down by the congress, which is only to sit for ten days, is the following:—

- (a.) To define the Caliphate and the conditions of the Caliphate in Islam
- (b.) To discuss the necessity of the Caliphate.
- (c.) To define the conditions of aptitude for the Caliphate.
- (d.) To decide whether it is possible now to establish a Caliphate fulfilling all the conditions prescribed by Koranic legislation.
- (e.) If the answer to (d) be in the negative, to decide what measures should be taken.
- (f.) If the congress decides that a Caliph should be appointed, to consider how this decision is to be put into effect.

14. It will be observed as significant that the election of a Caliph, which was to have been the main object of the congress when its convocation was first mooted, does not figure on this programme. Sheikh Mohammed Shakar, a former Wakil of Al Azhar, has called upon the congress secretariat, through the press, to explain this modification of the congress programme.

15. The Ittehadist newspapers report that the congress is attended by delegates from Poland, Java, India, Palestine, Syria, Mesopotamia, Transjordan, Tripoli, Cyrenaica, Assir, Tunis, Morocco and South Africa, and that delegates from Nejd and the Hejaz may shortly be expected. The congress having become, owing to its alleged association with the ambitions of King Fuad, almost a matter of internal Egyptian politics, the local press is unreliable in this particular. Newspapers of the Opposition are interested in diminishing, newspapers of the Ittehadist party in enhancing, its success. I enclose typical articles from the "Liberté" (Ittehadist) and the "Espoir" (Zaghlulist), which indicate how these cross-currents act.*

16. On the whole, the Opposition criticisms probably reflect fairly accurately the state of Egyptian public opinion. The Azhar Caliphate Congress is unlucky in its place and in its time. Vital to the Moslem world as are the doctrinal questions which learned men of all Moslem communities have assembled to debate, the atmosphere of Cairo is unfavourable to their discussion, and the taint of palace—and, it may be assumed, of British—intrigue will be held to cling to their deliberations and to their decisions.

I have, &c.

LLOYD, High Commissioner.

[E 3179/1511/65]

No. 297.

Lord Lloyd to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 26.)

(No. 315.)

Sir,

Cairo, May 15, 1926.

WITH reference to my immediately preceding despatch, on the subject of the Cairo congress convoked by the Caliphate Committee of Al Azhar, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a report on the attitude of the rival Caliphate Committee, presided over by Sheikh Mohammed Madi Abu'l Azaiem, which contains matter of interest.

2. The disqualification of Egypt, "en sa qualité de Puissance constitutionnelle," from being the seat of a Caliphate Conference contrasts oddly with the recommendation of Angora as an alternative.

3. The references to Turkey are significant as showing the desire to keep Turkey within the Islamic orbit for purposes of nationalist rather than religious solidarity.

* Not printed.

4. Sheikh Mohammed Madi Abu'l Azaiem is a vigorous opponent of the Azhar Caliphate Congress now in session. He is likely to attend the World Islamic Conference convened by Ibn Saud at Mecca on the 28th June.

I have, &c.

LLOYD,

High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in No. 297.

Ministry of the Interior to the Oriental Secretary, the Residency.

(Secret.)

The Oriental Secretary,

Cairo, April 11, 1926.

I FORWARD herewith for your information copy of a note which has been handed to me by the French authorities regarding the activities of the Khalifate Committee under the presidency of Sheikh Mohammed Madi Abu'l Azaiem.

A. W. KEOWN-BOYD,

Director-General.

Enclosure 2 in No. 297.

Réunion de la Société du Khalifat musulman, dans la Vallée du Nil, à l'occasion de la Nuit de la mi-Chaaban.

A L'OCCASION de l'anniversaire de la nuit de la mi-Chaaban et parce que la Société du Khalifat a été formée dans cette nuit bénie en 1342, après la suppression du Khalifat et la destitution du Khalife, le comité préparatoire supérieur s'est réuni dimanche 13 Chaaban 1344 (28 février 1926) sous la présidence de son Excellence Mohammed Madi Abou-el-Azem, dans son siège, à El Hanafi en Egypte, et après délibération et discussion de ce qui a été publié par la presse sur le Khalifat et sur les musulmans, dans tous les pays, a pris la décision suivante:

1. Protester énergiquement contre les actes barbares de la France, qui rappellent aux musulmans la destruction de la nation andalouse et aux Orientaux celle des indigènes de l'Amérique et de l'Australie. Les actes de la France en Syrie et dans le Kef sont si intolérables que les montages elle-même ne sauraient les supporter. Les Orientaux sont à bout de patience. Que la France se rappelle que la moitié de ses troupes dans sa guerre contre l'Allemagne étaient des musulmans et que sans ses combattants elle aurait disparu. Elle devrait éviter le danger qui la menace à cause de ses injustices. L'Orient se rend compte que la France récompense l'aide qu'il lui a apportée par la destruction des nations musulmanes.

Il a été décidé qu'une délégation sera chargée de remettre la protestation du Comité exécutif supérieur au représentant de la France en Egypte.

2. Le comité préparatoire supérieur annonce, au monde musulman en général et aux Egyptiens en particulier, la bonne nouvelle que les personnes réfléchies et clairvoyantes des nations et, en particulier, les penseurs d'Egypte et ses publicistes libéraux (Es Suass, Wadi-el-Nil, El Ahras, El Balagh et El Kaoukab) ont fait remarquer que l'Egypte, en sa qualité de Puissance constitutionnelle, ne saurait convenir à la réunion, dans son territoire, d'un congrès du Khalifat. La Société du Khalifat de la Vallée du Nil, avait gardé le silence durant tout ce temps, sur ce motif, par crainte de susciter les discordes. Car le but unique du comité est l'union générale entre tous les peuples musulmans. Il maintient son point de vue exprimé dans la décision de la nuit du mercredi 27 Rajab 1344. La vérité se révélera bientôt à toute personne qui a des yeux pour voir (la mousson s'évapore, tandis que la substance utile aux hommes demeure en terre).

3. Le comité préparatoire supérieur a approuvé le rapport envoyé par son Excellence le président de la Société du Khalifat de la Vallée du Nil, au grand Monjahed, Omar Said Jekrou Aminekou et à son confrère Saïed Fakhreddine, chefs du mouvement islamique à Kawa.

4. Remercier Sa Majesté le Sultan du Nejd, le Roi du Hedjaz, pour les lettres adressées par Sa Majesté à son Excellence le Président de la Société du Khalifat, lettres démontrant que Sa Majesté estime à leur juste valeur les efforts des travailleurs fidèles.

5. Engager les comités à inviter les fidèles à l'accomplissement du pèlerinage de cette année et d'envoyer leur rapport au comité exécutif supérieur sur le nombre des fidèles désireux de faire le pèlerinage pour que le comité puisse leur offrir l'aide nécessaire.

La séance a été levée à 1 heure du matin.

LE COMITÉ EXÉCUTIF SUPÉRIEUR.

No. 298.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir P. Lorrain (Tehran).

(No. 78.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, May 26, 1926.

YOUR telegram No. 124 of 23rd May: Press reports of Turco-Anglo-Irak pact of non-aggression in which Persia is to participate.

There is no foundation for the message from Geneva.

All we have done as regards non-aggression in our negotiations at Angora is to propose to the Turks an article whereby Great Britain, Irak and Turkey accept the existing Turco-Irak frontier (Brussels line) as final and definitive, and undertake that they will make no attempt to alter it. His Majesty's Government have definitely decided against inviting Persia or any other neighbour of Turkey to participate in this undertaking, and also against extending it to any other frontiers of Turkey.

It is impossible to say when, if ever, negotiations will be concluded.

No. 299.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir R. Lindsay (Angora).

(No. 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, May 26, 1926.

YOUR telegram No. 32 of 23rd May: Capitalised amount of possible oil royalties to attain settlement.

His Majesty's Government authorise you to go to maximum of £775,000 in case of need.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 6.)

No. 300.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 27.)

(Nos. 34 and 35.)

(Telegraphic.)

Angora, May 26, 1926.

I HAVE communicated to Minister for Foreign Affairs copy of complete [omitted: draft treaty]. He is producing a re-draft, which I fear will make rather a mess of it, but, so far as I can see, affects the form rather than the substance.

1. Chief point is first paragraph of article 16. He will not admit stipulation that Irak comes under establishment convention unless most-favoured-nation treatment is accorded to Turks in Irak. I have explained why this is impossible, and he realises how small foreigners' privilege is, but says that it is impossible for modern Turkey to accept inferior position in a treaty. He suggested complete omission of convention. As this would not prejudice Irak's rights under article 19, perhaps it might be accepted.

2. As regards commercial convention, he proposes that Turkey and Irak should merely accord each other most-favoured-nation treatment. If this is done without limitation as to time it might be advantageous, as convention only lasts till 1929.

3. Preamble is simplified, and paragraph 1 is made to refer only to article 3 of Lausanne Treaty.

4. In article 3, first and last paragraphs, he cuts out League of Nations. For first he substitutes Swiss President and for second he says that His Majesty's Government alone must notify League of Nations. Probably reference in article 20 is similarly treated.

5. He accepts article 5 unchanged.

6. An article in part 2 is proposed by which the two parties undertake to prohibit propaganda against each other by their own subjects or by subjects of other States. This should prevent use of Turkish territory by Russian agents.

7. There is some difficulty about last sentence of article 9.

8. And also over article 19, which I cannot at present explain.

9. He seems inclined at present even to increase importance of frontier commission in article 15.

Above is result of verbal discussion only and must be taken with reserve.

I am still trying to persuade Turkish Government to accept capital sum already offered.

(Sent to Bagdad, Nos. 32 and 33.)

No. 301.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 28.)

(No. 37.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Angora, May 28, 1926.

TURKISH Government specially request that rectification of frontier be made so as to leave to Turkey the road connecting Alamun and Ashuta.

I believe this is a proposal which might be accepted. If so please instruct me as to form in which this should be arranged. Turkish Government is indifferent as to procedure.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 35.)

No. 302.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir R. Lindsay (Angora).

(No. 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, May 28, 1926.

YOUR telegram No. 34 of 26th May: Draft Turco-Anglo-Irak Treaty. I will await text of Turkish re-draft before deciding whether proposed amendments can be accepted. Please telegraph re-draft of preamble as soon as you receive it, and also text of any other important amendments.

No. 303.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir R. Lindsay (Angora).

(No. 28.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, May 28, 1926.

YOUR telegram No. 30 of 21st May: Anglo-Turkish negotiations.

You should propose following text:—

"His Britannic Majesty's Government and the Government of Irak, recognising the desire of the Turkish Government to participate in the development of such oilfields as may be found to exist in Irak, agree that the Government of Irak shall pay to the Turkish Government, in lieu of active participation in the development of the said oilfields or a share in the royalties derived therefrom, an annual sum of _____ for a period of _____ years from the coming into force of the present treaty."

"At the request of the Turkish Government, the said annual payments will be commuted for a lump sum of _____. Such sum will be paid within a period of _____ months from the date of the Turkish Government's request, which must be made within _____ months after the coming into force of the present treaty."

You may, if you prefer, substitute the following passage for the last sentence given above:—

"Such sum will be paid forthwith on receipt of the Turkish Government's request, which must only be made on the coming into force of the present treaty."

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 7.)

[E 3304/1511/85]

No. 304

Lord Lloyd to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 31.)(No. 338)
Sir,

Cairo, May 22, 1926.

IN my despatch No. 314 of the 15th instant I had the honour to report the opening of the Caliphate Congress summoned by the Azhar Committee. This congress was adjourned *sine die* on the 19th instant, after having held only four plenary sessions.

2. The congress met behind closed doors, and no press men were admitted, but from what has leaked out it is apparent that the meetings were stormy and, from the first, ineffectual.

3. Various delegates, notably those from Palestine and Syria, worked hard to make the congress a platform for the ventilation of political grievances; and it was partly the unwillingness of the Azhar divines, whose attachment to the palace is notorious, to permit this importation of politics into a religious discussion that brought the congress to so abrupt a close.

4. The unfavourable political atmosphere of Egypt, the fact that most of the delegates had no official mandate and represented nobody but themselves, the impending World Islamic Conference in Mecca, and the withering mockery of the Opposition press in Egypt combined to make a fiasco of what in other circumstances might have been an event of world importance.

5. The press announces that the congress can only show for its labours a definition of the qualities pertaining to a Caliph. The "Liberté," however, which is an organ of the palace, publishes what are alleged to be the findings of the different commissions set up to examine the six questions which formed the congress programme. How far these findings represent any work actually done by the commissions, and how far they reflect the decisions which the organisers of the congress would like to have seen taken, I cannot say. As a matter of interest, and in order to complete my despatch under reference in which the objects of the congress were set forth, I enclose copies of the relevant articles in the "Liberté."

I have, &c.

LLOYD,

High Commissioner